PROJECT CHIGOE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05752560
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2021
• Case Number: F-2011-01575
• Publication Date: December 20, 1966

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20 December 1966
Project CHIGOE
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this paper is as follows:
To bring Project CHIGOE into proper focus by
summarizing in one paper the chronology of the
developing program as it affects OSA with spe-
cial emphasis on the responsibilities of SS/OSA.
To distinguish CHIGOE from other "usual" OSA
programs with an analysis of the security pro-
blems which its "unusual" nature has created.
To recommend a course of action for SS/OSA in
an effort to preclude a future reoccurrence of
security problems inherent in CHIGOE and other
"hybrid" projects;----
II. CHRONOLOGY (Based upon SS/OSA file material)
A. On 19 November 1965, two DD/S&T representatives
visited officers of LTV Electro Systems, Inc., at Green-
ville, Texas. and Lt. Colonel (b)(3)
William A. Seward, representing Office of Research and
Development (ORD) and Office of Special Activities (OSA)
respectively, provided LTV with an initial presentation
of proposed modifications to a P2V7 aircraft to provide
a multi-sensor platform. loutlined,requirements
to modify a P2V7 aircraft as a first-base strike recon-
naissance aircraft with a follow-on employment as a hunter/
locator vehicle for a near real-time hunter/killer team.
An agreement was made whereby LTV would submit a basic
proposal preliminary to a formal bid, was identi-
fied as the Program Manager with OSA providin support
for aircraft procurement, crew selection and training and
definition of communications and defensive systems require-
ments. Among other things, OSA was to provide operational
guidance for the entire weapons system, coordinate with
the military for the use of overseas test areas and deter-
mine operational procedures. Further, OSA was to, "Determine
what, if any, security requirements exist and, if they do
exist, provide security guidance and control to OSA, ORD
!717"-1
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and LTV."-
B0 Lt. Colonel Donald E. Songer D/FA, OSA indicated
to his components on 15 December 1965 that CHIGOE was a
joint ORD/OSA program designed to develop and test a group
of sensors in a suitable aircraft. The joint nature of
the effort would require some inputs, for planning purposes,
from OSA offices. He further advised, "It is intended that
the operational model will be used by OSA for the collection
of intelligence data." 4. (b)(3)
C. SS/OSA, reported on
17 December 1965 briefing of OSA personnel which
the program would be managed by the Agency with
as Program Director, The Agency would be the primary user
of the system with OSA identified as its operational instru-
ment, Further, The Department of Defense would be kept
fully advised regarding the progress of CHIGOE with a view
toward offering the completed operational system to the
DOD for its use, continued, "Security classifica-
tion for the overall CHIGOE reconnaissance system is 'TOP
SECRET' because of its primary use by the Agency. During
the preliminary proposal and development phase, a hold down
system should be initiated to restrict knowledge of the
total system and its_parts within the Agency on a need-to-
know basis. Necessary coordination oUtside the Agency will
only be done with the concurrence of the program director-
and SA SS." Regarding Agency security control of CHIGOE,
reasons that, ";�if this aircraft becomes opera-
its reason for being, that is collecting intelligence
by means of an aircraft flying over denied territory, appears
to come under the purview of the NRO." He then outlines the
ways in which CHIGOE appears to correspond with normal BYEMAN
projects ,3o
indicated
D. On 22 December 1965, met with OSA Opera-
tions, Contracting and Security representatives to establish
security procedures for the s s integration and field
testing phases of CHIGOE, recognized that no final
decision had been reached on inclusion of CHIGOE in the
BYEMAN system but agreed that the BYEMAN security format
would be used, beginning at the time the system's integra-
tion contract was let, understanding of this format
was that those then working on CHIGOE planning or sensor
equipment or who would be concerned with subsequent installa-
tion, testing and operations, would be identified and brought
up to- the first step of "Security Access Approval". Conversely,
persons dealing only with sensor fabrication at the contractor
facility would not be so upgraded.4-
E.
On 14 January 1966, met with
and Lt. Colonel Seward to clarify a reported policy
approval of CHIGOE. OSA responsibilities for CHIGOE were
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spelled out as follows:
"OSA is to prepare an estimate of costs and per-
sonnel requirements for both Headquarters and field
units in all of the several phases:
a. Proof of concept
b. Flight test
C. Initial operations
d. Full operations"
understood that OSA was to prepare to support and
operate the CHIGOE aircraft and to support the flight test
phase which includes the use of contract flight crews and
coordination with the U.S. Navy for procurement and supply
of aircraft spare parts. Colonel Seward wrote, "It is very
clear that DD/S&T intends to include CHIGOE (or an appro-
priate later version) as a capability to be operated by
OSA as an Agency asset".5*
F. Recommended security controls for CHIGOE were
made a matter of record on 11 January 1966 when Colonel
Seward wrote, "Because of its basic intended use and its
developmental connection with other similarly oriented sys-
tems, it should be seriously considered for control within
the BYEMAN -system at�some-future date." He mentions also
that the interrelationship between some CHIGOE sensors and
IDEALIST sensors prevent CHIGOE from being placed under
normal CIA security control, i.e" Logistics Security.
