THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICA: ORGANIZATION, COMMUNIST TIES, AND SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05734262
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986

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Director of Central Intelligence
--Seeret�
Ift9f-eiitAL
COPY
CO LC1 GIVE OUT
Special National Intelligent Estimate fl!
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The African National Congress of
South Africa: Organization, Communist
Ties, and Short-Term Prospects
Key Judgments
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SNIE 73-86W
July 1986
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of Department of State
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN� Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT� Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN� Caution�Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON� Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to ...
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SNIE 73-86W
THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF
SOUTH AFRICA: ORGANIZATION, COMMUNIST
TIES, AND SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.
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SCOPE NOTE
In the past two years, the African National Congress (ANC) of
South Africa has emerged both within South Africa and on the
international scene as a major actor on the South African scene. Its
growing international acceptance seems predicated on the belief that
the ANC is a dominant shaper of events inside South Africa. This
Estimate seeks to examine the ANC, assess its policies and role in
contemporary South Africa, and estimate its growth and influence over
the next two years. It will also examine the nature of the ANC's
revolutionary alliance- with the South African Communist Party
(SACP) and measure SACP influence and control over the ANC and its
policies and activities. (s NI?)
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KEY JUDGMENTS '
The international recognition accorded to the African National
Congress (ANC) as a spokesman for South African black political
aspirations is likely to grow during the next two years, as is its popularity
with South African blacks. The ANC's ability to garner widespread
support, however, is unlikely to be matched by a commensurate
increase in its ability to direct and control events inside South Africa.
We believe that the ANC recognizes that its chances for overthrowing
the South African Government in the near term are poor and that its
greatest short-run strengths lie in its ability to broaden its base of
international support and to gain domestic support as South African
blacks become more politicized and radicalized. (s NI')
In our judgment, the ANC's advocacy of the revolutionary and
violent overthrow of the South African Government will continue and
likely intensify. The ANC will maintain a pro-Soviet posture and the
longstanding alliance between the ANC and the South African Commu-
nist Party (SACP) will continue, as will the SACP's considerable
influence over and extensive and widespread presence in the ANC's
organizational and decisionmaking structures. This influence, however,
will remain constrained by non-Communist ANC leaders and fall short
of complete domination or control. (s NP)
The Soviets calculate that the ANC will be the principal vehicle for
change in South Africa and the view the SACP, as well as ANC
dependence on Soviet military assistance, as their means of influence
within the ANC. The SACP is a protege of the Soviet Communist Party,
which funds and guides it. Moscow has treated the ANC as its -natural
ally- in the region deserving of financial, political, and military support.
The Soviets, however, are somewhat suspicious of the ANC's ideological
reliability and are concerned that nationalist elements could be co-
opted by Pretoria into some kind of reform program. -(s-t44-____
The Soviets are opposed to current Western efforts to promote
negotiations because they believe the South African Government is still
too strong, Western countries remain influential, and the ANC is not yet
' The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, concurs in this Estimate,
but notes that it has not examined how potential changes in US policy or a significant expansion of US
relations with black South African organizations might alter the conduct or policies of the ANC.
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NORJRN,
recognized as the only spokesman for South African blacks. Moscow
appears convinced that the best way to advance Soviet interests in South
Africa is to support the ANC and its campaign of armed struggle.
Carefully directed violence, as Moscow sees it, will provoke counter-
action and repression by the South African Government, which in turn
will contribute to the polarization and politicization of the masses.
Violence will disrupt the economy, lead to disinvestment by Western
governments, and ultimately promote the collapse of the South African
regime. Moscow, however, appears concerned about growing internally
generated violence that is not under the control of the ANC and from
which rival groups may benefit. ts-N-F
The ANC is a small (about 10,000), externally based and bureau-
cratically complex organization. Transformed by banning and suppres-
sion in the 1960s from a legal, internal mass party to an externally
based, -vanguard- style liberation movement, the ANC's main compo-
nents are:
� A military wing (about 5,000 strong), mostly based in Angola.
� A collection of governing bodies located, along with most of the
ANC leaders, in London and Lusaka.
� An extensive external network (in about 40 countries, including
most major capitals) of ANC offices, which raises funds and
garners support, disseminates propaganda, and provides general
foreign representation.
