<SANITIZED>RECOLLECTIONS OF CANADIAN REQUESTS IN 1979

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05849185
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2020
• Case Number: F-2013-00944
• Publication Date: August 3, 1988

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THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
(Please do not remove)
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SE RET
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IDo io CIA-I 7 A
.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
1979
3 August 1988
Recollections of Canadian Requests in
who has been out of town for the last month,
phoned early morning 3 August and the undersigned asked him if
he recollected the meeting in 1979,, with a ranking Canadian
security official in then DDCI Carlucci's office. The Canadian
made the dramatic announcement at this meeting that six
American Embassy of � ials had taken refuge in the Canadian
Embassy in Tehran. idid not recall any mention by the
Canadian that the U.S. ongress should not be briefed. He did
recall how frightened the participants were for the lives of
the Americans and the 15 Canadians, who were now also at risk.
He also recalled the phrase, "this should not be discussed
outside these four walls." When I asked if he rememb
Carlucci saying he would have to brief the President,
said he thought that was right. He added that the Cana
very up-tight and that as the weeks following this meeting
progressed, the Canadian Government was taking a lot of
political heat to pull all of their people out of Tehran. The
Canadian did take their embassy down to the absolutejn1nimurn
required to support our six people. Several timesP had
to plead with the Canadians for a few more days be ore we could
organize the rescue. The Canadians did pull out the remainder
of their people immediately after ours left.
Associate Deputy Director for Operations
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SEC/(ET
29 July 1988
OCA 2520-88
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Acting Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Response to Boren/Cohen Letter on a Canadian
Request to Limit Congressional Notification
1. Attached for your signature is a response to Chairman
Boren's and Vice Chairman Cohen's request that we provide
documentation regarding Canada's request that Congress not be
informed of the operation to rescue Americans in the Canadian
Mission in Tehran. As you are aware, the Committee believes
the Administration has exaggerated the facts concerning the
story to defeat the Intelligence Oversight legislation.
2. I have also attached for your information a summary
prepared by the Directorate of Operations that documents
additional details regarding the Canadian assistance in the
exfiltration of the Americans. The summary mentions a meeting
that occurred on 19 November 1979 at which time a Canadian
official may have made the request that Congress not be
notified of the operation. Secretary Carlucci, who was the
DDCI at the time, was present at the meeting. You should be
aware that Secretary Carlucci today has no recollection of the
meeting.
Attachments:
As stated
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SUBJECT: Response to Boren/Cohen Letter on a Canadian
Request to Limit Congressional Notification
A/D/OCA/
(26126) 29 July 1988
Distribution:.
Orig - addressee
1 - DDC1 (w/att.)
1 - EXDIR (w/att.)
1 - ER (w/att.)
1 - D/OCA (w/att.)
1 - OCA Registry (w/att.)
1 - hrono (w/o att.)
1 - irono (67/o att.)
S E E T
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S EVET
27 July 1988
SUBJECT: Additional Background Information on Canadian
Assistance in the Exfiltration of U.S. Embassy
Employees from Tehran
N.B. Given the extreme sensitivity over Canadian support
to our exfiltration efforts, several aspects of the operation
were not committed to paper. The information contained below
is primarily based on the recollections of Agency officers
involved in the initial planning of the exfiltration operation.
1. Although the Iranians seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran
on 4 November 1979, we were unable to reconcile the numbers of
U.S. employees being held captive. The Iranians claimed to be
holding 54 hostages: 51 at the Embassy and three at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If this figure were correct
small number of employees were "missing"
visited Headquarters on 16 November 1979. During the
visit, which had been arranged before the U.S. Embassy was
seized, advised six Embassy employees had made
their way to the Canadian mission where they sought safehaven.
It was stunning and welcome news.
