"EAGLE AND SWASTIKA: CIA + NAZI WAR CRIMINALS AND COLLABORATORS" CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05657203
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2011-00655

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Chapter Seventeen
In the Shadow of the Cold War (U)
The Nazi war criminal investigations labored under the shadow of the Cold War.
When the Office of Sp-eefatInvestigations reached an agreement with Soviet authorities
ih 1980 to interview Witnesses and collect evidence behind the Iron Curtain, doubts arose
concerning the motives behind Soviet cooperation.1 Many ethnic groups, especially those
from the Baltic States and other Eastern European countries, blasted OSI as a tool for
Soviet KGB disinformation activities to discredit anticommunists living in the United
States by affixing the "fascist' label on groups that resisted Moscow's oppressive rule.
They directed vehement protests against Allan A. Ryan, Jr., OSI's director, for his work
in fostering cooperation with the Soviet regime and his description of the Ukrainian role
during World War II in his 1984 book, Quiet Neighbors.2 (U)
During the 1970s and the 1980s, the Central Intelligence Agency grew
increasingly aware of the importance that Soviet intelligence placed on "active
measures." The KGB, in fact, had a branch in the First Chief Directorate dedicated to
'For a discussion of OSI's agreement with the Soviets, see Ryan, Quiet Neighbors, pp. 65-93..
(U)
2Examples of emigre writings against OSI are seen in National Confederation of American
Ethnic Groups, Inc., Victory Without Fear: A Response to OSI 's "Nazi Hunting" Experiment
(Irvington, N.J.: n.p., 1985), and various articles in Boshyk, ed., Ukraine during World War II.
(U)
SENc
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employing front groups, media manipulation, disinformation, forgeries, and agents of
influence to promote Soviet foreign policy goals. The Soviets also sought to discredit the
American government in the eyes of world opinion and to undercut international support
of the United States. As a result, the Nazi war criminal investigations became drawn into
the larger arena of US-USSR competition.3 (U)
KonsIantin Hanft(U)�
Even before the establishment of the Office of Special Investigations in 1979, the
Central Intelligence Agency questioned the relationship between the Nazi war criminal
investigations and the disinformation activities of the Warsaw Pact intelligence services.
One case, that of Konstantin Hanff (also known as Konstanty Zygfryd Hanff), threatened
to embroil the United States and Poland in a diplomatic squabble. Hanff, of mixed
Polish-German background, was born in the Polish village of Czestochowa in 1926 and
immigrated to the United States in 1969. According to later statements to the FBI, Hanff
lived in Poland until the outbreak of the war, when he moved to Lithuania. He then
worked in Warsaw and Berlin and served in the German Army on the Eastern Front.
3The CIA exposed the KGB's efforts in Congressional hearings while the State Department also
publicized examples of deliberate disinformation attempts. See US Congress, House. Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. Soviet Active Measures. 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 13-14 July
1982, and various special reports, foreign affairs notes, and bulletins issued by the Department of
State. For a discussion of Soviet targeting against emigre groups, see Herbert Romerstein and
Stanislav Levchenko, The KGB Against the "Main Enemy:" How the Soviet Intelligence Service
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Hanff deserted in 1944 but was arrested and sentenced to two years imprisonment. The
Germans soon placed Hanff in a special rehabilitation unit and returned him to frontline
duty. In the spring of 1945, he fell into Soviet hands and, thereafter, he assisted-the
Russians in spreading anti-German propaganda. The NKVD later apprehended Hanff for
anticommunist sentiments and held him until his return to Poland in early 1948.
Following his release, Hanff worked throughout Eastern Europe in numerous private and
governmental bodies, primarily in the import-expert business. Intrtid-I969, at the age of,
43, Hanff, his wife, and one son obtained immigrant visas and moved to the United�
States, where they took up residence in New York City.4 (S)
A Threat to US-Polish Relations (U)
While holding an assortment of jobs. Hanff, a translator, had other goals in mind.
In September 1975, he published his first issue of Wolna Polska, or "Free Poland," the
voice of an anticommunist group, "Combat Organization Free Poland."5 In this paper,
Hanff listed the names of alleged Polish, Czech, and Soviet intelligence officers stationed
in the United States under diplomatic cover. In addition, Hanff tried to influence various
Operates Against the United States (Lexington: DC Heath and Company, 1989), pp. 308-318.
(U)
4Hanff s brief autobiographical statement is found in various excerpts of FBI reports in OGC
Records, Job 85-00903R, Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. Hanff's CIA personality file is quite
extensive. For further details, see Konstanty Zygfryd Hanff, File DO Records. (S)
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Warsaw Pact officials to defect. These activities incensed the Polish Government to the
point that the Foreign Minister complained to the American ambassador in March 1976.
