THE SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY: A CHANGING ROLE IN POLITICS?

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• Case Number: F-2019-00499
• Publication Date: November 1, 1987

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The South Korean Military:
A Changing Role
in Politics?
An Intelligence Assessment
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-Secret-
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EA 87-10050
November 1987
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Directorate of
Intelligence
The South Korean Military:
A Changing Role
in Politics?
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
(u)
Civ
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It
EA 87-10050
November 1987
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Secret
The South Korean Military:
A Changing Role
in Politics?
Scope Note Our judgments on the military's role in South Korean politics are based
largely on impressionistic reporting
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rather than on hard data
this paper assesses trends in military thinking and speculates on the factors
that may change the military's role in the 1990s
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November 1987
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 9 November 1987
was used in this report.
The South Korean Military:
A Changing Role
in Politics?
The charged political atmosphere in South Korea as it prepares for the
country's first direct presidential election since 1971 spotlights once again
the role of the military, historically a key actor in politics. The fact that
military officers have justified intervention at two critical junctures in the
past, by citing domestic unrest and the threat from the North, makes us
wary that they could do so again. At this point in the campaign, however,
we believe that, as long as the election process remains on track and
domestic disturbances are under control, the Army will not derail the
transition. Many of the same attitudes that guided past military forays into
politics will influence the thinking of the officer corps as it evaluates the
political scene:
� The military's perception of itself as the ultimate guardian of national
security continues to convince many officers that they have the right to
veto political developments�including election outcomes�that could
threaten that security.
� Distrust of civilian leaders' abilities to protect the national interest has
led many officers to believe the country is best served when retirees from
their ranks hold public office�including the presidency.
� Bread-and-butter issues also color military attitudes, and
many officers see an extension of military influence through
ruling-party candidate Roh Tae Woo's election as a way to protect their
wealth and status.
Notwithstanding the deep-seated views that incline the officer corps
toward intervention, countervailing trends in military thinking�
highlighted by military opposition to a declaration of martial law during
protests in June�suggest that the military elite has grown reluctant to
interfere directly in the political process:
� A tarnishing of the military's image�the result of its close association
with the highly unpopular rule of President Chun Doo Hwan and the
Army's brutal suppression of riots in Kwangju in 1980�has convinced
many officers that South Koreans have grown antagonistic toward them
and complacent about the North Korean threat
senior officers argued against martial law to quell protests in June
because they believed they could not sustain such a role in the face of
strong popular opposition.
---Thrtwat�
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� Public pressure for democratization has also affected senior officers, who
recognize that they cannot easily turn back Korea's political clock.
many junior officers share the desire for a
genuinely apolitical military, and that their superiors, while seeking to
maintain their political clout, do not want to jeopardize the democratiza-
tion process.
Over the longer term, we believe the Army's changing perception of its role
will alter the military's threshold for overt political action. In the 1990s,
the rise of a new generation to command positions and possible improve-
ments in North-South relations also could lessen the chance for coups
justified on the basis of "national security."
This information is
cret vi
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Seurcl.
Contents
Page
Scope Note
iii
Key Judgments
V
The Army and Politics
1
A Look at Military Attitudes: What Has Stayed the Same. . . 1
. . . And What Views Have Changed? 5
The Military in the 1990s: What Lies Ahead for Korea and the United States? 7
Appendixes
A. What Might Prompt Direct Military Intervention?
Vii �Seeret--
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Domestic Political Events Involving
South Korea's Army
April 1960
Student uprisings protesting reelection of President
Syngman Rhee . . . he declares martial law, but
soldiers refuse to shoot . . . Rhee resigns, Prime
Minister heads interim regime.
May 1961
Major General Park mounts coup against interim
government after student protests, labor unrest, and
economic downturn. . . Park forms ruling council
and promises return to civilian rule . . . runs for his
first presidential term in 1963.
October 1972
Park declares martial law after students protest
tighter political controls . . . oversees drafting of new
Constitution containing an indirect presidential elec-
tion system . . . martial law lifted after he is elected
under new system.
