AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05633485
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: October 17, 1986

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Africa Review
17 October 1986
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Africa Review
17 October 1986
Articles
Southern Africa: Frontline States React to US Sanctions
Although most of the governments of the six Frontline States are
convinced that comprehensive sanctions must be applied against
South Africa, they have responded differently to the recent US
decision to impose additional sanctions, reflecting their varying
degrees of economic and military vulnerabilities to Pretoria.
Tanzania: Profile of a Frontline State
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President Mwinyi's government is committed to supporting the
South African liberation effort, but it is increasingly preoccupied by
internal economic problems and has moderated its stance toward
South Africa.
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South Africa: Buthelezi and the Black Opposition
Tensions between Chief Buthelezi and more radical black opposition
groups appear to be growing, but do not pose any immediate threat
to Buthelezi's leadership of South Africa's 6 million Zulus.
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Seychelles: Rene Beheads the Army
President Rene's response to an alleged coup plot by dismissing
three Army commanders and accepting his Defense Minister's
resignation probably has quashed military opposition for now, but
Rene still must deal with popular discontent over unsuccessful
economic policies.
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Guinea: Malinke on the Outside Looking In
Despite the failure of a coup attempt led by members of the Malinke
tribe last year, some members of the tribe in the military still hope
to overthrow President Conte's government.
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Liberia: Prospects for Leftist Group
The Movement to Obtain Justice in Africa depicts itself as an
alternative to the pro-Western Doe government, but lacks the
internal support and organization necessary to challenge the regime
successfully.
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Briefs South Africa: National Party Leadership Changes
Rightwing Parties Moving Closer
Senegal: Economic Squeeze Play
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Angola Chronology
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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Africa Review
Articles
Southern Africa:
Frontline States React
to US Sanctions
The public reactions of the Frontline States (FLS) to
the recent US decision to impose additional sanctions
against South Africa underscore the differences
within the six-nation group on this increasingly
sensitive issue.' Each FLS leader's stance on sanctions
traditionally has hinged in large part on his country's
economic and military vulnerability to Pretoria and
more recently reflects growing fears about South
Africa's willingness to employ harsher retaliatory
measures in the region. In addition, some FLS leaders
face discernible domestic opposition to sanctions
because of their economic costs. Nonetheless, most of
the leaders remain convinced that comprehensive
sanctions must be applied against South Africa to
press President Botha to bargain seriously with its
black majority.
Tanzania, which has no economic ties to Pretoria and
which has yet to contend with South African military
pressure, has repeatedly issued statements praising
the US sanctions move. Tanzania's distance from the
major disputes in southern Africa has traditionally
afforded it the luxury of adopting a forward-leaning,
independent stance on the thorniest southern African
issues without suffering any domestic or South
African backlash. During the Rhodesian
independence war, for example, President Nyerere
(who also served as FLS chairman) consistently
supported sanctions against Salisbury and pushed
hard�with mixed results�for the FLS to adopt such
measures.
The US sanctions decision could strengthen the hand
of moderate officials within the leadership of
Tanzania's ruling party who have demonstrated an
increasingly pragmatic approach to foreign policy
issues. They urged the party last month to support US
'The FLS includes Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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efforts in South Africa.
The government-controlled press in Angola has also
praised the US sanctions decision. Angola has
minimal economic ties to South Africa. Moreover, the
Angolans probably believe that their comments on
sanctions would have little effect on the steady
military pressure that Pretoria has exerted on their
regime in recent years through direct and covert
attacks on economic and other facilities as well as
support for Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgent force.
Angola's approval of the US move, however, is
unlikely to lead to any major changes in Luanda's
attitudes toward a dialogue with Washington.
t has shown
little interest in negotiating seriously on either
Namibian independence or a Cuban troop withdrawal
any time soon. The Angolans appear to be waiting for
the next US Presidential election, which they hope
will result in the installation of a government more
sympathetic to their concerns, and seem to hope that
domestic unrest will begin to weaken South Africa's
regional resolve.
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Meanwhile, other FLS members that are both
economically and militarily vulnerable to South
Africa have been at least as vocal in their praise for
the US decision. Zimbabwe has been particularly
positive and Prime Minister Mugabe has publicly
urged the European Economic Community to adopt
stronger sanctions against Pretoria. He also has called
for greater synchronization and coordination of the
measures already agreed on by the Commonwealth,
the European Economic Community, and the Nordic
countries. Mugabe subsequently called for increased
global aid to the FLS to cushion the economic effects
of possible South African retaliatory measures.
At home, however, Mugabe has met little enthusiasm
for his public posturing on sanctions.
In addition, US Embassy
reporting indicates that Mugabe's stance on sanctions
is not shared by all of his constituents. A 10,000-man
crowd had no applause for a speech Mugabe gave in
August in which he warned that sanctions will bring
hard times for Zimbabwe but will be survivable.
Mugabe's recent remarks could lead South Africa to
give greater consideration to retaliating against
Harare.
Pretoria
would cut all transport links to Zimbabwe if Harare
cut airlinks to Pretoria�a measure included in the
Commonwealth sanctions package that is likely to be
approved later this year.
Pretoria would not
allow the upgrading of the Beira corridor�a rail,
road, and oil pipeline network that provides
Zimbabwe access to the Mozambican port of Beira
and offers it a potential transportation alternative to
routes through South Africa.
Zambian President Kaunda has echoed Mugabe's
sentiments on the US sanctions decision, albeit in a
more muted manner. The Zambian leader appeared
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to be speaking as FLS Chairman when he made a
restrained statement indicating that he was grateful
for the US move.
Kaunda's remarks contrast noticeably with his high-
profile lobbying effort for sanctions during the
Commonwealth minisummit in early August that led
to the approval of a limited package of sanctions
against Pretoria. His decision to tone down his
comments probably reflects his concern about the
domestic political and economic costs of sanctions and
his fear of South African reprisals.
Kaunda has
already had a taste of how seriously Pretoria could
damage his economy by the temporary delays in
cross-border rail and road traffic that South Africa
imposed shortly after the Commonwealth
minisummit. More recently, Kaunda has repeated
public claims that South Africa is aiding Zambian
dissidents and is planning to launch military attacks
into his country.
Other FLS leaders have avoided making any
statements on the US sanctions move. To date, there
has been no public response from the Botswana
Government, which is economically dependent on
South Africa and that has been subjected during the
past year to a variety of cross-border raids against
anti�South African insurgent targets. While
Botswana Independence Day celebrations earlier this
month might have served to delay any such reaction,
the continued absence of any official commentary
suggests that Gaborone will retain its low-key,
pragmatic stance on sanctions. Botswana is reported
to have urged a moderate stance in a recent FLS
announcement on sanctions.
Our Embassy in Maputo indicates that Mozambique
has also refrained from any official commentary on
the US sanctions decision, aside from a factual
account of the event in the government-influenced
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media. Maputo is more preoccupied with trying to
counter a rainy-season offensive in the north by South
African�backed insurgents. The pragmatic
Mozambican President Machel probably hopes to
avoid actions that might lead Pretoria to step up its
limited support to the insurgents, who are placing an
increasing strain on the beleaguered Mozambican
military as well as on some 4,800 Zimbabwean troops
guarding the Beira corridor.
