CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/06/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973650
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 27, 1961

- � zzrzrzzzrzrzzzzizzz/ ///
Approved for
27 June 1961
Copy No. C 79
CENTRAL
cLV:(h)(2)
3.5(c) 0
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
-TOP SECRET--
p-ofe for as f. co co /Sfi (c'o (9 (3 (5 07
A
0
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
6A1010-ogf,oiiRilia,se: 2020/08/11 C05973650
1.
27 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Laos. (Page t)
CONTENTS
2. France-Algeria: Ambassador Gavin believes French
are ready to proceed with partitioning of coastal Algeria
if Algerians do not indicate some readiness to compro-
mise soon. (Page t)
3. Iraq-Kuwait: Qasim's Kuwait claim may have been moti-
vated by need to rally internal support; UK would probably
resist any Iraqi attempt at force. (Page it)
X.,K,N0.7A9/.7X'///AW...W/1/####,N0/%77/ff,Ziffr/M,71/ff,/.0:ar
1,9;',P,r,22,5,112,r,&',M2,;',3,9,32211�S92,ZM�
A
ree
4AoRroved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO5973650
OECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 June 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Laos:ELt. Col. Siho, entrusted by General Phoumi with
responsibility for the security of Vientiane, has reportedly
told a Thai liaison officer that he is planning a "preventive 41".
coup" against Brigadier General Kouprasith, commander of
the Fifth Military Region which includes Vientiane.
Siho intends to carry out the coup
"very soon," and has requested Thailand's support. Siho is
described as fearful for his personal safety should Souvanna
Phouma be returned to power as prime minister. Siho's plans
are said to include the capture of King Savang in Luang Pra-
bang]
On early June, Siho was reported preparing counter-coup
plans because of information allegedly received by his intelli-
gence net of pro-Souvanna coup plotting. The broad areas of
agreement indicated in the 22 June Zurich communique by the
three princes may have given Siho an added sense of urgency,
convincing him that creation of a coalition government is only
a matter of time. Siho might believe that only through a take-
over of Vientiane and capture of the King would he have the
necessary power either to prevent a coalition government or,
failing this, to bargain for a position of continued influence
CThe enemy has resumed light artillery shelling on Meo
positions a few miles southwest of Pa Dongj
Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 27 June.
(Backup, Page 1)
France-Algeria: mbassador Gavin believes Paris is "pre-
pared to force an early solution" of the Algerian problem, "come
what may," and that France will soon divide the coastal area of
Algeria if the PAG is not more forthcoming. Minister foj
shazEt
APETY.251�fslfA9,mi�32321,9Y,11�.9,91PDP22
A
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
IRAQ
NEUTRAL
ZON
Ltee:Ys
UAR
(EGYPT)
SUDAN
�
SAUDI
ARABIA
KUWAIT sr as Sabihiya
oatt Bay
KUW Arn
Al Jahra
./
r SAUDI ARABIA
- UNCLASSIFIED
o
MILES 50
31807
Persian
Mena al Ahmadi 00.
.0�
Gulf
NEUTRAts1
.0"
ZONE �����'
,.
" ��
OFFSHORE
NEUTRAL ZONE
INDIA
21 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
IA
tpproved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973650
�SEERELT--
CAlgerian Affairs Louis Joxe outlined to Gavin on 22 June a
plan for concentrating in the Algiers and Oran regions pro-
French elements from the predominantly Moslem parts of
Algeria. Since Joxe had told the British ambassador on 14
June that partition would be "absurd," the emphasis he places
on this approach now may reflect a meeting he had with De
Gaulle before seeing Gavin. Paris may believe that maneu-
vering toward partition could induce a greater readiness to
compromise on the part of the PAG, which has indicated vio-
lent opposition to a "Palestine-type" division of Algeria.
