SOUTH KOREA'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION A DIFFICULT ROAD TO TRANSITION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05828916
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00238
• Publication Date: November 1, 1987

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Directorate of
Intelligence
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South Korea's Presidential Election:
A Difficult Road to Transition
EA M 87-20217
November 1987
CoPY 0 7 6
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Central Intelligence Agency
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Ntshingtort D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
03 December 1987
South Korea's Presidential Election:
A Difficult Road to Transition
Summary
The more open political groundrules in South Korea have produced
a heated national leadership race with high stakes for the contenders and
other key actors. The ruling party and the military face the real possibility
of losing power and perhaps the loss of financial and personal security as
well. The opposition has its first chance to gain the presidency in 16
years. For their part, radicals will confront a major political setback if the
transition is peaceful.
In our view, an election widely viewed in South Korea as legitimate
is necessary but not sufficient to bring about a smooth transfer of power.
A clear mandate for the winner also is an important factor. On both
counts we see reason for concern:
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of East. Asian Analysis
Information available as
of 03 December was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to Chief, Northeast Asia Division, 0EA
EA M 87-20217
WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED
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� The opposition already is poised to cry foul if Roh wins whatever the
evidence of cheating.
� With no sign that any of the four mai7r candidates will drop out, the odds
favor a plurality winner.
The behavior of the Army and the radicals--both potential roadblocks to a
smooth transfer of power--for now appears less worrisome than had been expected
only a few months ago. The Army seems inclined to stay on the sidelines during the
election, and the radicals have failed to muster support.
We believe Koreans could initially accept Roh as President even if he won by a
slim plurality, as long as the ruling party was perceived by Koreans as having refrained
from wholesale cheating. Nonetheless, Roh would need to show progress on his
promises of political reform in order to maintain the inner hand and prevent a
resurgence in protests.
a win by either Kim
Young Sam or Kim Dae Jung would carry more legitimacy. But an opposition-led
government would face challenges from senior military officers who would see
weaknesses or other shortcomings through the prism of national security.
In any event, the transition is only the first of several hurdles the government will
face. The president must guide the ruling party and the opposition to agreement on a
new national assembly election law, hold parliamentary elections before April, and
manage what is expected to be a more diverse and competitive legislative body. At the
same time, he will continue to face pressures from the right and left, with military
leaders anxious to protect themselves, and their share of the pie, and radical dissidents
still committed to revolutionary change.
The Election and Political Reform
After 25 years of rule by military-dominated governments, South Korean voters
will have their first opportunity since 1971 to vote in a direct election for president
when they go to the polls on 16 December. The foundation for the contest and for a
democratic transfer of power was laid in June. Massive demonstrations then protesting
President Chun Doo Hwan's earlier abandonment of his commitment to revise the
Constitution led ruling party presidential candidate Roh Tae Woo to promise major steps
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toward political reform (see inset). A national referendum in October overwhelmingly
endorsed an interparty agreement establishing a new Constitution with direct election
procedures.'
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In a political environment dramatically different even from that of six months ago,
three main contenders are challenging Roh in a heated race. Two opposition
leaders--the former presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung, and his rival Kim (b)(1)
Young Sam--are vying for power. On the right, former Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil,
who returned from exile earlier this year, is competing directly with Rob for conservative
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The new ground rules create high stakes for the contenders and other potentially
critical actors in the process:
� Aside from the possibility of losing power, the ruling party faces the thrpat nf
legal, financial, and personal reprisals from an opposition victor.
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� As the de facto foundation of the ruling camp, the military almost certainly is
worried that an opposition victory could bring a purge of its ranks as well as a
loss of financial and social status.
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� With their first chance at power in 16 years, opposition leaders must consider the
consequences of a loss Defeat would undermine their
longstanding claim that only government duplicity and a political process stacked
in the ruling camp's favor have kept them from office.
� For radical activists�intermittently powerful catalysts of change--a credible
election would be a major setback. Before June, many leftists undoubtedly
counted on popular repudiation of Roh's succession under the old Constitution to
fuel support for revolutionary change.
1 The previous, indirect presidential election system called for an electoral college of
over 5,000 delegates to select the president. The process was heavily stacked in the
government's favor
inevitable.
Making a victory for the ruling party
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The Path to Direct Presidential Elections
February Opposition campaigns for National Assembly elections on
1985 platform demanding direct presidential election system...wins
surprisingly large minority of seats.
February Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam launch signature campaign
March to press Chun to agree to revise Constitution and adopt
1986 direct elections...after obtaining over 1 million signatures,
Kims begin street demonstrations...emboldened by "people
power" in the Philippines that deposes President Marcos.
May Continuing protests prompt Chun to establish interparty
1986 committee in parliament to consider changing Constitution.
