IRAN TASK FORCE PAPER

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05850277
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2014-00454
• Publication Date: May 11, 1961

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� �ROC I �IP
Ndedbypull
MAY
11 May 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
SUBJECT : Iran Task Force Paper
1. Attached for your information are the following:
a. Draft outline for the Iran (Talbot) Task
Force paper
b. DDP draft for Part II of the outline
c. ONE comments on the DDP draft
d. Final CIA draft prepared jointly by ONE and
DDP for Part II of the outline
2. As of yesterday, apparently, DDP intended only to receive
ONE comments on their draft and not attempt any formal coordination.
Signals were switched this morning, however, and two DDP represent-
atives met with a Board Panel and the NE Staff to produce a single
contribution for Section II of the outline. The meeting began
at 10:00 and was supposed to produce a finished product by
12:00, which was patently impossible. By dint of hard work,
Item 4 above was produced at about 2:00 this afternoon for a
task force meeting due to begin at 2:30.
3. The history of this effort illustrates how not to
prepare an intelligence contribution to a task force pager. I
would like to come in at your convenience to discuss this
situation, because similar problems are almost certain to rise
again.
(b)(3)
LUIS MARENGO
SECRET
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SECRET- This document consists alljoges,
Copry.4.of 30 copies, Series A.
IRAN TASK FORCE
2211 IRANIAN SITOLTION
DRAFT OUTLINE
I. The Problem for the United States
������
What.can the US do to foster a stable. indepeodent liram,free of
Soviet dcminatice?
What kind of government in Iran would beet serve-this VS objective?
.What are the prospects of evolutionary political change in Iran?
What should be the relationship of the US to the Shah and to other
loci of power in Iran?
What should be the US role in and attitude toward defense arrangements
with Iran?
Should the US attempt Con strength= or deemphasise =TO?
Should the US oppose, =Wane, or support a neutra-ilat posture an
the part of Iran?
What should be the role Of US economic aid?
II. Estimate of the Situation (to be derived to the =tint feasible 111/*
from MIL 3h-61, 28 Febraary2961)
A. The Internal Situation
1. Summary of elements in the present eitostion
Sole of the institution of the =mangy, role of the
Shah, of thio traditional forces (landowners, religious
leaders, conservative business elements), military and
security forces, and of the reforkist elements
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(nationalists, extreme lett indluding TUdsh). The
rising unrest.
2. The recent crisis
The teachers' strike and the resulting riots,
"contingency planning" by Bakhtiar, appointment of
El.. All Amini as Prime Minister.
3. Prospects for an Amini government
Will Amini be able to play a moriOndependent role than
recent prime ministers? What will the role of the Shah
be? Will he be satisfied with a lesser role? Will the
Shah try to re-establish his personal rule if Amini
succeeds in stabilizing the situation? What is Amini's
relationship to Bale `tar and the military likely to be?
Is Amini likely to pacify at least the moderates among
the oppoaition? What will be his relationship to the
conservatives? Will he be willing and able to introduce
meaningful reforms? lbet will be his foreign policy
orientation?
4. Likely developments if Amini fails
Would a return to personal rule by the Shah with a weak
Prime Minister be feasible? Likelihood of a takeover by
Bakhtiar or another conservative leader? Possibility
of a nationalist government? What would be the role of
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the Tudeh? What would be the likely end result of
any of these developments? A neutralist Iran? A
Communist Iran?
B. Iran's Foreign Relations (7; ba. i7 Irwm
1. Summary of background
From neutrality to alignment with the West. Commitments
to the USSR.
2. CENTO and the bilaterals
Vhat is the military and political importance of Iran's
participation in CENTO? Vhat would be the effect of a
strengthening, weakening or disappearance of CENTO on
Iran? What would be the international effects? Role
of the bilaterals?
3. Iran and the USSR
lAhat is the nature of the threat of the USSR to /ran?
In the military, political, economic, propaganda and
subversive fields? What are the chances of a detente?
Are rellpions likely to deteriorate? Under what
circumstances? USSR view of the Amini government?
How would it view the establishment of a dictatorship
by a military man such as Bakhtiar?