The State Department noted that "the message was clear to the Ambassador that '-
retaliation of some kind is possible unless Poles are convinced soon that Department
takes their concern seriously and that everything possible will be done to meet their
demands." By June of that year, the Hanff affair threatened to upset the American
. -
secretary of state's.visit to-Poland,. .(S):
The Poles had, in fact, already checked Hanff s financial support among the
Polish emigre communities in both New York and Chicago. At.the same time, the first
indications of Polish disinformation efforts appeared in the United States. In early April
1976, the Zionist Organization of America received an anonymous letter that claimed that
Hanff had served as a Nazi informer in 1941 and, later, had participated in war crimes in
eastern Poland. While Hanff denied these allegations to the FBI, he did not curtail his
anticommunist activities. On the contrary, he continued his work and even registered as .
an American agent of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London in the summer of 1976.
This act once again led the Polish Government to protest Hanffs presence in the United
States and increased Polish suspicions that Hanff worked for American intelligence.6 (S)
5For a chronology of the Hanff case, see Office of Technical Service to
OGC, "Technical Assistance for US Attorney's Office, New York," 7 April 1978, QDL
51-78, (S), in OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. (S)
6William H. Webster, the FBI director, asked the Director of Central Intelligence in early 1979 if
"Hanff was ever employed or had his activities directed by the Central Intelligence Agency."
The Agency replied that "an intensive search of the files and indices . . . reveals no evidence of
any contact or association between Subject and this Agency." See Webster to DCI, "Unknown
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Hanfc s publications and his own suspected forgeries raised concern within the
State Department, the FBI, and the CIA. The Poles took Hanff's threats seriously and
began to retaliate in kind by spreading doctored copies of a "Free Poland Special Report
Nr 3," which published a "black list of dangerous CIA and FBI agents." Consequently, in
the spring of 1977, the State Department asked the Justice Department to examine
Hanff's wartime activities and ascertain the validity of war crimes allegations: The US
PistrictAttorneys,Office in New York had already located several witnesses in Israekv
who claimed that Hanff had helped select Jews for extermination camps. The FBI also�
had an informant who said that he had seen a photograph of Hanff in an SS uniform. (S)
CIA's Technical Assistance (U)
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In early 1978,
the chief of CIA's Questioned Documents '
Laboratory in the Office of Technical Service, became involved in the Hanff case after he
received a call from the US District Attorney's Office in New York.7 In a meeting with
Subjects; Mailing of Forged Letters on Polish Consul General Stationery in New York City;
Protection of Foreign Officials-Harassment-Subversive," 1 February 1979, in DO Records,
Box 1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. The Agency's reply is found in DDO to Director, FBI,
"Unknown Subjects; Mailing of Forged Letters on Polish Consul General Stationery in New
York City; Protection of Foreign Officials-Harassment-Subversives," [undated], (S), in OGC
Records, Job 85-00903R, Box I, Folder 6, CIA ARC. (S)
7Bom in 1928,77had served with the Counter Intelligence Corps in Austria in the early
as a document technologist when he transferred
and retired from the Agency
1950s, He later worked with
to the CIA. He received his Ph.D.
in 1982.
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Harry Batchelder, Jr., the assistant US attorney
eviewed the 1976 letter to the
Zionist Organization of America and its three photocopies of German wartime
documents, which had implicated Hanff. Batchelder wantedn7to determine if the
documents were accurate or if they were Soviet/Polish forgeries implicating Hanff with
war crimes. After receiving permission from the Office of General Counsel,
agreed to undertake a technical examination pending further approval for any expert
testimony in court. (S)
After performing his examination of the three photocopied documents
concluded in April 1978 that Hanff was a victim of a disinformation effort on the part of
the Polish intelligence service. He recommended that CIA have no further involvement
with this case "unless there could be a definite showing that Hanff was the proper subject
of Agency interest."
assessment, confirmed by the Office of General Counsel
later that spring, reinforced the Agency's belief that Hanff "seems to be a political
entrepreneur involved in imaginative intelligence intrigues."8 (S)
Despite echnical advice about the German documents, the US District
Attorney's Office and later the Office of Special Investigations insisted on pursuing the
Hanff case, especially after he petitioned for naturalization. In the spring of 1978, the
Justice Department asked the CIA to interview
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
also Interview with b 16 July 2001, transcript and tape in Oral (b)(3)
History project, CIA History Staff. (S)
8David S. Brandwein, Director, OTS to k:1GC, "Assistance to US Attorney, New York, (b)(3)
by "11 April 1978, OGC 78-2349, (S), in OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box (b)(3)
1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. (S)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
officer, who had defected to the United States in the early 1970s.9
lived in New York and had worked with Hanff to publish the names of Polish
intelligence officers.
