CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/09/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973623
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2019
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2019
• Publication Date: September 23, 1952

Approved for Release 2019/05/28 CO5973623,
C TOP ,SECRET
SECUBY INFORMATION
23 September 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Copy No.
57
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
tr.
DOCUMENT NO. 15
NO CHANGE IN C SS. 9t
� 0 DECLASSIFIED
� CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 24111r 9
AUTH: HR 70-2
Office of Current Inte11igencemeg1944.0 1 REviEwER!.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP
ET
SECUBFYINFORMATION
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(Ic)
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Floods temporarily hamper Communists in western Korea (page a).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Iranian Chief .of Staff restricts travel of foreign military attaches
(page 3).
Iranian official believes Mossadeq will deliver ultimatum to
British (page 4).
Egypt may consider British-drafted constitution on Sudan (page 5).
Turkish reaction to British proposal on MEDO (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Paris Embassy comments on French Communist Party crisis
(page 7).
8. Italy believed unwilling to approve rapid build-up of NATO
military bases (page 7).
* * * *
3.3(h)(2)
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FAR EAST
1. Floods temporarily hamper Communists in western Korea:
Comment:
the loss
of vehicles and food rations as a result of floods. These difficulties,
combined with the recent shifting of Communist troops from the
front to the west coast in expectation of a UN amphibious attack,
have temporarily weakened the enemy's capabilities along the battle
line.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Iranian Chief of Staff restricts travel of foreign military attaches:
Iranian Chief of Staff Baharmast has
denied every request of the American
and British Military Attaches during
the past two weeks for permission to
travel outside Tehran. Although the
restrictions ostensibly apply to all
military attaches, the American Army
Attache notes that other foreign attaches
seldom leave the capital.
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3.3(1-)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
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Ambassador Henderson believes that
the restrictions are directed primarily against the British to
prevent them from contacting tribes along the Iranian frontiers.
Comment: Baharmast recently ordered
the General Staff not to discuss army reorganization plans with
the US Army Mission, and the new restrictions apparently represent
another step in Baharmast's anti-foreign policy.
. Iranian official believes Mossadeq will deliver ultimatum to.British:
4.
Prime Minister Mossadeq's official reply 3.3(h)(2)
to the joint Anglo-American approach for
a solution of the oil dispute. will neither
threaten severance of diplomatic relations
with Great Britain nor set a time limit for the British reply, according
to the vice president of the Iranian Senate,
Ambassador Henderson also reports that
Iranians close to Mossadeq are hoping that his reply will persuade
Great Britain and the United States to change their policies toward
Iran.
Comment: Awareness of nationalist sentiment
in Iran may induce Mossadeq to deliver an ultimatum. Judging from
his past actions, however, he may not carry out his threats. There
is no evidence' that he is ready to give up attempts at an agreement.
3.3(h)(2)
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3.3(
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h)(2)
5. Egypt may consider British-drafted constitution on Sudan:
Egypt may accept the British-drafted 3.3(h)(2)
constitution on the Sudan as a basis for
discussion, but may first suggest amend-
ments, such as postponement of the elections
sc e.0 e. or ovem er,according to Lieutenant Colonel Sabri, Egyptian
senior staff officer in the Sudan. Sabri stated that Egypt's chief objec-
tion to the Sudan constitution is that it gives the Governor General too
much power.
Sabrits position suggests that Egypt's military
regime has adopted a more reasonable view on the Sudan issue than
previous Cairo governments. Sabri's advice may carry some weight
in Egyptian official circles, since he is a brother of one of General
Nagib's close advisers.
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Comment: If Sabri's advice is followed, it
would represent a major change in Egyptian policy on the Sudan
question. There is no clear indication, however, that General Nagib
is prepared to face the repercussions within Egypt that such a settle-
ment might cause.
6. Turkish reaction to British proposal on MEDO:
3.5(c)
The Turkish Foreign Ministry states that 3.3(h)(2)
it agrees in principle with the British
proposal on the Middle East Defense
Organization, but believes that the Arab
States should be invited to sit in on any discussions preceding its
organization. Arab participation need not imply a commitment
on membership, and such an invitation should refute possible
claims of the Arabs that the sponsoring powers were proceeding
without consulting them.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry observes
that the present Egyptian Government appears more favorably
inclined toward MEDO than its predecessors. Ankara proposes
more military aid to Turkey and eventual establishment of MEDO
headquarters in southern Turlwy.-
Comment: The Turks do not favor
proceeding with defense planning before the obligations of each
member of MEDO are clarified. Egypt's position is still unclear,
but General Na.gib's desire for Western arms may make 'him consider
a more moderate course than his predecessors. Ankara's desire
to have MEDO headquarters in Turkey is presumably motivated by
considerations of prestige.
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. Paris Embassy comments on French Communist Party crisis:
The American Embassy in Paris states
that the current crisis in the French
Communist Party, the most serious
since 1939, is the compelling reason
fir Thorez's imminent return from the Soviet Union.
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
The Communists are facing a "delicate
situation" which could develop into a natiopal deviationist movement
along Titoist lines. If Andre Marty and Charles Tillon, the purged
leaders who represent the militant elements and paramilitary cadres,
further delay a "full public confession," grave repercussions may be
expected.
The whereabouts of Marty and Tillon are
unknown.
8. Italy believed unwilling to approve rapid build-up of NATO military
bases:
3.3(h)(2)
The American Embassy in Rome states 3.3(h)(2)
that the Italian Government will certainly
be unwilling to approve a rapid acceleration of
the military bases program in Italy. The
government fears that its survival in next spring's national elections
would be jeopardized by such approval. The Embassy believes that
such an acceleration would further the Soviet cold-war objective of
alienating the peoples of Western Europe from the United States.
Comment: The Italians have previously
indicated that a program of such scope would require parliamentary
ratification.
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