CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/06/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973649
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 26, 1961

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26 June 1961
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CENTRAL
IYTELLIG-ENCE
BULLETIN-
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26 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos: Further talks on coalition to be held in Laos within
15 days. (Page i)
2. Thailand: Foreign minister considering grouping of neu-
trals as alternative to SEATO guarantees. (Page i)
3. USSR: Soviet delegation said to plan no "disruptive and
aggressive" tactics at next UN session. (Page ii)
4. Turkey: Military leaders support new Forces of Solidarity.
(Page ii)
5. East Germany: "Soft" tactics fail to reduce popular dis-
content. (Pageii)
6. USSR-Japan: Moscow will send Mukhitdinov to Japanese
party meeting. (Page iii)
7. North Korea: Kim Il-sung to visit Moscow this month.
(Page iv)
8. Argentina: Frondizi reported seeking Peron's support in
congressional elections next March. (Page iv)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 June 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: Souvanna and Souphannouvong, in Geneva for Mon-
day's conference session, have stated that further talks on
forming a coalition government will be resumed in Laos within 121
15 days. [General Phoumi plans to leave Geneva for Laos on
'27 or 28 June, and apparently intends to consult with King
74 Savang before the talks are resumedj /
the King has recently repeated to French Ambassador
Falaize that he would not consider heading a government him-
self, but would be willing to designate Souvanna prime minister.
two government
camps were taken on 24 June and that a third was to be attacked
that evening. No major military actions have been reported.
Bloc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through 26 June.
) (Backup, Page 1)
[Thailand: [Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman told Am-.
bassador Young on 22 June that he is considering the possibility
that a neutral belt might be established in Southeast Asia to
supersede the security arrangements of SEATO, in which Thai- )1-4
land sees little remaining value. Thanat apparently believes the
concept originally proposed by Prince Sihanouk to include Laos,
Cambodia, and possibly Burma might be expanded to cover
Thailand, South Vietnam, Malaya, and even East Pakistan, pro-
vided agreement could be obtained from Communist China, the
USSR, and the US to guarantee the independence and integrity of
the grouping3 (Backup,
Page 2)
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USSR-UN: A member of the Soviet UN delegation is re-
ported to have briefed the European satellite delegations on
21 June on the tactics to be employed during the 16th General
Assembly session beginning next September. He gave the
general impression that the USSR was not inclined to under-
take "disruptive and aggressive" tactics at the session. On
the "troika" plan for revising the UN secretary general's of-
fice, the Soviet delegate said that the USSR would not press
for a decision because the timing was not right and there was
no hope of gaining a majority in support of the plan. This line
suggests that Moscow may plan to take a more conciliatory
stand at the UN in order to offset anticipated tensions over
Berlin and a possible breakup of the nuclear test negotiations
by the time the General Assembly convenes,03 ,
Turkey: The military group identified as the Forces of
Solidarity (F) which emerged from the recent power struggle
has reportedly gained the support of practically all top military
leaders. General Gursel and the other two generals on the
Committee of National Union (CNU) are also believed to have
joined the new group; they may be trying to exert a moderating
influence on the more radical young officers in the FS. The
group now includes officers from most, if not all, of the mil-
itary units in the Ankara area, which are the key to the military
control of Turkey3
The referendum on the new constitution will be held on 9 July.
all provincial governors, members of the CNU and the
Constituent Assembly will tour the country to propagandize the
new constitution before the referendum. The
CNU press bureau has announced that the date of national elec-
tions will be decided by the Constituent Assembly within one
week after the results of the referendum are known and that they,
will "definitely" be held before 29 October. Erhis schedule mayj
"i�
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5e altered, however, if popular disturbances result from the
political trials now in their final stages. The CNU is also al-
legedly considering permitting the return of 12 of the 14 for-
mer CNU members who were removed last November and
"exiled" abroad. Col. Turkes and Col. Erkanli, who were
suspected of plotting to lead a revolt within the c NTT. annar-
entiv will not be allowed to return at this timell
zasv-uermany: me 'soIt- tactics aaopteavoy me uioricnt -
regime last fall in an effort to reduce popular discontent and
stem the flow of refugees are not succeeding; the East Germans, A,
including industrial workers in several large enterprises, are
openly critical of the regime's failure to improve the food sup-
ply and are complaining about the sudden and drastic changes
in economic organization. Ulbricht is personally
concerned about the situation and recently made a trip to Halle
to discuss the "mood" of industrial workers with local officials
there. (Backup, Page 3)
USSR-Japan: Moscow plans to send a high-level delegation
headed by by presidium member N. A. Mukhitdinov to the Japanese
Communist party (JCP) congress beginning 25 July. The decision
to send Muldiitdinov indicates the USSR's determination to retain
its influence in the Japanese party. Peiping has been increasing
its efforts to impress its militant views on the leadership of the
JCP. A high-level Japanese party delegation was accorded
lavish attention by the Chinese Communist leaders and press
during a recent visit to Peiping.