Hanff.
of OGC and
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
of the DO interviewed (b)(3)(b)(3)
in mid-April 1978 in order to determine the extent of his involvement with
acknowledged that he had assisted Hanff, whom he described as a
"survival artist," and that he had seen wartime photographs of Hanff in a-German -
uniform.
agreed that-the timing of the allegations about Hanff s wartime
service "could not be dismissed as accidental," Based on this interview,
(b)(3)
felt that
and
should speak directly with the US- attorney's office in New
York. I9 (S)
The New York district attorney's office determined in mid-1979 that it lacked
sufficient evidence to proceed in prosecuting Hanff .1 I In August 1980,
in OGC provided OSI and the US Attorney's office of the Southern District of New York
with a list of third�agency material in CIA's files pertaining to Hanff.12 Later in 1981,
9Philip Wilens, Chief, Government Regulations and Labor Section, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice to OGC, "Konstanty Hang" 14 April 1978, OGC 78-
2417, (C), in OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box I, Folder 17, CIA ARC. (C)
10 Memorandum for the Record, "Denaturalization Proceedings against Konstanty
Hanff," 9 May 1978, OGC 78-3017, (C); see also Memorandum for the Record,
"Denaturalization Proceedings against Constanty Hanff," 18 April 1978, OGC 78-2470, (S), both
in OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box 1, Folder 17, CIA ARC. (S)
IlSovern, Memorandum for the Record, "Konstantin Hanff and Tscherim Soobzokov," 3 July
1979, OGC 79-06165, (S), and OGC to "Konstantin Hanff and
Tscherim Soobzokov," 3 August 1979, OGC 79-07123, (C), both in OGC Records, Job 85-
00903R, Box 1, Folder 13, CIA ARC. (S)
12 to Ryan and Thomas Belote, Assistant US Attorney, Southern District of New York,
25 August 1980, in Hanff, DO Records. (U)
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the CIA Het with Hanff as a possible source of current information
on Polish political developments.13 Interestingly, a defector told the CIA in 1990 that
Hanff was the target of a disinformation campaign by the Polish Ministry of Interior.
Aleksandr Makowski, a press counselor and the Ministry of Interior resident, was credited
as planning the attacks against Hanff. Makowski served in New York at the United
Nations from 1976 to1981, during the height of the Hanff investigations.14 This case
J.- highlights the complicated dimensions.of the Nazi war criminal invesiigationns"arid'the- '-
difficulties that Federal investigators and agencies faced in bringing war criminals and
collaborators to justice. (5)
Defectors as Experts on Disinformation (U)
Concerns about Soviet disinformation activities and the reliability of witnesses
and evidence from the USSR increased as the Office of Special Investigations expanded
its caseload. The CIA's sources of information about life behind the Iron Curtain
became increasingly important in cases dealing with former residents of Eastern Europe.
Both Justice Department prosecutors and defense attorneys wanted to question defectors
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
39600, IN
(b)(1)
13DCD o Director. "Operational Lead (Poland)," 6 April 1981,
6181194, (S), in Hanff, 00 Records. (S)
Against
Polish
(b)(3)
14Counterintelligence Information Report, "MSW Covert Action Operation
Emigre Journalist (fnu) Hamff," 22 March 1990, SBC1-6504, (S), in Hanff,
(b)(3)
DO Records. (5)
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from various Warsaw Pact regimes who possessed insights about Soviet operations
against various emigre groups in America. (U)
who provided information in 1978 about
Konstantin Hanff, is the first known defector to participate in the Nazi war criminal
investigations in the United States. Several years later, Imants Lesinskis, a Latvian-born
defector from the KGB, submitted depositions in the cases of Vilis Hazners, Karl Linnas,
and Liudas Kaiyrs. Lesinskis bolstered defense attempts toiallege that the-Soviets wanted. ,
to smear anticommunist groups as pro-Nazi organizations. The Central Intelligence
Agency
coordinated interviews with Lesinskis.
.15(5)
As early as the fall of 1978, Ivars Berins, a lawyer active in the Latvian
American community, learned about Lesinskis and sought his testimony in the case of
Vilis Hazners. The Immigration and Naturalization Service had filed charges in 1977
against Hazners for his service in a Latvian police unit. Lesinskis claimed personal
knowledge of the KGB's efforts to frame Hazners. To accommodate Berzins's request,
Martin Mendelsohn of the Special Litigation Unit and
"Various memoranda concerning
Job 85-00903R, Box 1, Folder 18, ClA ARC. (5)
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General Counsel arranged for both the defense and prosecution to interview the KGB
defector. i 6 (C)
Three years later, Berzins again wanted to interview Lesinskis about his
knowledge of Soviet disinformation campaigns directed against immigrants in the United
States in the case of Karl Linnas." The Justice Department had accused Linnas, an
Estonian, of running a concentration camp and murdering inmates. The court supported
Berziris's new request; and
in the Office of Generai atinsel arranged
with CIA's Doinestic Collection Division for a meeting at the Federal courthouse in St.
