IRAN-IRAQ: BALLISTIC MISSILE WARFARE AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

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• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-01482
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986

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Directorate of
Intelligence
,
Iran-Iraq:
Ballistic Missile Warfare and
Its Regional Implications
An Intelligence Assessment
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NESA 86-10013C
Sc 00394/86
March 1986
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Iran-Iraq:
Ballistic Missile Warfare and
Its Regional Implications
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. (u)
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
(u)
-trrp-Seeret�
NESA 86-100I3C
Sc 00394186
March 1986
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Tno-Seeret-
Iran-Iraq:
Ballistic Missile Warfare and
Its Regional Implications
Key Judgments
Information available
as of 6 January 1986
was used in this report.
The use of surface-to-surface missiles in the Iran-Iraq war foreshadows an
increasing reliance by both countries on these weapons to help achieve
regional dominance. The lack of a defense against missiles and their ability
to hit targets throughout the Middle East will encourage Tehran and
Baghdad to acquire large numbers of more sophisticated missiles. The
missiles' advantages as a delivery system will probably lead the two
countries to try to develop chemi�w2rhead in the next few years and nu-
clear warheads in the late 1990s
Iran and Iraq have fired Soviet-made Scud and FROG-7 missiles at each
other to weaken civilian morale and to disrupt military and economic
activities. Although the small warheads and inaccuracy of these weapons
have limited their effectiveness, missiles will continue to play a part in both
sides' war strategy:
� They will fire additional missiles against each other's cities in retaliation
for renewed attacks on civilian targets.
� Iran may use most of its limited supply of missiles against Baghdad
during a major ground offensive in an effort to disrupt Iraqi military
command and control and to undermine civilian morale.
� Tehran could also use missiles to threaten or punish the Arab Gulf states
for their support of Iraq if Iran suffers a serious setback in the war.
� If Baghdad develops chemical warheads for its missiles, it probably will
use them to disrupt any Iranian offensive that threatens to inflict a major
defeat on Iraq.
After the war, when Iraq has acquired missiles with a long range such as
the Soviet SS-12, improved Scud, or Brazilian Sonda, Baghdad will use the
threat of missile strikes, especially with chemicals in the late 1980s or
nuclear warheads developed in the late 1990s, to help deter future Iranian
aggression. The improved Scud or other new, longer range missiles also will
give Iraq a deterrent against Israel, although the likelihood of Israeli
retaliation will make Baghdad reluctant to employ them. Iran hopes
missiles will deter aggression by Iraq, the USSR, and Israel, although it
does not have rockets that can reach Israel. Israel probably would not
launch preemptive strikes on Iraqi long-range missiles; it has not attacked
similar systems in Egypt or Syria. If Israel determined that Iraq was again
attempting to build nuclear weapons, it probably would strike nuclear
development facilities rather than try to destroy missile launchers
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Increasing Iraqi missile capabilities probably will not pose a threat to US
forces in the Middle East in the short term because of Baghdad's fear of
provoking US retaliation or intervention. In the 1990s, however, Iraq will
view its growing missile power, especially with chemical and nuclear
warheads, as a deterrent to superpower intervention in the region. Even
then, we judge that the prospect of extensive US retaliation against Iraq
would make Baghdad reluctant to carry out its threats.
US forces in the Persian Gulf are likely to face a greater danger from
Iranian missiles than from Iraqi missiles because of the likelihood of
continuing, strong Iranian hostility toward the United States. Fear of a US
attack or even an increase in the US presence in the Gulf probably would
deter Iran from launching a surprise or unprovoked attack on US forces. In
the event of US-Iranian hostilities, Tehran might attempt retaliatory
attacks with missiles, perhaps on US naval facilities in Bahrain. Iran's
perception that its missile forces were helping to curtail US military
activity in the Gulf also might make Iran less reluctant to restrict passage
through the Strait of Hormuz.