When CHIGOE is operational, utilizing the current aircraft
or any other aircraft, it would seem to fall clearly under
the BYEMAN system, i.e., an aircraft for over-flying denied
territory collecting intelligence. Seward compares CHIGOE
with other BYEMAN programs and concludes by recommending
that BYEMAN security rules and standards be observed.6.
G. OSA's CHIGOE estimates were presented. to ORD on
21 January 1966. The basic document contains, among others,
certain pertinent assumptions by Director OSA as follows:
(1) OSA will support CHIGOE in the test phase
through completion of the "proof of concept".
(2) OSA will operate CHIGOE in the operational
phases.
(3) "Proof of concept" ends at the completion of
the overseas test phase when the analysis and
the evaluation are ready for presentation to
the Agency and DOD.
(4) CHIGOE security will be controlled by SS/OSA
and entry into the BYEMAN system is not con-
templated.
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(5) OSA will use contract flight crews and
contract maintenance support for the
operational phases.
(6) The first OSA flight crew will participate
in the "proof of concept" flight plans.
(7) A full-time CHIGOE Project Officer is required
in OSA.7-
H. On 4 February 1966, met with Dr. Wheelon
with the result that LTV was to be awarded the CHIGOE con-
tract. This meeting developed also that the U.S. Navy
would be included in the support operations for CHIGOE
development and spells out the coordinations to be accom-
plished by OSA with the U.S. Navy to implement such support.8-
I. A meeting was held in office on 16
February 1966. Representatives from ORD, OSA and U.S.N.
were present. This meeting represented a status report
on CHIGOE development and indicated that at that time the
U.S. Navy had entered the CHIGOE program in a rather large
supporting role. A recommendation was made that a Commo
facility be established at LTV to handle CHIGOE traffic.
�OSA Contracts-Management. Division was,designated the res-
ponsible office for handling CHIGOE contracts at both LTV
and Texas Instruments, however, Office of Logistics would
remain responsible for contracts with other companies in-
volved in CHIGOE hardware production. OSA's role, other
than as contracting office, was to provide security and
some material support during Phase 1, Lt. Colonel Seward
was assigned the task of monitoring the continuity of
Phase 1 (Research and Development). During Phase 2, if
it materialized, OSA would probably be responsible for
the development, staffing and budgeting for Project CHIGOE
.9-
J. Colonel Seward's men r dni-Pd 21 February 1966,
reflects that on 4 February I briefed the DDS&T
on the status of CHIGOE. LTV would be awarded a Phase 1
contract to design and price the development of an SP2H
aircraft to ORD specifications; any Phase 2 contract would
be awarded on the basis of design study results. Prior
to this writing, project plans anticipated OSA using the
first SP2H vehicle as an operational aircraft. This was
not now considered feasible due to the estimated cost of
a one-aircraft capability and, "The charter now is to
'prove the concept' with the first aircraft and then return
it to DOD for use in whole or in part as they see fit."
If CHIGOE proves out, then OSA, by direction of DDS&T,
would undertake a development program to establish and
operate a low altitude multi-sensor vehicle as an OSA pro-
ject. OSA support during Phase 1 included security support,
guidance and control. Plans for Phase 2 presumed an OSA
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operational project. 10.
K. This paper documents ORD's request for a Commo
link at LTV for Project CHIGOE. Paragraph 5 states,
"CHIGOE will not be formally included in
the BYEMAN system although OSA Security will
exercise the same measure of control, The
finished product being an overflight recon-
naissance vehicle, it is inevitable that it
should be put in the BYEMAN control system.
A formal request has been made to so include
the CHIGOE system under appropriate s'vcurity
safeguards and hold down procedures."11.
L. A meeting was held at Main Navy on 4 March 1966
regarding U.S. Navy support for Project CHIGOE. The
C/SS/OSA briefed participants that the Project would
not be included in the BYEMAN system but would follow
the same criteria. Security control would be exercised
through OSA Security and from the Navy side would be
funneled through Captain Wilson's office at REWSON.
I ORD, were present at
this meeting.)12.
M...I11-..t.hi$_RQPIcr. Colonel_ Songer requests Program
Staff, OSA, to provide clarifications of the suppbrt-- ---
which D/FA/OSA will be required to provide CHIGOE. His
message notes that the INS. Navy apparently will support
flight test operations both in the U.S. and in the de�
ployment overseas.13.