Louis in early June 1981. Berzins had Lesinskis provide a sworn deposition in Which he
outlined his work with the KGB in discrediting Latvian emigre organizations.I8 (S)
David E. Springer, attorney for Liudas Kairys, filed a subpoena for all documents
pertaining to his client, including evidence of Soviet disinformation activities and the
16According to the signed memorandum of agreement, the three attorneys "agree that Mr.
Leshinslciy's [sic] appearance in open court, or exposure to the public or the public media, would
be unnecessary and possibly hazardous." Berzins and Mendelsohn, "Memorandum of
Agreement," 18 October 1978, (C), in OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box 1, Folder 18, CIA
ARC. (C)
17 Memorandum for the File, "OSIMOJ Request for Briefing re: Imants
Leshinslcis," 30 March 1981, OGC 81-05153, OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box 1, Folder 18,
CIA ARC. (U)
18US v. Karl Linnas, "Deposition of Imants Lecinskis "1 Time 1981, OGC Records, Job 85-
00903R, Box 1, Folder 18, CIA ARC. See alsc 1:MS/FPLG, Memorandum
for the Record, "Meeting in St. Louis, Missouri to Interview and Depose Defector Imants
Lesinskis," 8 June 1981, (S), in DO Records, 13ox 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. Prior
to the deposition, CIA and OSI debriefed Lesinskis in St. Louis in April 1981. See (b)(3)
Chief, IMS/FPLG, "Meeting with Imants Lesinskis," 24 April 1981, (S), in DO
Box 1, Folder 6, CIA ARC. (S)
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alteration of fingerprint files.I0 Springer's request led eventually to a deposition of
Imants Lesinskis in April 1982 to discuss his role with the Latvian Society for Cultural
Relations of Foreign Countries. Lesinskis highlighted for Springer the KGB's efforts to
discredit Latvians who opposed the Soviet regime. Although Kairys was actually
Lithuanian, Lesinskis offered his opinion that Soviet deception methods were similar
throughout the Baltic States. The Soviets, he-claimed, wanted to undermine support for
the various nationalist movements by4ainting alLanticommunists:afascist stippotters-61-34
war criminals. "I would not attribute any validity at all to any Soviet docunients or SoViet
witness testimony," Lesinskis declared.20 (U) -
Lesinskis's depositions did have some influence on the outcome of the Hazners
case, which the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed for lack of evidence in 1981. In
the case of Linnas, the court revoked his citizenship and ordered his deportation in 1984.
Allan A. Ryan, Jr., the director of OS!, fiercely denied that American judicial proceedings
were corrupted in any manner by the use of Soviet evidence or witnesses. "The Soviets
have never attempted to tell OSI who to investigate. They do not send us unsolicited
information; they respond to our inquiries," Ryan asserted in his 1984 book. (U)
19 US v. Liudas Kailys, "Deposition Subpoena to Testify or Produce Documents or Things," Civil
Action File No. 80 C 4302, 6 May 1981, OGC 81-03777, in OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box
1, Folder 7, CIA ARC. (U)
20US v. Liudas Kairys, "Deposition of Imants Lesinskis," 9 April 1982, in OGC Records, Job 85-
00903R, Box 1, Folder 7, CIA ARC. (U)
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Valerian Trifa (U)
The depositions of Imants Lesinskis -were conducted in relative isolation without
public intrusion_ Both the Central Intelligence Agency and Lesinskis himself desired this
in order to protect his safety. In the case of Orthodox Archbishop Valerian Trifa, who
� had:b.een a leader, in the Romanian Iron Guard during the war, the presence of a
� Romanian defector became a majontissup between the.Archbishop':s defense-attorney and,
the Federal government. John J. Sibisan, Trifa's lawyer, raised the matter with President-
Ronald Reagan in the fall of 1982, protesting that Ion Pacepa, a former general and
deputy head of the Romanian intelligence service, had admitted to Sibisian that Pacepa's
information had been withheld by OSI in a "smear campaign against the religious leader
of 100,000 Orthodox people of Romanian descent in this country."21 (U)
Sibisan's letter naturally unleashed a flurry of activity in the White House, the �
Office of Special Investigations, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency and
OSI, in fact, had interviewed two Romanian defectors, Ion Pacepa and Nicholae
Horodinca, about their knowledge of alleged efforts by the Romanian Government to
218ibisan to President Reagan, "Archbishop Valerian D. Trifa," 14 October 1982, 107625, in
OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, bos 2, Folder 30, CIA ARC. Pacepa, a lieutenant general and
head of Romania's Department of Foreign Information (DIE), later wrote a book, Red Horizons,
in 1987. For further information abouyt Pacepa's postdefection activities, see Alison Mutler,
"Romanian Court Acquits Former Spy Chief; Ruling Viewed as Attempt to Impress NATO,"
Washington Times, 8 June 1999, op.A15. (U)
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falsify evidence concerning Trifa.22 Because the US Government had not yet publicly
acknowledged that it had given sanctuary to the Romanians, the CIA preferred to
integrate OSI's questions during the Agency's routine debriefings of both men. As a -
result, OSI did not initially conduct a personal interview, although
of OGC
offered this alternative if the debriefings provided any particular details. �As a result of
the Agency's interrogations,
reported that both men considered Trifa to be a war
crimipal;thuttthat theYia1s0 believed,that4he Romanian tegirrielad'taken steps to fabricate
evidence to be used against him in American courts.