Hnon lenrnino this information
Additional
officers representing Near East and European Divisions joined
Mr. Carlucci to discuss exfiltration planning with
The group adjourned to the Director's
where adequate table space was available to spre
Tehran and Iran. During the ensuing discussion,
made it plain the Canadians would help in the extiltration or
the Americans but knowledgeability of the presence of the
Americans at the Canadian mission and the Canadian assistance
must be ited. Two DO participants independently
recalled stating "the information must not go
beyond t is room or "beyond these four walls." Carliwri cni
the Agency would respect this, but he asked for
approval to brief one other individual -- the President.
S E/E T
Dining Room
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S E T
agreed and reemphasized no one other than the
President should be iare of our joint planning. One
participant recalled specifically said the
information should not be passed to
The participant believed this unusual request
added additional weight to request for utmost
secrecy. While two of the DO officers recalled that
stipulated Congress not be informed, two other DO
otticers did not recall a specific statement to this effect.
Rather, in subsequent discussions, the A enc officers agreed
that the "gentlemen's agreement" with contained the (W(1)
implication that Congress not be notified. (b)(3)
3. Lives were at stake and the information was extremely
tightly held within the Agency. In addition, we were concerned
with wiolent retaliation the Canadians would experience at the
hands of the Iranian revolutionaries should they become aware
of Canadian assistance, extremely tight compartmentation was
instituted. The uncertainty of events in Iran land the Middle
East was underscored when, during the same time frame as the
Embassy seizure in Tehran, militant Muslims destroyed the U.S.
Embassy in Islamabad, killing an Army Warrant Officer in the
process, dependents were evacuated from Kabul because of the
instability of the Afghan regime, and the U.S. Embassy in
Tripoli was sacked.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
4. In sum, offered us a (W(1)
means of saving six Americans. He requested absolute secrecy (b)(3)
and we agreed. Former DDCT Carlucci took this caveat seriously
and specifically requested permission to brief
the President. Within this context it was clear to the
officers involved that Congress must not be briefed on the
exfiltration planning. The point is not whether a specific
document memorialized a Canadian request not to brief Congress,
but rather how experienced Agency officers interpreted
request. The recollections of those officers
involved in the meeting indicated they believed
statements revealed a clear and consistent need
information on a "close-hold" basis, which was interpreted as
precluding Congressional notification.
to Keep tnis
(b)(1)
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Central tntdligence Agency
Washtyton fl C 205(h
OCA 2522-88
The Honorable David Boren
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
2 9 JUL 1988
This is in response to your letter of 12 July requesting
the Agency provide contemporaneous documentation that the
Canadian Government conditioned its cooperation in the 1980
exfiltration of six Americans from the Canadian Mission in
Tehran on Congress not being notified in advance of the
operation.
A search of our records has revealed no contemporaneous
documentation that Canada requested Congress not be informed of
the operation. This is not surprising. Given the extreme
sensitivity of the Canadian support to our exfiltration effort,
several aspects of the operation were not committed to paper.
We have discussed Canada's support to this oper.ation with
Agency officers, some of whom are now retired, who recounted
the events surrounding the exfiltration of the six Americans.
These officers recall that a Canadian official informed senior
Agency officials on 16 November 1979 that six Embassy employees
had made their way to the Canadian Mission. This was critical
intelligence as the Agency was desperately seeking information
on the location of the hostages during the preceding two
weeks. The Canadian official stated that Canada would help in
the exfiltration of the Americans. The official insisted,
however, that the knowledge of the Americans presence in the
Mission and Canada's assistance in their exfiltration had to be
extremely limited. Two officers from the Directorate of
Operations recall that the Canadians requested "that
information must not go beyond this room." Given the almost
certain violent retaliation that would occur against Canadian
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officials in Tehran if the Iranians became aware of the
Canadian assistance, the Agency agreed to honor this request.
She Canadian official did agree to the necessity of briefing
the President, but re-emphasized his country's requirement that
no one beyond the President should be briefed.
Precise recollections vary, eight years after the fact, on
whether the Canadian specifically requested that Congress not
be informed about the operation. Ivo Directorate of Operations
officers recall that the Canadian official stipulated that
Congress not be informed; two other officers present at the
same meeting do not recall a specific statement to this
effect. Based upon subsequent discussions, these Agency
officers believed that there was an implied agreement with
Canada that Congress not be informed of the operation.