N. On 14 March, requested OSA to provide
a draft of OSA's proposed support plans for CHIGOE so
that he could present an integrated CHIGOE package to the
U.S. Navy.14.
0. On 23 March, General Ledford emphasized that OSA
would support ORD during "Proof of concept" with one air-
craft and would plan for the development of a CHIGOE
capability, based on ORD's data from the CHIGOE program.
OSA Program Plans for Fiscal Year 1968 included an esti-
mated $45 million dollars to develop and employ a suitable
airframe with a multi-sensor array. According to this
paper, the "Proof of concept" phase with the single SP2H
aircraft now at LTV was to be "funded solely by ORD."
OSA would support Phase 1 as far as possible without an
exchange of funds, primarily in the area of obtaining
supplies and assistance from other government services
such as the USAF. The United States Navy had agreed to
support Phase 1 and presumably the follow-on Project,
assuming both came to fruition. The Security Staff OSA
was directed to provide security guidance in accordance
with previous arrangements.15.
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P. ORD, OSA and USN personnel met at the Naval Air
Test Center (NATC), Patuxent River, Maryland, on 28 March
1966, to discuss CHIGOE support required by ORD.
described the CHIGOE "proof of concept" phase as having
as its objective the production of a working model of the
sensor array and aircraft, with its technology to be made
available to the DOD, and specifically the U.S. Navy, as
required. In addition to the scheduled equipments planned
for CHIGOE, advised there was a magnetometer
system in the planning stages which might be ready by the
end of 1966 as an active system. This was not really a
part of the CHIGOE basic configuration, however it would
be added on when and if it proved feasible to do so. The
CHIGOE timetable is spelled out as follows:
"The first flight of the CHIGOE aircraft is
now .planned for some time in July 1966. The LTV
tests in the U.S. are to be completed by December
1966 and then the overseas will begin in January
1967. The overseas test area will be in the
ARPA,, site in Thailand. Additional flights will
probably follow over Laos. For this reason,
desires to have Navy crews fly
flight test."
the overseas
.nemoes on to state that will need a
Navy flight crew at LTV in early June 1966 with a-ConikftL--
ment to the program for at least one year. The crew would
consist of 6 to 8 flight crew members plus 20 to 22 ground
personnel. Crew integrity through the entire test period
was required.
Regarding CHIGOE security, Seward writes:
"Since the SP2H aircraft and the Navy personnel
to support it and fly it will be assigned to Pa-
tuxent River, there is serious question as to
whether or not the Agency should have any part in,
security control of this Project. The real under-
lying need for security cognizance of Project
CHIGOE is to protect the Agency involvement and
additionally to protect the OSA's involvement
in this and other similar types of endeavors.
It is now proposed that OSA Security control the
the security aspects of CHIGOE while the aircraft
is at LTV. Security responsibility and control
should revert to the Navy with perhaps some pro-
cedural requirements assistance from the program
manager. It is here inferred that the program
manager would necessarily have to seek security
guidance from someone else, either OSA or Central
Security. As this program continues, there seems
to be less and less valid reason for OSA to control
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security of this program. The follow-on system
is another matter."16.
Q. briefed the DD/SA and other OSA per-
sonnel on 30 March 1966 concerning the current status
of CHIGOE at a meeting convened to resolve some of the
uncertainties vis-a-vis OSA participation in CHIGOE, and
in particular, the first-phase of the Project.
noted the decision of the DDS&T to contract with LTV and
mentioned that the expense involved in a wholly Agency
supported program had resulted in the solicitation of
U.S. Navy support. Since the Navy was willing to support
CHIGOE, Dr. Brewer is looking to it for general support
except in the case of peculiar items or services which
OSA is better able to provide, such as procurement of USAF
items and cable service. Discussing security, the guide-
lines spelled out indicated:
"CHIGOE Security will be controlled and admin-
istered by OSA so long as the SP2H aircraft is
at LTV. Once it leaves, (July 1966) security res-
ponsibility will revert to the Navy. The only
remaining interest of OSA will be to protect
Agency association with this development and
the possibility of a follow-on system under
Agency-auspices- _OSA will maintain securi.ty_
cognizance over those persons in the Navy who
now know, or who in the future may know of the
Ag�connection to CHIGOE. 1
also indicated that a communications link
will be set up between Headquarters, Main Navy, (REWSON)
Patuxent River and LTV. Message traffic will funnel through
Headquarters communications control and communications secu-
rity control will remain with OSA. OSA would be privy to
CHIGOE I data and would plan CHIGOE II as an OSA develop-
ment with the D/SA assigning responsibility for CHIGOE II
planning as soon as possible. It was further indicated
that ORD would deal directly with USN for Logistic support.17-
R. On 4 April 1966, Dr. Wheelon issued the System
Program Directive for CHIGOE to ORD and OSA. This directive
presumably pulled together all thinking on CHIGOE. It posi-
tions ORD as the CHIGOE Project Manager for developing the
system and directs ORD to participate in a DOD-sponsored
study and development of a side-looking synthetic aperture
radar which will penetrate foliage and evaluate air-borne
magnetometer and other specialized devices. It continues:
"Office of Special Activities, DDS&T, is
directed to provide operational support for the
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development and test phases and to plan for
eventual Agency use of the multi-sensor system
as an overflight intelligence collection capa-
bility. Because of the sensitive nature of
Agency overflight operations, OSA will provide
streamlined contracting support and will assume
security guidance and control during the system
integration and all subsequent phases. Until',
it proves necessary to do otherwise, CHIGOE will
not be included in the BYEMAN system, but will,
nevertheless, be afforded the same close security
control."
