CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/09/11
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
05973613
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
June 6, 2019
Document Release Date:
June 27, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 11, 1952
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15653041].pdf | 165.36 KB |
Body:
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SECURIPflNFORMATION
11 September i952
Copy No.5 r
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DOCUMENT NO.
4/
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. C)
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED To: IS
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NEXT REVIEW DATE:
Malt HR 70-2
DATh4.11..0.110.....� REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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SECURT INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Chinese Communist paratroop capability assessed (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Britain sees Southeast Asia defense talks as step toward permanent
organization (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA 3.3(h)(2)
3.
4.
5.
6.
Iran reportedly to authorize note issue increase (page 4).
Ambassador caffery analyzes Egyptian situation (page 5).
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. Soviet officials in Vienna shun trade talks with Austrians (page 6).
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FAR EAST
1, Chinese Communist paratroop capability assessed:
Communist China has 138 twin-engine trans-
ports which could be used for paratroop
operations,
I If based on airfields
in southern Manchuria, these aircraft could_
carry at least 2,200 paratroopers to the
front lines in Korea on a single flight. The Communists have as
many as 244 conventional bombers which could be used to drop supplies.
Comment:
only one airborne division, and paratroop training has
been undertaken at three separate installations. No strength figures
are available from communications intelligence, but estimates based
on other sources have put over-all paratroop strength as high as
25,000 men.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Britain sees Southeast Asia defense talks as step toward permanent
organization:
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Britain regarded the
military conference in .Washington on South-
east Asia defense, now scheduled to begin on
ep em er, as a step toward regular military consultations and a
permanent defense organization. He also implied that a joint declara-
tion of "solidarity" in Southeast Asia should be postponed until steps
had been taken toward the formation of such an organization.
\the British will offer as the
basis for discussion a report assessing alternative plans for "parrying
a Chinese Communist attack anywhere on the frontiers of Southeast
Asia."
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Iran reportedly to authorize note issue increase:
The Iranian Government has authorized the 3.3(h)(2)
Iranian National Bank to issue "up to about
20 percent additional currency," amounting
fn thP P9,uivalent of approximately $50,000,000,
An attempt will be made to main-
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4.
tam n secrecy to avoid an adverse effect on public morale.
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Comment: There is a deep-seated fear in
Iran of "cheap money" and the Governor of the National Bank has op-
posed any note expansion which would "shake confidence in the
country's future." He also intimated that any such move would indicate
that the government had given up hope of an early income from abroad.
The Iranian Government is faced with a
dilemma in its attempts to finance salary payments and other govern-
ment obligations.
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5.
6. Ambassador Caffery analyzes Egyptian situation:
elections promised
military group will
during the next few
Issues, like MEDO
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Ambassador Caffery believes that the Egyptian
Government has probably entered a period of
relative stability and that its domination by
the military is likely to continue until the
for January and possibly longer. He warns that the
be so occupied with the complex internal situation
months that it will probably do nothing about external
or the Anglo-Egyptian question.
Caffery believes that the Egyptian officer clique
wants a "general working alliance" with the United States but not with
Great Britain. Egyptian reserve toward the British arises partly from
nationalism in the army, where there is much sentiment for "evacuation
before negotiations." At present, he states, the Egyptian military has
no interest whatever in even talking with the British; he adds that it
would be unwise for the United States at this time to try to associate
Britain in any talks with the Nagib government.
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The Ambassador warns, nevertheless, that
the Egyptian military may be unable to control the forces it has
released and that it may change its present objectives. Such possi-
bilities may be decreased, he adds, by a constructive United States
approach, particularly in the technical assistance field.
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Soviet officials in Vienna shun trade talks with Austrians:
Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber has in- 3.3(h)(2)
formed the American Embassy that Soviet
Political Adviser Kudryavtsev, whom he met
at the Vienna Trade Fair, professed no
knowledge of an Austrian note offering to open trade negotiations.
Neither he nor any other Soviet official showed any desire to talk
about possible Austro-Soviet trade.
The Austrian Foreign Ministry interprets
this as evidence that its note thWarted Soviet plans for an intensive
propaganda barrage on behalf of East-West trade. If this barrage
should later materialize, the Austrians believe that release of the
Austrian note will "demolish" the Soviet position.
Comment: It is too early to determine the
probable Soviet reaction to the Austrian note. The Austrian Foreign
Ministry, which disregarded American objections in making the offer,
is anxious to demonstrate that its action has had favorable consequences.
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