REVIEW OF THE CIA-NYPD RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05999891
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2023
• Case Number: F-2016-01298
• Publication Date: December 27, 2011

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27 December 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
VIA:
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Associate Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Agency
FROM: David B. Buckley
Inspector General
SUBJECT: (U) Review of the CIA-NYPD Relationship
1. (U//D:6 Introduction. The Office of Inspector
General (OIG) recently completed a review of certain CIA support
to, and involvement with, the New York City Police Department
(NYPD), including the NYPD Intelligence Division (NYPD-ID). The
attached Executive Summary is provided for your information and
contains the investigative findings and conclusions of the
preliminary review.
2. (U//W0) OIG found no evidence that Agency employees.
violated certain prohibitions contained in Executive Order (E0)
12333 or the National Security Act of 1947 during the course of
cooperating with or supporting NYPD post 9/11. This review also
found no evidence to suggest that during the course of CIA's
relationship with NYPD that. Agency personnel, while engaged in
the performance of CIA duties, either exercised law enforcement
powers or engaged in intelligence activities solely directed at
the domestic activities of US persons. Accordingly, I believe
there is an insufficient basis to merit a full investigation
into the CIA activities regarding the relationship with the NYPD
at this time. my particular observations are provided below for
your review and consideration for possible action,
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Review of the CIA-NYPD Relationship
3. (u/Lgavb) Observations. The Agency's longstanding
relationship with NYPD-ID is Unique. OIG is unaware of any
similar relationships between the Agency and other local law
enforcement entities in the United States. As a consequence,
the risk to the Agency' is considerable and multifaceted. While
negative public perception is to be expected from the revelation
of the Agency's close and direct collaboration with any local
domestic police department, a perception that the Agency has
exceeded its authorities diminishes the trust placed in the
organization. This has the added potential of impeding our
ability to effectively support law enforcement at both the local
and federal level. Additionally, the risk that CIA officers
could become involved in law enforcement matters exists if
implementing procedures and policies designed to accommodate
such collaboration are not clearly understood, managed well,
and followed. A lapse in any one of these- components when
associated ,with domestic intelligence activities has the
potential to make Agency officers vulnerable and could
jeopardize the vital mission the Agency performs.
4. (u//p uoT With these considerations in mind, OIG's
discovery of a number of irregular personnel practices, the
lack of formal documentation in some important instances, and
the varying degrees of management and legal oversight regarding
the CIA-NYPD relationship post 9/11 is noteworthy. The
revelation of these issues, as discussed in more detail in the
Executive Summary, leads me to conclude that the risks
associated with the Agency's relationship with NYPD were not
fully considered and that there was inadequate direction and
Control by the Agency managers responsible for the relationship.
5. For example, as reflected. in the Executive
Summary, OIG's preliminary review revealed an instance where an
effort involving the temporary receipt and review of potentially
unfiltered NYPD-ID reports did not appear to comport fully with
the Attorney General-approved
requirements of EO 123337 Many
employees had different
recollections and descriptions regarding what NYPD records the
Agency employee assigned to NYPD should have received and
reviewed. Furthermore, it is unclear what, if any, criteria
NYPD may have used to pre-screen the NYPD-ID records before
providing them to the Agency employee. In addition, there
appears to have been no documentation between CIA and NYPD
addressing specifically the employee's role concerning access
procedures implementing the
current and former
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SUBJECT':
. Review of the CIA-NYPD Relationship
to NYPD records and the practices to be followed with respect to
the sharing of lead information. Given the unique sensitivities
reflected in regarding the collection and retention of US
persons information, as well as the legal and regulatory
limitations and requirements on CIA's ability to provide
assistance to local law enforcement, better documentation of the
arrangement, practices, and appropriate approvals was warranted.
6. (U//52C65 This memorandum and the attached Executive
Summary are provided to you for your information and any action
you determine appropriate. Neither are finalized Reports of.
Investigation. Please advise me of any further information you
may desire and of any corrective actions taken based on the
OIG's review of the relationship.