old OSI that both men were
willing to speak with the Justice Department and to examine documents in an attempt to
identify the doctored evidence.23 OSI's interest in the Romanian defector diminished
following Trifa's "voluntary" surrender of his citizenship and his subsequent appea1.24
This move delayed the case for nearly two years. (U)
In preparing a response to Sibisan's charges, OSI's Richard Sullivan consulted
Office of General Counsel,
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with of the Agency's
in turn,
received guidance
years earlier using
from the Directorate
of Operations, which
Fnformation. D. Lowell Jensen,
had debriefed Pacepa two
Assistant US Attorney
22The following documents contain material pertinent to the debriefings:
for the Record, "Request to Interview Romanian Defectors by Office
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Memorandum
of Special Investigations,
DOJ," 16 June 1980, OGC 80-05083,
(S); Charles B. Renfrew, Deputy
Attorney General to
Frank Carlucci, DDCI, 2 July 1980,
OGC 80-06031, (S);
to Ryan, 15 July 1980;
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(S); and Ryan to
1 August 1980, (S), all
to Ryan, 24 July 1980, OGC 80-06378,
documents in OGC Records, Job
85-00903R, Box 2, Folder 30, CIA
ARC. (5) (b)(3)
(b)(3)
to
"Defector
Interviews in US v. Trifa," [undated], in OGC Records, Job 85-
00903R, Box 2, Folder 30, CIA
(b)(3)
ARC. (U)
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General in charge of the Criminal Division, told Trifa's attorney in December 1982 that
"your statement that Department of Justice attorneys withheld information favorable to
_Archbishop Trifa is flatly untrue." Jensen then informed-Sibisan of the circumstances. -
surrounding the interviews. "When Department of Justice attorneys became aware in
1980 that a Romanian defector purported to have informatiorton an alleged campaign to
discredit Trifa through false evidence, steps were immediately taken to..ascertain the truth
of the matter.. These steps," Jenserrsaid, "revealed that the defeetorliad nb;reliahle
information concerning Archbishop Trifa or any alleged attempts by any person or -
government to use falsified evidence against him."25 (U)
OSI's Range of Interests in the CIA (U)
As OSI's caseload expanded in the early 1980s, the Department -of Justice and
various defense attorneys expressed interest in interviewing current and former Agency
employees, who either possessed special knowledge about postwar Europe or about
specific individuals. As seen in the Bolschwing and Soobzokov investigations, CIA case
officers could answer key questions and resolve missing gaps in the records.
Unfortunately, Bolschwing's primary case officer had died before the investigation
(b)(3) (b)(3)
o "Nazi War Criminal Investigations�Valerian Trifa," 3 September 1980,
OGC 80-07551, in OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box 2, Folder 30, CIA ARC. (U)
25A draft copy of this letter, Jensen to Sibisan, [undated], appears in OGC Records, Job 85-
00903R, Box 2, Folder 30, CIA ARC. For the circumstances surrounding CIA's approval in the
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commenced, while Soobzokov's CIA contact failed to provide insights into the origins of
the State Department documents in the Agency's files. In other cases, such as the Hanff
investigation,
a current employee, assisted Federal authorities with
his expert knowledge of Soviet disinformation practices. (S)
While the CIA preferred to remain in the background of the Nazi war criminal
investigations,there were moments when Agency officials stepped into the limelight. hi
. , February 1979, the CIA transferred to-the National-Archives a series of Aerial
photographs taken of the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau by Allied
reconnaissance aircraft in 1944 and 1945. At a press conference, two analysts from
CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center described what they had learned from
the photographs, which had been stored in a Federal archival facility since the end of
World War II. Viewed in the light of hindsight, the photographs revealed activities on the
ground at Auschwitz-Birkenau, including concentration camp inmates standing in line for
the gas chambers. 26 Dino A. Brugioni and Robert G. Poirier prepared a study, "The
Holocaust Revisited," which President Jimmy Carter presented to Elie Wiesel, a
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wording, see Memorandum for the Record, "Nazi War Criminal Prosecutions�
Valerian Trifa," 17 December 1982, OGC 82-11182, in the same job as above. (U)
26Quotation appears in Thomas O'Toole, '44 Photos Showed Auschwitz Camp," Washington
Post, 23 February 1979, pp. A-1 and A-26. For other press coverage, see "Photos of Auschwitz
Extermination Unit Produced," New York Times, 24 February 1979, p. A-2; Daniel F: Gilmore,
"View of a Death Camp-35 Years Later," Boston Sunday Globe, 25 February 1979, pp. 29-30;
and Lora Sharpe, "City Man Helped Interpret Auschwitz Photo," New Bedford (Massachusetts)
Standard Time, 4 March 1979. (U)