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Contents
�
Contents
Page
Key Judgments
iii
Iraq
1
Strategy and Operations
1
Effectiveness
1
Capabilities
4
Development and Acquisition 4
Iran
7
Strategy and Operations 7
Effectiveness 7
Capabilities 7
Development and Acquisition 7
Future Use of Missiles in the Iran-Iraq War 8
Long-Term Regional Implications 12
Postwar Mutual Deterrence 12
Intimidation of the Gulf States 12
Threats to Israel 12
Iranian Deterrence of the USSR 15
Implications for the United States 16
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OD e tut�
Figure 1
Iraqi Scud Missile Deployment and Coverage
Syria
key
4.�
Saudi
Arabia
Soviet Union
_ .
Kuysamag.
Karkak
�
aq
Samarra'
BAGHDAD
Iraq-
Saudi Arabia
Neutral Zone
Scud range is 300 kilometers (estimated)
0 200 Kilometers
0
200 iles
Caspian
Iran
Bakluarin
�
Borajerde
.Dezfal
NW&
Al 'Amarah
Majnoo
Islands
Az Zubayr:-
VW*
Kuwait
KUWAIT
Jazireh-ye
Khark
Persian
Gulf
Sea
*TEHRAN
.Qom
,Shiraz
707014 (A05736) 3-86
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Iran-Iraq:
Ballistic Missile Warfarerand7
Its Regional Implications
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
During the past five years, Iraq and Iran have
engaged in sporadic attacks against military and
civilian targets using FROG-7 and Scud missiles.
Although these operations have had only marginal
effects, the range of the missiles and their ability to
penetrate air defenses have encoura ed Baghdad and
Tehran to continue their use.
Iraq
Strategy and Operations. Baghdad's strategy, accord-
ing to Iraqi press statements, is to use missile attacks
against Iranian cities primarily to weaken civilian
morale and foment opposition to the clerical regime in
Tehran. This was evident in early 1985, when the
Iraqis said they would cease attacks on the city of
Borujerd because of civilian demonstrations there
against Iran's war policy. The Iraqis sometimes fire
several missiles into the same area�tending to sup-
port Iranian claims that Iraq tries to kill civilians who
gather where the first missile hit.
Baghdad's missile attacks on Iranian cities also are
launched in retaliation for Iranian activities against
Iraq. Iranian press reports indicate that over 40
percent of Iraq's missile attacks occurred in the spring
of 1985 after Iranian air and artillery attacks on Iraai
cities
During this period, Iraq also fired
Scud missiles at a number of Iranian cities.
the Iraqis launched
missiles against Iranian cities in response to terrorist
attacks in Baghdad. The Iraqis probably believe that
retaliation with missiles is a dramatic way to bolster
Iraqi civilian morale and dispel any impression that
Iraq is unwilling or unable to respond to Iranian
pressure
1
The Iraqis have fired a smaller number of missiles�
particularly FROG-7s�at military and economic tar-
gets. Iraqi commanders apparently use the FROG-7,
instead of vulnerable fighter aircraft, to attack some
� the Iranian rear. (b)(1)
Iraqis have launched these missiles agai(b)(3)
defensive strongpoints, concentrations of troops and
vehicles, command and control bunkers, and air de-
fense missile sites. Iraq fired a long-range Scud at
Jazireh-ye Khark (Khark Island) in October 1982
Effectiveness. We estimate that Iraq has fired at least
177 surface-to-surface missiles since the war began in
late 1980. These attacks have killed at least 1,400
civilians and wounded another 6,400, according to
Iranian press reports. The highest losses were inflicted
between March and June 1985, when missiles killed
or wounded more than 3,000 people. According to
Iranian press accounts, a single missile killed as many
as 33 people and wounded 100 more in Dezful, and a
barrage of four Scuds killed 110 and wounded 1,000
in Bakhtaran. At least 19 Iranian cities have been hit,
with Dezful suffering the most damage, according to
the Iranian media
Iraqi air
and missile attacks contributed to antiwar demonstra-
tions in some Iranian cities in 1985, but the Scud
missiles now in Iraq's inventory lack the range to hit
Tehran, where unrest would have the best chance to
influence Iranian political leaders. We believe that
the Iraqis have not targeted any city long enough to
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Figure 2
Iraq and Iran:
Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Maximum Warhead Accuracy b
Range Weight (meters)
(kilometers) (kilograms) a
FROG-7 70 430 400
Missile on
truck transporter
Scud-B 300 1,000 500-900
Missile in firing
position (left) and
in transport position
on truck transporter
(right)
a High-explosive warhead.
