COMMENTS ON TASK FORCE PAPER

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05850272
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-00496
• Publication Date: May 16, 1961

Approved for Release 2016/02/03 005850272
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16 May 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
SUBJECT : Comments on Task Force Paper
1. Following are verbatim comments by the ONE Staff
based on the semi-final draft of the Iran Task Force Paper.
The political paragraphs are by and the econamic
ones by . I agree with their comments although I
would add with respect to Paragraph 4 that although we cannot
be sure that the kind of support that the paper proposes for
Amini will swing the balance,the question is replly one of
whether we have any alternatives.
2. We have no problems with the basic judgments or
recommendations of this paper -- although somehow they seem to
be less crisp than one would have hoped. Certainly, we approve
of what appears to be the main message: "Let us get behind
Amini and see what we can do to promote evolutionary develop-
"Lent in Iran." The following few camments are inspired more
by what seem to be loose ends in the paper than by significant
substantive disagreements.
3. The paper assumes throughout that a military coup
would inevitably constitute a rightist conservative reaction.
The possibility of a military coup with nationalist partici-
pation should not be so thoroughly excluded. Indeed, the
nationalists as such seem to be ignored to a fair degree.
Thus, there is considerable emphasis on the need to keep the
Shah off Aminiis neck; there is little mention of the urban
nationalist pressure on Amini. After all, it was this kind
of pressure which caused the recent crisis.
4. The Political Back-Up begins with objectives; adds
that neither US nor Iran have the instruments to guarantee
success of these, but concludes that the recammendations of
the report have sufficient promise of success to justify their
adoption. This seems a rather peculiar way of coming at the
problem. However, it does raise a question of interest.
NIE 34-61 said that "the nature of Iranian politics and the
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personal characteristics of the Shah appear to make gradual
evolution unlikely." In context, the WEE suggests that change
is more likely to be revolutionary. Assume for the moment,
the WEE is correct. How sure can we be that the kind of
support the paper proposes the US give Amini will swing the
balance?
5. It seems that two points need to be mentioned, or
at least stressed more, in this paper. The first is that
Iran made quite rapid progress between 1954 (when oil began
flowing again) and 1960. GNP increased by about 5% annually,
the number of banks and factories more than doubled, and
investment rose to about 18% of GNP. Thus when Iran encountered
difficulty beginning in 1958 it already had four years of
progress behind it. The paper gives the impression that the
Iranian economy encountered trouble as soon as it began to
make same progress, whereas it encountered difficulty only
when a sharp rise in private investment was piled on top of
the rapid growth of expenditures for public investment, the
armed forces, and social service.
6. Equally as important as the need for foreign aid is
the need to modernize the country's econamic institutions and
practices. A start has already been made along these lines,
and it is fortunate that Iran has quite a number of capable
people available, concentrated in the Plan Organization, but
also in other branches of government, who have not as yet
been allowed to use their talents fully. More emphasis
might well be placed on this point, as it suggests that there
is roam for considerable improvement in the management of the
econamy and a good chance to achieve it if we act wisely.
(b)(3)
LOUIS MARENGO
Approved for Release 2016/02/03 005850272