While I can understand your interest in having an accurate
historical record on this matter, I believe that the crucial
point to keep in mind is the .distinct possibility that in the
future a country will condition its cooperation with the Agency
on Congress not being notified until the extraordinary
sensitive part of the covert action operation is completed.
Without the flexibility to delay Congressional notice in such
situations, the Agency may not be able to carry out a covert
action designed to save innocent American lives. This
possibility must be seriously considered in determining the
wisdom of mandating Congressional notice within 48 hours. A
copy of this letter is being provided to Vice Chairman Cohen
and Chairman Stokes and Ranking Minority Member Hyde of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Sincerely yours,
Is! William H. Webster
William h. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
S E/R E T
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CentralftelligerbmAgncy
2 9 JUL 1(2188
leicashilr,-DC2050:,
CCA 2523-88
The honorable William Cohen
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your letter of 12 July requesting
the Agency provide contemporaneous documentation that the
Canadian Government conditioned its cooperation in the 1980
exfiltration of six Americans from the Canadian Mission in
Tehran on Congress not being notified in advance of the
operation.
A search of our records has revealed no contemporaneous
documentation that Canada requested Congress not be informed of
the operation. This is not surprising. Given the extreme
sensitivity of the Canadian support to our exfiltration effort,
several aspects of the operation were not committed to paper.
We have discussed Canada's support to this operation with
Agency officers, some of whom are now retired, who recounted
the events surrounding the exfiltration of the six Americans.
These officers recall that a Canadian official informed senior
Agency officials on 16 November 1979 that six Embassy employees
had made their way to the Canadian Mission. This was critical
intelligence as the Agency was desperately seeking information
on the location of the hostages during the preceding two
weeks. The Canadian official stated that Canada would help in
the exfiltration of the Americans. The official insisted,
however, that the knowledge of the Americans presence in the
Mission and Canada's assistance in their exfiltration had to be
extremely limited. Two officers from the Directorate of
Operations recall that the Canadians requested "that
information must not go beyond this room." Given the almost
certain violent retaliation that would occur against Canadian
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officials in Tehran if the Iranians became aware of the
Canadian assistance, the Agency agreed to honor this request.
The Canadian official did agree to the necessity of briefing
the President, but re-emphasized his country's requirement that
no one beyond the President should be briefed.
Precise recollections vary, eight years after the fact, on
whether the Canadian specifically requested that Congress not
be informed about the operation. Two Directorate of Operations
officers recall that the Canadian official stipulated that
Congress not be informed; two other officers present at the
same meeting do not recall a specific statement to this
effect. Based upon subsequent discussions, these Agency
officers believed that there was an implied agreement with
Canada that Congress not be informed of the operation.
While I can understand your interest in having an accurate
historical record on this matter, I believe that the crucial
point to keep in mind is the distinct possibility that in the
future a country will condition its cooperation with the Agency
on Congress not being notified until the extraordinary
sensitive part of the covert action operation is completed.
Without the flexibility to delay Congressional notice in such
situations, the Agency may not be able to carry out a covert
action designed to save innocent American lives. This
possibility must be seriously considered in determining the
wisdom of mandating Congressional notice within 46 hours. A
copy of this letter is being provided to Chairman Boren and
Chairman Stokes and Ranking Minority Member Hyde of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Sincerely yours,
;7f 77,18 RY
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William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
SE R E T
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� EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INWAL
ACI
X
2
DDCI ,
X
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SUSPENSE
25 Jul 88
Date
Remarks
D/OCA to respond over his signature.
Executive Secretary
12 Jul 88
_(b)(3)
3637 (441)
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From: John L. Helgerson
41,
We plan to prepare an
answer for your signature.
L./
We plan to prepare an
answer for my signature.