October 1979
Security Chief assassinates Park . . . Prime Minister
heads interim government, declares martial law . . .
Defense Security Commander Maj. Gen. Chun Doo
Hwan investigates Park's death.
December 1979
Chun mounts coup against the senior military claim-
ing some are implicated in Park's death . . . consoli-
dates control in military . . . begins manipulating
weak interim government.
Spring 1980
Student and labor unrest escalate, economy hits
bottom . . . Chun directs government to declare mar-
tial law, arrests opposition leader Kim Dae Jung. . .
Chun crushes riots in Kwangju.
Summer 1980
Prime Minister resigns. . . Chun elected President. .
military supports Chun's election after he begins
reforms, promises only one term.
Sccrct
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The South Korean Military:
A Changing Role
in Politics?
The Army and Politics
The South Korean Army has been trained and disci-
plined primarily as a professional military force, but
the reality of the North Korean threat has given it a
rationale for intervening directly in domestic politics
at two critical junctures since 1960 (see inset). In
1961, the turmoil of a bitterly fought election after
the ouster of Syngman Rhee, including considerable
social and economic dislocation, prompted Maj. Gen.
Park Chung Hee to seize power from the fledgling
parliamentary government. In 1980, then Maj. Gen.
Chun Doo Hwan used student and labor protests to
justify ousting the weak government that took over
after President Park's assassination in 1979. In both
cases, military leaders with political ambition tapped
widespread concern among senior officers over the
dangers of political instability to build consensus for a
military coup
We do not know whether the political situation in
South Korea once again holds the seeds for military
intervention on the scale of 1961 or 1980. Ruling-
party presidential candidate Roh Tae Woo's dramatic
concessions to the political opposition in June 1987
(see inset, "The Military and Roh's Proposal") de-
fused a crisis that some observers believed threatened
to draw in the military for a third time, but the
atmosphere remains charged. Indeed, many South
Koreans are not optimistic, expecting renewed turmoil
as they prepare for a presidential election this Decem-
ber, the transition in February, and the Olympics next
summer
As always, the Army will watch for escalating student
demonstrations, labor unrest, or other political turns
that by its lights might invite North Korean aggres-
sion. As important, when they consider a possible
ruling-party defeat in the country's first direct presi-
dential election since 1971, will be senior officers'
views of themselves as the custodians of the military's
interests and the future of the officer corps.
A Look at Military Attitudes: What Has
Stayed the Same...
Military officers appear to be guided by many of the
same attitudes in 1987 that set the stage for their past
forays into South Korean politics. Perhaps most im-
portant, in our judgment, is their view that they�not
a civilian leadership�remain the ultimate guardian
of national security, with the corollary that deter-
rence of North Korean aggression depends on main-
taining political and social stability. Efforts by P'yon-
gyang since the Korean war to destabilize the South
have reinforced the Army's belief that it must remain
on guard.' this sense of
threat as well as mission have, in turn, strengthened
the view that the Army should have veto power over
government actions that could jeopardize national
security.
both Junior and senior officers contin-
ue to use the term "political instability"�without
elaboration�as a catchphrase to justify a direct
military role in politics:
.
mili-
tary officers generally recognize the danger posed
by an unpopular President Chun's extending his
term, one officer said last year that the Army would
support such a move if widespread political unrest�
and the ensuing threat of North Korean
aggression�required it
� When describing what would prompt Army leaders
to follow orders for martial law during protests in
June 1987, a senior officer referred to the military's
role as the "last rampart" of national security,
'North Korean efforts to spark political chaos in the South have
ranged from a commando raid on the presidential Blue House in
1968�foiled by security guards�to the Rangoon bombing in
1983�when 18 senior South Korean officials were killed
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V V
The Military and Roh's Proposal
In his speech on 29 June 1987, ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) Chairman Roh Tae Woo said that meet-
ings with prominent South Koreans had convinced him that Seoul had to meet opposition and dissident de-
mands for a direct presidential election system and lifting of political controls.
