MOZAMBIQUE: CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR CHISSANO

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05857808
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• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2020
• Case Number: F-2018-01308
• Publication Date: October 1, 1988

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Directorate of
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Mozambique: Challenges Ahead
for Chissano
An Intelligence Assessment
A .
PROJECT NUMBER kH_fj_JP_A6.
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ALA 88-10049 '
October 1988
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Seerct
Mozambique: Challenges Ahead
for Chissano
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with
contributions from
Office of Leadership Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division]
Scent
ALA 88-10049
October 1988
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Scope Note
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Mozambique: Challenges Ahead
for Chissano
This Intelligence Assessment is part of a continuing research effort by the
Directorate of Intelligence on the domestic and regional problems facing
key black-ruled states in southern Africa
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ALA 88-1 88-10049
October 1988
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Mozambique: Challenges Ahead
for Chissano
Key Judgments
Judgments
Information available
as of 14 September 1988
was used in this report.
President Joaquim Chissano, who took power in November 1986 after the
death in a plane crash of his predecessor Samora Machel, has skillfully
consolidated his domestic position, successfully implemented economic
reforms, and followed a pragmatic foreign policy that has yielded desper-
ately needed foreign economic and military assistance. Despite these
achievements, however, Chissano faces a major challenge from the 20,000-
man Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgency, which
operates throughout much of the countryside. The insurgency has seriously
damaged Mozambique's economic and social infrastructure and disrupted
African efforts�supported by substantial Western assistance�to rehabili-
tate key transport routes that run through Mozambique in order to reduce
the region's economic dependence on South Africa. Although neither side
in the conflict is likely to gain a decisive advantage over the next two years,
we believe that the civil war will continue to test Chissano's leadership
skills and survivability.
In an effort to contain RENAMO, Chissano is likely to follow a dual-track
counterinsurgency policy that uses both military and political strategies.
He almost certainly will continue to try to improve the capabilities of key
Army units, but we judge that on balance the beleaguered 35,000-man
military will suffer serious deficiencies that will hamper its ability to make
headway against the insurgency. Consequently, Chissano will also try to
utilize political means to stem the fighting. While he is probably willing to
open an indirect dialogue with RENAMO aimed at co-opting the insur-
gents, we believe he is reluctant to agree to direct negotiations for fear of
legitimizing the insurgency and provoking a strong reaction from military
and regime hardliners. Even if Chissano eventually agrees to direct talks,
the two sides remain far apart on terms for a settlement, and vrores
toward a negotiated solution would be slow and tentative.
In addition to the war, Chissano faces serious political and economic
challenges. Although we believe he will further consolidate his political
position over the next two years, his efforts to open up the formerly rigid
Marxist-Leninist political system and improve the ruling party's popularity
will be hampered by the poor security situation and opposition from
entrenched party officials. Moreover, despite Chissano's strong commit-
ment to reform, Mozambique's severe economic problems are unlikely to
be resolved as long as the insurgency remains a serious problem. Although
Maputo has received generous amounts of international relief, 6 million of
Mozambique's 15 million people are at risk of starvation as a result of the
war and various natural disasters, while another 900,000 have fled to
neighboring countries
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On the foreign policy front, Chissano's most difficult problem is to improve
relations with South Africa without alienating Zimbabwe and other
neighboring states, which provide Maputo with critical military support. In
recent months, Chissano has met with South African President Botha and
made other concessions to Pretoria in hopes of ending South African aid to
RENAMO and securing important economic assistance. We believe
relations will continue to gradually improve, but that Pretoria will still give
limited backing to RENAMO as a low-cost method of ensuring that
Chissano is responsive to South African security concerns. At the same
time, we believe that Maputo's key African allies are likely to continue
their military support to Mozambique despite the high costs of their
jnyoiyerncni in order to protect their own security and economic interests.
South African policy toward Mozambique will remain a key variable,
however, in assessing the prospects for the Chissano regime over the next
two years, in our judgment. Although we believe limited South African
support to RENAMO will continue, debate is likely to intensify between
South African officials over whether to emphasize military pressure or
cooperation with Maputo. On the one hand, Pretoria could decide that
Chissano's willingness to acquiesce in its security concerns argues for
South Africa efforts to facilitate greater stability in Mozambique by
ending military aid to RENAMO. While the insurgents would still be an
effective military force without South African aid, the loss of their primary
source of external support would be a significant psychological blow to the
insurgents and could lead them to make concessions to Maputo that would
facilitate a settlement. On the other hand, of course, Pretoria could easily
increase assistance to RENAMO, thereby improving the insurgents'
military capabilities and creating even greater security problems in
Mozambique.
Chissano will continue to expand ties to the West to obtain desperately
needed aid, while protecting his ties to the USSR. Over the past 18 months,
Chissano's search for additional Western military, as well as economic
assistance and his unhappiness with the quantity and quality of Soviet aid
have increased Western influence in the Mozambican economy and armed
forces, in our judgment. While we expect Maputo's relations with the
United States and other Western countries to continue to improve,
Chissano almost certainly will move cautjoiisiviaavoi4 alarming Moscow
and pro-Soviet officials in his government
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We believe believe Mozambican relations with the USSR will remain strong
because of the primacy of Soviet military aid and petroleum deliveries,
limited Western military assistance, and Moscow's longstanding position as
a trusted ally. The USSR probably will work to maintain its influence in
Mozambique without incurring significant new costs or commitments.
Moscow will remain concerned with Maputo's expanding ties to the West,
however, particularly in the security field, and will monitor events closely
to protect its influence within the military, security services, and ruling
party.
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Contents
Page
Scope Note
ill
Key Judgments
V
Introduction
1
Containing the Insurgency
1
Problem-Ridden Counterinsurgency Effort
1
Exploring Political Alternatives
5
Pushing Political and Economic Reforms
6
Opening the Political System
6
Promoting Economic Recovery
8
Managing Regional Relations
12
Improving Cooperation With South Africa
13
Maintaining Regional Military Support
15
Balancing East and West
16
Attracting Greater Western Aid
17
Ensuring Crucial Soviet Bloc Assistance
17
Outlook
19
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Seer�at.
Mozambique. head
for Chissano
Introduction
Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in
1975 after a decade of struggle by the avowedly
Marxist-Leninist Front for the Liberation of Mozam-
bique (FRELIMO). By the 1980s, FRELIMO's ill-
conceived socialist policies had created serious eco-
nomic problems and fueled the rapid growth of an
insurgency backed by South Africa. In recent years,
however, FRELIMO has moderated its policies in an
effort to stem economic deterioration and gain critical
Western aid. Mozambique is now an important test
case for Western efforts to move Marxist-Leninist
states toward more open political and economic sys-
tems, and it is the focal point for African efforts to
reduce the region's economic dependence on South
Africa because of ma or trans ortation routes that
transit its territory.