� A rather disorganized and small clandestine political and mili-
tary support infrastructure within South Africa and in neighbor-
ing states.---
We see little near-term prospect that the ANC and the South
African Government will find common ground to negotiate. Both sides
appear ill-disposed to compromise and determined to gird themselves
for the long struggle. There remains, however, an outside chance that
both sides could agree to talks. Should such talks occur, we believe both
sides would enter into them largely for tactical reasons, such as sowing
division in the other's camp or fostering the appearance of reasonable-
ness in Western eyes, rather than with the intention of negotiating
seriously. (s Nu)
The ANC is unlikely to fundamentally alter its articulated goals
and objectives. The ANC's short-term military goals will continue to be
designed to rally black resistance to the government, to intimidate
whites and erode their resolve, and to undermine government control of
nonwhite areas, while seeking over the longer term to develop an
insurgency capable of overthrowing the white government. On the
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political front, the ANC is likely to continue to encourage intensified
antigovernment activities by black South Africans and try to increase
Pretoria's international isolation by supporting demands for harsh
economic sanctions. In an effort to appeal to as broad an audience as
possible, the ANC also is likely to maintain its allegiance to its official
political manifesto�the 1955 Freedom Charter�that lists moderate
socialist and democratic aims. ANC leaders are unlikely to see any
political advantage to formulating a more specific vision of a future
black majority government. �(s-rti.)-
Notwithstanding the fact that the ANC is now the most popular
black organization inside South Africa, there is little prospect that the
ANC will be able to mount a regime-threatening military campaign
during the period of this Estimate. In particular, Pretoria's willingness
to strike whenever and wherever it believes necessary against the ANC
will hamper its efforts to build the infrastructure needed inside South
Africa to sustain an insurgency. (s NF)
ANC military activities during the next two years will probably
result in more civilian�especially white�casualties than in the past.
Although the older generation leaders may question the political
wisdom of risking Western support by such a campaign, we believe
pressure from young militants for such actions�including possible
attacks on Western business interests�will grow. (s
ANC internal political operations will have very mixed results.
Efforts to create a coherent underground political organization have
been beset with difficulties and will face continuing constraints. We
expect the ANC to participate in and even take control of some of the
shadow government organizations springing up in townships where
government control has collapsed. Although in competition with other
groups, ANC popularity and access to weapons will give it a decided
edge. (3 NO
The ANC will continue to try to broaden its appeal to supporters of
groups such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (COSATU). While these groups are not
now under�or likely to come under�ANC control or direction, a
growing number of internal groups are likely to at least publicly pay
homage to the figurehead role of the ANC. In most cases, however, ties
between the exiled ANC and internal opposition groups are unlikely to
go much beyond rhetorical alliances with their leaderships, and we
expect that the ANC will be forced to be content with trying to bypass
leaders and appeal to the rank and file. Internal leaders, in our
judgment, recognize that closer ties probably are a short-term liability
rather than an asset as long as the ANC remains a banned organization.
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Resistance to the ANC from -black consciousness" groups,
regionally/tribally based groups like Chief Buthelezi's Zulu organization
Inkatha, and rural-based groups such as the Pretoria-created homeland
-governments," will continue but slowly erode as the ANC makes
inroads into their memberships and areas of influence. IN
The ANC is likely to have considerably more success mobilizing
international opinion in its favor and gaining increased financial, and
perhaps military, support. Although we expect that many supporters,
and potential supporters, in the West will be troubled by the ANC's
close ties to the Soviet Bloc and the group's increasing use of indiscrimi-
nate attacks, current political trends in South Africa as well as the
worldwide focus on Pretoria's intransigence will work to the ANC's
advantage. (s NI')
Increases in support from the wider international community,
however, are likely to be offset somewhat by ANC reverses in the
region. South Africa almost certainly will increase the cost of supporting
the ANC to neighboring countries by repeatedly demonstrating its
military and economic dominance. The black ruled nations have few
resources for fending off Pretoria, and when pressed will have no choice
but to attempt to please Pretoria, if only by temporarily limiting or
restricting ANC activities within their borders.-N.$-_
The SACP, by dint of its long history of support for the ANC and
presence therein and its dedicated and ideologically committed leader-
ship, has exercised, and is likely to continue to exercise, considerable in-
fluence in the ANC. We see little likelihood that ANC officials�
Communist and non-Communist alike�will see any political advantage
to fundamentally altering their longstanding and extensive relationship.
These ties date to the 1920s, extend through the period of civil
disobedience in the 1950s, and were formalized in an alliance in 1969 of
the three revolutionary -pillars of the liberation struggle": the ANC, the
SACP, and the SACP-controlled South African Congress of Trade
Unions (SACTU). We estimate that perhaps as much as 25 percent of
the ANC's total membership now belongs to the SACP. (
SACP representation on the ANC's ruling National Executive
Committee (NEC) and other ANC bodies, as well as the ANC's
dependence on the Soviet Bloc, will continue to give SACP members
considerable influence over ANC policies. In our judgment, probably
more than half the seats on the NEC-11 known and 8 probable SACP
members�currently are held by Communists. Known or suspected
SACP members, for example, hold such important ANC positions as
secretary general, deputy secretary general, intelligence and security
director, director of information and publicity, and top slots in the
military wing.
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The SACP and the Soviet Bloc also are likely to continue to have
leverage because:
Thousands of ANC political and military cadres have been
trained in the Soviet Bloc or exposed to Marxist-Leninist
political education by Communist instructors in ANC camps.