Issue Promised Action
Presidential
election
system
Presidential
election law
Political
rights
Basic rights
Free speech
Local
autonomy
Political
dialogue
Social
purification
Scrap indirect presidential
election system . . . revise
Constitution after agree-
ment between DJP and
opposition.
Rewrite election law to
ensure a fair election.
Restore all Kim Dae Jung's
rights suspended in 1980 . . .
release political detainees.
Reform Constitution to bol-
ster basic rights, including
ensuring human rights and
limiting prisoner detention.
Abolish Basic Press Law,
which permits censorship of
media.
Expand self-government by
forming local legislative
councils.
Increase interparty talks to
avoid social conflict.
Progress
DJP and opposition drafted
new charter in September
. . . passed National Assem-
bly and approved by nation-
al referendum in late
October.
Revision of presidential
election law passed by
Assembly.
Kim's rights restored in
July . . . government has re-
leased 2,000 political viola-
tors and suspects.
New rights include writ of
habeas corpus, workers'
rights to strike and bargain
collectively.
Law still on books but not
enforced . . . change pending
that retains controls on sen-
sitive security issues.
Discussion of system under
way but final action may be
put off until next year.
Opposition taking part in a
dialogue for implementing
reforms.
Reinvigorate efforts to bring Unknown.
"common criminals" to
justice.
The Military's View
Although most officers favored
existing system as guarantee-
ing a DJP win, many support-
ed the move initially as way to
stifle unrest.
Many officers expected the
DJP to stack the new law in its
favor.
Strong military opposition to
the move . . . concern that Kim
and other "Communists" re-
leased will foment unrest.
Concern freer environment has
opened the way for student and
labor unrest . . . fear the situa-
tion will worsen.
Adds to concerns about politi-
cal climate.
Unknown.
Probably views this as accept-
able as long as DJP does not
appear to be conceding to too
many opposition demands.
Not likely to object to this
provision.
Secret
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Closely associated with this self-proclaimed role as
guardian of stability is the conviction among many
officers that civilians have failed to fashion policies
to protect the country from external attack. The
judgment, in our view, reflects the legacy and biases
of Korea's political culture, with its militaristic heri-
tage; long history of strong, one-man rule; and 35
years of Japanese occupation until 1945. Many Kore-
ans believe that civilian mismanagement of the gov-
ernment led to the North Korean invasion in 1950. In
military ranks the sense remains strong that similar
malfeasance required the interventions by Park and
Chun to rescue the nation.
Korea Military
Academy (KMA) graduates in particular see military
leaders today as best qualified to run the government.
the KMA
faculty indoctrinates cadets with the notion that many
university students do not take the North Korean
threat seriously�a view of civilians that officers later
appear to project onto university-educated politicians
and bureaucrats. The monopoly of leadership roles
held by KMA graduates makes their political atti-
tudes especially important. Although they constitute a
minority of Army officers, KMA graduates are dis-
proportionately influential in military decision
makingH over 80 percent
of active duty general grade officers are academy
graduates
We believe this elitist attitude plays a major role in
shaping military thinking on the succession and the
question of intervention.
officers at all levels believe the country's�as
well as the military's�interests will be best served if
Chun's successor comes from retired officer ranks.
This attitude appears to be the linchpin of military
support for ruling-party candidate�and retired
General�Roh Tae Woo. When asked by US officials
who else might be qualified to run the country, most
3
officers list retired KMA graduates, such as Defense
Minister Chong Ho Yong, who are active in politics.
staff officers at the
Defense Ministry who have been among the strongest
advocates of an apolitical military stumble on the
issue of genuine civilian leadership
for example, many of these officers
are saying the country will not be ready for a "truly"
civilian leader until Roh serves a full presidential
term.