At two-thirds maximum range with 50 percent of the warheads impacting
within a circle with the radius.
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Maximum Warhead
Range Weight
(kilometers) (kilograms) a
ACUraCy b
(meters)
S-21 c 100 500 50-100
Missile on
truck transporter
SS-12
Mod 1 c
Scaleboard
missile being raised
into firing position
on track transporter
\mmi,
925
1,000
600-900
3
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keep morale depressed. Iranian civilians apparently
have become resigned to occasional missile attacks as
part of the war. The Iranian regime has used the
attacks to foster hatred of Iraq by claiming that the
missiles have indiscriminately killed women and chil-
dren and damaged or destroyed hospitals and
mosques
Iraqi attacks against military and economic targets
appear to have inflicted little damage, despite the
large number of rockets fired at some targets. The
inaccuracy of both Scuds and FROGS and the rela-
tively small destructive power of their high-explosive
warheads have severely limited the missiles' effective-
ness against such targets.
the Scud fired at Khark Island in 1982 caused no
damage and probably missed the island. Similarly,
FROG-7 attacks aimed at airfields, troop concentra-
tions, or dikes (to flood Iranian positions) usually have
failed to hit their targets.
Capabilities. Since first acquiring long-range rockets
from the Soviet Union in 1976, Iraq has built one of
the largest missile forces in the region and gained
valuable operational experience during the war with
Iran.
we estimate that Iraq
has at least 12 to 18 Scud launchers organized into a
brigade, with two of these launchers used for training.
Baghdad also has at least 25 FROG-7 launchers�
some used for training�organized into a brigade. In
our judgment, Iraq has a stockpile of about 50 Scud
and 100 FROG-7 missiles.
Senior Iraqi political leaders apparently control the
selection of targets. Scud units are subordinate to the
Ministry of Defense, but Iraqi President Saddam
Husayn probably selects many of the targets and
approves all reauests to fire.
FROG-7 units are
attached to various corps commands along the front.
The Soviets do not directly control Iraqi missiles, but
we believe Moscow has some influence over targeting.
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Development and Acquisition. We expect the Iraqis to
continue to ask the Soviets for additional and more
advanced missiles. If Moscow refuses, we believe that
Iraq will turn to Brazil, Argentina, and India
We believe the financial burden of the war has
stopped any Iraqi program to develop its own long-
range missile.
We judge that the Iraqis have the equipment and
expertise to extend the range of Scud missiles, proba-
bly by reducing the warhead's weight, although we
have no evidence they have begun such efforts.
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Figure 4
Iranian Scud Missile Deployment and Coverage
Soviet Union
Syria
key
Kilysanjag.
Karkfik
Saudi
Arabia
Tabriz.
Bakhtaran
�
Az Zubayr:-
00 kilometers (esti ted)
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
Caspian
Iran
Boriijerd
Jazireh-ye
Khark
Persian
Gulf
Sea
*TEHRAN
.Qom
.Shiraz
tUttil b (AUS(Jb) J-tSb
up 3VLVI
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Iran
Strategy and Operations. Iranian leaders have public-
ly stated they use their Libyan-supplied Scud surface-
to-surface missiles primarily to deter, and retaliate
for, Iraqi attacks against civilians. Tehran probably
started using missiles in early 1985 as a way to strike
Iraq without risking further losses of scarce Iranian
aircraft. Iranian public warnings to Iraq about missile
attacks have been linked to promises that Iran would
cease such operations if the Iraqis stopped bombing
Iranian cities
Effectiveness. Thirteen Scud missiles have hit Iraq so
far The first missile hit
Karkuk on 12 March 1985, and 12 more struck
Baghdad between 14 March and 15 June. The Irani-
ans probably stopped their attacks in June to conserve
their limited supply of missiles and because Iraqi air
attacks on Iranian cities declined.
we esti-
mate that 60 to 100 Iraqis were killed and 300
wounded in the Iranian missile attacks. The location
of the impact points suggests the Iranians attempted
to hit areas of Baghdad that contain important gov-
ernment buildings or are densely populated.
some of the missiles
landed on open areas, river banks, or roads, causing
few casualties.