April After year of political brinksmanship that prevents
1987 parties from making progress on constitutional revision,
Chun announces election will be held in December under existing
electoral college system... most South
Koreans see move as proof Chun plans to manage the election
and hand off to a chosen successor.
June Chun endorses Roh Tae Woo candidacy and ruling party confirms
1987 Roh at national convention...demands for direct presidential
elections mount, leading to widespread demonstrations...to
defuse unrest Roh proposes dramatic reforms, including direct
presidential election.
July Chun blesses Roh's proposal...groundwork for negotiations
1987 between the parties begins.
September Ruling and opposition parties agree on draft
1987 constitutional amendment establishing direct elections and
changes in presidential election law.
October
1987
New system is approved in nearly unanimous National
Assembly vote...gains overwhelming public approval in
national referendum.
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Keys to a Stable Transition
In our view, an election outcome widely regarded as legitimate is the most
critical factor for a stable transfer of power. Most Koreans expect campaign
improprieties on both sides, and
Nonetheless, the onus for ensuring a fair contest clearly rests with the government.
Heavy handed tactics--such as strong-arming voters, coercing or manipulating the
military vote, or stuffing the ballot boxes--would undermine the credibility of a Roh
victory. In the worst case, an obviously fraudulent election could provoke a public
outcry at least as intense as the June protests.
A winner with a clear popular mandate also would help ensure stability. A solid
win--for example, one that approached a simple majority--would undercut those who
are prepared to cry "foul," as well as deter military officers who might consider an
extralegal challenge to an opposition victor. Indeed,
public opinion remains a determining factor in the military's view of its political options.
The behavior of both the Army and the radicals--always South Korea's
potential spoilers on the right and left, respectively�is crucial to a successful transition.
Military leaders remain intimately involved in the electoral process. As practical
helpmates to the ruling camp, they control the indoctrination, if not the votes, of their
troops, Beyond that, the
military is a ratifier of the election outcome, with the option to overturn the results.
The radicals occupy a similar niche within the opposition camp. As an organized force,
they can turn out supporters; as potentially disruptive challengers to the establishment,
they can polarize the political scene, precipitate a crackdown and derail the electoral
process.
The Election: Out of the Starting Blocks
public comments by Koreans
generally underscore the fact that many in the ruling party, the opposition, and the
military are sensitive to popular expectations for a fair election.
politicians of all stripes recognize the risks of domestic unrest
and international censure--for example, the damage that could be inflicted on South
Korea's prestige and the dangers posed to a successful hosting of the 1988 Seoul
Olympics--if the political process is disrupted. Even so, the competitive pressures and
the prospect of defeat will loom larger as the ruling and opposition parties approach the
end of a heated contest. As the race enters the home stretch, we see several danger
signs.
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The ruling party does not appear well organized, unified behind its
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candidate, or confident that it can win. According to a variety of reports, the
Democratic Justice Party remains split between moderates who support Roh and his
reform initiatives and hardliners who remain loyal to Chun. Criticism of Roh for lifting
the lid on dissent--and for depriving the ruling party of a presidential election system
that guaranteed victory--also continues to surface, suggesting that, despite the
campaign, the conservatives have yet to pull together as a cart
political team.
The effects of these divisions are likely to become more worrisome as election
day approaches.
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No matter how far the ruling party goes--a decision that is likely to come at the
last minute, when an opposition victory appears imminent--all three of Roh's major
rivals are preparing to contest the outcome. Both Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam
have �ubliclv denounced ruling art election_soendin
The issue of a clear mandate also promises to be troublesome. With four major
contenders and four minor candidates in the field, we see the odds strongly favoring a
plurality, rather than a majority winner. The main development that could change this
outlook is a compromise between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam that would
produce one opposition challenger. Both recognize one opposition competitor would
wage a far more effective campaign:
the opposition would probably win a fair
contest it only one of the Kims ran
a majority of Koreans disapprove of the Kims'
dual candidacies.
� The dual candidacy of the two Kims also may well deprive them of political
backers over the longer run. their younger faction
members are annoyed that the Kims are putting personal ambitions ahead of a
commitment to beat Roh. This could produce defections after the elertion if Rnh
wins.
We doubt the atmosphere between now and 16 December will offer many
opportunities for reconciliation between the two Kims. Antipathy between their
supporters has already been evident in several scuffles during the campaign, suggesting
that strong pressure for accommodation is unlikely from below. Moreover, distrust
between the two men runs deep: Kim Dae Jung outmaneuvered Kim Young Sam in
1971 for the opposition's presidential nomination, and at this point neither is likely to
turn to the other to look after his political fortunes.
Given military leaders' potential roles as spoilers, their actions and those of
radical dissidents ironically have proved less worrisome than those of the ruling party
and the opposition.