In addition, the Mozambicans are probably still
reeling from South Africa's recent decision to expel
about 50,000 Mozambican gold miners from South
Africa at the end of their contracts and to not hire any
additional Mozambicans. The South African move�
which came only days after a landmine injured six
South African soldiers near the South
Africa�Mozambique border�could well carry
significant economic and political costs for the
Machel government, which has no jobs for returning
workers.
FLS leaders will probably continue to express their
differences on sanctions privately and to paper them
over in public or say nothing at all. Meanwhile, those
states heavily dependent on South Africa
economically are likely to intensify their search for
alternative transport and trading partners to Pretoria.
FLS leaders with close economic ties to Pretoria, like
Zimbabwe's Mugabe, may be forced to tone down
their prosanctions rhetoric, especially if�as is
likely�South Africa takes retaliatory economic
moves against them. Even if Pretoria refrains,
domestic opposition to sanctions among the
populations of the FLS could well serve the same
purpose.
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The Tazara Railroad
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railway bridges
railway/highway
bridge
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Pemba
Zanzibar
DAR ES SALAAM
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Tanzania: Profile
of a Frontline State
Tanzania remains firmly committed to the principle
of abolishing apartheid but Dar es Salaam's stance
toward South Africa has been moderated under
President Mwinyi, who is more preoccupied with
internal economic affairs than his predecessor Julius
Nyerere. Nyerere served as chairman of the Frontline
States (FLS) from the time the group was formed in
1976 until he stepped down as Tanzanian President
last year. The Mwinyi government will continue to
support South African liberation efforts, but there is a
growing perception in Tanzania that South African
covert action and air forces, despite the distances
involved, could retaliate against Tanzanian
transportation links and facilities for guerrillas that
operate against the Pretoria government. Tanzania,
while lacking the economic links to South Africa that
make fellow FLS members vulnerable, could take on
a new strategic importance as these countries seek
alternatives to South African transportation networks.
The Sanctions Issue
Mwinyi and other senior Tanzanian officials favor a
pragmatic approach to the issue of sanctions and
believe the time frame for dismantling apartheid will
be measured in years, rather than months,
Although Prime Minister
Warioba, in a recent conversation with US officials,
asserted that sanctions are the only avenue left before
the situation in South Africa becomes
"uncontrollable," Dar es
Salaam does not advocate harsh sanctions that would
damage southern African economies. Differing from
some other FLS leaders, including FLS Chairman
Kuanda, President of Zambia, Tanzanian leaders are
opposed to leaving the British Commonwealth over
the sanctions issue,
Mwinyi has avoided antagonistic comments toward
the United States on the sanctions issue, in contrast
with Nyerere, who often lambasted US policies in
public forums. Mwinyi recently told a US Embassy
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senior official that he "fully understands US rationale
for not pushing for total sanctions."
Following Mwinyi's pragmatic lead on this
issue, Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister
Salim and Prime Minister Warioba defeated a move
by radical party members to issue an official
condemnation of US policy in southern Africa
Tanzania's new approach departs, in our view, from a
popularly held view in Africa that the United States
and the West have pivotal influence over Pretoria�
able to force the end of apartheid by enacting
comprehensive sanctions�but realistically recognizes
that Western involvement is essential to resolving the
South Africa problem. Mwinyi is also conscious that
African nations need Western aid to improve their
economies and regional transportation systems to
survive South African countermeasures. Speaking
before the Nonaligned Movement summit last
August, Mwinyi emphasized the need for protection
and full utilization of regional transport and
communications systems. Mwinyi also encouraged
African nations still dependent on South African
ports to reroute their exports and imports through Dar
es Salaam, according to press reporting, probably by
using the 1,900-mile Chinese-built Tazara railroad
that connects the port to the Zambian copperbelt.
Transportation Woes
Despite Mwinyi's offer, we believe most southern
African states recognize the severe limitations of
Tanzania's rudimentary transportation systems.
Although a new surge in Western funds for the
development of the port of Dar es Salaam and the
Tazara railroad promises some rehabilitation of the
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Tanzanian President Mwinyi's moderate tone at the Nonaligned
Movement summit in August reflected his pragmatic approach to
regional issues.
transportation sector, we believe it will be at least
three years before Tanzania is able to accommodate a
significant increase in regional cargo shipping and
provide a viable "northern corridor" for the southern
African transport network.
Tanzania's transportation network is primarily
hindered by the poor condition and sporadic operation
of the Tazara railway. Further impediments include
the deteriorated and congested state of the port
facilities of Dar es Salaam, the country's inability to
maintain basic services such as electricity, and the
lack of handling and shipping companies to service the
influx of additional goods. Government redtape will
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Tanzania Daily News
discourage major private ventures to improve
conditions, in our view, and the unwieldy Tanzanian
bureaucracy is unlikely to be able to cope with the
increased demands on its resources.
As South African political and economic pressures on
its neighbors grow, Tanzania may become a more
important transshipment point for southern African
national liberation groups. In our view, arms for these
groups already move through the port of Dar es
Salaam.
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The Tazara Story
The Tazara railroad, built by the Chinese at a cost of
over $400 million and opened in 1976, has never
achieved its intended capacity of 2 million tons of
cargo traffic a year. Operating at less than half
capacity, the railroad has been plagued with fuel and
spare parts shortages, lack of trained technicians, and
roadbed deterioration. According to press reporting,
Western donors recently agreed to provide financial
backing for a 10-year rehabilitation plan, to include:
� Repowering most of Tazara 's 61 operational
mainline diesel-hydraulic locomotives. Of 85 such
locomotives supplied by China from 1976 to 1979,
37 have been scrapped and 18 have received new
engines. Although Tazara purchased 14 more
powerful engines with West German funding in
1983-84, traffic on the railroad has been adversely
affected by the inadequate traction power of the
Chinese-built locomotives still in service.
� Introduction of mechanized track maintenance
system and major track repair at a cost of US $14.9
million.
� The purchase of 375 cargo cars. Tazara 's original
fleet of 1,997 cars had declined to 1,750 by 1984
due to inadequate maintenance and damage to
vehicles in accidents.
The inability of port facilities at Dar es Salaam to
cope with the massive increase of freight traffic
occasioned by the opening of the Tazara route has
hindered smooth transport in the region since the
opening of the railroad. Because of inadequate
handling facilities, compounded by a slow
turnaround of railway cargo cars at the Kapiri
Mposhi terminal in Zambia, large backlogs of
Zambian freight served to increase congestion at the
port of Dar es Salaam. This situation has caused as
much as 90,000 tons of Zambian freight to build up
in storage facilities at the port, where goods are often
stolen or uncovered foodstuffs rot under the sun.
The port of Dar es Salaam, however, has not been
used to its full potential because of inadequate
storage space and cargo handling systems. An
inefficient stacking and inventory procedure and a
lack of trained personnel further complicate the
problem. A shortage of spare parts and poor
maintenance of cranes and other handling equipment
have rendered most support machinery inoperable. In
addition, the Tazara railroad runs on a different
gauge track from the state-owned railway, which also
services the port and there is no effective means of
shunting goods from one system to the other.
