THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
05974133
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
April 26, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 30, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 22, 1967
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PDF icon THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602393].pdf164.08 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 005974133 The President's Daily Brief cret 22 November 1967 23 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 005974133 3.5(c) 44 . TOP DAILY BRIEF 22 NOVEMBER 1967 1. Cyprus 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 2. Israel-Jordan 3.3(h)(2) TE Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 Timeappears to be running out for peace on the island. Although feverish diplomatic efforts to defuse the critical situation continue in Athens and Ankara, the Turkish war machine--already in a high state of readi- ness--is being geared both to move rapidly into Cyprus and to respond to any counter- move by Greek forces. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots, for their part, remain determined, de- spite Turkish military superiority, to resist any Turkish military move. Jordan's interest in discouraging ter- rorism along its borders has been shaken by the artillery pounding it got from Israel Monday. 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 TOP CRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 3. North Vietnam 4. 5. 6. TOP RET 3.5(c) The main rice crop now being har- vested looks as if it will be below average. A combination of bad weather and disruptions brought on by bombing is responsible. In a normal year, North Vietnam can expect a three-million ton fall harvest. This year's may drop 200,000 tons below that mark. With this shortfall, Hanoi will have to maintain its already high level of food imports and perhaps increase them. 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3 h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3. 3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 3.5(c) TOP RET 7. South Korea TO CRET - Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 The five-month political impasse in the National Assembly has moved a step nearer resolution. 3.5(c) Opposition representatives have ex- pressed willingness to end their boycott of the Assembly. For its part, the gov- ernment party has promised that steps will be taken to satisfy opposition griev- ances, largely growing out of irregulari- ties in last June's elections. But the protagonists ducked some of the major issues at stake--such as the number of seats to be "corrected." These omis- sions, along with factional struggles in both parties, could make for some further delay in seating the opposition. Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 005974133 ret Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 005974133 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY Special Daily Report on North Vietnam Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 cret 3.5(c) 16 22 November 1967 TOP 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only 22 November 1967 I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION * * * 3.3(h)(2) Report on Situation in Hanoi: the situation in the capital early during a lull sive raids in this month. in the bombing, late October. the raids had not broken the morale of the North Vietnamese nor appreciably weakened their capacity to fight. Neither the bombings nor the prospect of additional raids seemed to have affected the determination of Hanoi's leaders. Several North Vietnamese officials told however, that "Hanoi would ex- days." 3.3(h)(2) following the inten- perience more dark changes a number of in Hanoi's preparations for air raids. the city's defenses remained alert de- spite the lull in bombing raids, and that security orders were strictly observed. Loudspeakers continued to announce the approach of enemy planes. TQPSECRET 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 3.5(c) TOP CRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 As soon as the sirens went off people entered shelters, no longer standing outside as in the past. In several sections of the city shelters were being constructed of reinforced concrete for North Vietnamese officials in case of prolonged attack. * * * * * * * * * Hanoi Urges Diplomatic Missions to Provide Own Water, Electricity: the North Vietnamese have urged all foreign missions to dig wells and provide equipment to generate their own electricity. Hanoi claims this is necessary because of the "critical situation" and bombing of the power plants.' For about $800 per well, the North Viet- namese have offered to provide digging crews and pumps. The missions are expected to get their own generators abroad. TO ECRET - -2- 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 3.5(c) NR NR TO ECRET - 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 * * * More on Parliamentarians: Last week we noted the possi 1 ity that some sort of parliamentary delegation might try to Visit Hanoi. We now have more detail. Early, this month Parliament's Committee on External Affairs adopted a resolution asking the Department of External Affairs to look into the possibility of the committee visiting both North and South Vietnam. The resolution, however, has not been followed up with a formal request to the department. Until the request is put in writing, the department intends to take no action itself. The committee, of course, is free to ask both Hanoi and Saigon on its own. II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR Hanoi Broadcast Encourages Negroes to Desert: A 20 November Hanoi broadcast in English to US troops in South Vietnam encourages Negro GI's to "rise up and oppose this Johnson war." Hanoi as- serts that there are no reasons to justify Negroes fighting in Vietnam since "the Johnson administra- tion does nothing good for Negroes." The broadcast goes on to claim that the Viet Cong has consistently treated prisoners well and notes the recent release of three US soldiers as an example. Therefore, ,Hanoi concludes, "the best way for the Negro GI is to let himself be taken prisoner rather than be killed." TOB.�SECRET - -3- 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 005974133 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 005974133