De Gaulle has long considered, as a last resort, however,
making provisions for the withdrawal of all Europeans from
Algeria, and the proposal outlined by Joxe could be the first
step in such a movep
(Backup, Page 2) (Map)
Iraq-Kuwait: Prime Minister Qasim's declaration that
Iraq will "peacefully" annex Kuwait reiterates Iraq's long- toc._
standing claim to Kuwait and probably was motivated by
Qasim's need for an issue to try to rally support for his re-
gime. Technically, Kuwait sovereignty antedates that of 7
Iraq, and their common boundary was recognized by Iraq /Ai.
when it became independent in 1932. According to the Amer- 9-1-
ican consul, the Kuwaitis are "stunned, infuriated, and appear
frightened."
CBritain has been stocking certain arms, including tanks,
in Kuwait since 1958, and maintains a small military mission
in mufti there to train the Ruler's defense forces. It is unlikely
that Iraq would attempt to annex Kuwait by force; any Iraqi mil-
itary move against Kuwait would probably be met by British
military opposition under the terms of the new UK-Kuwait agree=
ment.: (Backup, Page 4) (Map)
27 June 61
DAILY BRIEF
4,',091;225'12,1",1!!!M�,393941/29,111,292E,M9'
A
/Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
L
Laos
The major point of Chinese Communist Foreign Minister
Chen Yi's speech at the Geneva conference yesterday was his
adamant rejection of any international control which would in
any way hamper the activities of the pro-Communist elements.
His speech, as played up by the Chinese Communist news
agency, charged that the US is determined to "destroy through in-
ternational control" the "powerful patriotic force" which has
emerged in Laos, and stated that if the US persisted in its �
stand, the only result could be "rekindling the flames of war."
Elaborating on the role the Chinese envisage for the ICC,
e)yChen declared that that organization should control the with-
drawal of foreign military personnel from Laos, but should
not be responsible for control of foreign forces reintroduced
at some future date. This, he said, would be primarily the
responsibility of the Laotian government, a government the
Chinese anticipate to be friendly to the Communists.
Declaring that a Laotian settlement requires the abolition
of "whatever is incompatible with the neutrality of Laos," Chen
called for abrogation of SEATO, a point which Peinine has re-
iterated several times in recent weeks.
No airlift operations were noted on 25 June, but operations
were scheduled for 26 June. During the period 19 through 25
June, there was a total of 75 sorties, delivering an estimated
total of about 155 tons of cargo.
Two Soviet IL44s which have been involved in airlift op-
erations since their arrival in North Vietnam in Decemb er are
now returning to the USSR. This could be an additional indica-
tion of a diminution of Soviet responsibility for airlift operations
into Laos.
NTTTZ A T . MTV T T .Tar. mr -a! �RTIT .1LE TIN
27 June 61 CEApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
610621
French Majority
ALGERIA
STATUTE MILES
200
UNCLASSIFIED
31116
�
BONE
�
C ON STAN TI N E --Moslem
Majority
TUNISIA
21 June 61 . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
SECRET
French Outline Ylans Ivor rartition of Algeria
rjoxe was markedly more pessimistic about the possibility
of achieving an agreement with the PAG than he was just be-
fore the Evian talks began. He decried the obtuseness of the
PAG negotiators, who persisted in reading into every French
offer the intention of keeping Algeria French. He insisted that
the PAG should by now recognize that France does not wish to
hold on to Algeria, and he spoke with some heat when he pointed
out the economic and propaganda burden it represents. At the
same time, however, he stated his flat opposition to the PAG
claim to the Sahara, which is a major factor in PAG suspicion
of French intentions.]
iJoxe indicated that Paris intends to send some European
settlers and pro-French Moslems to France and move the others
into two coastal areas around Algiers and Oran so that the gov-
ernment can protect them. His assistant, Bruno de Leusse, in
an earlier conversation with American officials had pointed out
that it would be infinitely easier and require many fewer men to
protect a small enclave than it had been to carry on war in all
of Algeria and man both the Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers.