Although President Chissano has turned in a strong
performance since assuming power in November 1986
after the death of his predecessor in a plane crash, he
faces daunting security and economic problems. The
Mozambican armed forces are locked in a stalemated
civil war with the 12-year-old Mozambican National
Resistance (RENAMO) insurgency, which operates
freely throughout most of the countryside and has
devastated much of the country's social and economic
infrastructure. The guerrilla war has crippled the
economy and complicated Chissano's efforts to gain
broad popular support for his ruling FRELIMO
party. On the foreign policy front, Chissano must
juggle two sets of competing priorities: he needs to
improve relations with South Africa without alienat-
ing black-ruled neighboring states, and he needs to
garner increased Western assistance while ensuring
that the USSI continues its vital military and eco-
nomic support.
This paper examines the principal challenges facing
Chissano and assesses the prospects for his rule over
the next two years. It focuses first on the regime's
efforts to contain the tenacious insurgency through
1
improved counterinsurgency efforts. It then analyzes
the impact of the security situation on the President's
attempts to consolidate power, reform the ruling
party, and cope with the troubled economy. Finally, it
assesses Chissano's foreign policy, which is designed
to improve relations with South Africa, while main-
taining support from his black African neighbors _and.
gaining more aid from both the East and West.
Containing the Insurgency
Chissano's most pressing challenge is to control the
formidable 20,000-man RENAMO insurgency. Al-
though organizational changes and foreign assistance
have marginally improved the capabilities of some
Mozambican military units, the beleaguered 35,000-
man armed forces have made little headway against
the insurgency because of a wide variety of deficien-
cies, including major logistic and command and con-
trol problems, poor leadership and morale, and inade-
quate training and equipment.' As a result of the
military's poor performance, Chissano has been
forced to explore political alternatives aimed at co-
opting the insurgents without making major conces-
sions such as agreeing to direct talks.
Problem-Ridden Counterinsurgency Effort
Chissano's hopes for containing the insurgency
depend largely on his ability to obtain continued
external support and to improve the performance of
' The 35,000-man military includes approximately 32,500 troops
from regular Army and Border Guard units, a 1,000-man Navy,
and a 1,500-man Air Force. Provincial military battalions totaling
some 10,000 to 15,000 men are not part of the regular Army, while
some units are undergoing training by Cuban advisers in an
apparent effort to upgrade them to regular forces. Mozambique
also has a 20,000- to 25,000-man militia but it exists only on paper
because of manpower and supply shortaaes.
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his armed forces. Chissano has gained help from his
neighbors in the form of 5,000 to 6,000 troops from
Zimbabwe, 3,200 troops from Tanzania, and 400
troops from Malawi, as well as border patrols and
training provided by Zambia. Nevertheless, such sup-
port is only buying him time to improve his own
armed forces
�Segret.
Over the past year, Chissano has made sweeping
shifts in the military high command and Ministry of
Defense aimed at placing younger officers with field
experience in key command positions.
Maputo also is
2
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The Military Situation
Over the past year, RENAMO has shifted its major
areas of operations inside Mozambique to take ad-
vantage of thinly stretched counterinsurgency forces.
Following an unsuccessful attempt in late 1986 to
split the country along the Zambezi River and take
control of large portions of the central region, the
insurgents returned to a strategy that stressed hit-
and-run guerrilla onerations throughout all 10 prov-
inces
The Southern Region
In our judgment, RENAMO moved many of its
forces away from the central region into the three
southern provinces�Maputo, Gaza, and Inham-
bane�in an effort to isolate the capital and create a
climate of insecurity in FRELIMO's traditional
stronghold. RENAMO attacks�directed primarily
against key transport routes such as the South Africa
to Maputo railway, the Limpopo rail line, and
Maputo's primary road artery to the north�in-
creased significantly over the past year. These opera-
tions have seriously disrupted the distribution of
goods and food to outlying provinces as well as
economically important trade with South Africa. The
insurgents also have ambushed military convoys and
patrols, attacked several small military bases, and
overrun numerous towns, resulting in a high number
of civilian casualties and widespread destruction o
economic, health, and educational facilities.
The military has conducted several successful coun-
terinsurgency sweeps in the region over the past year,
but government troops have been unable or unwilling
to maintain the constant pressure needed to dislodge
RENAMO. The worsening security situation led
Zimbabwean troops earlier this year to mount opera-
tions in the south for the first time, including a major
combined air aAcl ground assault on RENAMO bases
along the Limpopo railway, b mporarily
disrupted RENAMO activity
The Northern Provinces
The insurgents, gradually moving some units from
the central region into Nampula, Niassa, and Cabo
Delgado Provinces, have established a new corn u
cations and logistic network in the north,
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as of April 1988, RENAMO (b)(3)
dominated some portions of Nampula Province and,
according to US Embassy reporting, insurgent activi-
ty in Niassa and Cabo Delgado�two provinces that
traditionally have been unaffected by RENAMO
activity�has risen dramatically in 1988. The Nacala
railway�a key transport route that runs from Mala-
wi to the Indian Ocean�has become an increasingly
attractive insurgent target. Attacks last April forced
a halt to repair work aimed at reopening the 650-
kilometer line, which is only protected by 400 Mala-
wian and several hundred Mozambican troops. Gov-
ernment forces are spread thinly throughout the
region and are primarily protecting only the larger
cities, giving RENAMO virtually free rein in the
countryside.
The Central Region
The intensity of insurgent attacks in the central
region�RENAMO's traditional stronghold, com-
prising Manica, Sofa/a, Tete, and Zambezia Prov-
inces�have diminished over the past year, in our
judgment, because effective counterinsurgency opera-
tions have kept the insurgents off-balance and forced
them frequently to move their camps. In addition,
insurgent units in the region appear to have been
continually short of supplies and manpower probably
because resources were diverted to expanding opera-
tions elsewhere. RENAMO has failed to seriously
disrupt treic along the Beira Transportation Corri-
dor�a key insurgent target. The guerrillas, however,
continue to strike economic targets, towns, and small
military camps throughout the region
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Eastern Zimbabwe
RENAMO has initiated a campaign of attacks into
eastern Zimbabwe over the past year, presumably to
raise the cost of Zimbabwe's military role in Mozam-
bique. Insurgent attacks across the porous 800-kilo-
meter border have averaged several per week, with a
high of several per day in September 1987 and June
1988. Although Zimbabwe sent more troops to the
border area, they have been unnhla fn nroliont con_ (b)(3)
tinuing cross-border attack,
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3
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Figure 1
Current Military Situation in Mozambique
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(b)(3)
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trying, with help from both Western and Communist
countries, to reorient the military from a conventional
to a counterinsurgency force by stressing the forma-
tion of light, highly mobile units.
the Army now has
four combat-ready battalions of paratroopers and
commandos, and military leaders plan to form three
more units by 1989. The Air Force recently acquired
six Soviet transport helicopters to improve troop mo-
bility, and it is negotiating with Moscow and several
Western countries to acquire additional helicopters
and small transport planes
Chissano's efforts have resulted in some marginal
improvements in military performance.
the mili-
tary is now capable of mounting counterinsurgency
sweeps that are somewhat more effective than in the
past. Mozambican troops, sometimes with Zimbab-
wean support, have conducted several large-scale op-
erations against RENAMO over the past year, in-
cluding major offensives in eastern Tete and western
Zambezia Provinces. These operations were relatively
well-run logistically and employed air support and
recently trained paratroopers and commandos.