Doctor Wheelon goes on to state:
"It is recognized that both the wide range of
capabilities being provided and the national inte-
rest require that maximum use be made of this
system. Close coordination is to be maintained
with those DOD components who concurred in Agency
,development of the concept, and others who are
identified during the program as potential users,
with the understanding that parts of the Agency
multisensor technology may contribute to their
. specialized needs."
Due to the'llrgent'natiodal-requirement for this par�
ticular type of system, Dr. Wheelon directs, "...that the
total DDS&T capability in this area be combined into the
CHIGOE air-borne system, and that the results be evaluated
by potential military users as soon as possible. The
target date for Production of the operational multi-sensor
program is December 1966, and the first operations are
to be directed toward areas of U.S. involvement in South-
east Asia."
Finally, Dr. Wheelon directs:
"OSA will cooperate with ORD in the prepara-
tion of appropriate documentation, such as an
initial system Package Program, so that develop-
ment, test, evaluation and replication can
proceed in a valid and logical manner. The
System Package Program will include preliminary
operational estimates and planning factors based
on the assumption that OSA will integrate this
air-borne system into an existing OSA Project, to
provide a basic long-term Agency capability in this
specialized field of overflight co1lection."18.
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III. CONCEPT ANALYSIS
A. Available evidence indicates that what is now
known as Project CHIGOE was born as an in-house ORD
study underway early in 1965. Sometimes during the
summer of that year, the lack of timely, tactical intel-
ligence in combat situations was recognized by the U. S.
military and intelligence community. Deeper U. S.
involvement in Viet Nam against transient, guerrilla
type operations in heavily foliated areas, handicapped
local commanders' so that normal military tactics to
locate and destroy the enemy's hit and run capability
wae largely ineffectual. A coordinated quick reaction
reconnaissance-strike capability was needed. Accordingly,
the DCI directed DD/S&T to seek the answer to the Problem.
ORD's in-house study was funded and accelerated to prove
the feasibility of the R&D effort to fill this need.
B. Project CHIGOE came
under the direction of
, of ORD. They
moved quickly to establish the system requirements for
-CHIGOE and-in_thelall of_1965, pinpOnted.LTV,..Inci
Greenville, Texas, as the logical prime contractor to
undertake prototype development. Several other companies
were tentatively tabbed as individual component fabricat-
ors. Also at about that time, the decision was made to
use a U. S. Navy P2V, as the airborne systems platform,
primarily because it was large enough to house the system
and was available in large numbers.
C. In late 1965 ORD combined with OSA in what
became a joint venture, with OSA providing materiel
support for CTIGOE dvelopment and testing. At that
point in time represented CHIGOE as a multi-
sensor airborne platform to be utilized as a first base
strike reconnaissance aircraft, with a follow-on
capability as a hunter/locator vehicle for a near real
time hunter/killer team. This means use of the CHIGOE
aircraft and systems to spot targets, then quickly relay
target data to local tactical air commanders for
immediate air strike action.
D. Early ORD/OSA discussions indicated to OSA that,
if the CHIGOE concept proved sound, the vehicle (or a
later version) might benefit OSA's manned aircraft recon-
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naissance program. Col. Songer, then D/FA/OSA wrote
in December 1965, "It is intended that the operational
model will be used by OSA for the collection of
intelligence data." In January 1966, this point of
view was strengthened when ORD asked OSA to prepare
cost estimates and personnel requirements for all phases
of CHIGOE development, including flight: testing and
subsequent operations. Specifically, the estimate
included provisions for use of OSA contract pilots and
ground crews for test and operational use. In addition,
a full time OSA Project Officer was programmed.
E. There were indications during these early plan-
ning meetings that the Department of Defense (DOD) was
to be made privy to CHIGOE data as the program progressed
and that the completed proved system would be turned
over to DOD for its own use. The ramifications of this
intent would not become fully apparent to OSA until a
little later.
