SANITIZED TO DISTRIBUTE COPIES TO RINGDAHL AND PETER RODMAN OF THE NSC.

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05661453
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: July 14, 1986

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
to distribute
copies to Ringdahl and Peter
Rodman of the NSC.
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CIA Briefing to Secretary Shultz's Committee
on South Africa -- 10 July 1986
The African National Congress
The outlawed ANC is a small,
than 10,000 members. It is also
South African blacks today, with
percent of the 23 million blacks
observers and polls.
externally based movement of not more
the most popular organization among
a sympathetic audience of about 40 to 50
in South Africa, according to some
The ANC, formed in 1912, was once a mass political movement of about
100,000 members, transformed itself into a small, hierarchical exile
group after it was banned by the government in 1960 and driven
underground. Its widespread popularity among South African blacks
reflects several factors:
-- The ANC has a long, legitimate history as the most visible
organization opposing apartheid.
It purposely concentrates its appeal on its broadest, most
popular, least controversial program contained in its 1955
"Freedom Charter" which calls for a "united, democratic, and
nonracial state."
Potential rivals to the ANC for the mantle of leading the
antiapartheid struggle have not survived internal dissension,
government suppression, and ANC efforts to eliminate the
competition.
Inside South Africa, we believe the ANC remains poorly organized,
albeit making some progress. The clandestine internal ANC organization,
destroyed by the South African Government in the early 1960s, remains
tenuous. The ANC benefits from the fact that it has many of its former
members in South Africa. A number of these former members have been
active in new legal, political and labor entities, providing the ANC with
a body of well-placed sympathizers. We believe, however, that many of
those who describe themselves as ANC sympathizers within South Africa are
ANC allies rather than actual members of the semiclandestine ANC
organization. As such, they are not necessarily responsive to ANC
command or discipline.
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There are at least two identifiable factions in the ANC leadership --
the "old guard" black nationalists, epitomized by ANC President Oliver
Tambo, and the South African Communist Party faction.
Question: Is the ANC Communist-Dominated?
The ANC was first targeted by the Soviet Union in 1928, when Moscow
instructed the South African Communist Party to penetrate the ANC. The
SACP is strongly pro-Soviet and well-represented in the ANC's
leadership. While Communists account for only 25% of ANC membership,
they hold a high percentage of key leadership positions. At least half
of the members of the National Executive Council of the ANC are also
members of the South African Communist Party (of approximately 30
members, 14 are Communists and 5 are suspected Communists).
The Soviet Bloc provides almost all (over 90 percent) of the ANC's
military support and training. Most of the ANC's military training is
conducted by Cuban and East German military advisors at several camps in
Angola. Moscow keeps the ANC's military wing well supplied with
automatic rifles, pistols, machineguns, bazookas, ammunition, grenades,
explosives, detonators, mines, and other equipment such as some types of
communications gear. The ANC most often uses Soviet limpet mines,
grenades, and AK-47 rifles in its attacks, but also has fired Soviet
122-mm rockets and RPG-7 projectiles on several occasions. Most Soviet
Bloc materiel for the ANC is offloaded in Angola and smuggled overland
into South Africa via numerous ANC clandestine facilities scattered
throughout neighboring states. We estimate that Moscow also provides the
ANC with roughly half of its nonmilitary support; that is, about $25
million annually. The remainder comes from the Scandinavian states
(Sweden in particular), the World Council of Churches, and various other
international organizations such as the UN and the OAU.
Non-Communist ANC officials, led by President Oliver Tambo, have on
several occasions taken steps to limit SACP influence, apparently with
some success, and have tried to improve relations with China and the
West. Communist influence in the ANC is particularly strong in the
military wing and in the propaganda department. ANC delegations -- often
led by SACP members -- have made regular visits to the Soviet Union
during the last decade. SACP officials also are in frequent contact with
Soviet officials in various southern African and European capitals. Most
ANC literature is written in London by SACP members and printed in East
Germany, and we suspect that the pervasive pro-Soviet, anti-US line in
ANC propaganda is one of the prices the ANC's non-Communist leaders pay
for vital Soviet Bloc support. The ANC's official political goals are
listed in the 1955 Freedom Charter, which are mildly socialist but
purposely vague to appeal to and attract the broadest coalition of
antiapartheid support possible.
Among the non-Communist majority within the ANC rank and file there
is another identifiable faction, a militant group of younger members who
reject negotiations and clearly see violence as the only means for
overthrowing the South African Government. While this group has thus far
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been excluded from the ANC leadership, it has begun to influence ANC
policies -- most specifically the loosening of the ANC's heretofore
strict rules of engagement for its military activities to include "soft"
targets. Decisions made at the ANC's Second Consultative Conference last
June paved the way for the shift, which has been reflected in subsequent
ANC sabotage and paramilitary activity.