4. Attitudes of other area states
a. Turkey and Pakistan
h. The Arab states and Israel
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ble 4rkft
Ti 4, 64(4( CX40-4ier4
,.. 4 4. oF Teta(
Tie Internal 'potties
94mearzof Elements in the Present Situation
In the years singe Wad lihr II, the institution of the nommrshr
has been the simile polarising flees in /ran Ishieh at an has bad out the
promise of an orderly transition to a new era and served as $ barrier te
.:.ftreelst movements. It vas publis faith in this institution ehidh helped
to brim; about tho loselrell of Nessades. govever, eince August 1953 the
thstttuti has taken on s. personal image, that of the active ruler. Part
of the power elite seems no longer villing to uphold this individual as opposed
the institution itself. Those vho elein to be plotting against the regime
statc that they wad retain the monarehy but mot the preen of the ruler, *seep
in a syAbolic role. Sven the nor* extreme nationalists seen to believe that the
monarchy should be retained, for they vise:aisle the internal inst-ebility inherent
in an Iranian reputIto. Blomumer, onse any serious action against the ruler
begins, the first step toward the inevitable destruction of the manarehy may
wall havr been t ten.
Effective politisal pover still remains in the hands of the traditional
elite the landowners, religions loaders, eonservativr mordants, all
interrelated. This elite can ace4emodate a certain amount of Change. It can
cooperate viLh the etlitery whose leaders become of importance
as they plan to take action. This action they views. the sale alternative
to internal Chaos. Male the military may not move, it is possihle that on
the occasion at sous serious incident, .us as the demise of the ruler or a
massive leftist tration, they would take over the government. This
military regime might be Able to hold power.
The reformist elements have speeifie Ohjestiveo bet ant a scehsantve
program and may be espested to consentrate an selh ob4eetives as free
eiectiemm6 and a sore fivorihle agreement sitb the emeamrtimm rather than a
general attack an any interim regime.
The Teach Party is not an immediate threat to internal stability. Given a
slackening of security sontseas, its meihers eill imam neve votive in pametrating
natiomalist groups but it vil not some out in the open as it did is 1933 as a
=Chat arm of Soviet policy. The MOvieto realise that they snAle serious errors'
in eVerestinatimg the streagthJof Tudeh in Iran in 190-46 and 1953 and be
=tent to
3.
. .
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mir
lie Resent Oriels;
*store leading tip to the ) Mg, crisis vow dissattisfaetlemetth the rigged
election oft 196o mod 1961, tie deteriersting esseents situatisadthresatmei
inflation end the iseressimg taupe at nationalist astivity. Atemmises strike
for higher pay co 2 Mug preelpitated the exists.
Event* immediately lsediag Ap to the 5 May crisis iegma with the 2 Ney
dirsonstratioa in *hi&a teaeher vas ittUed mod several others weeded by the
police. On 3 May, a dememetratios estimated at betimes, 15 and 50 thousand
persons married the ~pee of the "nertyredr teeiher through the streets of
Teheran. Oa 4 Day a similar demenstratica vas joined by verkers. National host
�soups vire seheduled to joie the dememstmatisms ea 5 Shy, bet these plans sere
ousieelled tam Ali Anini vas appointed Prime Minister.
Pressures ea the Shahlteappaiat Asia beim via a meeting Unseen the to.
On 2/ *veil vheahmiai varseathe Shah at impemdiag tesOhles. Mere is ns
A
indication, hoesver, that the Shah vas snare at may ineineat exists until the
teadheres demenstratisas veret veil underway.
Oa 3 or 4 'Ay general Tieing. Dakblier, favour Mit Ohist, vas alaseted
several boors vith the Shaw Cl NKOMO AleviAlla, Deputy Chief at Imo
essferred with the dish for three hears late te Mhy and is supposed, to bum
z pressed far the ippeistamut at ALL Anini. Departedly extremely vpset sad ready
to flee the soustry, the Shah offered Antal the Prise Minister's post late that
'it. It vas acsepted the next morning, 5 Say, ca 'S esadliiens that he
be gives bread powers.