The JCP leadership will probably welcome strong Soviet
representation as offering support for its policy of gradual rev-
olution in Japan. In 1958 at the last party congress, a sizable
dissident faction favoring a more militant attack on the conserva-
tive government blocked adoption of a platform incorporating this
policy. However, last November party leaders won recognition
of their position in the declaration of the .Moscow confere,nce of
Communist parties.
26 June 61
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North Korea - USSR: Pyongyang has announced that Kim
Il-sung will lead a party and government delegation to Moscow
toward the end of June. One purpose of Kim's visit may be to
conclude an economic agreement. Soviet First Deputy Premier
Kosygin was accompanied on his visit to Pyongyang earlier
this month by top economic negotiators but no announcement
of further Soviet assistance was made at that time. North Viet-
nam's Premier Pham Van Dong, now on a bloc tour, is sched-
uled to be in Moscow from 26 June to 5 July. The presence of
both Asian leaders would afford an opportunity for discussion
of Communist�reunification tactics in divided countries
CArgentina: President Frondizi reportedly has renewed nego-
tiations with ex-President Juan Peron in Madrid for Peronista
electoral support in the March 1962 congressional elections,
these negotiations are known
to a group of high-ranking officers which has been planning a coup
before mid-July. While retired officers have continued to plot
against Frondizi, the majority of the armed forces support con-
stitutional government. All of the military, however, oppose any
resurgence of Peronista political power. J
Backup,, Page 5)
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Laos
The bloc's attempt to develop the theme of foreign involve-
ment in Laos is reflected in an article in Peiping's People's
Daily of 25 June. Charging that the US is "stepping up" mil-
itary deployment so as to launch "new military ventures," the
People's Daily Observer alleges that South Vietnamese, Thai,
and Philippine troops are active in Laos. The article charac-
terizes the Zurich talks as an "initial success" on the "internal
aspect" of a Laotian settlement and expresses the hope that
the princes' negotiations will have a beneficial effect on the
outcome of the Geneva conference.
[Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi have all charged that, twice
during the past week, South Vietnamese artillery fired across
he border into Laos in the vicinity of Route 9 in support of air-
anding operations. Some South Vietnamese artillery firing
upported actions on 17 June, when a small South Vietnamese
orce clashed with an enemy patrol inside Laos. President
iem, who is concerned over the ineffectiveness of the Laotian
roops as well as over reports of southward movements by en-
my forces, recently commented that it might prove necessary
or South Vietnamese troops to move into Laos and protect cer-
tain key positions)
A Soviet AN-10 arrived at Canton on 24 June and, after
five and a half hours, returned to Peiping. It apparently car-
ried no passengers to Canton, but
50 passengers were aboard on the return trip�an addi-
tional indication that Soviet aircrews are probably being with-
drawn from North Vietnam. Only three of the six Soviet IL-14s
which were to fly to Canton from Hanoi in conjunction with the
arrival of the AN-10 actually made the trip. They remained at
Canton for a little over three hours before returnipg to Hanoi.
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Growing Wai Interest in /4�utralism
[Foreign Minister Thanat's remarks are all indicative of
the trend toward neutralism in Thailand during the past year.