Although the Iranian attacks initially caused fear
among civilians in Baghdad, they failed to lower
morale for long or to undermine support for the Iraqi
regime Baghdad's ini-
tial refusal to admit that Iran was using long-range
missiles led to rumors of terrorist attacks in the Iraqi
capital and probably increased fears among civilians.
We judge that the Iranian missile attacks would have
lowered Iraqi morale more if they had occurred within
a few days rather than being spread over four months.
Anxiety among Iraqi civilians appeared to decline as
they became more accustomed to the attacks and they
recognized that the missiles inflicted relatively little
harm
7
(b)(3)
Capabilities. Iran's surface-to-surface missile capa-
bility is very limited compared with Iraq's and is
dependent on Libya for equipment and expertise
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard is responsible for
the missiles but relies on Libyan advisers to help fire
them,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Development and Acquisition. Tehran claims that it
has been trying to develop long-range missiles, but we(b)(1 )
believe these efforts have not produced a satisfactory (b)(3)
weapon. as
early as 1983, Iran began programs to build a missile
with a range of 200 to 400 kilometers carrying a 1-ton
warh
-\ Tehran
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
apparently is trying to compensate for its limited
technological expertise by enlisting foreign scientists
to help develop long-range missiles (b)(1)
(b)(3)
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The Iranian-Libyan Connection
Iraqi diplomatic efforts have failed to halt the flow of
wea ons from Libya to Iran.
Al-
though Baghdad will continue to protest Libya's
transfer of Soviet-made weapons to Iran, it is unlike-
ly to go beyond this because of Iraq's dependence on
the USSR for military equipment. We believe that
Baghdad instead will try to use such transfers to
press the Soviets to provide more sophisticated arms
to Iraq to offset the Iranian missile threat.
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Meanwhile, Iran is continuing to seek missiles from
a hrna d
but Tehran's persistence
suggests that it may obtain such weapons from North
Korea China, or Syria, especially after the war.
Future Use of Missiles in the Iran-Iraq War
In the months ahead, Iraq may launch some rockets
at Iranian military and economic targets but will
continue to favor aircraft for such operations because
of the inaccuracy of missiles. We would expect Iraq to
fire Scuds at Khark Island if Iranian air defenses in
the Gulf improved enough to make air attacks on
Khark costlier. Because of the accuracy of the Scud
and the destructive force of its warhead, we judge that
between 10 and 20 missiles would have to be fired to
assure damage to important equipment. Missiles
could attack military targets in the enemy rear, but
they are unlikely to affect the outcome of the war if
they carry only high-explosive warheads.
If Iraq acquires chemical warheads, it probably would
use them against Iranian cities only in response to
Iranian chemical attacks against Iraqi civilians. A
barrage of Scud missiles carrying a lethal nerve agent
would inflict thousands of casualties if fired into
densely populated areas of Iranian cities. We believe
Baghdad also would fire missiles with chemical war-
heads if an Iranian offensive threatened to inflict a
major defeat on Iraq. Large-scale, intensive use of
such missiles along the front would inflict many
casualties and would probably delay or defeat the
offensive.
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Figure 5
Potential Damage Resulting From Iraqi Missile Attacks
Khark Island
(Jazireh-ye Khark)
Area in which a single
Scud missile aimed at
� the tank farm would impact
� Tank
Sea island oil-
loading terminal
--BERTH 14
� farm
�
Submerged oil pipeline
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� �
BERTH
15 ���*"%,elitle
oil PI,
BERTH 11 SI3rriergs'
�
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BERTH 12
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Persian
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� ��
ea of destruction�. �
1000 Meters
1000 Yards
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a high explosive � �
arhead �
9
Persian
Gulf
Airstrip
Iranian naval base
T-jetty oil-
loading terminal
BERTH 10 BERTH 9
BERTH 8
BERTH 7
BERTH 2
BERTH 4
BERTH 6
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BERTH 3
BERTH 5
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Iraq's Efforts To Develop
Chemical and Nuclear Weapons
Iraq's success in developing chemical bombs and
artillery shells suggests that it could develop a crude
chemical warhead for a missile, although we have no
evidence that it has begun such a program. Iraq's first
use of chemical weapons against Iran in August 1983
was the culmination of 20 years of effort. In the last
three years, Iraq has used mustard gas against
Iranian troops in at least two other major battles,
inflicting 2,500 casualties in one attack, according to
Iranian press rePorts.