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�111
rzairptete ter a Aid* tplreeosests
Mum&
Far avarel yews wipe vamps her, tried tsnonmiamme the ilee thet he
sheali retest est mist rale; shot by Alio' be 4rema hostile orttisten te blimeelt
as the person solely reepessible fee the shertenalligh We Sammumwit� Ihi,
have likewise wpm that he toaster the hordes a' eseermat um a 'treed trim
ustAr Who gala be respecoille, se the cartinatiesienerlies, tor the sesact
at ar1ested-11ft. emA replawl it he tails. It is pasible that the ibiab italewed
th.$ lime at reseal-ft thee he selected Aelai. teeny* A is elaer Umat he los
:41tatly frightened hi the deterloretieg situfm.loe sad reolised that *
eommwomisoW prime minister IA.*, see deointied by banyevat as* etteblidb
eontaot elth easeedege eiresitica alarm at thie U.
Antal boa bees gramag himeit to be Flask sinister ter aw yews bet may
L* reseeZ yew* nat et while *CM. bosh* bees ale Us devote toil tise he
eftcorcOlsb this ea& The dotal law has three ghats: 13 the snort. *sweetie
sdrioistrotor with a meets' earteme Lk flown* ad. weesseles) 2) shop asa
she is es risk he eon &taw& to he beret ad gill se &12. oat sasiast morreptiSsi
ead 3) the am** is imeigair gpslitioil te sot as the beide, betasa the osierato
nationalists al the emeweeraMis lie le mowtais to projrat these three teats IV
tryiag te tehe Westin% steps We astrel the nonmetal eeteds4 hr WARS t*
make eseesles of sewer% slostata 1440 pima* 111114VaXteMPWAS toilette*
eertaSa atisalist dimasole.
eaastias se Whether Se sill be stle to silo &ewe Ledepeedant role then
resaat priae ataistere
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Sass not peeress a OSIMMINitagpitellISON sod le set a toeeirtoe seesaw. In Le mac
a illAAfir 3.1ttcLia,lad bee so ergaisat devote. telleelas, but lathe pat two
"ars he las eystenotisalr amide sentoste swing both motional** eel eseseremAirm
&lamas, sod sbrieuslx mei prates* illetWatadhaimageasteld�441"4111"4"
Whose preasemeelaettee with *ha selt*toterest at these grape,
*a will I*s.gattesaltet 1,1,11t pat & big I esotiesallet, I.e., will it tit&
&al not extremist setimaliet elamente. le sill prebthIr ant lest sa &SA.
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on the oil consortium, but vill talk beam' the seems to obtain special firers
'which emn be promoted. paiMiely es setiomslistigaimnimm. Se mar net mike sie-
nifleant ommessions to the old power elite to feta its import.
Given the above, it be summed that be utll play as indepeedest a
circumstenses allow.
(b)(1)
ss (b)(3)
be may
unwillingly mike ecneessions to the Slashes the letter attempts to reassert his
authority, the limit mmy soon be reached *en pUblic *plc:km would bogie to see
him as subservient to the Sheik. Ma sight then resiga.
Other factors to the sontrery, Amini's regime tenure may depend, in more or
less direct propartica, on the Stab's villingiess to vithdrom sigmificattli troa the
day to or conduct of goverensmt business. Althoogh the Shih has been frightened
Laval-Meal crises Indere, experimme bee Ohm tint atter regaining equilibrium
be ham alleys sueeeeded La dominsting the prime sinister. The toot that IMIR is
now in equelly serious esememic difficulty-soy indium the Rah to allowlir. Amini,
aho is a oompetent esomomist sod finsmeder, the time sad the indepeedemos of action
that the situation revises.
Should the tl.S. Govermaintplearly indicate its support for 44 'S role as
an independent prime sinister, as well as far his program of flamasial ami soceamic
disciplines, the Shah vould incline to believe that this represented a Shift from
U.S. support of the status quo end =elude that be himself no longer enjoys the
total personal support at the U.S. in this situatioa be might question the wisdon
of tryiog to estehlisah seeendeney over Amial.
Amini's stayiog power may well depend in pert las his success is sinning the
support of the military. lie shimmies for doing so seem gook as Amisi met senior
military officers are in -friendly eanteet.