The port has 11 deepwater berths, two of which can
handle container and roll-on/roll-off shipping, but
only two or three are ever in use, according to a
senior US official. There are also 45,000 square
meters of covered storage area and 113,000 square
meters of open space for storage. Because of
inadequate dredging of the port, pilots�difficult to
find and unwilling to work for low Tanzanian
wages�are needed to guide virtually all ships
entering the harbor berths. Current development
plans�backed by Western donors�cal/for the
conversion of two additional berths to accommodate
container shipping, the rehabilitation of the oil jetty,
and the upgrading of grain handling equipment and
wharves, but the much-needed dredging has been
termed too costly.
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Dar es Salaam harbor�bottleneck for the Tazara railroad.
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Support for National Liberation Groups
Tanzania has long provided support and safehaven for
southern African liberation groups, notably the
African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC). Despite the government's
increasingly moderate approach to sanctions, there
are no signs of a lessening of support for the liberation
cause. Recently, Party Chairman Nyerere�who set
forth Tanzania's policy of active support for the ANC
and the PAC as well as other fighters when he was
President�has succeeded in shifting responsibility for
relations with these groups from the government to
the party. Tanzanian support includes:
� Allowing transit of Eastern Bloc arms to national
liberation fighters.
� Military training of ANC fighters by the Tanzanian
military.
� A flexible immigration policy for ANC cadre from
other African nations. For example, Tanzania took
in ANC personnel ousted from Lesotho earlier this
year.
� The establishment of at least a half dozen camps to
train and house fighters and their families. The
ANC in Tanzania has become relatively self-
sufficient, with its own schools and farms.
We believe the Mwinyi government will take a more
active role in supporting and training ANC cadre
In addition, Tanzania will
permit the ANC to relocate its headquarters from
Lusaka to Dar es Salaam, should the ANC decide to
do so for security reasons
Tanzania has also taken
the lead in plans to form a special Organization of
African Unity (OAU) military wing to assist the
ANC�announced at the OAU summit in July but
likely to be stalled by ethnic and language diversity,
as well as logistic and funding problems�to be
headquartered at Nachingwea
The PAC has received far less attention in
recent years because of its dwindling effectiveness and
numbers.
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Concern for South African Reprisals
In our judgment, Tanzanian leaders�despite plans to
increase support for southern African liberation
groups�remain concerned with a possible South
African attack on ANC sites and the country's
vulnerable transportation system. According to
various press reports, Mwinyi has warned civilians to
be prepared for a South African attack and Defense
Minister Salim has told the Army to be "on alert" for
a possible attack on Tanzania because of its status as
a Frontline State assisting antiapartheid guerrillas.
In recognition of its vulnerability and the deficiencies
of its 30,000-man Defense Force�particularly its
inability to detect and stop air raids�Tanzania has
turned to the USSR�its chief military supplier�for
new aid, at
present only two radar units�at Dar es Salaam and
at Tabora�in the country are operational. Moreover,
the radars in use are easily jammed, cannot cover low
altitudes or accurately locate incoming aircraft,
and�because of the lack of trained personnel�
operate only eight hours per day.
The Army also is seeking additional air defense
missile systems and two regiments of antiaircraft
artillery, Tanzania's
present Soviet-supplied systems are virtually
inoperable because of the lack of spare parts, fuel, and
trained technicians. The Soviets sent a military survey
team to Tanzania last September, but no new
agreement or military assistance is expected, possibly
reflecting presently cool relations between Tanzania
and the USSR, as well as Dar es Salaam's inability to
pay for new military aid.
Outlook: Surviving Sanctions and Countermeasures
Although uneasy about possible South African covert
action (such as bombing of ANC residences) and
airstrikes or other forms of military retaliation,
Tanzania would not suffer seriously from South
African economic countermeasures. The country has
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only peripheral economic ties to South Africa and
does not depend on South African transportation
networks, jobs, or trade arrangements, as do many
other FLS members. In our view, Dar es Salaam may
even benefit in the short term because it could raise
transport tariffs and other charges as nei hbors turn
to Tanzanian transportation systems.
Given the distances involved in a South African
airstrike on Tanzania, covert action by Pretoria
against ANC targets in Tanzania may be the most
likely action. the
ANC is concerned by an apparent attempt to bomb a
regional ANC residence in southwestern Tanzania in
mid-October. In our view, the most likely targets for
South African retaliation besides the ANC would
include:
� Bridges along the Tazara railroad.
� Port facilities in Dar es Salaam.
We agree with the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam,
however, that Tanzania's transport infrastructure in
its present condition almost certainly could not absorb
much additional traffic without completely collapsing.
Poor maintenance capabilities, and fuel and spare
parts shortages for the railroad and Tan-Zam
highway operations would have to be overcome before
a significant increase in traffic could be tolerated. In
the event that Pretoria undertakes serious economic
countermeasures, Tanzania probably would
accompany its offer to FLS members to replace South
African transport links with renewed calls for
additional international assistance in the transport
sector.
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South Africa: Buthelezi and
the Black Opposition
Tensions between Zulu Chief Buthelezi and more
radical black opposition groups�especially the
multiracial United Democratic Front (UDF) and the
Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU)�appear to be growing, but in the short
term do not pose a threat to Buthelezi's leadership of
South Africa's 6 million Zulus. Buthelezi and
Inkatha, a Zulu-based political and cultural
organization claiming 1.3 million members,
historically have dominated the black opposition
movements in the KwaZulu homeland and in Natal
Province. The UDF, South Africa's largest
antiapartheid group with over 600 affiliate
organizations and over 2 million members, however,
continues to gain strength in the area, particularly
among youths. The UDF and its affiliates consider
Buthelezi a collaborator because of his position as a
homeland leader, his opposition to disinvestment, his
denunciations of the African National Congress
(ANC), and his willingness to negotiate with Pretoria,
most recently proposing a multiracial government
joining KwaZulu and Natal Province. Nonetheless,
both UDF and ANC leaders admit the legitimacy of
Buthelezi's role as leader of the Zulus and
acknowledge that he will have to play a role in future
negotiations.
The harsh restrictions of the nationwide state of
emergency have had a dramatic impact on the ability
of most black opposition groups to operate, but
Buthelezi has been allowed to hold mass rallies and
make speeches critical of the government. He has
exploited his position as head of the country's largest
black ethnic group and his moderate stance to gain
access to the highest levels of government and to
achieve unparalleled support in the white community.
While most black leaders are now calling for one-
man/one-vote, Buthelezi has made clear his
willingness to accept a political arrangement that
guarantees the protection of white minority rights.
Pressure from his increasingly politicized
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constituency, and Pretoria's failure to offer
concessions, however, may force him to adopt a more
radical position.
Buthelezi's continued moderate policies, in our view,
threaten to weaken his base of support, particularly in
the urban areas. The past 24 months of continuous
unrest and Pretoria's repressive measures have
politicized blacks in unprecedented numbers and
raised black demands and expectations. The Durban
area so far has not been affected much by the
unrest�except as the primary site for ANC
bombings�because Natal has suffered less from
South Africa's general economic downturn, and
because Inkatha continues to maintain control of most
aspects of daily life.
Poor Relations With the ANC
in 1975 the
group helped Buthelezi, a former ANC member, set
up and finance Inkatha, believing it would be an ideal
organization for promoting ANC views and interests,
Relations soured in
1980 when the ANC concluded that Buthelezi had
agreed to work within the system, including accepting
remuneration from the government as chief minister
of KwaZulu. Buthelezi contends it was the ANC that
initially counseled him to take the homeland position
to prevent Pretoria from railroading KwaZulu into
accepting "independence." Buthelezi also split with
the ANC on the issue of foreign investment in South
Africa by opposing disinvestment and sanctions.