F. Concurrent with OSA's acceptance of a supporting
role, the question of security cognizance, a natural
cOlicomiiiittant Cif-OSA'-g COntratting- and
began to be explored more fully. Of primary concern was
that CHIGOE was (at this stage) a blending of two DD/S&T
offices with radically different experience pertaining
to security control and guidance precedures. ORD, as a
DD/S&T component normally divorced from special programs
and operations, usually turned toward the Office of
Logistics Security Staff for its security guidance. OSA,
deeply immersed in special operations, relied almost
entirely upon BYEMAN Security Standards using OSA Security
Staff for security policy guidance and implementation.
In addition, OSA had an in-house security force whereas
ORD had no permanently assigned security representative.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 130
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 130
HC What finally emerged from the various meetings
and discussions, more by direction than by rational thinking,
was a compromise "Bigot List" type of security, which was
to control CHIGOE by the application of BYEMAN Standards
so far as possible without actually placing CHIGOE under
BYEMAN Control.. Many factors contributed to the partial
breakdown of this hybrid security system as the Project
progressed. These will be enumerated later.
I. The CHIGOE concept changed radically in February
1966 when advised OSA that the USN was entering
the CHIGOE lop (apparently with the approval of the DD/S&T)
in a large supporting role. Heretofore, USN had facili-
tated_the procurement_of the Mr_alrc_raft_for_CHIGOE.
modifications. From this point in time, OSA's role
in CHIGOE materiel support matters diditished. The USN
assumed more and more importance in logistical support
of the Project. OSA's input, except for contractual and
security support, seemed related to downstream use of
the proved CHIGOE concept, rather than to the developmental/
testing phases moving 'forward during 1966. The ORD/OSA
merger had become the ORD/USN/OSA triumvirate.
J. In March 1966, the USN role in CHIGOE was firmly
established--plans were going forward for USN TWX links
with OSA and LTV; a rather ill-defined security channel
at REWSON was outlined to coordinate with SS/OSA on matters
of CHIGOE security from the USN side.
K. The change in support roles caused the D/FA/OSA
to request clarification of A's role in the Project.
Coincidentally with this, requested OSA to define
its plans for CHIGOE so an integrated CHIGOE package could
be presented to the USN. OSA's clarification came
fl;LA.
r-till I -r
I
(b)(3)
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on 23 March 1966 and noted that initially, USA would
support ORD's CHIGOE Program during "proof of concept"
in the area of obtaining supplies and assistance from
other U. S. Government agencies and so far as possible,
without an exchange of funds. Funding for CHIGOE was
solely ORD's responsibility. Downstream, USA plans inclu-
ded an estimated $45,000,000 for FY 1968 to develop and
employ a suitable airframe with a multi-sensor array.
Security and contracts cognizance remained with USA.
1. On 28 March, ORD, USA and USN representatives
met at NATC, Patuxent River. The CHIGOE timetable spelled
out there indicated the CHIGOE aircraft was scheduled
to make its maiden flight in July 1966, with a completion
date (modification-and domestic tests) in December 1966.
After that, the aircraft would move overseas for flight
testing, probably at the ARPA site in Thailand, and later
over Laos. Both flight and ground crews would be USN
personnel. The USN's expanded role in CHIGOE support was
spelled out as well as ORD's intent to look to USN for
total support, even to the extent of reverting to USN
security control of CHIGOE when the aircraft left LTV.
Lt_,_col._Se)vq,rd). recording_this_meeting, wrote, "As this
program continues, there seems tO-Vd-less'and less
valid reason for USA to control security of this program.
The follow-on system is another matter."
M. The implications of the NATC meeting, above,
were soon reinforced by when he briefed D/FA/OSA,
indicating that USA Security would prevail while CHIGOE
was at LTV. Once it left (July 1)66) security respon-
sibility would revert to the USN, with SS/USA's remaining
mission to protect the agency association with this devel-
opment and the possibility of a follow-on system under
Agency auspices.
N. Finally, the DD/S&T System Program Directive
was published on 4 April 1966. It affirmed USA's role
in providing support (type and amount not spedified) for
the development and test phases of CHIGOE and to plan for
eventual Agency use of the multisensor system as an over-
flight intelligence collection capability. Streamlined
contract and security procedures were directed during
system integration and all subsequent phases. CHIGOE
errPET
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would not be included within the BYEMAN system but would
be afforded the same close security control. CHIGOE,
funding by the Bureau of the Budget amounted to $2,800,000
for development and initial testing Close coordination
with potential DOD users was required. OSA would proceed
on the assumption that this airborne system would be
integrated into existing OSA projects, to provide a basic
long term Agency capability in the specialized field of
overflight collection.