The ANC maintains a diplomatic and propaganda apparatus designed
largely to solicit support from the international community and which
maintains offices in 38 countries, and a military wing. The military
wing, encompasses over half the ANC membership and is largely based in
camps in Angola, with clandestine facilities in states bordering South
Africa. There are 500 Cuban and East German advisers and trainers
attached to these camps.
The diplomatic/propaganda effort of the ANC has been its most
successful. With considerable aid from Soviet controlled and influenced
governments and entities, the ANC has increasingly developed
international fora for promoting itself and its programs. In the last
two years the ANC's quest for legitimacy as the sole representative of
the South African masses has registered particular success as Western
governments have begun to consult with and acknowledge the ANC as a major
actor -- if not the major actor -- in South Africa.
The ANC's military activity has increased dramatically during the
unrest, even though the group remains unable to maintain much of an
in-country military presence. Forced to send paramilitary teams hundreds
of miles and across several borders and then exfiltrate them out imposes
severe constraints on ANC capabilities and makes them highly vulnerable
to South African Government counteraction. In the last year, the ANC has
begun to increase its disruptive capabilities within South Africa by
means of a limited program of arming the uncontrolled proviolence
militants in the townships and expanding the targets of ANC paramilitary
activities. Nonetheless, we do not believe the ANC will by means of its
military wing seriously threaten South African Government control for
many years.
The main ANC program of overthrowing the South African Government is
receiving increased emphasis. The ANC attitude toward some form of
negotiated settlement has been purposely obfuscated by the ANC leadership
and the recent Commonwealth Eminent Person's Group effort concluded
before the ANC was forced to declare itself. Intelligence strongly
suggests that the majority of the leadership is extremely cynical about
the benefits of talks at this time, with only the "old guard" leaders
Tambo and Nelson Mandela apparently interested. The SACP faction opposes
talks at this time. We believe this opposition to negotiations will
deepen even further as Tambo and Mandela pass from the scene, as the
Botha regime continues intransigent, and as the rank-and-file militants
within the ANC wield greater influence in the next few years.
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Economic Vulnerabilities
South Africa dominates a regional economic network that provides
significant economic benefits to neighboring black countries and gives
Pretoria considerable regional leverage. We have little doubt Pretoria
will make good on its threat to retaliate economically against
neighboring countries if the West imposes new economic sanctions against
South Africa. Such moves would impose major and immediate hardships on
regional economies. Pretoria's neighbors have no ready or economically
feasible alternatives to their dependence on Pretoria, and would feel the
effects almost immediately. All will almost certainly turn to the West
for relief.
The View from Pretoria
South Africa's major leverage comes from its control over
transportation links and the flow of migrant labor.
Pretoria controls 75 percent of the region's rail network and has
the area's most efficient ports.
Some 350,000 workers from neighboring states are legally employed
in South Africa and probably between 200,000 and 700,000 work in
South Africa illegally. Remittances from legal workers alone
probably support some 3 million additional people in neighboring
countries.
South Africa is a major supplier of chemicals, petroleum,
machinery, finished consumer goods, and grain and other foods for
the region. South Africans also have invested heavily in
neighboring economies.
Pretoria earns about $1.2 billion in foreign exchange from trade and
other economic ties to neighboring countries, but would suffer little if
it imposed selective economic sanctions.
-- Pretoria would lose more than $100 million in revenue if it cut
regional rail service.
Foreign workers makeup nearly 40 percent of the mining work
force, but Pretoria is convinced -- probably rightly so -- that
the dismissal of selected workers would cause only short�term
disruptions given high regional unemployment.
Pretoria's Likely Moves
In the event of new Western economic sanctions, Pretoria's initial
response probably will be measured, designed primarily to showcase its
regional economic might and indicate to the West the cost of sanctions to
the region.
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-- Pretoria's threat earlier this week to reduce revenues going to
neighboring members of the regional customs union probably was in
part a signal to the West that they mean business.
-- Opening salvos from Pretoria are likely to include expelling
selected foreign workers or disrupting selected rail links.
Pretoria also could engage in a campaign of economic sabotage,
perhaps attacking Zimbabwe's oil routes through Mozambique, or
striking at Angola where its leverage is limited.
Summary of Regional Vulnerabilities
A review of trade and financial statistics shows that all neighboring
states, except Angola, are vulnerable to South African economic
retaliation.
Botswana
-- All petroleum products used in Botswana come via South Africa and
most are refined there.
Nearly 19,000 Botswana miners are employed in South African mines.
About three-quarters of the grain and 80 percent of the fruits
and vegetables consumed are imported from South Africa.
Receipts from the South African controlled Southern African
Customs Union (SACU) account for over 20 percent of government
revenues.