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prominent survivor of the Nazi death camps. CIA's Brugieni hailed wartime overhead
imagery as "an untapped source of history."27 (U)
,The Office of Special Investigations occasionally interviewed CIA officials as a
part of a formal investigation. Allan A. Ryan, while leading the Klaus Barbie
investigation in 1983, requested traces on several retired Agency employees in order to -
arrange for.interviews.2.8 As a part of the initial stage of the Trifa investigation, which -- t
lbroaden&Finto the-d3olschwing-eaee,--Ifie Special Litigation Uniisebntacted-the CIA in the vi
summer of 1978 for information-pertaining to Col. Boris T. Pash. INS investigators
suspected that Colonel Rash had "a strong influence" on Trifa's entry into the United
States and his rapid rise within the ecclesiastical ranks of the Romanian Orthodox
Church.29 (U)
Pash, whose father served as the Metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church in
America during the 1940s, joined the Office of Policy Coordination as a military detailed
27The article, "The Holocaust Revisited: A Retrospective Analysis of the Auschwitz-Birkenau
Extermination Complex," by Dino A. Brugioni and Robert G. Poirier appeared in Studies in
Intelligence, 22 (Winter 1978), pp. 11-29. OSI continued to express interest in CIA's capability
to interpret aerial photographs. In 1981, Neal Sher, OSI's acting director, asked that Poirier
analyze a massacre site in the Soviet Union and provide some technical assistance in the
prosecution's case against Albert Deutscher. The Department of Justice also considered having
Poirier testify in the trial of Hans Lipschis in 1982 concerning his concentration camp guard
duties. See Neal M. Sher, OSI, to Stanley Sporlcin, OGC, 23 June 1981, OGC 81-05356, and
Sher, OSI, to Sporlcin, OGC, 22 December 1981, OGC 81-10990, both in OGC Records, Job 85-
00903R, Box 2, Folder 31, CIA ARC. See also various memoranda concerning Lipschis case in
OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box 1, Folder 3, CIA ARC. (S)
28Ryan to OGC, 6 May 1983, OGC 83-03816, (S), in DO Records,
30x 12, Folder 128, CIA ARC. CIA name traces to OSI's requests are also included in
this folder. (S)
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in 1949. He served with OPC in�the Far East, Washington, and in Austria until his return
t't
to the Army in 1952. Pash had a long record in intelligence activities, having
.commanded the Alsos Mission at4he end of the .war. As the Third Reich crumbled, -
Pash's Alsos task force located German scientists with knowledge about atomic research
in order to keep them from passing the information to the Soviets. Pash continued his
intelligence activities after leaving OPC and had a wide range of contacts. The Agency,
however, could not determine_whether Colonel Pash�whose.na.m&hadtheempublieized
in the course of the Church Committee hearings in 1975�had any official or unofficial
relationship with Trifa.30 (U)
The Office of Special Investigations grew interested in the Agency for other
reasons. The fact that CIA had a number of employees who had initially served in the
Army Counter Intelligence Corps in postwar Europe proved a valuable resource. In
addition, many of the Agency's early employees had immigrated to the United States
from Eastern and Southern Europe and possessed native fluency and familiarity with the
countries behind the Iron Curtain. OSI focused most of its investigations on this region
of the world because it had been the scene of many of the worst Nazi atrocities. Indeed,
29Eugene M. Thirolf, SLU to Anthony A. Lapham, OGC, "United States vs. Trifa 5-70924," 18
July 1978, CO 1421, OGC 78-4754, in OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box 2, Folder 30, CIA
ARC. (U) (b)(3)
(b)(3) 3C Office of Legislative Counsel "Name Trace and Records
Search�Colonel Boris T. Pash," 12 September 1978, OLC 78-4034/1, (C), in OGC Records, Job
85-00903R, Box 2, Folder 30, CIA ARC. For further information of his wartime activities, see
Boris T. Pash, The Alsos Mission (New York: Award House, 1969). (C)
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the United States had accepted hundreds of thousands of Europeans as displaced persons
in late 1940s and the 1950s, including untold numbers of former Nazi collaborators. (U)
OSI Looks at M. Paul Hartman (U)
. The Special Litigation Unit first expressed interest in M. Paul Hartman, a retired
counterintelligence officer,,whenahetestifieft on behalf of,viliS"Hazners, the Latvian
resident alien in New York accused of membership in a collaborationist
Schutzmannschafi during the war.31 Hartman later served as a witness at the
denaturalization hearings for Karl Linnas and Karlis Detlays. In all cases, Hartman spoke
on Soviet disinformation practices. His testimony to and affiliation with the CIA
concerned SLU and OS!, because Hartman left the impression that he enjoyed official
sanction. This led the Department of Justice to make inquiries about Hartman's service
in the Agency. (U)
Born Misha Kanter in 1923 in Latvia, Hartman arrived in New York in 1937.