No answer expected or required
John, I prefer to
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� � DAVID.L. BOREN. OKLAHOMA, CHAIRMAN
WICLIAM S. COIN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN
E LLOYD BENTSEN. TEXAS WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DELAWARE
SAM NUNN, GEORGIA ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA FRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA CHIC HECHT, NEVADA
DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT DOLE. KANSAS, EX OFFICIO
SVEN E. HOLMES, STAFF DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN P. MeGHEE, CHIEF CLERK
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United eStats eSenate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475
The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Judge Webster:
July 12, 1988
#88-2637A
As you know, in the course of our deliberations on the
intelligence oversight bills, there have been repeated
references to the CIA operation to extricate U.S. hostages
from the Canadian embassy in Tehran in 1980. We have heard
repeatedly that the Canadian government explicitly
conditioned its cooperation in this matter upon the U.S.
Congress not being notified of the operation.
In reviewing their records, however, including two
subsequent hearings before the SSCI and one before the HPSCI
where this matter was discussed at length, neither Committee
has found any mention of this aspect of the operation.
Inasmuch as it is important to both Committees to have
the historical record accurate on this point, we request that
you provide both Committees with any contemporaneous
documentary evidence in CIA's possession which documents the
assertion that the Canadian government specifically
conditioned its cooperation in the operation upon the U.S.
Congress not being notified of the operation.
We ask that the Committees be advised of such evidence
by July 25, 1988.
Since
D id . Boren
Chairman
11094111111:!!
atie4iam S. Cohen
e Chairman
CC: The Honorable Louis Stokes
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
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Z-Llos-s.K
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United tates g5tnate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
,,adeLJ
The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
U.S.S
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OLC 80-0004/2
February 6, 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT Testimony on Iran Findings Before HPSCI Subcommittee on
Oversight, 7 February 1980
1. You are scheduled to appear before the Subcommittee on Oversight
of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) at 2:00 p.m.
on Thursday, 7 February 1980, to testify on the 27 December 1979
and 23 January 1980 Findings relating to Iran. The Subcommittee was
unable to accommodate our request for-an earlier time to avoid a conflict
with your travel plans. The Subcommittee Chairman, Les Aspin (D., WI),
is aware that you may have to enart heforp the Subcommittee has exhausted
its questions and expects that will (b)(1) "MI"
remain until the session ends. (b)(3)
2. You will recall that you appeared before this Subcommittee on
23 January to present the Findings of 27 and 28 December 1979 relating
to Iran, Afghanistan, Oman and Sudan. Because of a conflict in your
scheduling that day (a later appearance before the House Appropriations
Defense Subcommittee on the Reserve reprogramming), the Subcommittee
decided to take up only the Findings on Afghanistan and Iran,
order. Not only did you never get to the Finding on Iran, but had
to complete the testimony on-Afghanistan after your departure for
HAC.
4-
3. On 29 January, again appeared before the Subcommittee to
satisfy its request for briefings on all outstanding Findings, now
including those of 22 January on the Arabian Peninsula as well. Unaware
of the 23 January special Finding, Aspin agreed in advance to defer the
27 December Finding on Iran since neither you nor Hal Saunders were
available. Unfortunately, the story about the eXfiltration of the six
Americans broke on CBS that morning and I rushed over to brief Committee
Chairman Edward Boland (D., MA) before Hodding Carter's noon press
conference. In an attempt tn soften the blow further, I arranged
to have accompany to the 3:00 p.m. briefing, where we
were prepared to brief the ongressmen in Executive session on this
matter. Aspin refused to have the 23 January Finding read into the
d unless we were prepared to "open the whole Iranian bag", kicked
out of the briefing, and proceeded with testimony on the other
,
Findings.
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4. Last Thursday, at the request of Chairman Boland, provided
Tom Latimer, HPSCI Staff Director, a hriefing on the exfil n.
Earlier this week, Les Aspin called me for details on our normal notifica-
tion process in compliance with Hughes-Ryan.