Nevertheless, we believe the Mozambican military
remains generally ineffective.
government troops in outlying areas often
assume a defensive posture, with most units remaining
in garrison to avoid combat. Even when government
troops take to the field, they generally inflict few
casualties, and RENAMO often returns after they
leave the area.
poor living conditions for soldiers have
resulted in numerous defections, widespread deser-
tions, and abusive behavior toward civilians. In fact,
the rural population often views government troops
with the same fear as the insurgents. In addition, the
military has devoted little attention or resources to the
critical field of civic action, which often plays a key
role in building popular support for government forces
at the expense of an insurgency. Finally, Zimbabwean
and other allied forces constantly complain about
inadequate military support from Maputo, and they
often refuse to conduct joint operations because of the
poor performance of government troops under fire and
suspicion that some collaborate with RENAMO.
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5
RENAMO leader
Afonso Dhlakama
President and military commander of RENAMO
since 1981 ... considerable military talent but lacks
charisma.., espouses vague democratic ideals and
strong anti-Communist bias ... member of Ndau
tribe from central Mozambique ... about 34 years
old.
Exploring Political Alternatives
Chissano's concern with the military's weak perfor-
mance has led him to try to co-opt the insurgents
without making major political concessions. The cen-
terpiece of this effort is an amnesty program, enacted
in December 1987, that provides a full pardon and
reintegration into society for any insurgent who aban-
dons armed struggle. Maputo claims that about 1,600
insurgents have accepted amnesty, including several
midlevel military leaders and a former rebel spokes-
man. We believe, however, that the number is proba-
bly closer to 600, most of whom have come from the
central nrovinces where there are serious food short-
ages
Chissano also has been quietly exploring avenues for
possible negotiations with the insurgents, but the two
sides remain far apart on conditions for direct talks.
While publicly rejecting negotiations, he has put out
feelers to RENAMO leader Dhlakama through the
Catholic Church, Kenya, and South Africa
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Chissano is constrained by opposition
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from Zimbabwe and members of his own party,
however, and is reluctant to make concessions; for
example, he is not prepared to recognize RENAMO
or discuss real power sharing�the guerrillas' key
demands. Moreover, disarray in RENAMO's political
organization and insurgent brutality against civilians
have undermined insurgent efforts to present a cohe-
sive political agenda and gain international support�
key factors that would put pressure on Maputo to
negotiate.
Pushing Political and Economic Reforms
Despite the continuing insurgent threat, Chissano has
skillfully consolidated power during his first 2 years in
office, in our judgment. He appears determined to use
his growing influence to implement political and other
reforms to reduce FRELIMO's elitist nature�out of
a population of 15 million the party has only 50,000
members, most of whom are government employees,
and to reverse ill-
conceived socialist policies that leave it virtually
without support outside major urban areas. In pursu-
ing this agenda, however, he will face major social
and economic constraints and the political opposition
of influential elements within FRELIMO who proba-
bly fear they will lose power as Mozambique drifts
away from Marxism-Leninism.
Opening the Political System
President Chissano has moved cautiously but steadily
to consolidate his power base and garner support for
political reforms. He has increased the influence of his
closest supporters and like-minded pragmatists at the
expense of hardliners,
He has placed loyalists in charge of all key govern-
ment ministries and appointed capable technocrats to
lesser posts (see appendix). To strengthen his hand
further, he has tightened his control over the military;
last year, he replaced the Armed Forces Commander,
the heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Militia,
and all 10 provincial commanders.
At the same time, Chissano has worked to improve his
popularity and that of the ruling party. He has visited
all 10 provinces at least once since assuming power
Cli �
and has solicited the views of provincial leaders and
peasants. Other senior officials, particularly Prime
Minister Machungo, also have traveled widely to
explain new economic reform programs and to listen
to local problems. Senior party officials have acknowl-
edged past errors that cost them popular support,
particularly in rural areas. They are implementing
new policies that have wide popular appeal, such as a
new "land to the tiller" program that gives small
farmers title to their land and restricts government
interference.
After years of antipathy toward religion, Chissano
also has significantly improved relations with influen-
tial Christian and Muslim institutions in an effort to
increase FRELIMO popularity and involve them in
providing basic services to the population.' The gov-
ernment has returned expropriated Catholic Church
property and is likely to renew diplomatic relations
with the Vatican following the Pope's visit in Septem-
ber.
With his newfound political strength, Chissano has
begun to push for limited reforms that would make
the political system more responsive to the average
Mozambican without undercutting the party's preem-
inent position. The Politburo�Mozambique's key
decisionmaking body�already has approved several
moves, including opening some local elections to
multiple FRELIMO candidates and allowing nonpar-
ty members to hold seats in the People's Assembly,
the largely ceremonial national legislature. In recent
months, Chissano also has encouraged debate on
possible constitutional revisions, including a proposal
for greater popular participation in indirect presiden-
tial elections, which will be discussed later this year at
the Fifth Party Congress.'
'About 30 percent of the Mozambican population is Christian,
mostly Catholic; 12 percent are Sunni Muslims; most of the
remainder practice indigenous African religions.
' The party congress, which by statute is to be convened every four
years, is the formal source of authority within FRELIMO. In
practice, only two congresses have been held since independence�
the Third Party Congress in 1977 and the Fourth Party Congress in
1983. The party congress is a significant political event and is often
used to approve major policy changes that have already been
adopted in advance by the party leadership
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Human Rights and the War
The civil war in Mozambique over the past year has
been marked by increasing abuses of civilians,
Although most inci-
dents appear to have been committed by RENAMO,
government troops also appear to share some respon-
sibility.
Increasing RENAMO Brutality
Over the past year, reporting has documented in-
creasing insurgent brutality against civilians through-
out RENAMO areas of activity
allow the International Red Cross (ICRC) to deliver
food aid throughout the country, provided that both
RENAMO and government-dominated areas would
receive supplies, there
is some evidence to suggest that Dhlakama has
ordered insurgent units to improve their treatment of
civilians.