Although Thanat's views as expressed may not have been
cleared with Prime Minister Sarit,
Sarit is strongly attracted to the
idea of neutrality and that the prospect of increased American
military and economic aid has not increased his enthusiasm
for present commitments to the West]
[Deterioration of the situation in Laos and the inability of
SEATO to influence events there have given considerable im-
petus to Thailand's concern over its Western alignment. The
Thais believe a neutralist government in Laos would be a
mere facade and that Communist control would be extended
to Thailand's own borders. Several officials are said to reason
that, regardless of the extent of US aid, Thailand in two or
three years will be unable to defend itself against growing
Communist strength in the area. They believe withdrawal
from SEATO and adoption of a neutral policy would at least
put an end to bloc propaganda attacks and enable the country
to receive aid from both the West and the bloc2
4
Public expression of dissatisfaction with Thailand's West-
ern 'lies has, increased during the past year, with complaints
that Thailand's support was taken for granted by the West and
the country's needs were ignored while neutral nations were
granted greater assistance. In recent months the Thais have
endeavored to improve relations with the Soviet Union_:_7
ahanat's thinking on a neutral belt appears to be in the pre-
liminary stage, with no certain idea of the machinery for inter-
national guarantees. There has been no suggestion that the
Thais intend to relax their internal anti-Communist stancej
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East German Regime Concerned Over Popular Disaffection
In recent months, Ulbricht probably at Soviet behest--
has granted minor political concessions, promised more food
and consumer goods, and a slowdown in economic develop-
ment. He also has encouraged grievance petitions to the
Council of State, which he heads, and has removed locally
unpopular administrators as "sectarians" and "dogmatists."
These measures have led to some relaxation of tension, but
they have been undercut by recent bloc pressures against
Berlin.
The regime. is greatly concerned over the publication by
a private West German intelligence service on 20 June of a
petition signed by 56 workers at the important Hennigsdorf
works north of Berlin, demanding an end to butter rationing,
adequate food supplies, and the firing of incompetent state of-
ficials. central committee
functionaries believed the petition originated in "exactly the same
department which started the trouble on 17 June 1953"�the
East German uprising. Politburo member and agitprop chief
Albert Norden was to go to Hennigsdorf in an attempt to pla-
cate the workers.
Ulbricht
would make a secret trip to the dis-
trict on 23 June to discuss with party functionaries the workers'
concern over the Soviet peace treaty and Berlin proposals, pro-
duction plans, and shortages of food and consumer goods. Ap-
parently changing his plans to keep his presence secret, Ulbricht
delivered a major speech in Halle the following day reiterating
his demand for a separate treaty.
Neubrandenburg party headquarters reported on 20 June that
construction workers in its district, long a center of unrest, were
holding "negative discussions?' Some were saying, apropos of
butter rationing, "When there is no butter, then we must strike
for a day." Others, while voicing "complete support" for a
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separate peace treaty, asserted that food shortages would be-
come even worse once a treaty is concluded and Berlin is a
"free city."
a near riot in
Potsdam over inadequate pay and shortages of meat and butter.
Others report increasing discontent, but none believes anti-
regime demonstrations imminent,
Acting Premier Willi Stoph admitted in Neues Deutschland
on 14 June that "some difficulties exist in the supply of meat,
milk, and butter" and disclosed that the newly collectivized
farms have suffered heavy livestock losses. Losses have been
aggravated by bad weather. Concurrently, a delegation of agri-
cultural experts, headed by the party central committee secre-
tary for agriculture and the minister of agriculture, left on
12 June to study Soviet agricultural techniques.
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Argentine Negotiations With Peron for Electoral Support
the
negotiations involve a proposal that Peron publicly renounce
leadership of his party and appoint a figurehead acceptable
to both Peron and Frondizi. The Peronistas would then sup-
port Frondizi's party in the next national elections, in which
half of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies will be filled.
In return for this support, Frondizi reportedly has of-
fered Peron $500,000, but Peron is holding out for $1,000,000
cash. The same agents who reportedly are now negotiating
with Peron allegedly paid him $500,000 before the 1958 elec-
tions, in which the Peronistas supported Frondizi in his land-
slide victory. Peron receives "an
allowance of only $10,000 a month from Jorge Antonio," who
was Peron's financial adviser prior to the 1955 revolution and
has since apparently controlled the bulk of his funds.
Peronista ranks have been badly divided since the party
was outlawed in November 1955, and not all of Peron's instruc-
tions have been obeyed. The Justicialista party, the official
successor of the Peronista party, suffered from lack of lead-
ership and was outlawed after the abortive Peronista attacks in
several provinces on 30 November 1960. A number of neo-
Peronista parties are legal, however.
A leading neo-Peronista, Juan Bramuglia, departed for
Spain in May to brief Peron on political realities in Argentina
and to seek support for "outstanding candidates."
fore departing, Bramuglia had separate interviews with for-
mer Provisional President Aramburu, Cardinal Caggiano, and
the papal nuncio to explain his plans.
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CCHNI-11)LIN 11AL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
MNPMFIVTIA I.
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