Attachment
Executive Summary
3
RET/
avid B. Buckleyt
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Executive Summary
Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into
the CIA-NYPD Relationship
I. (U) Scope and Background
1: (u//055r Scope of the Inquiry. On 29 August 2011,.
the Inspector General (IG) directed that the Investigations
Staff (INV) of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct
a preliminary inquiry into allegations of inappropriate CIA
involvement in the activities of the New York City Police
Department (NYPD)., as reported in an Associated Press story.
On 31 August 2011, the Acting Director CIA requested OIG
expeditiously review CIA support to, and involvement with, NYPD.
Based upon this request, OIG assembled a team of seven
investigators, an Attorney, and a Research Assistant to conduct
a preliminary inquiry of the CIA-NYPD relationship, including
the NYPD Intelligence Division (NYPD-ID), to determine whether
CIA actions violated Executive Order CEO) 12333, the National
Security Act of 1947, and/or
Law and Policy Governing the Conduct of Intelligence
Activities. OIG reviewed many thousands of records from its own
holdings or provided to OIG by Agency components, consisting of
cables, e-mails, official correspondence, Congressional briefing
notes, personnel and security files, and Agency biographies. Over
the course of its inquiry, OIG interviewed 33 individuals, some of
them more than once, at various Locations within the United States
and overseas. (Exhibit)
. 2. (u//p0) Background. According to the witnesses we
interviewed, before the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attack
on the US, specifically' the City of New York, the NYPD-ID was
focused on VIP personal protection and criminal intelligence
collection related principally to gang, narcotics activities, and
organized crime. After 9/11, the ID dramatically expanded its
focus on counterterrorism. In January 2002, NYPD:E&inissioner
Raymond Kelly appointed David Cohen, a retired CIA Senior
Intelligence Service (SIS) officer who had been working in the
private sector in New York City, to be the Deputy Commissioner of
Intelligence. Over several years, Cohen expanded the size of
NYPD-ID and established several division initiatives directed at
thwarting terrorist activities. As of the date of this Report,
Cohen continues to serve as the Deputy Commissioner of
Intelligence.
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(U) Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into the CIA-NYPD
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3. In early 2002, senior CIA management received
requests for increased Intelligence Community (IC) support from
federal, state, and local law enforcement, to include the NYPD.
A Concept of Operations (CONOP) was developed by senior Agency
officers in April 2002 for a temporary duty assignment (TDY) of
a seasoned Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analyst to New York
City for a six to nine month period under Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) authorities.l. The officer's task was to
of law
New Jersey.
improve analytic information-handling capabilities
enforcement entities in the States of New York and
On or about 4 June 2002, DI careerist
eventually become
was selected and began what
a prolonged temporary duty assignment
as a DCI Representative
March 2004. operated under then-DCI authorities, and
held no official position with NYPD.
met with federal,
state, and local law enforcement officials and assessed their
needs for analytic counterterrorism (CT) assistance. His assigned
goal was to help various local authorities develop strategies for
improving their CT analysis..
4. assignment to New York City ended in
about March 2004.- e returned to the Agency
he was contacted
by Commissioner Kelly and offered a full-time position with NYPD.
was interested and he requested Leave Without Pay (LWOP)
from the Agency so he could accept the NYPD offer. In addition,
an Outside Activity Request explaining his intent to work for
NYPD was submitted electronically on his behalf. In August 2004,
approved LWOP and Outside Activity Request,
began employment as an
with NYPD, Although
LWOP was initially approved for just a year, Agency
records show he received annual approval for continued LWOP
through his resignation from CIA in May'-2009. A review of Agency-
records found no information that was advised, either
prior to or during the LWOP period, about prohibitions pertaining
the A enc
and
would
(TDY)
until
(I.V/MItre) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was
created by statute in 2005 as the President's principal intelligence advisor
and manager of the national intelligence community. Before the creation of
the ODNI, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) served as both the head
of the intelligence community and the head of the CIA. DCI Tenet directed
to New York City in 2002 under his DCI authorities as manager of
the intelligence community.
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(U) Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into the CIA-NYPD
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to EO 12333, the National Security Act, or
OIG he did not receive briefings on the law enforcement
restrictions.
told
5. During the period he was in LWOP, did
not consider himself an Agency officer and believed he had "no
limitations" as far as what he could or could not do.