Once in America, he changed his name and worked in a Baltimore shipyard until joining
the Army in 1943. Hartman served in the CIC in Europe, where he located Nazi
scientists for Operation PAPERCLIP. Following his discharge from military service,
Hartman remained as a civilian instructor at the Army's counterintelligence school at Fort
31Hartman's testimony in this case is found in "In the Matter of Vitas A.
Hazners before Hon. Anthony M. DeGaeto, Immigration Judge," 1 May 1978,"
Box 8, Folder 159, CIA ARC. (U)
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Holabird in Baltimore, Maryland. In January 1949 he accepted a position with the US
Displaced Persons Commission (DPC) in Hamburg interviewing Eastern Europeans as a
part of the immigration process. The CIA in Germany recruited Hartman in early 1951 to
serve as an Intelligence Officer in the Foreign Division S, Baltic Section.32 (S)
Hartman quickly became a controversial figure. While still employed by the
DPC, Hartman approached the Department of State with his plans to support the LatVian
government-in-exile. In severaFtratings with.State Depattinent 'officials, Hartman
_discussed his role in interviewing displaced Halts and mentioned his new position in CIA.
He even claimed that his actions (including the funding of the Latvian activities) had the
sponsorship of the Agency and did not require State Department consent.33 The State
Department naturally did not look kindly on Hartman's independent action, and Robert P.
Joyce protested to Frank Wisner that "Hartman's activities have caused
misunderstandings and confiision;" -Joyce felt that Hartman "is endeavoring to promOte
not only his own personal ideas but also to put himself into a position of influence and
power among the Baltic emigration."34 (C)
32For further details on Hartman, see Personnel file, M. Paul Hartman, OP Records, Job 77-
00767R, Box 23, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)
33Mr. Vedeler to Mr. Joyce, "Activities of Mr. M. Paul Hartman, an Employee of CIA," 23
August 1951, (S), in DO Records, 3ox 13, Folder 128, CIA
ARC. This document, and Joyce's memorandum to Wisner below, were located in State
Department records. See Classification Review Division to
Information Services, "Review at State of Material Possibly Containing Information on Klaus
Barbie," (C), in the same job as above. (S)
34Joyce to Wisner, "Mr. M. Paul Hartman," 29 August 1951, in DO Records
Box 13, Folder 128, CIA ARC. (U)
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A few years later, Frank Wisner, now the Deputy Director for Plans, reprimanded
Hartman in writing for mishandling contract agent funds and for his unauthorized "free-
wheeling" activities. The Agency again disciplined Hartman in 1956 for filing false
reimbursement claims (although he was not fired). Instead, Hartman joined the Agency's
Counterintelligence Staff, where he handled defector cases and became CIA's expert on
Nazi records.35 Hartman' s biggest success came after the Israelis-arrested Adolf
e Eichrnann in,J960, when he uncovered the fact that Otto'von1361S�c'Sing;cofie Of the
Agency's top agents in Austria after the war, had actually worked with Eichmann in the
1930s. His review of captured German records revealed the extent of Bolschwing's
duplicity; Hartman duly reported this information to his superiors in CIA. (S)
Hartman retired from CIA in 1976, two years before he came to the attention of
the Special Litigation Unit. As a result of his testimony, Martin Mendelsohn, SLU's
chief, requested that the CIA provide him with an unclassified summary of Hartman's
Agency service to assist in "evaluating his veracity and competence as an opposition
defense witness in Government hearings."36 In May 1980, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., OSI's
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35Between 1956 and 1960, Hartman directed the review of some 1 500 000 paaes of captured
German documents under the Agency auspice, and
his team checked the German records for counterintelligence leads which, in some cases, were
incorporated into CIA's own records. Some of the German material, Hartman's notes, and
kmogress reports are found in DO Records Box 1, and Job 75-
00660R, Boxes 1-9, CIA ARC. (S)
3=to Director of Personnel et al, "Justice Department Request for Data or
Paul Hartman: POB Riga, Latvia," 5 February 1979, OGC 79-01171, in
DO Records, Job 88-00252R, Box 8, Folder 159, CIA ARC. Mendelsohn believed that Hartman
may have sponsored Hazners's immigration to the United States, although Hartman denied in
court that he knew of the Latvian. SeeD Memorandum for the Record,
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� director, sought further details about Hartman's role in raising money for Latvian exile
groups. Drawing its conclusions from State Department correspondence, OSI believed
that Hartman may have recruited war criminals while working for the Army and, later, for