Just as the military views its own as best suited to
govern, the Army deeply distrusts the opposition's
abilities to run the country. Since 1960, senior mili-
tary officers have been suspicious of leaders Kim Dae
Jung and Kim Young Sam�who have dominated
opposition ranks�and their concerns are probably
even stronger now as an election approaches in which
either one, or both, of the Kims will challenge the
ruling camp. We suspect fear about reprisals under an
opposition leadership accounts for much of the mili-
tary's concern
some officers believe an opposition-led government
would attempt to hold the military responsible for
suppressing the bloody Kwangju riots in 1980 and use
the issue to purge the officer corps.
he military is particu-
larly concerned that, as president, Kim Dae Jung
would introduce policies similiar to those he called for
in his 1971 presidential campaign, including immedi-
ate reunification with the North and decreased mili-
tary spending. Indeed,
that even junior officers�too young to remember
Kim's former political agenda�view him as a danger-
ous radical whose leadership would likely plunge the
country into chaos
Our lack of solid evidence on plans to deal with Kim
makes it impossible to distinguish between hardline
posturing and preparations for action, but military
talk are
considering their options should Kim win. Some se-
nior officers have pointedly told US officials the
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military would accept an opposition victory by a
popular majority. Others have threatened action if
Kim Dae Jung is elected:
� The most highly publicized example occurred in
July, when Chief of Staff Park Hee Do told foreign
reporters that "something unhappy" would happen
to Kim if he ran�a comment at a minimum
designed to intimidate both Kim and his supporters.
Kim Young Sam may have
only a slightly better chance of winning military
acceptance: the military
would adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude if he is
elected. Claims from Kim Young Sam's supporters
that he is backed by military officers from his native
Kyongsang-namdo (South Kyongsang) Province are
exaggerated
Bread-and-butter issues also appear to color military
attitudes. Since Park took power in 1961, military
leaders have accrued economic and social, as well as
political status. the background of and
reaction to Chun's seizure of power in 1980 suggests
senior military leaders viewed it as one way to protect
their social and financial standing after Park's death.
We believe status concerns among officers have inten-
sified in recent years as economic and social changes
driven by modernization have created competing
elites. Alternate routes to the top of the political,
economic, and social pyramid have been spawned by
increased corporate management opportunities and
broader access to university education. As a result,
civilians are actively competing for the standing the
military once dominated by virtue of its early monop-
oly on management training, access to leadership
opportunities, and intimate involvement with the gov-
erning process.
Ironically perhaps, past concern about status within
the Army itself�specifically, worries about interfer-
ence in the Army's promotion process�also has
translated into support for military intervention. Polit-
ical manipulation of promotions�begun under Syng-
man Rhee in the 1950s�has exacerbated factional-
ism that exists along regional and educational lines in
the officer corps,
President Park's tendency to favor "boot-
strap" officers who received OCS-style training that
was standard before the first four-year KMA class
graduated in 1955, as well as his promotion of officers
from his native Kyongsang-bukto (North Kyongsang)
Province, appears to have driven others to support
Chun's 1979 coup Chun
and his backers�whose careers suffered for a time
under Park�may have moved preemptively after
Park's death to seize control in the military to avoid
losing out to Park's former favorites.'
Chun's effort to
build a network of loyalists in the military has
continued to aggravate rifts, particularly between
senior members of various KMA classes who are
vying for promotions and critical assignments
has deliber-
ately created tensions between the classes�for exam-
ple, by selecting younger generals as personal advisers
to undercut the top brass and reduce the potential for
coup plotting. Chun's interference in the promotion
process also has drawn widespread criticism from
junior- and middle-level officers who face longer time-
in-grade restrictions because the President has ex-
tended the careers of loyal senior officers. According
to the defense attache, many officers compare promo-
tions in the Chun military to the "crony system"
under Park.
'In the early 1970s, Park believed Chun and others from KMA 11
were members of a faction under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Yun
P'il Yong, then Commander of the Capital Security Command.
Yun was convicted in 1973 on charges of bribery and extortion and
went to prison. Most military observers believe that the move
against him was intended to discourage KMA "comers" in Yun's
faction such as Chun from trying a coup against President Park.