More recently, US Embassy and press reports
indicate that Buthelezi's relations with the ANC�in
Buthelezi's words "the ANC-in-exile"�have reached
an alltime low, with each side regularly denouncing
the other. Although Buthelezi was an active member
of the ANC in the 1950s and maintained direct
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The Role of Inkatha
Inkatha, a Zulu national cultural liberation
movement, was revived by Chief Buthelezi in 1975.
His leadership is based on his position in the Zulu
royal house�second only to that of Zulu King
Goodwill. Inkatha claims to have a paid-up
membership of over 1.3 million, almost half of whom
belong to the Inkatha youth brigade. The Inkatha
leadership is virtually identical to the KwaZulu
legislature, and the KwaZulu cabinet, with a few
exceptions, makes up Inkatha 's inner council. While
the group claims to have a national base of support
that includes non-Zulus, we believe that its support
outside Natal is minimal. The Embassy reports, for
example, that most of the supporters attending an
Inkatha rally in Soweto in July were Zulus bused in
from Natal for the event. Critics have attacked
Inkatha's membership figures, claiming that
membership is required to obtain basic services or
jobs in the townships, according to Embassy
reporting. KwaZulu schools devote one hour a week
to Inkatha meetings, school syllabuses are prepared
by Inkatha, and KwaZulu civil servants have
"voluntary" contributions to Inkatha deducted from
their government paychecks. In addition, all
employees of KwaZulu are required to swear loyalty
to Chief Buthelezi. NR
contact with the group until 1980, he draws a careful
distinction between the imprisoned ANC leader
Nelson Mandela and the exiled ANC organization.
Both Buthelezi and Mandela were members of the
ANC youth wing in the 1950s, but split over the use
of violence. Buthelezi claims that the ANC has
planned to assassinate him. For its part, the ANC
publicly refers to Buthelezi as a puppet of the South
African Government and last year admitted
responsibility for bombing Inkatha offices in
Amsterdam. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Despite the personal animosity that has clouded
relations
Buthelezi and Inkatha are
important and powerful forces in black politics that
cannot be ignored. The ANC's top political leadership
Secret
reportedly recognizes that a military takeover will not
allow time to resolve the tribalism issue, (b)(3) NatSecAct
Buthelezi probably will hold the key to the country's 6
million Zulus (b)(1)
ANC advocates in Natal, for example, have cal b)(3) NatSecAct
Buthelezi "a power in Natal who will have to un
any powersharing discussions" and stated that while
they disagreed with him on strategy and tactics they
were in agreement on ultimate goals, according to the
US Embassy. For his part, Buthelezi continues to call
for the unbanning of the ANC and other opposition
groups,
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
In the current political climate, Buthelezi has walked
a fine line by making the release of Nelson Mandela
and other political prisoners a condition for his
participation in the National Statutory Council�
Pretoria's latest attempt at drawing blacks int(b)(1 )
negotiations�but clearly has separated Mand(b)(3) NatSecAct
release from the unbanning of the ANC.
Mandela does not share
(b)(3) NatSecAct
the ANC's anti-Buthelezi views and
Winnie Mandela, in criticizing Buthelezi, has not
accurately reflected her husband's attitude. For his
part, Mandela, like other ANC leaders, recognizes
that Buthelezi and Inkatha will have to be included in
any negotiations for a new South Africa, (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
The UDF in Natal
The UDF is having mixed results in efforts to build
support in Natal Province. According to US Embassy
reporting, it has been relatively inactive in Buthelezi's
stronghold of KwaZulu. A senior UDF executive
member stated that Inkatha, through a variety of
means sometimes including violence, has prevented
the UDF from organizing in KwaZulu. In the non-
KwaZulu townships in the Durban area, however,
Buthelezi and the UDF have been engaged in a
struggle for control. Buthelezi claims that the UDF is
under the control of the ANC, while the UDF has
accused Inkatha of sending impis, or Zulu warriors, to
12
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intimidate township residents and UDF members.
The National Education Crisis Committee�a group
with strong UDF connections�met in Durban last
March and publicly declared Inkatha to be "an
enemy of the people" and a greater threat than the
government, after Zulu impis attempted to prevent
the group from meeting by attacking its members,
according to the Embassy.
Despite its problems with Buthelezi, the UDF has
some 60 affiliate organizations in Natal, including
such diverse groups as the Natal Indian Congress and
the Azanian Students Organization. According to US
Embassy reporting, the student group may be the
fastest growing organization among disaffected black
youths who are frustrated with the slow pace of
change. According to a survey carried out by a noted
sociologist and senior UDF executive last year
following serious township violence, Buthelezi had lost
significant support among blacks while the UDF had
doubled its following. The survey concluded that
Inkatha was viewed as one of the main causes of
black-on-black unrest. The survey results appear to
overstate the decline in Buthelezi's popularity,
however, probably reflecting considerable bias and a
degree of wishful thinking.
Buthelezi remains firmly opposed to boycotts of black
institutions, including school boycotts, a major tactic
used by the UDF, and has stressed the importance of
education to black advancement. Although KwaZulu
has been little affected by widespread school and
consumer boycotts, radical youths have forced the
closing of schools in several Durban townships where
the UDF has successfully organized opposition to
incorporation into KwaZulu. Consumer boycotts of
white stores in Pietermaritzburg and Durban were
called off when Inkatha threatened to crush the
boycotts. Although Buthelezi has often stated his
commitment to nonviolence, he has also stated that
Inkatha would protect its members from "enemies"
by taking "an eye for an eye."
The Black Labor Movement
Buthelezi's relations with the burgeoning black labor
movement also are contentious. Inkatha has mass
appeal in Natal, including significant working-class
support, and Zulu workers generally have strong
13
The United Workers Union of South Africa
UWUSA, a general workers union, has gotten off to a
slow start since its founding in May, but it is likely to
succeed in recruiting a sizable membership in Natal,
at least in the short term. Although the Embassy
reports that 70,000 people attended its 1 May
founding rally, a UWUSA senior official last month
claimed a membership of 50,000. While several
unions that had been expected to join UWUSA on
1 May failed to do so, its officials are reportedly
holding talks with a number of existing unions and
expect to form a federation by February. UWUSA is
a probusiness and proinvestment union, and its top
leaders all have political or business�rather than
trade union�backgrounds, lending strength to its
opponents' claims that UWUSA is a "sweetheart"
union.
tribal loyalties. In May Buthelezi announced the
launching of a new Inkatha-backed labor union�the
United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA)�
to counter the growing influence and anti-Buthelezi
rhetoric of COSATU, according to US Embassy
reporting. Buthelezi has accused COSATU of being
an ANC front with socialist goals. UWUSA has been
condemned by a wide spectrum of black groups,
including most of the black South African trade
unions, according to Embassy reporting. These
organizations see the new union as an unnecessarily
divisive element in the trade union movement.
