OUR ROLE IN PREPARATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE PAPER FOR THE IRAN TASK FORCE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05850267
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2014-00454
• Publication Date: May 23, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Div' 41/
This is the blow by blow summary of ONE
participation in the Iran task force paper which
I mentioned to you yesterday.
(b)(3)
Lou Marengo
24 May 1961
( DATE )
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FnRm in. int
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Mr. Sherman Kent
23 May 1961
'--" (b)(3)
Our Role in Preparation of the Intelligence Paper for the Iran
Task Fore*
#
24 in your absence, an agreed CIA...State *Estimate of
the Iranian Situation* was produced for an Iran Task Force which
was set up lk the MSC to recommend new policy. The intelligence
paper 'which finally went to the Iran Teak Force is not a bad
Job. Certainly, there is nothing in it mach is not acceptable
to ONE, However, the manner in which the paper was produced
could hardly have been more confused or less calculated to
bring available talent within CIA to bear on the problem. On
the assumption that there are some lessons to be learned from
this exercises I am setting down a chronology of developments
as I sew them and a few comments on the whole procedure.
2. Chronology:
Monday, gMai lop04 Iran Branch Chief, informed (b)(3))(3)
rernoon that MSC had set up Task Force
previous Friday that his office will -want
sone help from (OCI) in pre- (b)(3)
paring an *intelligence estimates* responsibility
for which had been assigned by the Task Force
to Mown and (b)(3)
Tuesdays I Msly
comment n outline for
estimate prepared by and colleagues; (b)(3))(3)
at same time outline was being separately
coordinated with State by DO/P.
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Wednesday,I4VM4Y: About noon commented on dr
of t of Estimate written b
and of oft. informed
he h major problems with draft; discussion
lasted only about 15 minutes because
had to get paper to Task Force meeting
afternoon.
Thursdays,/
About 100, discussed exercise with Mr.
Amory, who said decision had been made that
drafting and coordination with State would
be done by DIVI side with Board panel of ONE
going over paper and representing ONE
in drafting and coordination with State.
About 600 1i4, Critchfield CIA representative
on Task Force) eslled to say exercise
was ebout over. He had presented CIA portion
of estimate to Task Force in afternoon telling
them it was not coordinated and they had
accepted happily. All that remained was to
file "corrected owl, for Task Force recorda.
told him ONE had problems with paper;
Board panel was meeting Thursday morning;
would probably have to iasus note taking
exception to paper on several counts.
Oritchfield informed
have ONE work
with and
draft for 200 meeting
he would like to
draft in collaboration
o produce new agreed
of Task Force.
Board Panel met from 10:00 to MO to produce
new draft of CIA portion of estimate.
accompanied to State and at
Oritchfieldle direction undertook to help
coordinate CIA portion and State portion in
separate meeting uith representatives of
INR (Elwood and Libesney) so as to produce
completely agreed paper for Task Force by
7:00 PM.
State accepted CIA portion with minor changes.
then received instructions from Critchfield (b)(3)
in Task Force meeting that we were not to
accept State portion, insisting instead on
covering foreign affairs section of paper by
(b)(3)
(b)(31
(b)(?))(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(D)(3)
4�
CT2L'21;-7
g
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repeating pertinent paragraphs from NIE
3441. State categorically rejected but
offered to make any reference an desired to
xrs 3444 at beginning of Foreign Affairs
section. After four hours of
debate in which Critchfield and
participated after break-up of as ores
meeting, question was settled in Roger
Rilaman's office with Critchfield sterseing
to accept a footnote that the pertinent
section of NIB 34.61 remained valid.
3. Comments There are, I think, a few things that can
be said about this sagas
(A) The Task Force apparently decided it preferred a
State-CIA intelligence paper to a formal fullr.000rdinated BRIE
in order to save time. If it had asked for a Skill at the
beginning, it could have had it just about as promptly. (SNIE
34m4-61 was produced in less than a week immediately afterwards.)
(11) The MA" representatives on the Task Form
undertook to write the intelligence paper themselves with some
advice from staff level of MA. They simply don't know how to
do this kind of thing. ORE finally had either to disaert from
the paper or to rewrite it in committee in a three hour period.
This is hardly the best way to prepare a CIA draft.
(C) The DD/F representatives' assumption of responsi-
bility for directing the coordination process with INR of State
resulted in an unnecessary and time-.consuming hassles partly
because they are sinply unused to doing business with INR, and
partly because they chose to stand much more strongly on
principal than the occasion required.
(b)(3)
-3-
- ;
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(D) In discussing the whole exercise with Mr.
Critchfield after it was over, I found that we both agreed on
one thing. A much better way to handle a similar problem in
the future would be for the CIA representative on a Task Force
(whether he be DD/P or Dpix and presumably much of the time,
he is going to be DD/P) to turn over to DWI at the very
beginning any requirement he gets for finished intelligence.
DWI would then carry primary responsibility for drafting the
paper and coordinating it with State. This would have the added
advantage of leaving DD/P free to concentrate on the policy
problems of the Task Force, though, of course, it would also have
the opportunity to affect the intelligence paper being produced
bY
(E) If indeed this is the best way to handle this
aspect of the problem presented by the increasing use of Task
Forces, some kind of agency-mide directive might usefully be
issued so that various individual DD/P division caiefs and others
who servo on Task Forces will not have to go through the same
unsatisfactory process we did on Iran.
tr. 7,�:-":
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