We estimate that the Iraqis have a
stockpile of several thousand mustard bombs and
artillery shells and hundreds of bombs containing
Tabun, a nonpersistent lethal nerve agent. The Iraqi
chemical plant at Samarra' probably is capable of
producing up to 6 metric tons of mustard gas and 2
metric tons of Tabun daily
Iraq is still at least a decade away from having
nuclear facilities to support the development of nucle-
ar weapons. Israel's destruction of Iraq's Osirak
reactor in 1981 and war-related difficulties have not
dampened Baghdad's interest in enhancing its nuclear
capabilities. Iraq is conducting basic nuclear research
and is continuing efforts to replace the Osirak reactor
and to acquire foreign nuclear equipment, technology,
and training. We believe that, when the war with Iran
ends, Baghdad will accelerate its efforts to complete
a nuclear fuel cycle. Although we have little doubt
about Iraq's desire to develop nuclear weapons in the
long term, its current efforts do not appear aimed at
building a bomb in the short term.
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Given the Iranians' firing of Scuds at Baghdad during
the March 1985 offensive, we believe Iran may again
launch missiles at the Iraqi capital to support a major
ground offensive. Iran probably would fire several
missiles during the first day of the attack in an
attempt to disrupt the Iraqi leadership and weaken its
ability to direct military operations. Iran might also
begin daily missile attacks on Baghdad to cause panic
among Iraqi civilians. To assure disruption in the
Iraqi capital, we believe Iran would use many of its
remaining 25 to 30 missiles in the first few days of the
ground offensive. Tehran probably would save a few
missiles for retaliatory strikes to respond to possible
renewed Iraqi air attacks on Iranian cities after the
offensive began.
If Iran acquired many additional missiles in 1986, it
might fire them against economic and military targets
in Iraq to try to weaken Baghdad's ability to continue
the war and to retaliate for Iraqi attacks on Iran's oil
production facilities. Specifically, Tehran probably
would try to target pumping stations along the Iraqi-
Turkish or Iraqi�Saudi Arabian pipelines, refineries,
chemical weapons manufacturing and storage plants,
command and control facilities, or airfields. Because
of the Scud's poor accuracy and small warhead,
however, the Iranians would have to fire many rockets
at such targets to assure damage to important equip-
ment.
Serious reverses in the war could cause Tehran to
threaten to launch missiles against the Gulf states in
the hope that they would curtail their support to
Baghdad and press Iraq to reduce its military opera-
tions against Iran. As Iranian Air Force capabilities
deteriorate, missile attacks will become increasingly
attractive to Tehran as a possible means to strike
across the Gulf. Although a single Scud launched
from Iran's coast would be too inaccurate and would
carry too small a warhead to have a high probability
of destroying vital oil equipment, Iran could fire a
series of missiles at one target until damage occurred.
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Figure 6
Vulnerability of Key Government Buildings
in Baghdad to Iranian Missile Attacks
Cbe
,v4
Area in which a Scud
missile aimed at the
Defense Ministry would
likely impact
0 Area of destruction from
a high-explosive warhead
0 Y2 Kilometer
I
0 'A Mile
Scale 1:25,000
+C.3
5�3
sTga,:.r1
Health
Ministry
Khulara'
Square
Bab al Muadham
Square Defense
&Ministry
Agriculture
6Ministry
&Government
Printing Office
ps, kr.rwe.
