DIRECTOR'S SPEECH AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05964111
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-01945
• Publication Date: October 24, 1953

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
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and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient)
before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.
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P. S. It has just occurred to me
that you TITywish to have some con-
crete example of the manner in which
CIA operatives have collaborated witl
military operational personnel -- of
relatively recent date, which would
have particular significance to the
Navy. If so, I should think that
you could witipropriety and security
discuss some of the details of the
story of the intelligence effort whiC
lay behind the successful Inchon
landings, for which CIA was official-
ly commended by the Navy. The gist
of this story is to be found in my
memorandum of conversation with Bill
Quinn, dated September 3, which I hav,
had checked out and find to be in all
respects accurate and supported by
our own records -- the file is attach,
for your reference.
F. G. W. 10/26/53
2./1
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
13.
. 9.
10.
II.
,
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950
giegfT
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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1-_E-- - c - - -
DD/P 2eLI
mmu,
24 October 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Directoris Speech at the Naval War College
1. Mr. Long, of your office, told me yesterday that you desired
from me any thoughts I might have to be incorporated in the speech which
you are to make in early November at the Naval War College, entitled
t'Major Problems of U. S. Intelligence". I have not discussed this matter
with anyone on the Fl Staff, since I assume that if you desire any ad-
ditional ideas or information, you will communicate with 1]r. Timm direct.
2. It would be my thought that since most of your remarks would
deal with overall problems of intelligence, you would want to confine
your discussion of clandestine work for this audience to the problems
which we have in operating against the Soviet orbit. This clearly con-
stitutes for us our major problem, and it is one which is not well under-
stood in the Services or, for that matter, in the United States Govern-
ment. I have heard you speak informally on this subject with considerable
fervor backed up by detailed knowledge of the difficulties, so I will
limit myself here to enumerating certain of the points which I feel you
might include.
3. You will remember a document which the Fl Staff prepared for
the Jackson Committee and which you edited before it was forwarded. It
covered in some detail the enormous emphasis which the Soviet Union and
its satellites expend on counter-espionage and repressive measures.
Never in history has there been a government, prior to that of the present
Russian one, which has spent as much manpower, money, time, and effort
on counter-espionage and counter-subversive police work. This fact
needs highlighting. A simple example might be that of a Soviet soldier
returning from duty in Germany to his homeland. For many months after
his transfer home, he is surveilled, all his contacts are reported,
and he is in effect a subject of major suspicion. That it takes great
expense in time and effort to watch each of these returnees apparently
makes no difference to the Pre. When this kind of precaution against
the possibility that the individual might have been influenced by con-
tact with the "Western World is added to the fact that so few people in
the Soviet Union have any information which would be of interest to
the intelligence service of this country, we have presented, in over-
simplified terms, the essence of the problem confronting us in trying
to procure intelligence of a useful variety. For this reason and many
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others, we are attempting to devise new methods of approach to this
problem not only in the operational field but in the technical as
well.
I. You might also want to touch on the paucity of information
which the Soviet Union permits to appear in its publications or in
speeches by its top officials. This might be compared with the fact
that the Soviet Intelligence Service can procure almost all the infor-
mation it needs on the United States by a careful review of our press
and scientific magazines.
5. A word about defectors might be useful. It would be helpful
if these naval officers understood how difficult it is to induce de-
fections but haw worthwhile in terms of intelligence take an informed
Soviet defector can be.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
6. I don't know haw helpful the foregoing will be to you since
I am keenly aware that you have all these facts at your fingertips. I
must say, however, that it would be helpful to the Agency and its mis-
sion if you were to cover these items since missionary work of this
sort bears great fruit in our relations with naval officers the world
over.
Richdrd Helms
Chief of Operations, DD/P
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INSERT
The Inchon Landings: an example of effective cooperation
Problem: to get best intelligence on Seoul-Inchon Area, as to
landing sites, defenses, enemy troop dispositions, etc.