5. The reactions of Les Aspin, Charlie Rose (D., NC) and Chairman
Boland to the events of the 29th may overshadow the Subcommittee's major
concerns about the earlier Finding, which can be condensed into the '
following:
6. The questions relating to the 23 January Finding are likely to
be tough and emotional. Aspin is convinced that the performance of the
Executive failed to meet the "timely" notification requirement of
Hughes-Ryan, and that our actions were therefore illegal. He will not
attempt to define "timely" in terms of hours or days but will argue that
the intent of Hughes-Ryan is certainly clear, i.e., there must be
notification before the act. He probably will not quibble about preparatory
acts--although his basic position encompasses these as well--since it is
clear that in this case all acts were completed before notification.
7. Attached are a list of Subcommittee Members, a witness list and
information sheets on Subcommittee Members.
/ ci
Frederick P. Hitz
Legislative Counsel
Attachments:
As stated
istribution:
Original - Addressee w/atts
1 ets
1 -
//atts
1 u..jec w o info sheets
1 - OLC Chrono w/o atts
OLC
(6 February 1980)
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House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Witness:
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
7 February 1980
WITNESS LIST
Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Accompanied by:
Frederick P. Hitz
Legislative Counsel, Office of the
Director of Central Intelligence
(b)(1)
Directorate
(b)(3)
of Operations
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Briefing of
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Subcommittee on Oversight
Thursday - 7 February 1980
2:00 p.m.
H-405, The Capitol
(27 December 1979 8! 23 January 1980 Findings)
Les Aspin (D., WI), Chairman -
Charles Rose (D., NC) John M. Ashbrook (R., OH)
Romano L. Mazzoli (D., KY) C. W. Bill Young (R., FL)
Staff Members
Tom Latimer, Staff Director
Leon Fuerth
Mike O'Neil
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;7
-
1 February 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT: Breakfast with Congressman Les Aspin on 5 February 1980
at 9:00 on the Hill
1. I have invited Les Aspin to meet with you three to discuss
his reservations about the procedure surrounding the Canadian Six
Finding. This seemed indicated following an hour's conversation I had
with Mr. Aspin on 30 January. We had received reports that Mr. Aspin
considered the Canadian Six Finding to be outrageous, unlawful and
totally without precedent. I met with him alone in an attempt to hear
him out. I first showed him the language of the Finding and the
Presidential memorandum in order to prove to him that it was at least
a debatable question whether timely notification had been complied
with. Although he did not agree with my interpretation, he recognized
that it was not an open and shut case.
2. The thrust of Mr. Aspin's concerns is the following. He began
with a specific comment on the Agency. He stated that over a period
of time he has come to recognize that Richard Helms' homily that "we
too are honorable men" has some justification. In that spirit, he
stated that the relationship evolving between his Oversight Committee
and the Agency on the covert action Findings was becoming constructive
and fruitful from the Committee's point of view. He was, therefore,
dismayed and disappointed at the manner in which the Canadian Six
Finding had been handled because in the end it means that the
Executive does not trust the Legislative Branch. In effect, he said
the Executive Branch does not believe that in the Congress there are
also honorable men. I replied quite the contrary. The Administration
did not view this operation as an Executive Branch - Legislative
Branch matter. It was a question of keeping the number of those
witting to the absolute minimum necessary in order to safeguard the
lives at stake. I stated that this was not just a question of U.S.
lives but Canadian as well, and that the President did not wish to take
any chances respecting their involvement. After an intense but
amicable discussion in which Mr. Aspin stated he recognized that the
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trend was in favor of the Agency but because he felt betrayed by this
obvious lack of trust, he would look for an occasion to ambush us.
I stated that I regretted this fact and wished he would meet with
the DCI, DDCI and the DDO to lay on the table the concerns he had
expressed to me. I told him that under the best of circumstances,
the President would probably only have consented to allow us to
brief the Committee Chairmen on this matter. Again I stressed
it was not a matter of trust, but a matter of operational security
where human lives were at stake. I stated that this was a question
where hard cases make bad law in the context of the "timely
notification" provision and wished that it had not been necessary.
With regard to his own behavior, I stated that many of us were
concerned by his actions on some occasions in releasing from his
office intelligence material which, though not classified, cut
pretty close to the bone. ,We are concerned by the fact that it
is he, the Chairman of the HPSCI Oversight Subcommittee, who made
these releases. We concluded that a hearing of views on both
sides was desirable.