SUMMARY
The original concept of the CHIGOE Program, that of
developing and testing an airborne sensor array, remained
constant throughout 1966. What did undergo a radical
change, however, was the role OSA was to play in support
of CHIGOE. OSA's role was influenced by two policy deci-
sions:
1. The possibility of a CHIGOE-type system
-being integrafed-Wfthin existing OSA-pro-
grams;
2. A decision to proliferate CHIGOE data within
the DOD for its use.
OSA planning for CHIGOE addressed itself to the first
decision while it appears that ORD visualized CHIGOE as
a CIA/DOD partnership. These different approaches had
little effect on OSA from a contracting and materiel point
of view. However, this dichotomy of intent eventually
caused serious degradation of security control.
Entry of the USN as the major CHIGOE supporting Agency,
with a corresponding decreasing reliance upon OSA, naturally
drew ORD and USN tighter together as the program progressed.
This worked to the detriment of cooperation between ORD
and SS/OSA despite efforts by the latter to offer its
service as a control mechanism to the former. The following
discussion of security control in the two primary areas
of U. S. Government and industry will elaborate on the
above. Part of the problem can be attributed directly
to the reassignment of the OSA Program Monitor early in
1966 and the failure to name a successor. The physical
distance between ORD and OSA was a contributing factor.
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IV. SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION
A. During the week of 2 May 1966, OSA security officers
visited the three contractors with which OSA had negotiated
contracts in connection with the CHIGOE Program. These com-
panies, all located in Texas, were LTV Electrosystems, Green-
ville; Texas Instruments, Richardson; and Electromechanics
Company, Austin.
1. Due to an earlier visit to LTV by
the May visit consisted primarily of a reaffirmation of
BYEMAN-type security ground rules which we expected to
implement at this company as well as conducting thir-
teen CHIGOE briefings at the top.-� management level.
These briefings were "after the fact" since it was
learned that , during his earlier negotiations
at LTV, made no pretense about his connection with CIA
and, as a result, top management and approximately forty
other individuals who had worked on LTV's CHIGOE pro-
posal were witting of Agency sponsorship. It was
apparent that the normal BYEMAN hold-down concept had
been violated from the beginning of this program and the
damage was irreparable--CIA was "blown" to a large
group of LTV personnel as the CHIGOE sponsor. It was
decided that approval-r-equests,on.those_people witting
of CIA involvement would be forwarded to Headquarters
and that appropriate briefings would be afforded by
the security coordinator at LTV when approvals were
granted. In addition, approximately 250 LTV employees
would be engaged on the CHIGOE contract and appropriate
approvals would be obtained on these individuals as
quickly as possible.
NOTE: Durim.,. April-June 1966, SS/OSA had examined
CHIGOE from the viewpoint of streamlining
security (in line with the DD/S&T Program
Directive). ORD's intent to have USN assume
security cognizance of CHIGQE, coupled with the
growing interests and influence of the DOD in
the program, led SS/OSA to adopt a modified
access approval approach. This took the form
of eliminating the two-level approval (in this
case the PSAA-2) from the normal one, two and
three levels employed in BYEMAN programs.
Other than for top management personnel re-
quiring sponsor identification, all other em-
ployees on the project would require only a one-
level approval. The ensuing influx of USN, USAF
and U.S. Army personnel at LTV provided a natural
"DOD" cover for the Agency.
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2. Texas Instruments presented no major security
problems with regard to CHIGOE. Working through "I"
cleared contacts and requiring only a minimum number of
new approvals for CHIGOE, a BYEMAN-type security was
established rather easily. Due to at least weekly con-
tact between T. I. and LTV personnel regarding CHIGOE
developments, arrangements were laid on between the
companies' security coordinators to facilitate visits
between the plants by the representatives involved.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 130
B. Application of BYEMAN-style security standards
within Ti. S. Government (mainly DOD) on CHIGOE proved to be
an entirely different proposition compared to the relative
ease with which such standards were implemented in industry.
1. Of primary importance was the manner in which
ORD promoted CHIGOE within the DOD. Proliferation of
the fact that CHIGOE was progressing and details re-
garding its progress were communicated through briefings
of high level DOD civilian and military officials.
SS/OSA managed to have a representative present at
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several such briefings, but it was readily apparent
that earlier unmonitored briefings had occurred and
that ORD would continue its practice of briefing any-
one and everyone who showed the slightest interest in
CHIGOE or who could help the program-without notifying
SS/OSA. As indicated above, ORD did invite SS/OSA par-
ticipation at several briefings; however, the repre-
sentative was afforded no opportunity to explain the
security ground rules attendant to CHIGOE. The most
that was accomplished was to have each briefed partici-
pant sign a project secrecy oath, and then back this
up with a formal approval through liaison between the
various service BCO's and SS/OSA.