COSATU, formed last December, is South Africa's
largest labor federation with more than 660,000
members, and cooperates with the UDF. COSATU
supports disinvestment and the use of strikes for
political purposes, and from its formation has
criticized Buthelezi's participation in the homeland
system. While COSATU officials publicly have
minimized the threat UWUSA poses to their position
in Natal, the Embassy reports that they have privately
expressed concern over UWUSA's incursions into
their membership. Clashes reportedly have broken out
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between workers of the rival unions over planned
strikes in Natal Province, and the violence may be
spreading into the townships, the Embassy reports.
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The Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA),
South Africa's second-largest labor federation with
200,000 members, hoped to reach a private agreement
with Buthelezi not to compete directly for workers to
avoid a confrontation with Inkatha,
. CUSA's general secretary, however,
has warned foreign labor movements that it will cut
its ties to them if they provide any assistance to
UWUSA, according to the Embassy. CUSA officials
have accused Inkatha of using intimidation tactics
against CUSA members and officials in Natal, but
have laid similar charges against UDF members as
well.
NR
Outlook
Although Buthelezi is likely to come under increasing
attack from more radical opponents, they are unlikely
to pose a serious threat to his position as leader of
Inkatha or South Africa's 6 million Zulus. Buthelezi
will continue to organize massive displays of support,
even under the state of emergency. The benefits
available through Inkatha, including jobs and
housing, virtually guarantee that the organization will
continue to attract members. Even with defections to
the UDF and the ANC among the young, urbanized,
and more radical Zulus, Buthelezi will continue to
have strong support among KwaZulu's less educated
and mostly rural Zulu majority. NR
Buthelezi's rhetoric�both antigovernment and anti-
UDF/-ANC�is likely to increase in the near term as
unrest continues. He has made clear that, despite his
call for nonviolent change, Inkatha will not hesitate to
resist challenges by its enemies. His demand for
Mandela's release is unlikely to win him additional
support outside the Zulu community. Only his
resignation from the homeland government and
support for sanctions against Pretoria probably could
bring him back into the black opposition fold. In our
judgment, such a fundamental change in Buthelezi's
strategy is unlikely unless Pretoria firmly kills all
prospects for multiracial government in Natal�the
centerpiece of Buthelezi's political agenda. While
Secret
Pretoria probably is reluctant to alienate Buthelezi�
his participation in any government power-sharing
scheme would bring it important credibility�it is
unlikely to risk white backlash or increased black
expectations elsewhere by offering concessions that
would effectively silence Buthelezi's critics.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
COSATU leaders will continue their ideological
rhetoric against Buthelezi and Inkatha and eventually
will force many Zulu workers to choose between
Inkatha and COSATU. In our judgment, many
workers will demonstrate their allegiance to Inkatha
by joining UWUSA, but over the long haul, we
believe UWUSA will lack staying power as an
effective trade union. More than political rhetoric is
required to deliver on the bread-and-butter issues of
the shop floor, and, in our judgment, UWUSA's lack
of experienced trade unionists will alienate workers
who have been used to aggressive, hard-bargaining
union representation.
14
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Seychelles: Rene
Beheads the Army
President Rene last month dismissed three senior
Army commanders and accepted Defense Minister
Berlouis's resignation, a move that improves the
chances for hardline socialist James Michel to
succeed Rene.
I We believe that Michel, who is the
second-highest-ranking government official and also
serves as Army Chief of Staff, will take advantage of
the purge of his longtime rivals to consolidate his
control of the defense establishment and to press Rene
to reduce ties to the West. Rene's action probably has
quashed opposition in the military for now, but he
must still deal with other problems, particularly
growing popular discontent over the ill effects of state
intervention in the economy.
The "Coup" Plot
Rene returned unexpectedly from the summit and
immediately met orivately with Michel
Rene's suspicions undoubtedly
were fueled by rumors that the conspirators solicited
US assistance to replace him with Berlouis, who last
year visited the United States as a guest of the US Air
Force. A source of the US Embassy reports that 26
junior noncommissioned officers were arrested in
connection with the alleged plot. Several days after
meeting with Michel, Rene, I
claimed he no longer had confidence
in the loyalties of three of the five Army
commanders�Major Marie, Major Bonte, and Major
Lucas�and demanded their resignations. It is
unclear whether Berlouis was forced to resign, but
Berlouis submitted his
resignation after expressing confidence in the loyalties
of the dismissed majors�two of whom were widely
known to be supporters of the Defense Minister.
15
Col. Ogilvy Berlouis
Regarded by Rene as greatest rival for power . . .
until recently was Minister of Youth and Defense and
Army commander . . .
substantial support within the military . . .
secondary school education followed by paramilitary
training in Tanzania . . . about 36 years old.
Although dissatisfaction in the armed forces had been
growing because the financially strapped regime is
unable to meet the military's demands for higher pay,
we doubt that a coup
plot was under way. Senior officers probably did no
more than talk about removing Rene while he was in
Zimbabwe�any plotters clearly would have had
sufficient time and opportunity to launch a coup
during his weeklong absence. Rumormongering is
endemic in Seychelles and,
we believe it is much
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17 October 1986
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Lt. Col. James Michel
Completely loyal to and trusted by Rene . . .
unofficially holds second-highest-ranking government
position . . . Army Chief of Staff, Minister for
Education, Information, and Youth . . . in charge of
developing civilian militia . . . avowed socialist, anti-
US, popular among ruling party's leftists . . .
years old.
. . . secondary education . . . about 42
more likely that Michel preyed on Rene's well-
founded concern over the uncertain loyalties of his
security forces to play up the rumors and engineer the
ouster of Berlouis and his supporters.
Picking Up the Pieces: Winners and Losers
The departure of Berlouis and the three majors
probably will allow Michel to consolidate his position
as Rene's likely successor. Michel already had an
advantage over Berlouis after Rene selected him last
year as deputy secretary general of the Seychelles
People's Progressive Front�the country's only party.
In addition, the staunchly anti-US Michel probably
now will have greater access to Rene and will
encourage him to reduce ties to the West and to be
more receptive to Soviet proposals, such as increasing
the number of Soviet military advisers in Seychelles.
For economic reasons, Rene is unlikely to heed
Michel's advice regarding ties to the West, but he
may follow Michel's recommendations on
Secret
replacements for the majors, who would come from
the younger generation of Soviet-trained officers and
who almost certainly will look favorably on expanding
military ties to Moscow. Michel's gambit has not been
entirely successful, however, because Rene kept the
defense portfolio for himself in a recent Cabinet
shuffle.
Although Berlouis almost certainly still has support in
the military, we believe that he probably cannot
capitalize on it now that he has been removed from
the chain of command.
Rene probably will continue to view
him as a threat as long as he remains in Seychelles.
Berlouis, like others Rene regards as potential
opponents, may emigrate to the United Kingdom or
Australia, which harbor active Seychellois dissident
communities, or to East Africa.
the London-based Seychelles National
Movement hopes to recruit Berlouis, probably to
exploit his ties to the military. In our view, the three
majors cannot overcome their reputations for
brutality and corruption to rally support in the
military, and probably will either emigrate or return
to the menial jobs they held before the coup in 1977.