Government Troops Share Responsibility (b)(1)
We believe government forces also freauently /(3)(3)
civilians.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
RENAMO has razed
entire villages, used forced labor, and been responsi-
ble for numerous cases of murder, rape, and mutila-
tion. A US Department of State commissioned report
based on interviews with 200 Mczambican refugees in
several countries also documented numerous inci-
dents of guerrilla atrocities, concluding that
RENAMO's behavior reflected a premeditated strat-
egy designed to control the population through fear
and coercion. Some of the atrocities, particularly
those committed along the Zimbabwean border, ap-
pear to have been part of a planned strategy intended
to generate popular discontent with Zimbabwe's poli-
cy of lending military support to Maputo
We believe most abuses,
however, probably are the actions of individual insur-
gent units operating in ethnically hostile territory or
using force to coerce increasingly scarce food and
labor from the local population
RENAMO's tarnished reputation and growing inter-
national isolation has spurred insurgent leaders to
try to improve the organization's image and treat-
ment of civilians. For a start, RENAMO rebutted
charges in the State Department report. In July of
this year, RENAMO leader Dhlakama invited re-
porters from several major US newspapers to Mo-
zambique to visit RENAMO camps in an attempt to
show them that the group was not a band of ill-
disciplined bandits. Earlier, RENAMO agreed to
in one incident
earlier this year, a village was wiped out because of
suspected support to RENAMO (b)(1)
(b)(3)
also indicates that shortages of food and other basic
supplies have led government troops regularly to
coerce these materials from the local population; in
addition, the Army's shortage of manpower has
prompted forced conscription in areas under its con-
trol. The Air Force's sparse but indiscriminate use of
airpower has resulted in a high number of civilian
casualties (b)(3)'
Maputo is making a greater effort to ensure that the
armed forces respect human rights. A newly enacted
military-justice law, presidential orders that military
commanders prosecute human rights violators, and
the
behavior of government forces has improved. Maputo
also has promulgated an amnesty and pardon law
that has led to fair treatment of defecting insurgents
and the release of one-third of all Mozambicans
imprisoned for crimes against state security
In addition, govern-
ment officials have met for the first time with repre-
sentatives of Amnesty International and have agreed
to a visit by the organization later this year,
(b)(1)
7
b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Nevertheless, we believe longstanding ideological and
racial divisions within the party and the poor security
situation pose obstacles to Chissano's political agenda.
Although hardliners are in a minority in the Politbu-
ro, FRELIMO's traditional emphasis on unity and
collective decisionmaking, in our view, ensures
that they will retain enough influence to hamper
Chissano's ability to push through more controversial
policies. We believe even those entrenched party
officials who are not ideologically motivated probably
oppose significant political reforms that might threat-
en the supremacy of the party or their own privileged
positions. Racial tensions between blacks and lighter-
skinned Mozambicans�the latter constitute 2 per-
cent of the population, yet hold 15 percent of
all government positions�are also a factor in
FRELIMO's noliticd dynamics
Although hissano has eased
tensions by reducing the number of mixed-race and
white Mozambicans in senior positions, racial consid-
erations greatly influence his personnel decisions and
affect his ability to implement policy, in our judg-
ment. Finally, the military's inability to provide secu-
rity to much of the rural population, the lack of an
official presence in broad areas of the countryside,
and abuses inflicted on the local population by govern-
ment troops all work against Chissano's moves to
improve FRET IMO's standing among the rural popu-
lace.
Promoting Economic Recovery
Chissano has accelerated a major reform program�
begun by former President Machel in 1984�aimed at
stemming the country's economic deterioration. Ma-
jor features of the program have included periodic
currency devaluations�totaling more than 90 percent
since early 1987�increased privatization, reduced
government expenditures, and improved price incen-
tives for farmers. International donors and creditors
have responded favorably to the program over the past
year; the IMF granted a $50 million loan, the World
Bank offered $720 million in new grants and loans,
and official foreign creditors agreed to reschedule
repayments on $1.6 billion in Mozambican debt. As a
� Lighter-skinned Mozambicans include mulattoes (people of mixed
race), Goans (Mozambicans of Indian descent), and the fewer than
10,000 whites who remained in Mozambique after independence.
(b)(3)
Secret-
result of the reforms and increased international aid,
the economy�after four years of sharp contraction�
grew by 4 to 5nerce tini9B and 1987, according to
IMF statistics
The reforms, however, depart sharply from FRELI-
MO's traditional socialist economic policies, and,
despite their initial economic successes
a consensus within the party
for further changes is not assured. We believe that
many influential ideologues are opposed to far-reach-
ing economic reforms, and lower-level officials�most
of whom have supported the reform program from its
inception�are also beginning to express doubts. Dur-
ing the annual National Party Conference in July, the
government-controlled media reported that party
members registered concern about the survival of the
socialist sector in the face of increased privatization,
rising prices of basic goods, and plans to reduce the
public-sector workforce.
even senior officials
who favor reform are increasingly concerned about
the impact on the urban population, and they have
plans to reintroduce state controls
and subsidies on basic goods such as corn, cooking oil,
and fuel
Chissano's efforts to reinvigorate the economy, how-
ever, are primarily hindered by the effects of the
insurgency. The dislocations resulting from the war
have overwhelmed many of the potential benefits of
the reform program while economic growth has oc-
curred almost exclusively in the trade and light
industry sectors located in relatively secure areas near
Maputo and other urban centers. Some results from
the war include:
� Agriculture, which provides the livelihood for 80 to
90 percent of Mozambique's population, has shown
little improvement, and food production fills only
about one-tenth of requirements. The fighting has
driven farmers from productive land, caused critical
shortages of fuel, spare parts, seed, and fertilizer,
and severely hampered distribution of farm com-
modities and food aid.
8
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Figure 2
Ethnic Composition in Mozambique
ZAIRE
Ltbumbash
Kabwe*
Lusaka*
ue
Lake
Kariba
Lake
Bangweulu
Ban gweulu
Swamps
ZAMBIA
Harare *
ZI BAEWE
Bulawayo
Chipata
mazewe
Lake
Nyasa
MALAWI
Lilongwe
MAN ICA
4fANyi
.
.,
Inha ban
TON A
Shona
Coastal
Islamic
cluster
. 40441Marav1111
Chopi
Macua-
Lomue
.,p0y 'INHAMBANE
puto
._
CHOP! Subgroup ZcaLloumswbteirl,
---- Province boundary
-
0 150 Kilometers
150 Miles
SOUTH AFRICA
Pretoria
Johannesburg
(Plants
IL D
Mbabane
Tsonga
9
714298 (A05253) 10-8 ( b)(3)
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"Serret
Table 1
Mozambique: Balance of Payments, 1982-87 a
Million US $
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Current account
-497.4
415.7
-308.3
-301.1
-409.3
-418.7
Trade balance
-606.7
504.8
-444.0
-347.2
-463.6
-556.1
Exports
229.2
131.6
95.7
76.6
79.1
85.9
Imports
835.9
636.4
539.7
423.8
542.7
642.0
Service balance
29.8
-0.5
-32.1
-92.9
-158.7
-210.6
Transport
55.1
33.6
10.0
0.7
11.0
-3.7
Labor
38.2
52.0
31.3
15.8
27.0
32.2
Interest
-60.3
-88.2
-80.9
-117.3
-204.7
-250.0
Other
-3.2
2.1
7.5
7.9
8.0
10.9
Transfers
79.5
89.6
167.8
139.0
213.0
348.0
Capital account
395.3
42.8
-73.0
-39.7
-51.5
-60.4
Loans
724.6
339.3
264.8
238.8
284.0
308.6
Amortization
-329.3
-296.5
-337.8
-278.5
-335.5
-369.0
Overall balance
-102.1
-372.9
-340.8
-460.8
-479.1
Financing
102.1
372.9
381.3
326.7
486.9
479.1
Arrears
285.2
205.6
152.7
482.2
-711.2
Debt relief
213.1
193.0
0
1,181.6
Other
102.1
87.7
-37.4
-19.0
4.7
8.7
Source: International Monetary Fund. Data for 1987 are estimated.
