THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05947652
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 26, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05947652
The President's Daily Brief
Top Secret 26 March 1968
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05947652
DAILY BRIEF
26 MARCH 1968
1. Vietnam
2. Panama
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05947652
3.5(c)
While military activity in South
Vietnam remains at a low level, we con-
tinue to get more signs of heavy enemy
infiltration into South Vietnam. Truck
traffic through the Mu Gia Pass is at
the highest level since just before the
Tet offensive. Some of the trucks carry
troops--a highly unusual procedure which
suggests that the movement has a good
deal of urgency behind it. Some Commu-
nist messages convey the same sense of
urgency.
Max Delvalle, the Arias supporter
whom the Assembly elected to the presi-
dency yesterday to replace Robles, has
called the Assembly into special session
this afternoon to make changes in the
electoral code.
This throws down the gauntlet to
the National Guard, which refuses to
recognize the impeachment of Robles and
says it will not let the session meet.
The confrontation could lead to violence,
although Arias and his supporters seem
to lack the resources in either manpower
or equipment for an effective challenge
to the Guard.
The general strike proclaimed yes-
terday by the Arias forces shows no sign
of getting off the ground.
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TOP
3. Laos
4. Cambodia
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05947652
3.5(c)
The United States Intelligence
Board has approved a Special National
Intelligence Estimate on Communist in-
tentions in Laos over the next two to
three months. The estimate notes that
the Communists could in fairly short
order reduce the area controlled by
Vientiane to a few enclaves.
It points out that the Communists
might press ahead if, for instance,
they saw an advantage in creating a
"second front" in Laos to spread US re-
sources. They might also do so if they
thought it advisable to strengthen the
Communist hand in any negotiations by
taking as much territory as possible in
Laos.
But, on balance, the estimate con-
cludes that the Communists will prob-
ably content themselves with the capture
of a few more positions and then reduce
their pressure during the rainy season
which begins in May.
Cambodian security forces have
evicted Viet Cong elements from Cambod-
ian territory and for the first time
have destroyed a large Communist biv-
ouac complex. The security forces
were acting on information provided by
the US.
Particularly significant is the
fact that the destroyed bivouac is in
an area where local Cambodian officials
have previously cooperated with the Viet
Cong.
Sihanouk reportedly is working up
a full dossier on Viet Cong installa-
tions in Cambodia, in case he decides
to blow the whistle publicly on their
activities.
3.5(c)
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k_./ I .-C-G�TeL
TOP SECRET -
3.5(c)
5. Communist China
6. Saudi Arabia
7. Soviet Union -
Cuba
TO SECRET
3.3(h)(2)
The Saudis are predictably reluc-
tant to go along with the Jordanian
call for an early Arab summit. They
fear--probably rightly--that they would
be pressed at such a meeting to ante up
more funds for Egypt and Jordan. They
are also worried that Nasir would trap
them into supporting another expedition
against Israel. The Saudis torpedoed
one proposed summit late last year, but
in the emotional atmosphere following
last week's military action, they may
have trouble heading this one off.
Growing political irritations be-
tween Moscow and Havana seem to have
had little effect on their economic re-
lations. The trade protocol for this
year, announced last week after six
months of negotiations, calls for a ten
percent boost in trade. Also, accord-
ing to press reports, Moscow is shell-
ing out more credits. The new credits
would presumably be to refinance pre-
vious ones and to cover Cuba's balance
of payments deficits.
3.5(c)
--T-4P-Strgh�T
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05947652