Rene's decisive purge of the military leadership
suggests that he will continue to react quickly to
potential threats frOm the armed forces. Even as he
focuses his attention on the military, however, we
believe he is ignoring the larger problem of popular
discontent over the economy, which is suffering a
severe foreign currency crunch.
because of the government's inability to
address economic grievances, party morale is ebbing,
support for Rene is waning, and the friction between
junior and senior military officers is easing as they
seek to unite against Rene. Although Rene will
remain alert to trouble from the military,
economically inspired unrest could get out of hand
and encourage the armed forces to side spontaneously
with the discontented populace.
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We have no evidence to suggest that Moscow had a
hand in the coup rumors. We believe, however, that
the Soviets clearly stand to benefit from the event.
The Soviets responded to the immediate "crisis" by
dispatching a warship to Port Victoria, a normal
Soviet practice to demonstrate support for Rene
during periods of tension and instability. Over the
longer term, Moscow undoubtedly will feed Rene's
suspicions that the United States was behind the coup
plot. Rene's relations with the West will remain
cordial on the surface, as he attempts to obtain
increased economic aid. He also will probably allow
the US Air Force satellite tracking station�in
Seychelles since the mid-1960s�to remain in
operation to retain the lucrative revenues he receives
in return. He is unlikely, however, to expand ties to
the West, and probably will not accept a longstanding
US offer of a small military assistance program.
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Guinea: Malinke on the Outside
Looking In
Elements within the Malinke tribal group still hope to
wrest control from President Conte, despite the
failure of a Malinke-led coup attempt last year.
Conte, a Sousou, came to power in 1984 in a military-
led coup shortly after the death of Sekou Toure, a
Malinke who had been President since independence
in 1958. The Malinke are the country's second-largest
tribal group, with about 25 percent of the population,
while Conte's Sousou are the third largest, with about
11 percent.
The Malinke believe they are suffering economically
from the rule of Conte, and feel politically cut off
from the government. Moreover, the uncertain fate of
those Malinke involved in the coup attempt last year
is another source of friction with the government. We
believe Conte's biggest challenge will be to retain
control of the military, which is predominantly
Malinke. Working against the Malinke, in our
judgment, are Conte's moves to put the control of
military units in Conakry in Sousou hands, and the
tribe's apparent lack of a strong leader. Moreover, the
harsh public reaction in Conakry to the 1985 coup
attempt will probably make the Malinke more
cautious in their estimations of popular support for
another attempt and may lead them to seek an
alliance with the majority Peuhl (Fulani) tribal group
before launching a new bid for power.
19
Earlier this year Conte reassigned a large number of
military personnel, in part to remove Malinke
commanders from the capital
of over 200
personnel reassigned from the Conakry area, 80
percent were Malinke. Almost all of the reassigned
Malinke were replaced by Sousous, including Malinke
officers serving as commanders or in senior staff
positions in the Conakry area. A major exception was
the Minister of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel
Doumbouya, who is also a Malinke, but whom we
believe is loyal to Conte. Following this action, the
only Malinke still in command of a military base in
Guinea is in an isolated region along the border with
Guinea-Bissau. Despite these moves, the Malinke
remain the predominant group in the military,
the President has
widespread�but in some cases unenthusiastic�
support within the military. Neither the Malinke
officers transferred out of Conakry nor any other
identifiable group appears to have enough support to
challenge Conte, according to the defense attache.
Moreover, the military was responsible for putting
down last year's coup attempt. The attache reports,
however, that morale within the military is quite low,
because of low pay and poor living conditions.
Economic Complaints
the populations in two
of the major Malinke cities in Guinea�Siguiri and
Kourousa�have become almost universally hostile to
the Conte regime. the Malinke
areas are facing increasingly tough economic
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conditions with no end in sight. Malinke residents
believe government corruption is artificially inflating
food prices and leading to the economic stagnation of
the country. 1 the
governor of the Kourousa region is reducing the
amount of rice sold in a 50-kilogram sack to 45 kg
while inflating the price by 50 percent and pocketing
the difference.
For his part, Conte thinks that Malinke merchants
are trying to sabotage his economic reform program,
Conte believes that, during a series of currency
devaluations undertaken last year, Malinke
merchants ignored his request for restraint in raising
prices. Moreover, Sousou merchants accused Malinke
merchants of stockpiling goods to create artificial
shortages and fuel price increases,
In response, Conte used government stocks
and organized the Sousou and Peuhl merchants to
control prices
Political Complaints
In addition to economic grievances, the Malinke also
feel left out of the political arena since Conte came to
power. Although the tribe makes up about 22 percent
of the Cabinet�an equal number to the Sousou
the Malinke believe they have
no way of communicating their grievances to
Conakry. the Malinke
believe that, because Conakry appoints local
government officials, it would turn a deaf ear to any
complaints raised about them. In addition, Conte's
rapprochement with France is unpopular among the
Malinke, as they are convinced that he has sold out to
Guinea's former colonial rulers,
Aggravating Malinke dissatisfaction is the uncertain
fate of those Malinke who staged the failed coup
attempt, according to US Embassy reporting. Last
fall the magazine Jeune Afrique�whose editor is a
Guinean political exile�ran a series of articles
charging Conakry with the executions of several
former members of Sekou Toure's regime as well as
Secret
participants in last year's coup attempt.
at least 40 military
officers have been executed for taking part in the coup
attempt, but the number of Malinke executed remains
unknown. While the government has denied the
executions, the Embassy reports that Conakry has
done little to disprove the allegations, which has
fueled Malinke suspicions.
The Malinke continue to hope that they will one day
regain power but are keeping a low profile for the
time being At a
meeting of 40 tribal leaders last spring, the retired
Director General of Customs, Alpha Keita�who was
chosen to be national coordinator for the group�
stated that there would be no talk of a reconciliation
with the Conte regime until Malinke political
prisoners had been released Keita
went on to promise that the Malinke would one day
rule Guinea again. In his opinion, however, now is not
the time for political action and the Malinke should
avoid another situation similar to the failed coup
attempt. the Malinke do not
feel they would be successful if they tried to take
power on their own, but that their chances would be
greatly improved if they could form an alliance with
the Peuhl.
Outlook
We believe the Malinke within the military present
the greatest threat to Conte. Despite the President's
move to assure Sousou command of the forces in
Conakry, the Army still is predominantly Malinke.
The biggest stumblingblock to a Malinke takeover is
the apparent lack of strong leadership within the
tribe, in our view. We believe the arrest and detention
of the Malinke leaders after the coup attempt last
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year dealt a demoralizing blow to the political
aspirations of the group. No other political leader as
capable as Diarra Traore�leader of the takeover
bid�has been found. Moreover, the harsh public
reaction following the coup attempt�when the
predominantly Sousou population of Conakry looted
and vandalized several Malinke businesses and
homes�probably will further discourage another
coup attempt by the Malinke.
We see no indication that the group has been singled
out by the Conte regime for harsher economic
measures. The Malinke are probably suffering from
the same economic hardships as the rest of the
population, resulting from Conte's economic reform
program, which has included a sharp currency
devaluation and subsidy reductions. Nevertheless, the
Malinke perception of persecution is likely to grow as
economic conditions worsen.
The Malinke are likely to continue to feel alienated
from the political system, despite the President's
efforts to downplay ethnic rivalries. In an effort to
topple the Conte regime, the Malinke may try to form
an alliance with the Peuhl, but Conte also may
approach the Peuhl for help in controlling the
Malinke, as he did when he suspected Malinke
merchants of ignoring his economic policies.