dbMayors
Office
�,
rail yard
Baghdad Central
Railway Station
Government Police
Control Center Headquarters
Jemal Abd
al Naser
Square
Finance
&Ministry
Nanda
Square
Wathba
Square
Khulani
Square
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Long-Term Regional Implications
Even after the war, we believe Iraq and Iran will
devote considerable effort to acquiring a large number
of powerful missiles because of their potential as a
deterrent and a threat. Both countries are likely to
acquire additional Scud-type missiles in the next few
years. On the basis of their efforts to acquire new
missiles abroad and to improve their capabilities, we
believe Iran and Iraq will try to obtain more accurate
missiles with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers to
threaten military, economic, and civilian targets
throughout the Middle East. They are likely to have
trouble finding willing suppliers as long as the war
(b)(3) continues, but, after the war, both countries will be
able to make attractive offers of large, profitable
orders and cofunding of missile development
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
The extent to which acquisition of modern surface-to-
surface missiles increases the regional power and
influence of Iran and Iraq will depend on how success-
ful the two countries are in developing more lethal
warheads. Both countries probably will try to develop
crude chemical warheads for their existing missiles in
the next few years. We judge that the advantage of
long-range missiles to deliver warheads quickly, virtu-
ally without warning, and�unlike aircraft�without
facing any defense, will be another factor that encour-
ages both countries to develop nuclear weapons in the
late 1990s
Postwar Mutual Deterrence. We believe that Bagh-
dad will view long-range missiles, with chemical or
nuclear warheads, as its primary deterrent against
Iran. In particular, Baghdad probably believes that
the threat of missile attacks on Tehran would help
deter Iranian attacks on Iraqi cities in any future
Iran-Iraq war. Tehran is likely to view missiles as a
particularly effective deterrent against Iraq because
they could hit targets that Iranian aircraft could not,
given Iraq's sophisticated air defense system
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Intimidation of the Gulf States. Iraq's missiles, along
with other parts of the well-equipped Iraqi military
forces, will encourage the Arab Gulf states to main-
tain good relations with Baghdad after the war. More
sophisticated missiles will not appreciably add to
Iraq's already substantial ability to coerce Kuwait,
but the implicit threat of long-range missile attacks on
oil facilities could increase Iraq's leverage over Saudi
Arabia and other Arab states in the Gulf. Iran also is
likely to use an increased missile capability to intimi-
date the Gulf states by making more credible an
Iranian threat to attack key oil facilities
Threats to Israel. The growing missile capabilities of
Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Iran are likely to become
major sources of concern to Israel, especially if Iraq
develops chemical warheads. Baghdad is likely to
judge that an ability to retaliate with more accurate
and longer range missiles than it has now will help
deter Israeli attacks, particularly on Iraqi nuclear and
chemical warfare facilities. Since the Israeli airstrike
that destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, Iraqi
leaders have repeatedly warned they would retaliate
for future raids. We believe Baghdad would be re-
strained, however, from carrying out threats to fire
missiles at Israel itself�especially its cities�even
after an Israeli first strike, because of the likelihood of
Israeli retaliation
We believe Israel would be unlikely to launch preemp-
tive attacks to destroy Iraqi missile launchers or
chemical weapons production facilities, even if Tel
Aviv determined that Iraq had acquired missiles
capable of hitting Israel, unless Israel believed an
Iraqi strike were imminent. Israel has not attacked
Egypt or Syria, although both countries have had
missiles capable of hitting Israeli cities, possibly with
chemical warheads, for many years. Moreover, we
judge that as Iraq gained a large force of mobile
missiles, the Israelis would be less able to locate and
12
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Figure 7
Vulnerability of Gulf Oil Facilities to Iranian Attack
Euphrates
Bandar-e
Khomeyni
IT
Kuwal
S a u
RIYADH A r a
0 5,0 100 Kilometers
.0midiyeh
Jazireh-ye Khark
(Khark Island),
50 160 Miles
00
panayeh
Bandar-e Bushehr
Persian
ANAMA
aft'
Qatar
Sabkhat Matfi
(salt marsh)
Iran
Jazireh-ye Lava',
(Levan Island)
Major oilfield
Selected tanker terminal
Oil refinery
Possible Scud missile
site
.Bandar-e
Maqam
Jazireh-ye SIM�
(Sirri Island)
(f)
ABU
DHABI _.,; 65
Q"Cz)4"dr---.., fro -- mn9e 300 km
rn Bondor-e 'Abbas
from Ekr dar,,-6 al'aci'4 �e" no defined
boundary
lx"
ted
Bandar-
"Abbis
0
0
Strait of
Hormuz
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
707020 (546740) 3-86
13
Oman
�,1
Umm as Samirn
(salt marsh) {06
rop-Seefot
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L1.1 III .