Chun restored Yun's military commission and retired him in 1980.
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... And What Views Have Changed?
Notwithstanding the entrenched attitudes and inter-
ests that buttress the military's rationalization of its
political role, there are signs that senior officers are
increasingly reluctant to become directly involved in
the political process. These crosscurrents emerging in
military perceptions and thinking complicate any
effort to make "straight line" projections of the
Army's political behavior based on what happened in
1961 and 1980
In our judgment, worry among officers over the
military's poor public image�a result of the Army's
close association with an unpopular Chun and its role
in suppressing the riots at Kwangju (see inset)�bears
on their view of political intervention.
senior officers are aware of popular
distrust of the military's intentions and would avoid
intervening directly in politics unless the public sup-
ported the move. Over the past seven years, public
antipathy toward the Army has made most senior
officers sensitive to rebuilding their reputation as
professionals. We believe most officers are counting
on Chun's departure from office to ease the criticism
they have shouldered during his tenure
Beyond the albatross of Chun's unpopular rule
senior
officers are worried that public cynicism toward the
military has prompted many Koreans to question the
government's warnings about the threat from North
Korea. senior officers
fear that a frequent use of the external threat to
justify unpopular domestic policies�such as harsh
crackdowns on dissidents over the past year�has led
South Koreans to lower their guard. Even in its own
ranks, the military hierarchy is concerned that junior
officers�too young to remember the Korean war�
are sympathetic to antigovernment slogans and com-
placent about the North.
We believe uneasiness about the consequences of a
tarnished image abroad has prompted officers to see
direct intervention in politics more negatively than in
the past. many feared�probably
correctly�that South Korea would have lost the right
to host the 1988 Olympics if the Army had intervened
5
The Legacy of Kwangju
The military's reputation was badly damaged by the
Army's role in suppressing riots in the provincial city
of Kwangju in 1980. The riots began when then Prime
Minister Choi Kyu Ha�under pressure from Chun
and the military�declared nationwide martial law
to cope with student unrest. When local police failed
to contain the riots, Chun dispatched special forces,
and a bloody battle ensued. The official count put '
civilian deaths at over 200, while dissident and
human rights groups claimed the number was well
over 1,000. Kwangju's residents responded with a
full-scale insurrection, seizing weapons and firing on
police and military forces. Chun eventually used
regular Army troops from the 20th Division to retake
the city with little additional bloodshed. Although
the government conducted an investigation, and the
Prime Minister eventually resigned, Seoul has never
accepted responsibility for the incident or punished
the officers responsible.
immediately after Kwangju
indicated deep public bitterness toward the govern-
ment and the military for the bloodshed. The US
Embassy reported in June 1980 that civilians who
were already questioning the military's intentions
after Chun's headquarters coup in 1979�and his
dominance of the weak Choi government�became
even more distrustful of military leaders
many senior officers see
Chun's inability to shake the stigma of Kwangju as
his greatest failure. Many view his departure from
politics as the only way for the military to remove the
taint of Kwangju and regain public trust
Contacts of the US Embassy indicate,
however, that emotions continue to run high on the
issue, suggesting public antipathy may continue well
into the post-Chun era. In Kwangju, in particular,
most citizens remain bitter toward the government
and the military, as well as the United States�
because Chun used troops from the 20th Division,
which is under the Combined Forces Command.
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directly in the domestic situation last June.
many
are eager to avoid an international impression that
Korea is politically "backward" despite its economic
progress
are particularly sensitive to comparisons be-
tween their ranks and politically minded�but in their
view inferior�militaries in the Philippines and Cen-
tral America.