Mozambique is experiencing severe trade and current account
deficits, despite economic reform. Exports have declined by almost
two-thirds since 1982 to about $85 million in 1987, according to
IMF estimates. Insurgent attacks on roads and railroads have
eliminated foreign exchange earnings from transport services,
which historically offset large trade deficits. Most capital inflows
consist of foreign loans, rather than investment in production
facilities.
� UN officials estimate that more than 40 percent of
Mozambique's population is suffering adverse ef-
fects from the fighting and, to a lesser degree, from
natural disasters; some 3.3 million people are at
serious risk because of a lack of food, shelter, and
medical care.
� The insurgency also continues to limit foreign ex-
change earnings from export crops such as cotton
and cashews and from mineral exports. The war has
-Seefe.t.
disrupted vital freight transportation routes through
Mozambique, which were at one time the principal
source of foreign exchange.'
The reopening of the Beira railroad in 1986 to shipments by
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi, for example, has not increased
Mozambique's net foreign exchange earnings because increased
revenues from the Beira route have been offset by sharply reduced
freight transport on the South Africa-to-Maputo rail line because
of insurgent attacks
10
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�Sacr.ei
Figure 3
Mozambique: Selected Economic
Indicators, 1981-87
Note scale change
Economic Growth
Percent
20
15
10
5
ri r--1 T
0
-5
-10
-15
-20 a
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87
Debt Service
Percent of exports
300
�
250
200
150
�
�
100
�
_
50
�
0 a
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87
a Estimated.
Exchange Rate
US cents/metical
3 _
_
�
2
1
0 a
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87
Port Traffic
Million tons
8
�
�
6
4
�
�
2
0
1981 82 83 84 85 86 d
Source: International Monetary Fund and US Embassy.
Foreign Debt
Billion US $
4
_
�
3
_
_
2 �
_
�
I
0 a
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87
Export Crops
Thousand tons
800
�
700
600
500
400
�
_
300
200
_
�
�
100
0
1981 82 83 84 85 86 d
11
Secret-
319053 10.88
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Mozambique's Growing Social Crisis
UN officials estimate that over 40 percent�or about
6 million�of Mozambique's population of 15 million
and as many as 900,000 Mozambican refugees now in
neighboring countries are victims of the civil war and,
to a lesser degree, of natural disasters such as
drought and floods. Of those most seriously affected,
over 2 million peasants and over 1 million other
displaced persons lack such basics as adequate food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care. In addition,
almost 2.7 million are without access to dependable
food supplies because of interruptions in food produc-
tion and marketing networks.
The UN cites the effects of the war on population
centers and public facilities as prime causes of a
deepening social crisis that threatens future genera-
tions. Medical surveys indicate a deterioration in
health care since the early 1980s; at least one-third of
all rural health units have been destroyed in the last
six years, and attacks on the health infrastructure
are increasing, according to humanitarian workers.
Infant mortality in areas affected by war and
drought rose from 159
deaths per 1,000 children under a year old in 1980 to
an estimated 325 per 1,000 by 1987. Vaccination
campaigns in all but the capital of Maputo are
reaching fewer children; more than 50 percent were
vaccinated in the early 1980s and only one-third by
1986. By the mid-1980s, health workers noted severe
nutritional deficiencies in up to 13 percent of young
children and observed stunted physical growth in
more than 35 percent of older children. More than
one-third of all primary schools functioning in 1981
were destroyed by 1987, leaving at least 500,000
children with no access to education
The Search for Food Relief
The UN and the Mozambican Government presented
an urgent appeal for humanitarian assistance to the
international donor community in April 1988. They
requested some 944,000 metric tons of food�valued
at $183 million for the 1988189 crop year (May 1988
to April 1989) and $194 million over the next two
years for rehabilitation of agriculture, health, educa-
tion, and transport
Despite determined national leadership, strong donor
support, and assistance from UN agencies and over
40 private humanitarian organizations, the lack of
security and weakened transportation and communi-
cation sectors throughout the country have left mil-
lions of Mozambicans facing starvation. Moreover,
because of these constraints, Maputo asked for only
that amount of food it could reasonably expect to
deliver-100,000 tons less than the UN-estimated
shortfall. Between 80 and 85 percent of the food
assistance moves to rural areas only by armed con-
voys or costly airlifts, while other parts of the
countryside are completely outside government dis-
tribution routes. Meanwhile, worsening food short-
ages are occurring in some areas previously thought
to be self-sufficient, and pest damage threatens this
year's cassava crop which is second only to corn as a
major food source.
Managing Regional Relations
Chissano's foreign policy has as its top priority
improving relations with South Africa while main-
taining critical military support from Mozambique's
black African neighbors. In recent months, Chissano
has made new approaches to Pretoria in hopes of
ending South African aid to RENAMO and securing
Sccrct
important economic assistance. Although Zimbabwe,
Zambia, and Tanzania disapprove of Maputo's initia-
tive toward South Africa, we believe the importance
of Mozambique's transportation network and political
stability toward them�along with Chissano's diplo-
matic skills�have convinced them to continue their
military commitment against RENAMO
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eii et
Exodus of Refugees
Civil strife, and to a lesser degree localized drought
and the search for greater economic opportunity, has
impelled between 915,000 and 1,025,000 Mozambi-
can refugees to move into Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanza-
nia, Zambia, Swaziland, and South Africa, according
to UN and host country figures. Some 600,000 had
sought refuge in Malawi by the end of June 1988, up
from 70,000 in January 1987. Zimbabwean camps
shelter nearly 70,000, and another 5,000 to 7,000 are
dispersed throughout the countryside. Swaziland,
Zambia, and Tanzania each have at least 20,000
registered refugees, with tens of thousands unregis-
tered living precariously outside the camps. While
South Africa treats refugees as illegal immigrants�
it repatriated 27,000 Mozambicans in 1987 and
nearly 6,000 in the first two months of 1988�the
South African homelands of Gazankulu, Kangwane,
(b)(3) and KwaZulu have accepted more than 40,000 Mo-
zambican refugees
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
In our judgment, intermittent heavy fighting near
border areas will force more Mozambicans to become
refugees. Prospects are poor for substantial voluntary
repatriation because of the inability of international
agencies or the Mozambican Government to arrange
secure and adequate facilities for returnees. Addi-
tional refugees are likely to complicate Maputo's
relations with its neighbors, as host countries become
increasingly concerned with security in their border
areas and with the use of scarce resources needed for
their own populations
Improving Cooperation With South Africa
Over the past year, Chissano has accelerated efforts
to cultivate Pretoria, and
relations are as good now as when the
bilateral Nkomati accord was signed more than four
years ago.' He has publicly stated that Mozambican
'The Nkomati accord is a nonaggression pact signed in March
1984, calling on South Africa to end its assistance to RENAMO,
and for Mozambique to terminate military assistance to the
African National Congress.