FBI conducted
The
background investigation in 2006 So he
could maintain a security clearance while serving in NYPD.
although not a Sworn law enforcement officer, performed
the functions of a full-time civilian
during the LWOP period.' Consequently, participated
in all activities of his position and rank to include supervision
and direction of ALL NYPD investigations, operations, and
surveillance activities directed at US persons and non-US persons.
According to CIA's Office of General Counsel (OGC), the "law
enforcement proviso" of the National Security Act, which prohibits
the Agency as an institution from exercising police or law
enforcement or internal security functions, generally does not
apply to the activities of an employee on LWOP, as long as the
individual was acting in a personal capacity and not subject to
CIA direction. OIG found no evidence indicating that while
was on LWOP, he was acting on behalf of the Agency.
Following resignation from the Agency he
continued his employment with NYPD,
III. (U/L5Q7orall NYPD Detective Trained at CIA
6. Assistant Commissioner Cohen, in coordination
with Commissioner Kelly, requested that an experienced NYPD-ID
detective receive Agency operational training to enhance the
capability of NYPD-ID CT efforts. Agency management
Headquarters concurred. An NYPD detective was
detailed to the Agency from October 2008 through November 2009
to attend the
The detective, tailect to
successfully complete
and subsequently returned to NYPD-ID
2 (U) OIG was advised by NYPD there were ,a number of NYPD
at the time, and others were also civilians.
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(U) Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into the CIA-NYPD
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in November 2009. The proposal to train the detective received
extensive review from senior Agency management, to include the
Associate Deputy Director, Director of the National Clandestine
Service (NCS), and the Senior Deputy General Counsel, before
being approved in accordance with requirements.
was the only NYPD officer afforded such training.
IV.
7. On 9 August 2007,
a full-time permanent analyst to suppor NYPD-ID.
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was drawn-up
requested
A
o provide direct support to NYPD.
In this newly created
position, provided direct analytic support to NYPD-ID.
The MOA documented that would identify potential foreign
leads of interest to CIA;
he would remain under CIA authorities
and bound by Agency restrictiOns throughout his assignment;
Although the MOA was not
signed until informed OIG that
management advised him to ignore any information that was
unrelated to foreign intelligence (Fl). an experienced
analyst, told OIG he was knowledgeable about the prohibitions as
an Agency officer working alongside domestic law enforcement.
He stated he did not engage in any law enforcement or otherwise
prohibited activities, to include improper collection regarding
US persons, while he served in this position.
8. told OIG that during the first two
months of his assignment, he received daily PDF files containing
NYPD-ID investigative reports, known as DD-5s, that he believed
were unfiltered (e.g., the reports had not been pre-screened to
remove potential non-Fl related information). However, most of
these reports dealt with criminal activity and were not of
potential Fl value, claimed that after two months his
presumed unfiltered access was removed and he was dependent upon
NYPD analysts to provide him with filtered, hard copy DD-5 reports
of Fl value. estimated he received somewhere between 0 to
12 reports eac
However, others
analyst and now
ay, and that approximately once every two months,
interviewed by OIG, including a former NYPD-ID
staff officer with NCS, maintained that no one,
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(U) Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into the CIA-NYPD
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including had unrestricted or unfiltered access to DD-5
reports, except NYPD-1D analysts, and Cohen,
9.
analyst
an experienced
was chosen to 'replace
and she began her assignment
exclusively
Although an
-limitations
However, unlike she engages
in training NYPD analysts in analytic tradecraft.
experienced officer who claimed she was aware of the
when working.With local law enforcement, had
not signed an MOA at the time she was interviewed by OIG in
During the course of the OIG inquiry, DDCIA
Morell was briefed by OIG About the findings thus far, and
subsequently he directed that management ensure the MOA for
was signed. As of the date of this report, OIG has no
information this has been finalized.
V.
10. According to accounts of senior Agency
officers, Cohen contacted Deputy Director Morell for a
"replacement for " Director/NCS John D Bennett
subsequently selected senior manager
for assignment to NYPD, but not as a replacement for
an.
or as
new assignment.
executive development for
and was looking for a
NYPD position was defined by .Cohen as
and not to fill role
as an
.interested in
Cohen
what he learned
accept the NYPD
MOA was drawn u
New York on
the NYPD position but
says he initially was not
decided to meet with Kelly and
MOA
but
would
defined
retain an Agency o
be
from
Kelly and Cohen,
executive development
was interested in
and he eventually decided to
position. an
and signed, and began his assignment to
as a Special Representative to NYPD. The
role: he would be co-located with NYPD-ID
ficer, operating under CIA authorities, and
limited by restrictions applicable to Agency activities.
ould not have any law enforcement authorities, and he
woul not exercise law enforcement, police, or internal security
powers. OGC briefed on the law-enforcement-related
limitations of his assignment.