Evolving views on democracy also appear to be shap-
ing the military's attitudes toward its role in politics.
popular sympathy
for dissident protests in June impressed on most Army
leaders that the public wants democratic change and
is willing to tolerate some turmoil to achieve it.
many senior officers believe the government must at
least appear to be moving toward democratization to
quiet domestic unrest. This view is particularly note-
worthy, in our judgment, because
many military
leaders, including Roh, believed a tight lid on dissent
would maintain order until after the transition.
hanges in military atti-
tudes go beyond a general recognition of popular
desire for democratization. According to the US
Embassy, the extent of public support for student
demands in June prompted even some hardline senior
officers to come out in favor of limited reform�
although their change in perspective may not be
permanent. Indeed, many senior officers seem to have
been counting on modest concessions to calm unrest
and safeguard the ruling party's grip on power.
their dissatisfaction with Roh's
lukewarm campaign performance suggest frustration
over the public's clamor for even more reforms than
the ruling camp has offered.
We believe a more fundamental change has taken
place in junior- and middle-level ranks, where youn-
ger officers seem to have experienced a stronger
commitment to democratization�including an apolit-
ical role for the military.
many younger officers have said they favor
Roh's democratization proposal as a step toward
strengthening political institutions and lessening the
chances for political instability. Moreover, they be-
lieve South Korea's economic development cannot be
sustained without political change.
Although the sampling of opinion is unscientific, a
more flexible view of the need for political reform
among younger officers would square with a similiar
perception apparent among the younger Korean gen-
eration as a whole. We also believe other factors
specific to the military could account for this emerg-
ing attitude among younger officers:
� Many have been exposed to Western attitudes dur-
ing training stints in the United States, giving them
views on governing styles that diverge from those of
their seniors.
� Even in Korea, changed training patterns have
affected their perceptions. Higher levels of schooling
in the military�in areas such as engineering and
management�appear to have produced a crop of
younger officers who are confident they can gain
postmilitary jobs without a political system geared
to favor them.
Finally, US views may be carrying more weight,
especially when considered in conjunction with the
military's new concern with its image. US opposition
to military intervention has not prevented the Army
from stepping into politics in the past,
against such a move in June, as well
as in solidifying a consensus in favor of Roh's democ-
ratization proposal. After private and public US
warnings about the consequences of martial law, the
US Embassy reported that military leaders, who had
been on the political fence, strongly urged Chun
against it.
Defense Minister Chong Ho Yong also pointed to US
opposition to martial law in his efforts to line up
military support for Roh's proposal.
6
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In sum, the military's evident reluctance to intervene
in politics unless it can count on popular support,
heightened concern for its image at home and abroad,
and sensitivity to US views, in our judgment, will
offer strong competition to the type of pressures that
led officers to move in 1961 and 1980. Without a
major threat to their or the nation's interests, we do
not believe military leaders will take action to derail
South Korea's first direct presidential election in 16
years. Nonetheless, past experience shows that a
decision to act will be difficult to discern-
The Military in the 1990s: What Lies Ahead
for Korea and the United States?
We believe senior officers already are adjusting their
approach to politics as they seek to retain power in a
country that increasingly demands civilian suprem-
acy. Ruling-party leaders�and retired generals, such
as Chong Ho Yong�are seeking more acceptable
ways to maintain a military hand in politics. For
example, Chong as early as two years ago counseled
Roh that he must distance himself from Chun to win
popular support for his potential candidacy, instead of
relying on Chun's financial and political machine to
deliver the election
In any event, we believe the military's criteria for
intervention will continue to evolve. The reality of a
system built on politicized promotions and a firmly
entrenched patron-client format designed to weed out
young officers unwilling to play politics is certain to
offer considerable resistance to quick or broad-range
change in military views. Nonetheless, generational
pressures in the lower officer ranks for an apolitical
military have already made a coup harder to mount,
and we expect that younger officers will carry forward
some legacy of support for a professional military as
they enter senior positions.
A change in North-South relations over the next
decade may also reshape military thinking. In our
view, a durable modus vivendi between the North and
South�for example, the development of an active
dialogue, lowered military tensions, and agreements
on economic and cultural exchanges�would make it
harder for the military to use national security as a
rationale for intervention. Even so, if military leaders
continue to see P'yongyang as posing a sustained
challenge to South Korea's survival�no matter what
foreign policy initiatives a civilian government
undertakes�we believe they are highly unlikely to
divest themselves of their option to exercise a direct
role in politics.
