THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05974315
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 7, 1968

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The President's Daily Brief
7 March 1968
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DAILY BRIEF
7 MARCH 1968
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1. South Vietnam
2. Communist China
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Coup rumors are cropping up again
in Saigon, and Ky is doing nothing to
squelch them. Dissatisfaction among
junior officers over President Thieu's
performance in recent weeks is said to
be at the root of the problem.
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Some of Mao's more ingenious ene-
mies have recently resorted to inten-
tional misprints in leading Chinese
newspapers to ridicule the Great Leader.
One of these toasted Mao as "endlessly
lifeless" instead of the standard "end-
lessly long-lived." This particular
insult has appeared at least twice and
others have occurred, necessitating
hasty recalls of the papers after they
had been distributed. These "misprints"
were most likely coordinated at a fair-
ly high level in the bureaucracy.
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3. Jordan
4. Panama
5. Ecuador
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The political standoff continues
and tensions have not significantly
eased. Vallarino's National Guard still
holds the decisive cards.
This country is also a good candi-
date for pre-election violence. The
election is"not until June, but the
first shots have already been exchanged
between rival camps. The leading con-
tender, former president Velasco--widely
known as "el Loco"--announced 3.3(h)(2)
that on Saturday he will return from
self-imposed exile. If he does, it will
be despite warnings that he may be assas-
sinated. Even if it does not come to
that, the storm signals are definitely
up.
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6. Cyprus
7. Yemen
8. Rhodesia
TO SECRET
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A definite split emerged in the
cabinet during its six-hour meeting
just prior to the decision to execute
the three Africans in defiance of the
Queen's reprieve. A few moderates in
the judiciary have resigned in protest
or are threatening to do so, but clear-
ly the right wing is in the ascendancy.
Whatever slim chance remained of an ac-
commodation with Britain now seems gone.
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-Top-Secret-
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
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7 March 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
7 March 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Hanoi on the San Antonio Formula: Hanoi's week-
ly, Vietnam Courier, of 26 February carries a detailed
rejection of President Johnson's San Antonio formula,
and all interpretations of it, as a basis for start-
ing negotiations. The article breaks no new ground,
but it is one of the most thorough restatements of
the regime's long-held position that the bombings
must be stopped unconditionally before any talks can
take place.
The Courier quotes the key passage from the
President's San Antonio address and seems to accept
as reasonable the call for prompt and productive
discussions after a bombing cessation. North Viet-
namese spokesmen have addressed these points repeat-
edly in the past two months in an effort to put
Hanoi's position in the best possible light. The
Courier boggles, however, at the "no advantage" sen-
tence, saying that this is only a "more cunning" way
of asking for North Vietnamese reciprocity. It con-
cedes that the President used the "mildest" terms pos-
sible ("We would assume..."), but claims that this
still asks a price for ending the "criminal bombing,"
and implies there should be "restrictions on the nor-
mal activities of a sovereign people."
The Courier says the US is aware that the San
Antonio formula puts "the aggressor and his victim
on the same footing," and therefore has made it "sub-
ject to bargaining." At one time, said the article,
the formula was presented as a demand that infiltra-
tion be stopped, while later it was a call for "freez-
ing of military operations in the South" or keeping
them at their present levels. The Courier said that
Secretary Clifford's statement that supplies sent
south could be kept at an "ordinary, level" was por-
trayed by the US as a "major concession."
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The Courier rejected all interpretations of
the formula because Hanoi "will not negotiate under
the threat of bombs." It cited three key policy
statements since last December by North Vietnamese
spokesmen as having "cut the ground from under
Washington's feet." The US, says the article, is
left with only the "worn-out" theme of reciprocity
as an argument against a bombing halt. The stand-
ard Communist formula is repeated: if the US really
wants peace in Vietnam, first of all, the bombing
and all other acts of war against the North must be
stopped unconditionally. The article holds out no
hope of this happening soon, because the US is bent
on going "deeper into the tunnel" by insisting on a
military victory and by refusing any political set-
tlement based on the "Vietnamese people's national
rights."
* * *
Debriefing of French Correspondent: The former
French Press Agency correspondent in Hanoi, Bernard-
Joseph Cabanes, claims that Premier Pham Van Dong
made a special effort before Cabanes left North Viet-
nam to emphasize Hanoi's determination and ability to
continue the fighting. In a farewell interview on
19 February, the premier stressed that present levels
of fighting did not put a strain on Hanoi's resources.
He said North Vietnam would not only continue the
present pace of the war, but could step it up. North
Vietnam has yet to "bring to bear the full capacity
of its military force," the premier said.
Cabanes reported at length on Hanoi's attitude
toward a negotiated settlement. He believes that
Hanoi genuinely, wants negotiations but will not ac-
cept the "no advantage" aspect of the San Antonio
formula. This condition, however, is the only issue
still dividing Hanoi and Washington on the terms for
beginning negotiations, according to Cabanes. Neither
the bellicose language of Communist propaganda--which
Cabanes said is intended for home consumption--nor
the increased tempo of the fighting in the South
should be interpreted as unwillingness to negotiate.
Hanoi is simultaneously pushing military and diplo-
matic actions in hopes that either one or both will
obtain Communist objectives.
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The French journalist had two conversations
about negotiations with Foreign Minister Trinh in
February just before he left. The foreign minis-
ter implied that the North Vietnamese "four points"
were intended to be a "basis for discussions" rather
than final terms for a settlement, and that the lan-
guage employed was purposefully vague.
Hanoi unquestionably would prefer to talk di-
rectly with the US alone, Cabanes reports. The
North Vietnamese leadership would turn to an inter-
national conference only on two conditions--to ob-
tain international endorsement of an agreement
worked out between Hanoi and Washington, or as a
last resort in case "US-Vietnamese talks fail to
produce a settlement." The North Vietnamese con-
sider U Thant an important Asian statesman who
should be treated with respect, but they are unequiv-
ocably opposed to any role for the UN in a negoti-
ated settlement.
In terms of his understanding of Hanoi's nego-
tiating position, Cabanes appears to have developed
good contacts and used them well. He had ready ac-
cess to French diplomatic sources, speaking acquain-
tance with other Western and Communist members of
the diplomatic corps, almost daily contact with the
press office of the North Vietnamese Foreign Minis-
try, and occasional contact with important North
Vietnamese leaders.
* * *
Civil Defense: The North Vietnamese continue
to dig in for a long war
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More on Swiss - North Vietnamese Relations:
Following the visit to Hanoi last month by the Swiss
ambassador to Peking, the Swiss Government has an-
nounced that a representative of the North Vietnam-
ese Foreign Ministry will in turn make a visit to
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Switzerland. The visit to Hanoi resulted in the
establishment of semi-official diplomatic rela-
tions with the North Vietnamese, and the next step
may be to set up some kind of North Vietnamese
representation in the Swiss capital. The Swiss
announcement said cryptically that "a means of
contact that may be used at any moment has been
established."
Major Bridge Repaired: Haiphong's only
permanent rail and highway bridge, destroyed in
September bombings, may now be reopened to traffic.
Mid-January photography of a rail yard near Haiphong
showed enough 90-foot truss-type bridge spans to
fill the dropped portion of the Haiphong rail and
highway bridge. Preparatory repairs to the bridge
had been observed in earlier photography and the
dropped section could be replaced and rails laid
within hours. Photography during January indicated
that rail traffic has been moving out of Haiphong,
probably using a rail pontoon bridge near the de-
stroyed one. In addition to rail crossings, there
are 11 other by-passes--highway pontoon bridges and
ferries--over which supplies leave Haiphong.
* * *
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Nothing of significance to report today.
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