�
\
Radioed commendation from Admiral Joy: Your work in current
operations Inchon-Seoul Area has been exemplary. Reports have
been timely and information has proven to be most accurate.
You have contributed immeasurably to the success of the Inchon
landings. Admiral Joy sending.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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After some difficulties in working out relationships,
a true community was forged which gives us best intelli-
gence machinery we have ever had, and, we hope, the
best intelligence
The IAC, the specific embodiment of community
spirit, is where problems are thrashed out
CIA's role in the community
Coordination, largely by agreement
IAC's key position
Evaluation and dissemination of national intelligence
CIA the coordinator, point of issuance, of a product
truly community-built
Current intelligence
National estimates
Basic intelligence (NIS program)
Performance of services of common concern; e.g.
Cold war operations
Fl operations
Overt collection in usill
Monitoring foreign broadcasts
Basic scientific and economic intelligence
Translation, library, and register services
The Central Problem: Intelligence on the Soviet Bloc
Reason for problem
Vast Soviet CE and counter-subversive outlay
E.G., surveillance of Soviet soldier "contaminated"
by contact with West
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Real "iron curtain"; relative isolation of orbit
Partial elimination of basic material (e.g., scientific
and technological, economic) from overt sources
Contrast with liberality in what is published in U.S.
Solution lies in several directions and some of these produce in
turn problems almost as important as the central one itself
New methods and techniques
Better handling of the intelligence we get
Better cooperation with other agencies of government
Review of certain of these sub-problems would be useful
This is not an exhaustive discussion of problems for they exist
in all areas in varying degrees
The Sub-problems
(1) New methods and techniques, a matter we are constantly working
on. For example:
Physical tools and equipment (the TSS field)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
New approaches to the problem of diminishing sources
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
New sources
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(2) Better handling and exploitation of the information we get
Improvement in techniques and personnel and machinery
for collation and evaluation
A cost problem of growing expense in a day of
limited budget
There is a whole series of problems connected
with Budget which need only to be suggested
Carefully planned and directed long-range research and
intelligence production programs
Especially in economics, science
Better brains on the reasoning and speculative side of
producing better estimates
These solutions suggest a more fundamental problem: Personnel
Highly selective recruitment
Thorough training
Career service
(3) Better cooperation with other agencies of government
Much progress can be reported in the intelligence field
E.g. Duplication largely eliminated through efficient
division of labor within intelligence community
E.g. Cooperation in producing national intelligence
estimates is outstanding
The problem of relating intelligence estimates to war plans
L.
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E.g. Edwards and Bull Reports on Soviet capability
to inflict damage on U.S.
Important in out-guessing Soviets in their reactions
to U.S. policy
The Inchon Landing: an example of effective cooperation
Conclusion
Discussion has covered only some of more obvious problems which
stem from the Soviet Bloc problem
This is not to be taken as indication that we are not
concerned with other matters in other areas
Purpose of solving problem is to give greatest possible assistance
to policy makers
Hereby hangs another problem: to get policy makers to use
intelligence provided
But they're doing pretty well on this
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MAJOR PROBLEMS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE
(Proposed Outline for Naval War College Speech for November 1953)
Introduction
Pleasantries
General comment on the topic
A welcome one
Permits getting down to cases
Avoids stereotyped mission-function-organization
approach
A formidable one, demanding much organization and
rigorous selection
A host of problems confronts DCI in his position
both in CIA and intelligence community at large
Can avoid administrative problems and the like
(which are many and important)
Will seek to discuss those that are central to
our problem
Pivotal problem is the immensity of the task
of getting information on the Soviet Orbit
But an understanding of even this requires
that it be placed in context
Context: A brief picture of the intelligence community
Origin
Arose from need to apply coordinated intelligence to policy
Wartime intelligence coordination experience was
encouraging
Result: the National Security Act of 1947
Which, among other things, created CIA
and provided basic charter for peacetime
intelligence community
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