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.1 I
Figure 8
Potential Damage and Mortality Radii in Tel Aviv
Resulting From High-Explosive and Chemical Warheads
o A Kilometer
o Mile
Scale 121,000
Mediterranean
Sea
US Embas
Hilton
Hotel
Frishman D.
s. U sishk'm
Yirm�ahu
04
.1�060
Sderot Nord au
_a;
zame�.,
Harwrim
� k
009
cg,
**Cs
uay9 lolePS
S
Nab Y a rcl� n
Boey Dan
Yehuda HaMa"15
Sr
6
Jabotinsky
Lethal area
using a warhead
.with a persistent
nerve agent
5
Hamedina
Circle
Ariozo,ov
Damage area
\06' using awar:
head with high
explosives a
Central (Merkaz)
Railway
Station
Sderot David Hamelekh
o-42'
50
4s�
edeot
Cb,c06,
(-)
Kaplan E.
Habashmonalm
ge'
8"en k
be'elry Nshwom
z
6
adeh Yitzhak AMinadav
707018 (3-86)
TUP Scre
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1II
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Tap-Seer-et-
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Non-Soviet, Long-Range,
Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Maximum Range Warhead Weight
(kilometers) (kilograms)
Condor Hat,
(Argentina)
300 to 400 200
Sonda IV b
(Brazil)
300 to 500 1,000
SLV b
(India)
3,500 200
a Under development.
b Estimated capabilities.
destroy all the launchers, leaving Iraq with a potential
retaliatory force. If Israel determined that Iraq was
attempting to build nuclear weapons, we believe it
would strike the nuclear development facilities again
rather than try to destroy missile launchers
We judge that Iran cannot extend the range of its
existing missiles to reach targets in Israel
After the Iran-
Iraq war and arms embargoes against Iran end,
however, Tehran might acquire such missiles as the
Sonda, Condor, and SLY from Brazil, Argentina, or
India. Tehran would have to weigh the prospect of
Israeli retaliation against Iranians in the Levant or
perhaps against Iran itself before firing these missiles
at Israel.
Iranian Deterrence of the USSR. Tehran probably
will view long-range missiles with chemical and even-
tually nuclear warheads as the best way to deter the
Soviets from coercing or invading Iran. On the basis
of Moscow's strong opposition to the Libyan transfer
of Scuds to Iran and the continuing poor relations
between the USSR and Iran, we believe that the
Soviet Union considers even crude, limited Iranian
missile capabilities as a danger and may try to block
the transfer of missiles and related technology to Iran.
Tehran, in turn, would view this as a Sovjetatteninuo
keep Iran vulnerable to outside pressure
15
Iran's Efforts To Develop
Chemical and Nuclear Weapons
Iraqi success with chemical weapons and the ineffec-
tiveness of international condemnation of Baghdad
for using them have spurred Iran's efforts to develo
its own chemical weapons.
We believe Iran has filled a
small number of bombs with chemical agents, which
it may use during a major offensive against Iraq.
We do not believe Iran will have the technology to
produce plutonium for a nuclear weapon until at least
the mid-1990s, by which time it will have developed
significant parts of the nuclear fuel cycle and con-
structed a research reactor.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
-115frftere4-
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Implications for the United States
If Iraq and hap acquire more advanced missiles,
especially with chemical or nuclear warheads, the
credibility of US defense commitments in the region
may eventually decline. Over the past year, we judge
that Arab confidence in the US commitment to
defend its Arab allies has been weakened by the
failure of the United States to sell these states modern
weaponry. The US reluctance to use force against
Libya, where potential US losses would probably be
relatively small, has further reduced the credibility of
US defense commitments in the eyes of some Persian
Gulf states, according to Embassy reports. Many
Arabs are likely to judge that the United States will
be less willing to come to their aid and use its military
forces when US personnel and equipment are more
vulnerable to losses from missiles with high-explosive
or chemical warheads.