2. Several face-to-face sessions with the Project
Manager attempted, unsuccessfully, to indicate-to him
that SS/OSA could be a project control mechanism
valuable to ORD. Although ORD was sympathetic to this
view, in reality little cooperation was forthcoming
regarding advance notice of briefings and news of -
visitors,. either CIA or DOD, to contractors. For-
tunately, excellent liaison with company security con-
tacts afforded SS/OSA a channel by which visitor notifi-
cation could be passed and to some degree contro
The criterion that DOD visitors to LTV, T.I. and
must have at least.a U._$,.G..overnment .Secret clearance(b)(1)
was eventually established and.has worked. Acceptance(b)(3) 10 USC 130
of this level of clearance was based on the eventual
takeover of CHIGOE by USN for its "MUDDY HILL" operation,
controlled at a Secret level of access.
3. SS/OSA has maintained CHIGOE under a "Bigot
List" control system within the "I" Branch, SS/OSA.
CHIGOE approvals, briefing oaths and a card index com-
prise the records. This record is not complete by any
means, but represents SS/OSA's best effort in the face
of the limited cooperation received from the Project
Manager.
4. SS/OSA's prime concern in recent months has been
the monitoring of increasing DOD visitors to LTV. With
the approach of domestic and overseas testing, largely
staffed and logistically supported by the USN, the need
for re-evaluation of CHIGOE security cognizance, OSA's
role in the program and the downstream planning for an
OSA CHIGOE-style system is apparent. The attachment to
this paper outlines ORD's proposed plan for domestic
and overseas testing.
C'C-CRFT
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V. SECURITY PROBLEM AREAS/RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The major sources of irritation and frustration
from an SS/OSA viewpoint in connection with Project CHIGOE
stem from the following problem areas.
1. From the very beginnings of Project CHIGOE,
as it emerged from an in-house ORD study into an
accelerated hardware program, the exposure of CIA's
sponsorship to large numbers of personnel within
U. S. military and U. S. Government was a "fait
accompli." This was due in a large part to ORD's
"full speed ahead" attitude upon receiving its DCI
directive. It may also stem from the normal ORD
modus operandi in its usual contracting with indus-
try, i.e., CIA association held at a Secret level
only.
2. The concept of an ORD/OSA partnership
pitted two dissimilar security systems against each
other, so to speak, resulting in a less than ade-
quate hybrid security system. The differences be-
tween Office of Logistics and Office of Special
Activities security systems, although striving for
the_same_goal,, are many and educating ORD to the
latter was not at-arl-gucce8Sful;
3. The failure of ORD to comply with its clear
and stated understanding of the BYEMAN-style security
requirements grafted to CHIGOE caused a serious
breakdown in the effectiveness of security control
applicable to U. S. Government and industry. This
breakdown was abetted by conflicting policy, namely
that CHIGOE would be secured a la BYEMAN-type controls,
yet also that DOD would be kept apprised of all
development. While these two goals are not completely
opposed to each other, poor ORD/OSA communications
did provide a fertile ground for security breakdown.
4. The dual contracting/security responsibility
for CHIGOE, split between Office of Logistics and OSA,
never really permitted centralized security control
of the entire CHIGOE industrial set-up.
5. The loss of an effective OSA project officer
to monitor ORD/OSA relationships seriously hampered
monitoring of the developing program.
6. The rather quick switch from OSA to USN
for almost total CHIGOE logistics support and the lack
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of USN security coordination likewise rendered moni-
toring of the USN's role ineffective.
B. From an ss/osA point of view, security control
of a special project which is wholly OSA controlled is quite
different from securing a program which combines the talents
of two DD/S&T officers; one designated the Managing Office;
the other (OSA), the Supporting Office. In the former, all
OSA components complement each other through rapid decision
making and dissemination of project goals, techniques and
areas of responsibility. Even in joint OSA/OEL ventures,
security problems are minimized, since OEL historically
relies upon OSA for complete support and "buys off" on SS/
OSA control techniques. In the latter type program, and
there is every indication that this type is becoming more
and more the norm rather than the exception, a sizeable
barrier to effective security arises from the Managing
Office's unfamiliarity with SS/OSA style security. In
CHIGOE, another cause was lack of firm guidance and direction
to the Managing Office regarding the scope of SS/OSA's re-
sponsibility. The following recommendations will go far to
eliminate in future joint programs the causes of friction
and misunderstanding which arose during CHIGOE.
RECOMMENDATION #1
That the Managing Office, or the DD/S&T, issue as
early as possible in the program planning stage, a preliminary
Project Plan, setting forth the program goals and areas of
responsibility in both of the offices involved.