The festering problem of tribal discontent could
hamper Conte's efforts to reform the economy and
reduce tribal tensions in the country. If the Malinke
are able to rally the public to oppose the reforms,
Conte may feel compelled to ease off from some of the
measures. Moreover, should the President uncover
plots against him by the Malinke, he is likely to jail
those involved, especially those in the military. In our
judgment, this would reinforce Malinke feelings of
repression at the hands of the Sousou-led regime.
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Liberia: Prospects
for Leftist Group
The Movement to Obtain Justice in Africa (MOJA), a
banned leftist organization opposed to Liberia's
historically close ties to the United States, depicts
itself as an alternative to the pro-Western Doe
government, and occasionally claims it will topple the
President. In our view, MOJA lacks the internal
support and organization necessary to challenge the
regime successfully. In the near term, however,
MOJA may attempt to foment student unrest, hoping
to provoke further government repression and
undermine Doe's efforts to reconcile with his
moderate political opposition.
Origins and Ideology
MOJA, established in 1973 by a handful of students
and university faculty, initally hoped to convince the
conservative regime of the late President Tolbert�
who was ousted by Doe�to take a strong stand in
support of southern African liberation movements.
The US Embassy reported that the group gradually
evolved into a critic of the regime, denouncing the
country's rule by the minuscule Americo-Liberian
community. MOJA, however, never attempted to
overthrow the government, and a review of Embassy
reporting indicates that it did not participate in the
violence during 1979-80 that culminated in Tolbert's
ouster.
A self-described vanguard movement and pan-
Africanist organization, MOJA has sought to appeal
to Liberia's urban poor, according to the US
Embassy. Although senior MOJA members privately
profess an "African socialism" that would include
free education and health care as well as limited
foreign investment and free enterprise, younger
activists favor more radical reforms and have often
been less wedded to nonviolent change. MOJA has
consistently opposed US policy in Africa and says it
would end Liberia's unproductive "special
relationship" with Washington if it took power.
23
Politics Under Doe
MOJA members, who served as Cabinet ministers in
Doe's government from 1980 to 1983, were frequently
at odds with the regime's moderate political
orientation and unsuccessfully sought to build better
relations with the USSR and its allies. According to
US Embassy reporting, in 1981 former Foreign
Minister Fahnbulleh�one of MOJA's founders�
dispatched some 300 teachers to Ethiopia for adult
education training, and attempted in early 1982 to
undermine US-Liberian relations by not carrying out
Doe's orders to press for greater donor aid.
Fahnbulleh believed the West's "failure" to provide
new funding would prompt Doe to establish warmer
ties to the Soviet Union, the Embassy observes.
Since 1983, when MOJA lost its Cabinet positions
following policy disputes with Doe, the group's
influence has been marginal and its activities
constrained by fairly regular government crackdowns.
The US Embassy reports that MOJA issues
occasional press releases attacking Liberia's links to
the United States and Israel, and in September 1984
eight members were arrested for distributing leaflets
that threatened a guerrilla campaign against Doe.
Capabilities
Internal Support. The leftist group, which probably
has about 400 to 500 members, has little support
among Liberia's conservative majority�the rural
tribal population, according to the US Embassy. Most
MOJA supporters are students and intellectuals, and
the group lacks the necessary finances and
organizational skills to expand its narrow base of
support. Moreover, MOJA's ability to recruit new
supporters in Monrovia almost certainly will become
more difficult as the recently unbanned United
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People's Party�which is popular among Liberia's
youth�renews its activities. Although Defense
Minister Allison concedes there may be a few MOJA
supporters in the Army, they pose no threat to the
regime,
MOJA exerts some influence through two student
front organizations, the National Student Union
(LINSU) and the Student Unification Party (SUP).
According to US Embassy sources, all LINSU
officials belong to MOJA, and some reside in Ghana,
Cuba, and Libya. A few MOJA members reportedly
were killed during the April US bombing raid on
Tripoli, according to US Embassy reporting. Both
student groups must compete with the more popular
and more conservative Student Integration
Movement. the
1,800-strong SUP provoked minor student unrest
earlier this year, and it plans to step up its activities.
MOJA also was behind the now inactive Liberian
People's Party, founded in August 1984 to contest the
1985 presidential and legislative elections. Shortly
after the party's creation, the government charged its
leader, Dr. Amos Sawyer, with plotting to kill Doe
and install a socialist government, according to US
Embassy reporting. Although Sawyer was released
from detention later in the year, in 1985 both he and
his party were banned from political activity because
of their alleged leftist orientation. Sawyer initially
claimed the party was independent of MOJA, but a
survey of available Embassy reporting suggests that it
is a front organization for MOJA.
Internal Frictions. Internal power struggles and
ideological factionalism handicap MOJA's efforts to
present a coherent alternative to Doe.
Fahnbulleh resigned last March from
the group's executive committee following allegations
that he embezzled $20,000. According to press
reports, he quit over unspecified policy differences
with a senior official, Togba Tipoteh. Younger
members, such as longtime student activist Joe Wylie,
believe Sawyer and other leaders are ineffective, and
Secret
think a more radical posture is necessary for the
"revolution" to succeed, according to US Embassy
and press reporting.
External Support. MOJA receives limited financial
and military assistance from Ghana and possibly from
Libya. some Accra-
based dissidents receive training there. The Liberian
Government claims that its security personnel have
penetrated MOJA's cell in Accra and are aware of its
plans to fuel unrest,
reporting.
We have no direct evidence of Soviet aid to MOJA,
but Moscow probably maintains limited contact,
including scholarships for MOJA members residing in
the USSR.
reporting, some MOJA members reside in Soviet Bloc
countries, and Defense Minister Allison alleges that
Fanbulleh maintains links to several Marxist regimes.
The government is convinced that MOJA receives
Soviet aid, and in July 1985 Doe severed relations
with Moscow following the arrest of 14 MOJA
supporters in front of the Soviet Embassy, who
allegedly possessed secret government documents.'
Outlook
For the near term, MOJA will remain on the fringes
of Liberian politics. Its inability to stage public
demonstrations or otherwise mobilize the population
against Doe suggests it suffers from weak leadership
and organization, and that the public disapproves of
its radical leanings. MOJA leaders almost certainly
will focus its efforts on recruiting students, and hope
to spark campus unrest. They probably hope a
1 Liberia reestablished diplomatic relations with Moscow in July,
but the embassies in their respective capitals have not been staffed.
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Key MOJA Officials
H. B. Fahnbulleh, Jr. . . . Ph.D from George Washington University . . . self-
declared African nationalist . . . once called Liberia "errand boy" of the United
States . . . highly articulate . . . served as Education Minister from April 1980 to
October 1981 . . . became Foreign Minister, but was dismissed in July 1983 for
"ideological differences" with Doe . . . moved to Paris . . .
Togba Nah Tipoteh . . . one of MOJA 'S founders . . . Ph.D. from the University of
Nebraska. . . economist at University of Liberia in the 1970s . . . served as MOJA
chairman 1975-80 . . .
. . resigned in 1981 while visiting the Ivory Coast . . . has lived in
the Netherlands and Sweden in recent years . . .