Evolving attitudes in the South Korean military carry
clear benefits for Washington. Indeed, recognition in
the Army of popular desires for democratic change
and civilian supremacy has already diminished the
prospects for coups launched primarily to achieve the
personal ambitions of politically minded officers.
Nonetheless, even under the best of circumstances�
steady progress toward a more open democratic sys-
tem without serious domestic unrest�we expect the
political signals from the South Korean military to be
mixed. Tension between old and new attitudes also
may complicate communication between South
Korean military leaders and US officials. Senior
officers who recognize US concerns about military
intervention are certain to reassure their US counter-
parts. But they could obscure or omit deep-seated
attitudes that are likely to continue to weigh heavily
in shaping the thinking and behavior of the Army's
leadership. Under such circumstances, Washington is
certain to find it more difficult to detect the signs of a
military coup.
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Appendix A
What Might Prompt Direct
Military Intervention?
Changing attitudes within the military, evident in
June when the Army argued against martial law,
suggest the threshold for direct intervention in politics
is rising. The path toward democracy Roh set last
summer is uncharted, however, and the stakes are
high for all the key actors in the transition. For some
presidential candidates, December's direct election
might offer the final opportunity to win power. We
believe the volatility of the political situation,
warrants consideration of what could make the mili-
tary decide to step in:
Escalation of Student and Labor Unrest. In our
view, a repeat of the widespread dissident protests
that occurred in June�when thousands of South
Koreans opposed Chun's cancellation of the consti-
tutional revision effort�could prompt many senior
officers to reverse their opposition to martial law.
Although the widespread student protests that many
observers predicted this fall failed to materialize,
moderate and radical groups
alike have continued to plan strategy.
many dissident organizations
lack strong political organizations and are consider-
ing using demonstrations to influence the election
outcome. In light of recent progress the political
parties have made in forging agreement on a direct
presidential election, we believe most officers would
view renewed dissident protests as an effort to
destabilize the government. A resurgence of labor
unrest in the politically charged atmosphere this
fall�workers may be tempted to make additional
demands with election campaigns under full
swing�could also force the military's hand.
� Impending Ruling-Party Defeat. It has become in-
creasingly clear that Kim Dae Jung's candidacy
represents the main potential provocation that could
bring military intervention before election day.
Faced with an impending victory by Kim Dae Jung,
senior officers could calculate that a preemptive
strike would be less politically risky for them and
their institutional interests than a postelection coup,
when they would have to move against South
Korea's first democratically elected president on
the eve of the Olympic Games.
The problems of a postelection environment could also
prompt military intervention:
� A Contested Election and Widespread Demonstra-
tions. A seriously tainted ruling-party victory that
raised opposition charges of election fraud might
produce military action�with officers fearing
North Korean aggression in the face of widespread
unrest and a government without legitimacy. In-
deed, politically minded officers might be tempted
to try to step into the breach, calculating they would
meet little public resistance to their move to prevent
a badly tainted president-elect from taking office.
� An Opposition Victory and Government Disarray.
An opposition victory that ushers in a badly faction-
alized coalition government�not out of the question
given the rivalry between the Kims�could prompt
the military to act. Any sign that the new govern-
ment intended to extract wholesale retribution from
the military for alleged crimes under the Chun
government might also lead military leaders to
consider a coup.
� Radical Violence in the Aftermath of a Fair Elec-
tion. Although this development may be the least
likely, the US Embassy suggests that some minority
faction in the radical movement might try to launch
violent demonstrations in an effort to draw military
intervention and mar South Korea's first democratic
transition. Radical dissidents, who favor revolution-
ary change, might hope such a move would prevent
a clean election from handing them a major political
setback. Many South Koreans might initially sup-
port a military role in this case, but questions among
senior officers about how, when, and whether, to
return the government to civilian rule before the
Olympics could erode public support.
This appendix is
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