the Displaced Persons Commission.37 (S)
OSI's interest in Hartman increased after he testified about the Latvian Waffen SS
at the deportation hearings of Karlis Detlays, a Latvian accused of belonging to the
Auxiliary Security Poliee,38;4R3ialibelievedi.that Hartmardialtanmitted perjury; and'ffe2
pressed the Army for informatidn about his CIC employnient. This request came back to
the CIA, prompting concerns about OSI's procedures. "We find it less than courteous
and of considerable concern,' 7 wrote of the DO, "that the DOJ is �
requesting information on a former CIA employee without any notification to the
Agency."39 (U)
The Agency arranged to have Hartman meet with OSI investigators to discuss
"several items of interest" in the fall of 1980.40 Nearly two years later, Hartman again
"Testimony of Mr. M. Paul Hartman," 4 May 1978, (S), and to Chief,
Security Analysis Group, '16 May 1978, (S), both in DO Records,
Box 8, Folder 159, CIA ARC. (S)
37Ryan to Daniel Silver, OGC, 6 May 1980, OGC 80-03905, (S), in OGC Records, Job 85-
00903R, Box 1, Folder 15, CIA ARC. (S)
385heridan Lyons, "Ex-CIA Man Blames Soviets for Detlays Charge," Baltimore Sun, 9
February 1979, p. C1-5. (U)
(b)(3) to "Department of the Army Request for Coordination of CIA Records
Requested by the Department of Justice, Office of Special Investigation," 12 May 1980, in DO
Records Box 8, Folder 159, CIA ARC. (U)
4�O5I, in fact, did meet with Hartman in October 1980, with CIA officials also in attendance, to
discuss his work in compiling captured German war records and ferreting out Otto von
Bolschwing's connection to Eichmann. See Memorandum for the Record, "Nazi
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came up in conversation between CIA and OSI. The Department of Justice now had
specific, if obtuse, questions about Hartman's past, including his religious affiliation,
Ianguage.proficiency, the circumstances surrounding his mother's death, and his
postretirement work with the Agency.41 The Office of General Counsel answered all of
these questions in the summer of 1982; after that point, OSI's interest in M. Paul Hartman
dwindled. He died nine years later. (U)
� firc n
CIA's Crucial Role in the Investigations (U)
Hartman proved to be the exception to the rule. The Office of Special
Investigations never investigated any other member of the Central Intelligence Agency for
illegal action or conduct. In fact, OSI even hired
a retired CIA officer and (b)(3)
native of. Latvia, in 1981 for his knowledge of the Baltic region and languages. During
the course of the Barbie investigation, Ryan interviewed several retired Agency officers
for their activities with CIC in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Department of Justice,
however, has never pressed charges against any CIA employee, current or retired, for
actions taken on behalf of any Nazi war criminal or collaborator. (U)
OSI drew on CIA's wealth of talent and resources.42 By the early 1980s, the
Office of Special Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency operated a fairly
War Criminals," 16 October 1980, in DO Records, Box 1, Folder 4, CIA ARC.
(U)
41Hartman's mother, for example, died in 1941 of "Communist atrocities." (U)
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smooth system of conducting name traces, which, for the most part, avoided controversy
or public inquiry. While there were occasional delays due to communication problems
between the two organizations, as well as other demands imposed upon CIA's records -
managers, it became apparent that the Agency played a key role in the Nazi war criminal
investigations.43 This relationship, due in large part to Allan Ryan's almost daily contact
with CIA's Office of General Counsel, soon faced a severe test. John Loftus, an attorney
on Ryan's staff,- pursued his own conspiracy theories,:whieh tested theCIA's patience7.:
His subsequent claims on a national television program and the publication of his book --
brought renewed Congressional interest into the Agency's past. From 1981 to 1987, the
Nazi war criminal investigations occupied a significant part of the Central Intelligence
Agency's resources in a series of well-publicized cases. The Belarus Secret marked a
new chapter in the Nazi war criminal investigations. (U)
421t also appears that a member of the Special Litigation Unit cooperated with CIA in providing
information about Soviet officials. See various memoranda in DO Records Box
1, Folder 1, CIA ARC. (S)
43The Department of Justice complained about CIA's lengthy responses to its name trace
requests in early 1982. See D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to
OGC, 4 March 1982, OGC 82-02269; see also Sporkin to Jensen, 15 March 1982;
to Jensen, 14 May 1982, OGC 82-04740; Jensen to Sporkin, 29 June 1982, OGC 82-
06286; and Sporkin to Jensen, 9 July 1982, all in OGC Records, Job 85-00903R, Box I, Folder 3,
and Box 2, Folder 31, CIA ARC. (U)
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