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(U) Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into the CIA-NYPD
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In addition,
responsibilities
had no Fl collection
11. The MOA enumerated the justification for
assi nment as mutually beneficial to the Agency and
told OIG he understood the legal limitations
regarding his authorities and said he was careful not to overstep
his bounds. He said he spent considerable time and effort trying
to help NYPD improve its volatile relationship with the local FBI
and specifically the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force. .
12. � (U/4.E.CiEfOr During the course of its inquiry, OIG
received information from current and former senior Agency
officials who expressed concern that his position with NYPD had
placed the Agency in the middle of a contentious relationship
between the FBI and NYPD.
VI. (U) Conclusions
13. (U// 0) OIG's preliminary inquiry found no
information or evidence that Agency officers engaged or
participated in any activities that violated EO 12333 or the
National Security Act of 1947. Specifically, OIG found no
evidence indicating that Agency officers conducted intelligence
activities directed at the purely domestic activities of US
persons in violation of EO 12333 or that Agency officers, while'
engaged in the performance of CIA duties, exercised any law
enforcement, police, or internal.security powers in violation of
the National Security Act of 1947.
EO 12333 and Agency regulations authorize the Agency to provide
assistance to local law enforcement entities in certain
circumstances provided that necessary approvals have been
obtained.
14. (U//F ) OIG's inquiry identified a potential
issue that may have occurred from about February to April 2008,
with regard to certain collection activities within the US.
A previous officer assigned to NYPD-ID believed he
temporarily received/had access to particular "unfiltered"
NYPD-ID reports. OIG, on 8 November 2011, reported this potential
violation to the Intelligence Oversight Board, as required
by EO 12333.
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(U) Report of. the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into the CIA-NYPD
Relationship
.15, (U/AFettrl Agency staff officers provided direct
assistance to NYPD, initially to identify ways to improve IC
support to, and information sharing with, law enforcement,
followed by efforts to develop the analytical expertise of NYPD-ID
in dealing with counterterrorism issues of local concern. Since
2002, CIA has assigned a total of four officers to provide direct
assistance to NYPD.
16. (U/LF,C1'1,3451 The Agency provided these officers with
varying degrees of management and legal oversight and guidance
during their respective assignments. The personnel assigned to
assist,NYPD had different functions and different levels of
understanding of their respective role as an Agency staff employee
assigned to work with NYPD. OIG's inquiry found inconsistent
administrative documentation and levels of review regarding LWOP
approvals, MOAs, information-sharing arrangements, and Outside
Activity Requests. With respect to each Agency officer assigned
to NYPD, the inquiry identified, 'albeit at various intervals and
.
degrees, consultation with OGC, as required by when the
Agency provides generalized training to state or local law
enforcement.
17. (U/aGetrir OIG's preliminary inquiry found that issues
raised in 2008 with respect to the appropriateness of providing
specialized operational training to an NYPD detective received
extensive review and assessment by Agency personnel, including OGC
attorneys. Agency senior management, including the Associate
Deputy Director, Director of the NCS, and the Senior Deputy
General Counsel subsequently approved this training, and the NYPD
detective was temporarily detailed to the Agency and attended a
portion of the Agency's before returning
to NYPD.
18. ).cir OIG determined that the assignment of to
NYPD placed the Agency more prominently in the middle
of a contentious relationship between the FBI and the NYPD
regarding NYPD's efforts to combat terrorism. In OIG interviews,
several Current and former senior-level officers expressed
concerns with assignment and role as a senior Agency
manager working directly with the NYPD.
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(Ti) Report of the OIG Preliminary Inquiry into the CIA-NYPD.
Relationship
Exhibit *
Individuals Interviewed for OIG Preliminary Inquiry
on the CIA-NYPD Relationship
* Exhibit is classified SECRET
Executive Summary
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if separated from
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