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The radical movement, the main catalyst that could change the military's attitude,
in our view, has been unsuccessful in winning broad popular support. Since Roh's (b)(1)
reform proposals won widespread backing in June, radical organizers have failed to (b)(3)
enlist student, labor, and other sympathizers. efforts to
snatch ballot boxes during the October plebiscite on the new Constitution were roundly (b)(1
criticized in the press. Similiar disruptive tactics to undercut Roh's campaign by (b)(3)
instigating egg and bomb throwing incidents also have backfired
winning Roh some sympathy, if not support.
We believe the splits in radical ranks over strategy in the election period will
undermine the radicals' ability to derail the campaign.
the radical leadership is divided, but several groups
already have shifted gears to concentrate on the postelection period.
many groups are focused on organizing new members, rather than
preparing violent tactics to avoid alienating potential backers who sunnort thp plprtino
process.
Outlook
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With several weeks left before the election and shifts likely in voter attitudes as
well as in the behavior of the four competitors themselves, it is too early to pinpoint the
factors that will make or break the candidates' fates.3 Given the current signs that a
winner will only gain a plurality of the vote, the public perception of.the election's
legitimacy will be central to how events unfold after 16 December:
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3 For a closer look at factors that will influence voting patterns see DI Intelligence
Assessment EA-87-10051 November 1987 South Korpa's Mnva Tnwarri
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Democracy: A New Look at the Electorate.
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� We believe Koreans could initially accept a Roh victory, even by a slim plurality,
as long as the ruling party refrained from wholesale election cheating. Roh
almost certainly would win a measure of tolerance, if not an initial "honeymoon"
period, for successfully keeping the political process on track. He already has
gained respect for his bold reform steps in June, and many Koreans give him
high marks for his ability to run the country and maintain stability, according to a
variety of reports. But, he would need to show progress in fulfilling his promises
of political reform in order to maintain the upper hand, prevent a resurgence in
protests, and avoid the pervasive unpopularity that plagued the Chun government.
victory would carry a
strong measure of legitimacy to most Koreans. Depending on the policies tabled
by a new administration in Seoul, however, the opposition's lack of governing
experience could emerge rapidly as an issue and perhaps as a political danger
point. While a Kim Dae Jung or a Kim Young Sam also would enjoy a
"honeymoon" period of sorts, the opposition has already advanced proposals for
broadbrush social, economic, and political reform that are certain to mit pit hr
man under pressure to demonstrate quick results.
Even with legitimacy initially on his side, the new president will face potential
challenges from a watchful military and radical element, each with a potentially
disruptive agenda. Indeed, both the military radicals oaethecireatest threat to
If an opposition president-elect indicates he
retaliatewill against the military for real or alleged past transgressions, the odds
favoring intervention will rise considerably:
Indeed, a weak or ineffective opposition-led government--no
matter how legitimate the election outcome--would face risks from senior
military pificers wh
security.
In addition, a variety of reports indicate that the radicals see the postelection
period as their best chance to foment unrest. They reportedly expect election
impropriety by the government, followed by opposition cries of foul play, to allow them
to tap widespread popular dissatisfaction. They also almost certainly hope many on
campus--historically their main recruiting ground--will be disillusioned, enabling them
to expand their ranks and press new challenges on the government.
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Even if the military establishment remains on the sidelines and radical activity is
ineffectual, the new president will have to cope with a wide range of political challenges
as he consolidates his control. Given South Korea's postwar history of dictatorial
executives, one-party rule, and neutered legislatures, the nuts and bolts of governing in
the wake of a major step toward democratization would be a serious test for the new
government.
As president-elect with defacto power, Roh or one of the Kims will immediately
need to lead the government and opposition to agree on a National Assembly election
law. With legislative elections required under the new Constitution by April 1988,
success in that effort will be an immediate measure of his skills--and a scorecard on
his leadership. Similarly, the election for the National Assembly will nrovide voters their
first chance to pass judgment on the new government.
Most political observers agree that a new electoral system to choose the
legislature will produce a more diverse and competitive body. 4 The odds do not favor
legislative cooperation and efficiency, with the possibility of a president without clear
control of the executive on the one hand and no tradition of political compromise in
Korea on the other hand. Indeed, we have few reasons to expect pressures or
confrontational tactics by losing opposition politicians to abate.
In our judgment, South Korea's initial crises in 1988 could well occur because of
relatively mundane matters--for example, the passage of routine legislation such as the
budget--rather than because of battles over major national policy issues. A new leader
also will face the demands to deliver on campaign promises--such as higher
wages--from constituents emboldened by the success of street demonstrations in June.
And old pressures, such as those from big business, anxious to ensure that its interests
are served, and from the military, seeking to protect its status and share of the
budgetary pie, will be no less significant in 1988.
af The current National Assembly election law strongly favors the ruling party, providing
it with a solid majority if it wins only 25 percent of the vote.
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