Although some Arab states might initially turn to the
United States for protection against Iraqi or Iranian
missiles, confidence in any US guarantee would even-
tually be weakened by the difficulty of either destroy-
ing the missiles with preemptive strikes or defending
against them once they were launched. Mobile missile
systems, such as the Scud and the SS-12, are difficult
to target because they can be moved frequently and
launched from almost anywhere. The missile requires
less than an hour to be prepared for launch and can
reach its target in less than 15 minutes. Even if the
United States detected a launch and passed this
information quickly, the target countries would not
have time to evacuate civilians or move vital equip-
ment
Conversely, Israel would attempt to draw the United
States into a closer defense relationship and ask for
new weaponry to offset the growing threat from long-
range missiles. This, however, might induce Iran and
Iraq to speed up their efforts to acquire more missiles
and to develop chemical or nuclear warheads. In any
event, an Arab-Israeli war that included Iraqi missile
attacks�even using only conventional warheads�
would probably inflict much higher civilian casualties
and destruction on Israel than it had suffered in any
past conflict.
-`firp-Seeret-
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Ballistic Missile Defense in the Persian Gulf
Iraq and Iran have been unable to neutralize each
other's surface-to-surface missile capabilities. Spe-
cial intelligence indicates that in April 1985 the
Soviets informed Baghdad of the general location of
Iranian missile sites, but the Iraqis could not find the
sites and launch air attacks to destroy them. As early
as October 1980, the Iranian Joint Staff gave orders
to try to suppress Iraqi missiles at the time of launch,
intercept them in flight, or destroy the launchers. In
September 1982, Iran asked Syria for help in defend-
ing against long-range missiles after launch but was
told it is impossible to disrupt the Scud in flight.
The Arab Gulf states would have little warning and
no defense against an Iranian missile attack. They do
not have the sophisticated radar systems needed to
detect missile launches from Iran. Saudi AWACS
lack the range and sensitivity to detect a missile
launch. None of their surface-to-air missile systems
could intercept and destroy a ballistic missile such as
the Scud. The Gulf states are neither willing nor able
to launch preemptive airstrikes to destroy the mis-
siles and launchers in Iran.
Increasing Iraqi missile capabilities probably will not
pose a threat to US forces in the Middle East in the
short term. On the basis of Iraqi efforts to avoid
incidents with US warships and aircraft in the Persian
Gulf in the Iran-Iraq war, we believe that Baghdad
would avoid firing missiles at US targets for fear of
provoking US retaliation or intervention. In conflicts
against the Gulf states or Israel, however, Iraqi
missile attacks might harm US civilians or facilities
unintentionally. In the 1990s, we judge that Baghdad
will view its growing missile power, especially with
chemical and eventually nuclear warheads, as a deter-
rent to superpower intervention in the region. To
16
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11117-Seetet�
bolster its influence and claim to leadership of the
Arab world, Iraq might try to give the impression that
its missiles were a shield against US attack, although
we judge that the prospect of extensive US retaliation
against Iraq would make Baghdad reluctant to carry
out any threats.
We believe that, because of continuing Iranian hostil-
ity toward the United States, US forces are likely to
face a greater danger from Iranian missiles than from
Iraqi missiles. Fear of a US attack on Iran or even an
increase in the US presence in the Gulf probably
would deter Iran from launching a surprise or unpro-
voked attack on US forces. Rather, Iran would try to
hold US facilities in the Gulf hostage to prevent US
military operations against Iran. In the event of US-
Iranian hostilities, the clerical leadership probably
would attempt retaliatory attacks with missiles, such
as on the headquarters of the US Middle East Force
in Bahrain. Tehran's perception that its missile forces
were helping to curtail US military activity in the
Gulf might also make Iran less reluctant to restrict
passage through the Strait of Hormuz
17 en)p Seire
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