13
policy is designed to develop "interdependence" with
South Africa, reflecting, in our judgment, his belief
that he needs South African cooperation to improve
his country's security and economic situation. Chis-
sano met with South African President Botha in
September 1988�the first meeting between the �resi-
dents of the two countries since 1984�
Chissano has taken a number of initiatives to assuage
South African security concerns and set the stage for
better relations. He has kept a tight rein on the
military activities of the black South African insur-
gent group, the African National Congress (ANC), in
Mozambique. He has also refused to endorse calls by
the FLS for economic sanctions against Pretoria,
reduced harsh anti�South African rhetoric, and
helped arrange a South African�Angolan meeting in
May 1988 At
the same time, Chissano has greatly expanded bilater-
al channels of communications with South Africa. He
revitalized two important joint commissions, encour-
aged the formation of joint working groups on specific
economic issues, and increased bilateral contacts
through the South African trade office in Maputo.'
Botha has responded positively to Chissano's over-
tures because, in our view, he hopes to show other
Frontline States and the rest of black Africa that
cooperation with Pretoria can bring important bene-
fits. After meeting with Chissano's representative,
Botha told his cabinet that South Africa must
' The FLS are a loosely organized caucus of black-ruled states
(Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe) that have considered themselves since the mid-1970s to
be on the "frontline" in the struggle for independent black majority
rule in southern Africa.
E The two bilateral commissions�a joint security commission and a
joint liaison commission�were established by the Nkomati accord
to discuss security and other issues. Maputo in 1985 suspended both
commissions after the two sides accused each other of violating the
terms of the accord
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RENAMO 's Role in South African Policy
RENAMO is a key element in a broader South
African policy toward Mozambique that combines
military pressure and economic inducements to force
Maputo to acquiesce in South Africa's security con-
cerns. Although this policy has been highly success-
ful since the signing
of the Nkomati accord with Mozambique in 1984,
differences have surfaced between the South African
Defense Force (SADF) and the Department of Foreign
Affairs over the right mix of coercion and cooperation
to apply toward Mozambique. In addition, recent
insurgent attacks on economic targets in Mozam-
bique, which are partially financed by Pretoria, have
brought into sharper focus the potential conflict
between the two tactics.
Pretoria's Military Pressure..
South African security officials view RENAMO as a
low-cost vehicle to ensure that Mozambique and
other Frontline States, particularly Zimbabwe, re-
strict ANC activity and remain weak. They also see
the insurgents as an obstacle to FLS efforts to use
transportation routes through Mozambique to reduce
their economic dependence on South Africa. a Al-
though South African military officials acknowledge
that Maputo is keeping a tight rein on the ANC, they
distrust Chissano and are unhappy with his continued
ties to the ANC and anti�South African rhetoric.
Consequently, the South African military believes
that constant pressure is needed to ensure that Chis-
sano restricts ANC activity; they frequently warn
Maputo to clamp down on the ANC, and occasionally
intervene directly, such as the two attacks in Maputo
over the past year against presumed ANC personnel
and residences.
Nevertheless, in our judgment, most South African
military officials do not see RENAMO as a viable
alternative to the current FRELIMO regime, and
they are unwilling to provide the substantial re-
sources needed for a RENAMO military victory.
Moreover, the SADF may also be concerned that a
more serious RENAMO threat to the Maputo regime
would lead to an increased Communist presence to
bolster government defenses, possibly even including
the deployment of Cuban troops.
South Afri-
can military officials view the insurgent's political
organization as feckless, and probably reason that
the insur ents could not govern effectively in any
case.
. .. and Economic Rewards
At the same time, the South African Foreign Minis-
try is encouraging security cooperation by promoting
modest economic assistance programs that reinforce
South African leverage. Pretoria is giving Maputo a
$3 million low-interest loan and technical assistance
to improve the port at Maputo�the closest harbor to
South Africa's industrial heartland. It also has
agreed to provide financial and logistic support to
help reopen and protect the Cahora Bassa hydroelec-
tric facility, and recently rescheduled $13 million in
Mozambican debt at concessional terms. In addition,
Pretoria is negotiating a new work-permit system for
the more than 70,000 Mozambican migrant workers
in South Africa who pump critical foreign currency
into Maputo's economy; South African businesses are
considering providing financial assistance to help
protect the railway that runs from South Africa to
Maputo
South African foreign affairs officials have been
pleased with Chissano's pragmatic policies, and they
believe that Pretoria can work with him to improve
bilateral relations.
Foreign Minister Botha is encouraging
Increased economic ties to Mozambique, while also
pushing to limit South African ties to RENAMO.
Foreign affairs officials are advocating improved
economic ties to Mozambique, partly in an effort to
resurrect their influence in a policymaking process
dominated by security officials
RENAMO attacks on economic targets in Mozam-
bique, however, appear to be complicating Pretoria's
dual-track approach. Over the past year South
African repair crews have repeatedly rebuilt track
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and bridges bridges destroyed by RENAMO that had de-
layed the export of thousands of tons of South
African goods through the port of Maputo. REN-
AMO attacks also are a major stumblingblock to
reopening the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric facility�a
key issue in South African�Mozambican relations
whose successful outcome is viewed by Maputo as an
important sign of good faith by Pretoria
Prospects for Continued South African Support
In our judgment, limited South African support to
RENAMO is likely to continue to be part of
Pretoria's two-track policy toward Mozambique. De-
bate probably will intensify, however, between South
African military and foreign affairs officials over
which track should be emphasized. Chissano's appar-
ent willingness to cooperate with Pretoria as well as
RENAMO's political weakness may give added le-
verage to South African officials who favor playing
down aid to RENAMO.
Although less likely, in our judgment, Pretoria could
decide that Chissano 's willingness to acquiesce in its
security concerns and cooperate on key economic
projects argues for South Africa to facilitate greater
stability in Mozambique. Under such circumstances,
South Africa probably would end military aid to
RENAMO, provide security assistance to help Ma-
puto defend key transportation and communication
links, and try to use its influence with the insurgents
to facilitate serious reconciliation talks. Although
termination of South African aid would lead to a
gradual erosion in RENAMO's military capabilities,
the insurgents have become largely self-sustaining
and, in our judgment, would remain an effective
military force. The end of South African assistance,
however, probably would have a significant political
and psychological impact on RENAMO, further iso-
lating the insurgents and undermining the influence
of those officials in the political wing who are closely
tied to Pretoria. Such a change in RENAMO's
internal political dynamics, along with the realiza-
tion that a military victory was now impossible could
lead RENAMO's leadership to make significant con-
cessions to Maputo that would facilitate a political
settlement.
improve bilateral relations and distance itself from
RENAMO
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
On the economic
front, Pretoria is helping to upgrade the port at
Maputo and is cooperating on a number of important
projects, such as the reopening of the Cahora Bassa (b)(3)
hydroelectric facility.'