(Hopefully, such a preliminary policy paper would
allow SS/OSA an early start on exploring its security re-
sponsibilities and at the least establish early that SS/OSA
is to be the cognizant security office).
RECOMMENDATION #2
In concert with SS/S&T and Managing Office representative,
SS/OSA should establish early whether or not the program will
be controlled via the BYEMAN Security Control System.
(In CHIGOE this problem was haggled over for about four
months before a firm decision indicated whether SS/OSA could
apply the philosophy of BYEMAN control and utilize the exist-
ing BYEMAN control mechanism, or whether it should devise a
"bigot list" security system. One way or the other, SS/OSA
should receive a go-ahead early in the program, so that the
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Managing Office can be educated to the security ground
rules and weaned from its usual reliance upon Office of
Logistics Security Staff).
RECOMMENDATION #3
That the final DD/S&T Program Directive specifically
point out that SS/OSA has full security cognizance over
the program and direct the Managing Office to seek out and
cooperate in all security matters with SS/OSA.
(This is necessary so that there be no doubt in the
Managing Office that SS/OSA has full top level authority to
secure the project. Fullest cooperation between the parties
should be specifically ordered, not merely implied).
RECOMMENDATION #4
That a written understanding, drawn between the DD/S&T
components involved, direct that information about shifts
in goals, techniques and intended involvement of other
parties, such as other U. S. Government agencies in the pro-
gram, be immediately communicated to OSA for dissemination
and evaluation as to the effect on OSA planning.
(Thi�-tindeitandingresumably between Director,
and the Management Office, will assist in preventing, as
happened in CHIGOE, a rapid unannounced shift in support
from OSA to USN, with a subsequent weakening of communications
between the former partners in favor of the new partner. The
shift went largely unnoticed in OSA, except for SS/OSA, for
several months in 1966. Full disclosure of such intent would
allow all OSA components to re-evaluate their roles).
RECOMMENDATION #5
That a program monitor be designated as OSA focal point
to coordinate all matters and that if a replacement is required
he be named promptly.
(Col. Seward, the original CHIGOE monitor, was reassigned
in April 1966. No replacement was apparently named to follow
the program until October 1966, when D/OSA indicated that
D/Ops was designated OSA contact point for operational matters).
RECOMMENDATION #6
That channels of access to D/OSA or DD/S&T be established
so that any dereliction on the part of Managing Office repre-
sentatives can be brought to the attention of their superiors
forcefully.
� Sr--C-VT
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(In CHIGOE, the breakdown at the working level between
and C/SS/OSA violated written understandings
by and Chief, ORD, as to SS/OSA's role. A memorandum
by DD/S&T or by D/OSA might have gotten SS/OSA and ORD back
together whereas SS/OSA discussions with failed
to accomplished this purpose).
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
I.
BYE-3078-65, 22 November 1965, by Seward, "Visit
to LTV Electro-Systems - Project CHIGOE."
II.
OSA-4885-65, 15 December 1965, by Songer, "CHIGOE
Briefing."
III.
Memorandum for the Record, 17 December 1965, by
Sweeney, "Project CHIGOE."
IV.
ORD-111-66, 7 January 1966, by
"CHIGOE
Security."
V.
OSA-0299-66, 17 January 1966, by Seward, 'CHIGOE."
VI.
BYE-3184-65, 11 January 1966, Seward, "CHIGOE Security
Control."
VII.
BYE-2121-66, 21 January 1966, by Ledford, "CHIGOE
Operating Cost Estimate."
VIII.
OSA-0671-66, 4 February 1966, by Seward, "CHIGOE."
IX.
Memorandum for the Record, 21
February 1966,-by-
CHIGOE Meeting."
X.
OSA-0871-66, 21 February 1966,
by Seward, "CHIGOE."
XI.
OSA-4673-65, 2 March 1966, by Chapman, "Communications
XII.
Facilities at LTV, Greenville, Texas."
OSA-1127-66, 4 March 1966, by Seward, "CHIGOE Meeting
with U. S. Navy."
XIII.
XIV.
OSA-1198-66, 14 March 1966, by
ORD-897-66, 14 March 1966, by
Songer,
"CHIGOE Support."
"CHIGOE - USN
Coordination Meeting."
XV.
BYE-2342-66, 23 March 1966, by Ledford, "CHIGOE Meetings."
XVI.
OSA-1619-66, 28 March 1966, by Seward, "CHIGOE Meeting
at NATC� Patuxent River."
XVII.
OSA-1642-66, 30 March 1966, by Seward, "CHIGOE Status
Briefing."
XVIII.
DD/S&T-1528-66, 4 April 1966, by Wheelon, "System
Program Directive for CHIGOE."
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