3. Comment - We will not talk Mr. Aspin out of his opposition
to the manner in which the Canadian Six Finding was handled nor
out of his opposition to covert action operations generally.
However, we cannot really afford for this issue to become a
festering sore in our relations with him. He cant counter with
a tight band of liberals in the House and Senate and harass us
unmercifully if he puts his mind to it. I have limited goals
for a meeting between him and the DCI but believe it important
to get our case upon the record.
4. I have since learned that the HPSCI met as a Committee
on Hughes-Ryan on 31 January 1980. The meeting was to discuss
restructuring the Amendment in the light of the recent spate of
Findings and,more particularly, the Canadian Six Finding. The
issue is not whether to change Hughes-Ryan, but in what way.
According to Tom Latimer, the principal questions are how many
Committees of the Congress should be notified and when.
Mr. Latimer described the meeting as unemotional and exploratory
of the issues involved. AlthoughMr. Aspin wants prior notification
of covert action Operations, Mr. Latimer confides that
Chairman Boland realizes the President will never consent to
this. There is clear majority on the HPSCI, according to Mr. Latimer,
in favor of Hughes-Ryan change.
cc: DDCI
DDO
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15 November 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Hughes-Ryan Finding on Proposed Iran Rescue Operation
1. On 15 November at 9:20 a.m. the DCI and I met with
Dr. Brzezinski. Noting that contingency planning was moving
forward on a possible Iran rescue operation, the DCI said we
should begin to discuss legal constraints. -Specifically, it
appeared to us that if our people became involved in providing
support in the form of documentation to Delta force people being
introduced into Iran this could fall under Hughes-Ryan. We were
not sure, hoyever, and thought it best to consult the Attorney
General. *5)
2. Dr. Brzezinski emphatically stated that the President
did not wish to have anybody else knowledgeable of this planning.
He wondered why a finding was needed just for the purpose of
providing documentation. I said the documentation was being pro-
vided for people who would be used for purposes other than the
collection of intelligence. Dr. Brzezinski said this would not be
the case since the early military people going in would be those- --
providing intelligence and other support. In any event it would
not be appropriate to consult the Attorney General at this time. 581
3. Two hours later in a separate meeting the DCI raised the
question of legal authority with Secretary of Defense Brown, asking
if Defense planned to operate under the War Powers Act. Brown had
obviously not given it a lot of thought, but said he believed that
would be the case. We indicated that if the President did operate
under the War Powers Act, this eliminated our legal problem with
regard to Hughes-Ryan. {-S1
(b)(3)
a ucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
cc: DCI (handcarried in sealed envelope)
General Counsel
(b)
Approved for Release: 2020/02/27 C05849185
I 111-A1 1AI
'Approved for Release: 2020/02/27 C05849185
Central Intelligence Agency
VVashington. D. C. 20505
October 22, 1979
Commodore John Rodocanachi
Director General
Intelligence and Security
Department of National Defence
Ottawa, Canada
Dear John:
I very much appreciated your taking time to meet with me
during my recent visit to Ottawa. I found the session with you
and your staff highly productive and am delighted with our
ongoing relationship.
Thanks also for the delightful lunch. I hope you will
allow me to reciprotate on your next visit to Washington, which
I hope will not be too long in coming.
DDCI:skm (22 Oct 79)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee (via DDO)
DDCI
1 - ER
Sincerely,
Frank C. Carlucci
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/02/27 C05849185
pproved for Release: 2020/02/27 C05849185
NOTE FOR THE FILE -4' P
Visited Hqs .on 16 Nov_ .79
at the request of.t e ppci.. He met with
the DDCI Chief, NE
NE,
Purpose of visit: to discuss the Iranian crisis
and possible Canadian support. The DDCI made
an Agency plane available for
---------- -
flight to Ottawa on 16 Nov.
Approved for Release: 2020/02/27 C05849185
�
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