Despite this warming trend, deep-seated mutual sus-
picions and irreconcilable differences over apartheid
remain. Chissano does not want to sever all ties to the
ANC or completely eliminate anti�South African
rhetoric, both as a matter of principle and to maintain
his standing in black Africa. Moreover, he probably
remains convinced that Pretoria continues to provide
support for RENAMO in direct violation of the 1984
Nkomati accord. From Pretoria's point of view, its
two-track policy of combining military pressure and
economic benefits has been effective, and many South
Africans�particularly military officials�are reluc-
tant to reduce military pressure by cutting off support
to RENAMO and halting attacks against the ANC in
Maputo.
Maintaining Regional Military Support
At the same time, Chissano is working to improve
relations with neighboring black-ruled states to
strengthen their commitment to his counterinsurgency
effort. Frontline State leaders have repeatedly gath-
ered to discuss the situation in Mozambique, and
Chissano has met individually with all of his key
regional allies over the past year. Frontline State
leaders have agreed not to criticize Mozambique's
growing cooperation with Pretoria�probably recog-
nizing that Chissano has few options�and have af-
fir upport for the fight against RENAMO.
In June, Zimbabwe and Mozambique signed a
two-year military cooperation accord that formalizes
Zimbabwe's longstanding military presence in
The Cahora Bassa hydroelectric facility, built in the late 1970s
with Portuguese financing, was intended to supply about 10 percent
of South Africa's electrical needs. RENAMO attacks in the early
1980s, however, destroyed a large portion of the transmission lines
to South Africa.
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Mozambique. Harare's 5,000- to 6,000-man force
protects the Beira transportation corridor, escorts
convoys from Zimbabwe across Mozambique's Tete
Province to Malawi, and engages in occasional offen-
sive operations against RENAMO in the central and
southern provinces. Zimbabwe also has deployed sev-
eral hundred troops to protect work crews repairing
the Limpopo railway, which has the potential to carry
a substantial portion of Harare's international trade.
Harare also is paying an increasingly
high human price from frequent RENAMO " unish-
ment" raids across its nor
Thus, we believe that Harare will
maintain its current commitment while gradually
deploying additional troops�perhaps as many as
3,000�to help protect the Limpopo railway.
Malawi, which also has vital economic interests in
Mozambique, is continuing to improve bilateral coop-
eration with Maputo and appears committed to main-
taining a military presence on the Nacala railway.m
Chissano and Malawian President Banda met in early
July in Lilongwe, capping a year of significantly
increased bilateral exchanges on security and refugee
issues. In May 1987, Banda deployed some 400 troops
from the 7,000-man Malawian Army to guard the
western portion of the Nacala railway. The Mozambi-
can military has been unable to protect its portion of
the Nacala line, however, and Lilongwe's limited
resources probably preclude a deployment of more
than a few hundred additional men for that purpose.
Zambia signed a military agreement with Mozam-
bique in May allowing Zambian troops to conduct
hot-pursuit operations across the border and providing
for the training of 600 Mozambican militia to protect
the border area. Zambian units along the border have
engaged RENAMO insurgents on several occasions in
recent months inside Mozambique
In our judgment, however, logistic and
morale problems will severely limit the ability of the
Zambian military to prevent RENAMO incursions or
mount effective hot-pursuit operations inside Mozam-
bique.
Tanzania has no vital economic or security interests
inside Mozambique, and its commitment to the coun-
terinsurgency effort has waned. The Tanzanians earli-
er this year announced plans to withdraw their 3,200
troops from central Mozambique to protect their own
border area from increasing RENAMO incursions
here are other impor-
tant motivations for the Tanzanian withdrawal, such
as cost, lack of logistic support by Maputo, growing
domestic criticism, and Dar es Salaam's belief that a
military victory over RENAMO is not possible. Tan-
zania has agreed, however, to stretch out its with-
drawal through the end of the year and to train at
least 1,000 Mozambican troops to take over its re-
sponsibilities
Although Dar es Salaam's redeployment may
help stem growing insurgent activity in the north, the
Mozambican military will be hard pressed to fill the
vacuum in Zambezia Province
Balancing East and West
While trying to stay on good terms with all his
neighbors, Chissano is seeking desperately needed
economic and military aid from both East and West.
Ties between Mozambique and Western nations con-
tinue to grow, and Western states are gradually
increasing their economic and military assistance.
This development has complicated longstanding close
relations with Moscow, but Chissano has been careful
to protect his ties to the USSR to ensure continued
delivery of critical military aid and petroleum
supplies
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-geeret
Attracting Greater Western Aid
Chissano's successful efforts to improve relations with
the West have secured new aid and investment essen-
tial for the economy and armed forces and further
isolated RENAMO in the international arena. Since
assuming the presidency, Chissano has visited numer-
ous Western countries�including the United States,
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Vatican, and
Sweden; ministerial exchanges between Maputo and
Western capitals have occurred frequently. He has
presented a more balanced view of global events in the
government-controlled media, and begun to take a
more genuinely nonaligned stance in the UN. On the
economic front, he has adhered to Mozambique's
IMF program, enacted measures to strengthen the
private sector, and encouraged Western investment in
key sectors such as a riculture, mining, and light
industry.
These pragmatic but dynamic diplomatic activities
have paid off with additional economic aid from a
broad spectrum of Western countries. Traditional
donors�including Italy, the Nordic countries,
France, and the Netherlands�have increased their
development assistance, and, despite the adverse secu-
rity situation, they continue to provide hundreds of
advisers to serve throughout the country. Other, non-
traditional donors such as the United Kingdom, the
European Community (EC) as a whole, Canada,
Japan, and Spain also have increased their economic
aid to Mozambique, either bilaterally or through the
Southern African Development Coordination Confer-
ence (SADCC).1
The United States, Maputo's leading supplier of
emergency food assistance, provided some 112,000
metric tons of food valued at $29 million plus $11
million in transportation costs in FY 1988
In addition, in both FY
1988 and FY 1989 the United States plans to provide
$15 million in economic aid to the Mozambican
private sector and $50 million to SADCC�some of
which will go to Mozambique.
" SADCC was formed in 1979 by nine black-ruled southern
African states in an effort to lessen their economic dependence on
South Africa and promote regional development. SADCC members
are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi Mozambique, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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US investments probably will
increase next year, because several US companies
pared to begin joint ventures with Maputo.
Western donors also are starting to provide limited
military aid to improve security for their economic
projects in Mozambique. London has taken the lead
by training a battalion of Mozambican troops in
Zimbabwe to guard the Limpopo railway, giving
limited nonlethal assistance to Tanzania and Malawi
in support of their operations in Mozambique, and (b)(1)
supporting efforts by a private British firm to train (b)(3)
and equip a 200-man special unit to guard the Nacala
railway.
Moreover, France,
Portugal, and Spain in recent months have begun
limited military assistance programs that include
training and nonlethal support to improve security
around specific economic projects, such as the reha-
bilitation of the Nacala railway.