Lesotho
-- Over 95 percent of imports originate in South Africa and all
exports are either sold to or must be transshipped through South
Africa.
-- Remittances from the nearly 110,000 Basotho employed in South
Africa account for about 50 percent of GDP.
The Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (ESCOM)
supplies 100 percent of Lesotho's electricity.
Receipts from the South African Customs Union (SACU) account for
70 percent of government revenues.
Malawi
Nearly 95 percent of Malawi's petroleum comes from South Africa.
Some 18,000 Malawians work in South Africa and provide the
government with about $12 million in foreign exchange.
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Mozambique
More than 50,000 Mozambican miners work in South Africa and
provide nearly 70 percent of the country's foreign exchange
earnings.
-- ESCOM provides 60 percent of Mozambique's electricity.
Swaziland
Revenue from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) accounts
for over 60 percent of government revenues.
More than 13,000 Swazi miners work in South Africa.
-- South African firms own and operate major Swazi farms and tourist
companies.
Zaire
More than 40 percent of the minerals exported in 1985 were
shipped through South Africa.
Three�fourths of the food, petroleum, and chemicals used by
Zairian mines and mills are imported through South Africa.
Zambia
-- Zambia's Ndola refinery receives some feedstock from South Africa.
-- Nearly half of Zambia's mineral exports are shipped by South
African railway.
Zimbabwe
About 60 percent of Zimbabwe's export and import traffic utilizes
the South African transport system.
South Africa is Zimbabwe's largest trading partner accounting for
20 percent of total trade.
Soviet Perspectives
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-- Beginning in 1983, the Soviet leadership began to accord Africa a
higher priority in terms of Soviet global interests. This new
Soviet interest in Africa has been centered primarily around
developments in southern Africa.
-- The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party describes
South Africa as of strategic importance to Moscow for three
reasons:
- South Africa's important geographic position which commands
both the Cape shipping route and the south Atlantic and south
Indian Oceans.
- South Africa's possession of huge quantities of natural
resources, especially rare metals of military significance.
- Moscow understands the enormous political significance that
South Africa will have once it is ruled by a black
government. The economic weight of South Africa, its
educated and well-trained work forces, its developed economy,
industrial capacity and infrastructure will enable a black
South African Government to quickly assume a dominant,
leading role on the continent, even overshadowing Nigeria and
Ethiopia.
The Soviet Union sees as an important long-term strategic
objective the overthrow of pro-Western South African government
and its replacement by a regime "well-disposed" towards Moscow.
The Soviets are keen to have the capability of denying South
African resources, especially strategic minerals, to the West.
In the medium term, Moscow seeks to undermine the influence of
the West in South Africa and to remove South Africa as a
"strategic pillar" of the Western alliance.
Soviet Assessments
The Soviets believe that the African National Congress is the
principal vehicle for change in South Africa and views the SACP as their
means of influence within the ANC.
The SACP is a protege of the Soviet Communist Party Central
Committee, which funds and guides it. Moscow sees the ANC as a
"progressive, well-disciplined revolutionary movement" and, going back to
the Comintern days, has treated the ANC as its "natural ally" in the
region deserving of financial, political, and military support. Moscow
is actively working to expand its influence over the ANC which was
founded by and continues to include significant elements that have
nationalist agendas divergent from that of the SACP.
The Soviet Central Committee and other senior bodies appear convinced
that the best way to advance Soviet interests in South Africa is by
violence and armed struggle. Carefully directed violence, as Moscow sees
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it, will provoke counteraction and repression by the South African
Government, which in turn will contribute to the polarization and
politicization of the masses. Violence will disrupt the economy, lead to
disinvestment by Western governments, and ultimately promote the collapse
of the South African regime. Moscow does not wholly favor indiscriminate
or uncontrolled violence because it could provoke massive repression that
would set back the struggle.
Moscow is against a peaceful transformation of the South African
system in which moderate opponents of the regime would dominate a
post�apartheid government instead of pro�Moscow Marxist forces. While
the Soviets -- and the SACP -- are not totally opposed to "negotiations,"
they believe that negotiations now would probably enhance the role of
moderates and perhaps split the ANC. Moscow would likely find
negotiations acceptable only as a method of transferring power to the ANC
and SACP, with the "instruments of authority" being replaced by
revolutionary organs of government."
Moscow recognizes limitations on its ability to fully accomplish the
above programs. Acknowledged Soviet limitations include:
Lack of reliable information on internal South African
developments and concern that the SAG reform program could reduce
the ANC's appeal and effectiveness.
Lack of complete control over the ANC.
-- Concern about the ANC's lack of political/military infrastructure
within South Africa.
(b)(1)
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-- Acknowledgement of the South African Government's overwhelming
military/security power.
The senior Soviet leadership see their South Africa programs as
long�term efforts.
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