Amos Sawyer . . . candidate for mayor of Monrovia in canceled 1979 election . . .
served as Dean of Humanities and professor of political science at University of
Liberia . . . has voiced support for multiparty democracy and free enterprise . . .
chairman of national provisional committee of MOJA . . . chaired the committee
that authored Liberia's 1985 constitution . .
resident in the United States since 1985.
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crackdown by the regime will spark major
demonstrations, provoke shooting by the usually
jittery security forces, and gain them new
sympathizers. We believe, at best, MOJA will
attempt to capitalize on any civil unrest that may
emerge from Liberia's economic decay. Although it is
unlikely, we cannot dismiss a MOJA attack on the
US Embassy or other American property in an effort
to embarrass Doe.
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Africa
Briefs
South Africa National Party Leadership Changes
In a surprise move that may portend other important political developments,
President Botha stepped down as Cape Province chairman of the ruling National
Party during the party's provincial congress on 30 September. Botha, who had held
the leadership post for 20 years, remains national chairman of the party. The move
prompted speculation that the 70-year-old Botha may soon retire from public life,
but the decision probably only reflects his desire to reduce demands on his time.
Provincial chairmen are responsible for the daily administration of the party. In a
recent interview Botha said he is rearranging his priorities, but suggested strongly
that he expects to be President in 1988 when South Africa celebrates several
important milestones, including 40 years of National Party rule.
The President's decision may also signal his intention to call for early general
elections, probably sometime next spring. Botha probably wanted to avoid the
additional burdens that elections entail for a provincial leader. He has also passed
on to his successor as Cape leader, Minister of Constitutional Development and
Planning Chris Heunis, responsibility for presiding over the electoral redistricting
that is likely to precede new elections. Some observers believe that Heunis's
elevation will boost his chances of eventually succeeding Botha as President, but,
because of demographic shifts in recent years, redistricting will almost certainly
result in the Transvaal branch of the ruling party adding to its lead in
parliamentary seats over the Cape branch, thereby reducing Heunis's clout in the
party.
Rightwing Parties Moving Closer
Relations between the far right Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) and the
Conservative Party (CP) are improving, but a merger is unlikely in the near term.
At its annual party congress earlier this month, the HNP took significant steps
toward resolving its differences with the CP. The HNP adopted a bilingual
language policy, dropping its demand that Afrikaans be South Africa's only
official language. The party also agreed to support separate residential areas for
Indians instead of insisting on repatriation and reiterated its willingness to
consider an election pact with the CP. Both parties had already agreed to reject
the position of the ultraright wing, militant Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
(Afrikaner Resistance Movement, or AWB), which calls for establishment of an
exclusive white homeland.
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Current Distribution of Seats in White Parliamentary Chamber
National Party (NP) 127
Progressive Federal Party (PFP) 27
Conservative Party (CP) 18
New Republic Party (NRP) 5
Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) 1
If the government decides to call for a general election next year�a development
that US Embassy contacts believe is likely�the two rightwing parties probably
would form a coalition and run single candidates for most legislative seats. The
division of constituencies would be a sensitive issue, however, since the HNP�
which has less electoral support�has reportedly insisted on an equal distribution
of seats. A formal merger of the two parties is unlikely because the HNP fears it
would be swallowed up by the CP, and because of deep-rooted personal differences
between HNP leader Jaap Marais and CP leader Andries Treurnicht. Even in the
absence of a merger, a rightwing coalition would seriously challenge the ruling
National Party in the Transvaal and Orange Free State Provinces and probably
could win enough seats to replace the liberal Progressive Federal Party as South
Africa's official opposition.
Senegal Economic Squeeze Play
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Dakar continues to carry out its IMF-sponsored economic reform program despite
growing resistance from opposition parties, labor and Islamic leaders, and French
businessmen. In August the government introduced a new tariff policy and
announced a cutback on customs duties for a wide range of goods, including rice,
wheat, medicines, and raw materials used in agricultural and industrial
production, according to the US Embassy and press reports. The new policy paves
the way for implementing other initiatives intended to liberalize the economy,
reduce government subsidies, and attract foreign investors, according to press
accounts. The reforms are also aimed at reducing the incentives for cross-border
smuggling, a major source of income for the Islamic brotherhoods.
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Opposition to the reform program, although scattered among various groups, is
growing, and over the next year it could provide a rallying point against the
government, both the Tidjani Islamic
brotherhood and the National Confederation of Senegalese Labor�the umbrella
group for Senegal's labor unions�separately are lobbying the government to stop
the layoff of 200 workers at a chemical plant. The plant has suffered from a drop
in fertilizer sales following the liberalizing of the agricultural industry.
French businessmen oppose reforms that would reduce some subsidies, or threaten
French monopolies, according to the Embassy. In addition,
the leader of the Independence and Labor Party�a Marxist-oriented party
and the fourth-largest opposition group�have attacked the government's new
industrial policy, the collection of individual taxes in rural areas, and the steady
decline of the economy under President Diouf. Moreover,
an opposition party leader met with low level representatives of the two leading
Islamic brotherhoods last month, probably to solicit their
backing in opposing the reforms. So far Dakar has been able to cope with the
opposition. As the effects of the reforms spread throughout the economy, however,
opposition and labor groups may come to seek common cause against the
government, and view unity of action as the most effective way to force Dakar to
back down on some measures.
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Angola Chronology
September 1986
1 September
7 September
15 September
The sixth UNITA congress concludes at Jamba and is attended by 2,000 delegates
representing Angola's 16 provinces. The main topic is UNITA's peace policy that
has three points: first, the Luanda government must make an official statement
accepting and admitting the need to negotiate with UNITA; second, soon after the
statement UNITA could start negotiations; and, third, the government and
UNITA forces would maintain their positions in the field. The Congress elects
Jeremias Chitunda as UNITA's Vice President to focus on political affairs.
Finally, the Congress concludes that South Africa is useful to UNITA's struggle
against the Luanda government but condemns Pretoria's policy of apartheid and
calls for a speeding up of domestic reform and dialogue.
Cuban President Fidel Castro visits Luanda on his return from the NAM summit
in Zimbabwe. Although Castro publicly portrays Angolan forces as increasingly
able to defend their country without outside assistance, he reiterates his
willingness to keep Cuban troops in Angola for as long as apartheid exists in South
Africa. Castro also visits Cuban troops and installations in the field.
Angolan President dos Santos meets with Zambian President Kaunda in Lusaka.
Kaunda briefs dos Santos on talks he held last week in Malawi with Zimbabwean
Prime Minister Mugabe, Mozambican President Machel, and Malawi President
Banda, all of whom are members of the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC). The organization aspires to find alternative
road and rail routes to the sea to reduce dependence on South Africa.
18 September UNITA claims that it shot down an Angolan MIG fighter.
22 September
23 September
President dos Santos, at the conclusion of a visit to Cape Verde, outlines conditions
for the resumption of an Angolan dialogue with the United States and South
Africa. He says a gesture of US good will is needed, such as the cessation of
support for UNITA and political pressure against US oil companies operating in
Angola. Dos Santos also says South Africa, for its part, must cease interfering in
Angola's domestic affairs and proceed with independence for Namibia.
The Angolan press states that the government has regained full control of the
southeastern town of Cuito Cuanavale, scene of heavy fighting last month after an
attack by South African and UNITA forces.
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