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Ensuring Crucial Soviet Bloc Assistance
Meanwhile, Chissano is maintaining close relations
with the Soviet Bloc, his traditional and primary
source of military aid. Moscow's delivery of an esti-
mated $125 million worth of equipment in 1987 and
$78 million in the first six months of 1988
12 We
estimate that 800 Soviets provide critical advisory
"The USSR has provided about $2 billion in military a id to
Mozambique since independence
Seetet
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support to government-counterinsurgency operations,
instruction at military academies, training of elite
units, air transport, logistics, and maintenance.
mixed Soviet
and Mozambican crews fly Mozambican military-
transport aircraft, and a few Soviet Bloc or Cuban
pilots may fly attack helicopters and fighter aircraft
against RENAMO because of a shortage of qualified
Mozambicans. In addition, we estimate as many as
800 Cuban advisers are involved in training the
Mozambican militia, several hundred East Europeans
provide intelligence support, and a few North Korean
advisers are training commando units. Moscow and
Maputo's political ties include a Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation signed in 1977, frequent party-to-
party contacts, and mutual support in international
forums. On the economic front, the Soviet Bloc has
provided over $350 million in economic aid to Maputo
Sterol.
since 1980 as well as most of Mozambique's petro-
leum supplies on concessionary terms
Nevertheless
there are frustrations in the bilateral
relationship.
Moscow believes Mozambique makes inefficient use
of economic and military aid and lacks a strong
commitment to socialism. During Chissano's visit to
Moscow in August 1987, Gorbachev publicly criti-
cized the performance of FRELIMO, seeming to
attribute Mozambique's poor military and economic
performance to the party's incompetence
Maputo, for its part, has been unhappy with the
quantity and quality of Soviet military and economic
he Soviets have provided insufficient amounts
� of spare parts and maintenance training as well as
obsolete and inappropriate equipment for fighting an
insurgency. The Mozambicans also have criticized
Soviet economic support and used the high-level
exchanges in February celebrating the 10th anniver-
sary of the Soviet-Mozambique Friendship Treaty to
stress the need for more practical Soviet economic aid
In our judgment, Moscow's concern about Maputo's
expanding ties to the West, particularly in the securi-
ty field, has prompted the Soviets to be somewhat
more responsive to such criticisms.
" Although this economic aid is small in contrast with that of
Western countries, it exceeds Soviet Bloc largess to any other
African country, except Ethiopia and Angola.
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"Sreret�___
In response to Maputo's criticism of a lack of
Soviet support for the economic reform program,
Moscow recently rescheduled Mozambique's debt at
concessionary terms and significantly increased eco-
nomic aid. New Soviet assistance includes a $30
million package of consumer goods, a $58 million two-
year grant to help develop export-oriented industries,
and large increases in petroleum deliveries at conces-
sional terms. On the political front, the Soviets�
stressing the central role of the party in guiding
economic and military reform�have sent civilian
advisers to work with FRELIMO's secretariat
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Outlook
We expect the fighting in the civil war to continue to
ebb and flow over the next two years, with neither side
gaining a decisive advantage. RENAMO will contin-
ue to operate freely in much of the countryside,
relying largely on hit-and-run tactics, and occasional-
ly launching larger operations against poorly defended
targets. The insurgents, however, will continue to lack
the capabilities to threaten any major urban areas or
gain full control over large segments of territory. In
addition, RENAMO is unlikely to improve its politi-
cal organization or gain increased domestic and inter-
national backing, further constraining its ability to
threaten the government
Chissano is likely to continue to follow a two-track
counterinsurgency policy that employs both military
and political strategies in an effort to contain the
insurgency. Although foreign advice and training will
improve the combat capabilities of some units, we
believe that overall military performance will remain
seriously deficient over the next two years. A lack of
attention to key nonmilitary factors aimed at winning
the "hearts and minds" of the rural populace will
further diminish the effectiveness of the government's
counterinsurgency efforts. Likewise, Chissano's ef-
forts to induce rebel surrenders are unlikely to dimin-
ish RENAMO's military capabilities, and prospects
19
for a negotiated solution are slim at best. We believe
that Chissano is probably willing to open at least an
indirect dialogue in hopes of co-opting the insurgents,
but is reluctant to agree to direct talks for fear of
legitimizing the insurgents and provoking strong reac-
tion from his own military and regime hardliners as
well as Zimbabwe.
We believe Chissano's political position will remain
secure over the next two years. He is likely to use the
Fifth Party Congress scheduled for later this year to
further consolidate his base of support, probably by
enlarging the Politburo with handpicked supporters
and bringing new blood into key party and govern-
ment positions. While he probably will push through
some limited political reforms, we believe he will
proceed cautiously on liberalization to avoid alienat-
ing party elites or threatening FRELIMO's preemi-
nent position
In our judgment, prospects for a significant economic
recovery, particularly in the critical agricultural sec-
tor, are poor as long as fighting continues at current
levels. Consequently, the risk of widespread starvation
will remain high despite continued international aid,
and the number of refugees and internally displaced
persons will continue to grow. Economic growth prob-
ably will come reasonably close to the government's
target of 6 percent in 1988, thanks to the new
dynamism in the private sector, generous debt relief,
and new foreign aid disbursements. Nevertheless, this
growth will likely improve living conditions for only a
small segment of the population�primarily those
located in relatively secure areas near urban centers.
Opposition within FRELIMO is likely to constrain
Chissano's ability to push through more far-reaching
changes, such as increased privatization, and may
even lead him to backtrack on price reforms, reduc-
tions in the public-sector work force, and other issues.
In the international arena, we believe that Chissano's
most difficult challenge will be to persuade South
Africa to moderate its policy toward Mozambique
without alienating his black African neighbors.
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Maputo will continue to work to improve cooperation
with Pretoria, but any increase in ANC operations .
from Mozambican territory, evidence of continued
South African aid to RENAMO, or South African
cross-border attacks against the ANC could quickly
escalate tensions. In our judgment, Mozambique's
neighboring allies are likely to continue to provide
critical military support�despite concern over
Maputo's improving relations with Pretoria and rising
costs to them of the war�largely because of their own
security and economic interests
Similarly, Chissano must delicately balance relations
with the East and West. In our view, Maputo will
continue to cultivate the West�with an increasing
emphasis on the need for military aid to combat
RENAMO and protect economic projects�while
taking care to avoid alarming Moscow and pro-Soviet
FRELIMO officials. Western donors are likely to
SeLl
increase aid levels in response to Mozambique's food
shortages and economic reforms, but limit militar
assistance to training and nonlethal equipment
Soviet influence in Maputo almost certainly will
remain strong. We believe the USSR's primary objec-
tive will be to maintain its military and political
influence without incurring significant new costs or
commitments. Soviet military assistance over the next
two years probably will remain at roughly the same
level as in 1987 because of Mozambique's relatively
low global priority for Moscow and inability to pay for
large quantities of new equipment. Moscow will re-
main concerned with Maputo's expanding ties to the
West, however, particularly in the security field, and
will monitor the situation closely to protect its stand-
ing within the Mozambican military. t1e security
services, and FRELIMO
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