Joxe stated that the other major centers had Moslem majorities
and Moslem prefects and that they would not be used for re-
grouping settlers. He professed to have no idea what would hap-
pen to the areas left under Moslem controg
rIoxe had previously tended to dismiss the concept of Algerian
partition as unworkable, but his views may have changed as a
result of fresh impressions of military and settler restiveness
during his visit to Algeria last week and his subsequent discus-
sions with De Gaullej
rThe current farm crisis in France and mounting international
tension add new urgency to the possibility De Gaulle held out in
his 11 April press conference of diverting elsewhere some of the
massive expenditures France is now making in Algeria. In his
speaking tour of eastern France this week he is expected to
clarify his position on all these issues. Meanwhile, Premier
Debre is expected to make a major speech in the National Assembly
on Wednesday, and he may delineate the French position further
27 June 61
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
_Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650 0
SECRET
ahat
time. There is some speculation the French may try
to arrange one more formal session of the Evian talks be-
fore writing off the negotiating effort as a lossj
G)AG negotiators at Evian have insisted the territorial in-
tegrity of Algeria is the crucial issue. They have sharply
opposed French efforts to exclude the Sahara, to retain mili-
tary bases under French control, and to implement regional
self-determination within Algeria. The PAG views these pro-
posals as designed solely to maintain French political influence
in a future Algeria and to retain the economically rich and
developed areas under French rather than Algerian control.
A move to implement partition proposals would convince PAG
leaders that France does not want to negotiate a settlement,
and it would probably lead the PAG to break off the Evian ne-
gotiations, step up military efforts, and seek satisfaction i7 the
United Nation!)
27 June 61
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
Approved for Release 2020/08/11 005973650
( SECRET
Qasim Lays Claim to Kuwait
Although Qasim would doubtless like to acquire Kuwait's
oil revenues of about $42Q000,000 a year, his primary objective
in claiming Kuwait as Iraqi territory at this time appears to be
to bolster his sagging popularity at home and to rally the Iraqi
people behind him in a crusade to regain a "lost province." His
claim appears to lack legal justification. The present Iraqi-
Kuwaiti border was demarcated in 1913; it was formally accepted
by the Iraqi government in 1923, and this acceptance was reiter-
ated in 1932 when Iraq joined the League of Nations.
[While Baghdad Radio has broadcast numerous pledges by
Iraqi army commanders of support for Qasim's moveiLthe Ameri-
can Embassy in Baghdad reported yesterday that the general re-
action in Iraq was one of incredulity and ridicule. If faced with
the prospect of becoming a laughing stock, Qasim might be tempt-
ed, despite his reference to "peaceful" annexation, to make a
military move against Kuwait; more likely, however, he may try
to retrieve his position by some dramatic move in a new direction,
possibly through nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company
owned by British, American, and French interests3
Saudi Arabia has been the first of the Arab countries to spring
to Kuwait's defense. King Saud sent a message of support to the
Ruler of Kuwait, and the Saudi chief of staff has been sent to Ku-
wait as a demonstration of Saudi-Kuwaiti solidarity. Qasim's
claim poses a potential threat to Saudi interests in the Neutral
Zones which lie on Kuwait's southern and western borders and which
are jointly owned and administered by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Oil deposits of the southern Neutral Zone and its offshore area are
being exploited by American, British, and Japanese companies.
Other Arab countries have been less quick to take sides in the
dispute. However, Cairo Radio yesterday broadcast without com-
ment a Kuwaiti government statement rebuffing the Iraqi claim, and
the UAR-controlled Middle East News Agency reported that the
general Arab reaction to Qasim's move was critical.
In Kuwait itself, the reaction has been strongly against Qasim,
with large popular demonstrations of support for the Ruler. The
SECRET
27 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY _Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
r...,Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973650
L.) SECRET
Kuwait Radio has reacted by broadcasting statements of
recognition by Arab ruler leaders, including Nasir and King
Husayn, on the occasion of the new British-Kuwaiti agreement
last week.
[The British government, embarrassed by this contretemps
between two of its most important sources of oil, limited its im-
mediate public reaction to a mild statement supporting Kuwaiti
independence. It apparently hopes that the dispute will be
settled within the framework of the Arab League...]
27 June 61
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C05973650
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
CliNt. VIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 005973650
/ D