� The SACP has gained entry into black labor through the South
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), which is a member
of the major international Soviet labor front. This influence is
marginal, however, given that SACTU has little influence�and
only marginal prospects for gaining influence�in South Africa's
burgeoning black labor movement.
Most ANC literature is printed in East Germany and the two
mainline ANC publications as well as the ANC radio program
have Soviet Bloc advisers and receive Bloc assistance.
The Soviet Bloc continues to provide virtually all military
assistance received by the ANC. Hundreds of Cuban and East
German instructors train ANC military wing recruits in Angola.
The Soviets also provide limited nonmilitary assistance�such as
scholarships to study in Bloc countries�and provide or encour-
age a wide spectrum of material support through non-Bloc
surrogates or fronts. (s�-�,;1-:
Non-Communist leaders of the ANC�most notably ANC Presi-
dent Oliver Tambo�are well aware that SACP members have the
potential to gain control of the ANC, and are likely to continue to work
successfully to thwart Communist attempts to completely control the
ANC. indicates that Tambo and other non-Communists,
although recognizing the need to maintain good relations with their
major benefactor, sometimes resent heavyhanded Soviet and SACP
attempts to dictate to the group. Tt-1.44:
Among the factors that we believe will continue to limit SACP
leverage are:
� A decisionmaking process that operates by way of consensus
rather than voting. This has a tendency, in our judgment, to
discount the SACP's numerical strength and enhance -old
guard- influence.
The presence of two identifiable black nationalist factions in the
ANC�the -old guard- non-Communists and the young mili-
tants. The interests of these groups will continue at times to run
counter to those of the SACP.
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� Tactical and organizational moves by non-Communist leaders to
limit SACP influence. In the past, these have included rules that
prohibit all nonofficial contacts between ANC and Soviet
officials, and the reported creation of a core Working Commit-
tee�composed of non-Communists�to run the ANC on a day-
to-day basis. Tambo's position as ANC president also gives him
significant input in the SACP appointments of some SACP
officials.
� The presence of young black militants�many of whom are in
the military wing, and appear increasingly contemptuous of
nonblacks, Communists, and the cautious military tactics of the
-old guard- leadership.
� The ANC will continue to receive the bulk of its nonmilitary aid
from non-Bloc donors.
Recognition by all parties that the SACP lacks popular support
inside South Africa, and that a split would leave the SACP
isolated and with little influence inside South Africa.
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There are two sets of key variables that could alter our estimation
of ANC prospects. The first would see the release of Nelson Mandela.
The South African Government would like to release Nelson Mandela
primarily to avoid the repercussions of his dying in jail. However, given
the immense domestic and international popularity of Mandela, he
poses a real threat to the government and it is unlikely, in our judgment,
that he will be released over the next two years. (s
A second key variable, somewhat outside the scope of this Esti-
mate, is the pace and scope of South African Government reform.
Should political reform be accelerated by the government, ANC
relationships with internal organizations would be jeopardized. There
are few indications that Pretoria has such an acceleration in mind,
however, and recent government crackdowns suggest that the pace of
reforms will, if anything, slow. (5)
During the period of this Estimate, Moscow is likely to continue its
present mix of low-cost and low-risk support for the ANC and SACP by
supplying arms, advisers, and limited funds, and lending propaganda
and diplomatic support. The Soviets probably are confident that in the
long run this effort will pay off with a pro-Soviet regime in South
Africa. To this end, they likely are encouraged by Pretoria's shift
toward greater repression of black dissidents, believing that it further
isolates Pretoria, increases the chances of a violent overthrow of the
government, and lessens the chances that the ANC will be tempted to
backslide and negotiate with the South African Government. (3 Nr)
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The ANC will continue to present a dilemma for the United States.
The ANC's tactics of revolutionary violence are not consonant with US
policies designed to promote nonviolent change. Most troubling is the
SACP's strong position in the ANC leadership and the ANC's pro-Soviet,
anti-US posture. These negative factors are not likely to change in the
next two years.
On the other hand, in the likely context of developments in South
Africa over the next two years and beyond�inadequate reforms,
increasing black resistance, government suppression�the ANC will
strengthen its monopoly on the symbols of liberation and hold a virtual
veto over blacks who may claim to speak for the majority. In the
absence of significant political reform and negotiations with credible
black leaders, and given the likelihood of increasing violence and
polarization, it is difficult to see: how the ANC can be divorced from a
growing number of internal black opposition groups; the ANC-SACP
alliance sundered; its support of revolutionary violence diminished; or
Soviet influence reduced. (s Ni')
While the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC,
South African Government-ANC negotiations, or accelerated govern-
ment political reforms all seem unlikely over this period, progress on
any of them could alter the estimated course of developments or change
the factors in a more favorable direction for US interests.--Nft+
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