THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF - 1968/01/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05974208
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
The President's Daily Brief
To ecret 5 January 1968
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
3.5(c)
23
DAILY BRIEF
5 JANUARY 1968
I. South Vietnam
2.
3.
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
Budcihists of both factions are trying
jointly to form a political party that
would operate behind prominent Bud-
dhist politicians. While both moder-
ate and radical Buddhists are interested
in this approach, it is questionable
that they could resolve their own dif-
ferences long enough to make an effec-
tive team effort.
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
NR
NR
NR
NR
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
ecret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
16
5 January 1968
3.5(c)
TOP CRET
Approved for Release 2018/07/26 005974208
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
5 January 1968
I, NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Hanoi Moves with Care: North Vietnamese propa-
ganda has not followed up on Foreign Minister Trinh's
remarks that North Vietnam will talk to the US if
the bombing and other acts of war against the North
are stopped. Hanoi doubtless is pleased by the
world-wide attention the statement is receiving and
the implication that this initiative puts the "ball
in the US court." Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese
seem bent on sticking precisely to the Trinh formu-
lation and on not having it distorted or embellished
by others.
Hanoi's insistence on precision is underscored
by an announcement from the North Vietnamese mission
in Paris on 4 January. This announcement sought to
clarify a Western correspondent's account of an in-
terview with a spokesman for the mission the day be-
fore. The correspondent reported that the spokesman
had "confirmed more clearly than ever that Hanoi is
willing to open peace talks at once" if the bombing
is stopped. In response to a question about whether
the negotiations would be fruitful, the spokesman,
according to the correspondent, remarked "we are
ready, the next step is up to President Johnson."
In its clarification yesterday, the North Vietnam-
ese mission in Paris stated that a spokesman had
confirmed the Trinh statement and it quoted the
relevant sentences. It tersely added, however,
that the rest of the correspondent's story "is pure
invention."
Similar precautions about sticking to Trinh's
formulation are evident in Soviet handling of the
subject. Moscow reported the crucial portions of
the Trinh speech without comment in its domestic
and international broadcasts on 2 January. A story
from a Soviet correspondent in Hanoi on 3 January
uses the same language\
TOP CRET
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
3.5(c)
TOP CRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
* * *
Ho Calls for "Thrift, Production, and Combat":
According to a 31 December Hanoi broadcast, Ho paid
tribute and pointed out "shortcomings" in government
work during the past year to a year-end Council of
Ministers' meeting. The work of the people's armed
forces and communication and transportation forces
came in for praise. Ho, however, criticized the
management of labor and financial resources. The
usual exhortations were made by Ho concerning per-
formance in agriculture and animal husbandry. New
efforts were called for during 1968 "to satisfac-
torily fulfill the state plan." To start the New
Year out right, Ho described the situation during
Tet as one of "thrift, production, and combat."
* * *
TO CRET
-2-
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
3.5(c)
3.5(c) TOP ET
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
The basic unit is the regiment which normally
has six to ten batteries equipped with guns of
varying calibers.: made no ref-
erence to the four Chinese antiaircraft divisions
stationed in North Vietnam.
Regimental formations are used to protect
such targets as airfields, major rail or highway
bridges, industrial installations, or medium-
sized cities. Several regiments are used to pro-
tect major targets such as Hanoi or Haiphong.
Each battery is responsible for preparing two
or three gun emplacements and one dummy site--all
thoroughly camouflaged. The report gives an ex-
ample of tactics in citing the experience of one
unit defending the city of Vinh. This regiment had
13 gun batteries and in seven months conducted 205
redeployments between its 80 prepared emplacements.
In combat, the regimental commander attempts
to concentrate his fire on a single grou of air-
craft or even one individual aircraft.
that the North Vietnamese ave a
difficulty in coordinating fire between batteries
and note that this problem is receiving a great
deal of attention both in training and during com-
bat.
US tactics which have created problems for
North Vietnamese gunners include high-speed maneu-
vering at low altitude, varying flight altitudes
in approaching and leaving targets, and electronic
countermeasures.
Information from the same report on North
Vietnam's fighter aircraft defenses will be dealt
with shortly in the Special Daily Report.
* * *
Rail Repairs: Bombed rail lines are usually
repaired in a few hours, reports one of the Spanish
refugees
3.5(c) TOP ET
-3-
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
TOP
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release 2018/07/26 005974208
He said civilians of both sexes and
all ages are mustered from villages near the damage
and work the clock around until they get the job
done. The villagers are not paid and must provide
their own food. Most of the work is hand labor.
he has seen as many as 10,000
people conscripted for work gangs.
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
,ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There As nothing of significance to report.
-4--
TOP 'SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208
\
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 005974208