The Metal 40wernmsat may therefore be emmiliered as as interim regime of perhaps
only limited durstion. When ant if it false it sill probably be for ome of the
folloviag reasons: (4) Mini resigns rather than become patently mdmiseive to
the Shah, (b) be is dismissed by the Ask, (c) be resigns booms, be is meals
to satisfy nationalist &mends. ,
In summary, it allowed to voTk vithout major interference ties the Shah, vith
significant OA. morel and flmanial support, sadist the absence of ethetantial
internal opposition to himself his provers, Amini vill attempt to promote
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111 111,
meaniegful recce, to implenemt austerity measures, sat eonb xported to maintain
Iron's present foreign policy orientation.
Developeonts if Ail* Fall
If Mini resigns to avoid the stigma of sabeissica to the iheby it oould
produce a crisis vhich sight bring blabs& es heed of 4110410 alitienalligt regime
in alai& the Shah would ham � limited role. It Seeigee bemuse he is =Ole
to satisfy Nationalist demeadet emproseed by nes strikes sad dmeanitratiaos, there
moul4 basal:moment crisis of some megnitude end the nilibmwsight yell ast
to prevent a aollepee of reale ardor. It the Sheh dismieses Mini, this too
WO% 44MSO &pale oriels. In this creek the Oa% veal& prebehly be feud iirltb
a difficult shoisetertmees ma old line polities* lib, Sqbal eal$ieeelleste even
more inclined tovard the astiomilists thmaiidai.
If tha Asia sollaile tails, It is net felt Oat lbs eagebilitor of the 'Mak
Party mould be significent4 eshemeed.
F.
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XMl AD
The threat et the ITSSI to Use Use in its detiosiaateaWan to !Wee
Iran out of its anima with the Its*** sod int* a posture use enmeable
I. Soviet intlusese. The diplomas imam that bee deveIllped between
them is autleeted la the ftst that la The tee yews thab kari elcipsod
sine* afaSotiaiishil tor h steesesgeeselen past Wines the to eountrios
foundered* hostile Soviet propegenda has oentinqedanilhated. Likes,
wise. Soviet Worts to emit me Insist goodwill missies to rehstsom
tive talks have rinalted in an indefialte postponement. it is likely,
however* that the Soviet Soveromont will moat to the /mini regime
its desires remission to *meow as sell as its resent otter of
*commie assistsnee.
It is improwe tees the Soviet deveresset will indulge in sabre
rattling snd even lees probable that it will emit say set of evert
*LUtary aggrfreeien trip serer* limited war in the suarost semiAperiteis
situation in Inas
aeesiderimg the wide rims It beetles is to The Soviets tor
petit:teal *sties in Imes it is Tray dittioult to peldtat what IbLirestien
$ stepped up Soviet esepaign at tobversiee would take. Ilinimally* it
would involve an intensitisatien et hostile plimpoisoda, renewed attempts
of fragmented Wash oleos% in Tehran Isespleit popular disenstrations
and a concerted Otos* to shake oonfidenee in the regime. The chances
for a detente in the seer future depend in pleat part is the willingness
of the Milai regimes to *eke tho oonsessions the Soviets haw boon
seeking, whieh in our view is net liMly It is probable that a
ifeeliag out" period will new wan *high will lead either to a slight
isorovement if a Good Will Itioadoe sutoseds* or to a Maw tem stale
-
Amite in relations between the tee eeuntrlee if it deeehlts
The *Metal Soviet view It the ni floverement will probably not
differ greatly fres its views of the predeoesser regime* !be Ilational
Vhios of Iran has nainteined its previous teem and Ilhemos and has already
asserted that the sebinot olumeell as Oen* stall Sad 111141.04
911414401y* that theMinimoveriamot is le hasmieen eisatisaa
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soviet rsaotiont.
t p
la tale neer et a die
One probably imId provoke a
ok sod vigostats
probably take the teria et a am.
t would Valve say sew attempt
in Witch Sakhtiar is Identified es a prInalpal, with ellegations
tiat the U.S, Government had mponeorod the ohmse booms, the Shah
been
SAVAK and pertla
with high levels of the U,S, Oovrtent and his re
Me roturn to iron amid also be cited as reloyeet
machinations,
1
neutrallem4 tiarls 1n history as Chief
W$ ~ant visit to the U.SA.� his emstattil
tellowing
Or LS.
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