AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05632927
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: December 27, 1985

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Intelligence
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Africa Review
27 December 1985
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27 December 1985
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Africa Review
27 December 1985
Page
Articles South Africa�Zimbabwe: Rising Tensions
Relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe have become
increasingly strained following a series of landmine attacks in
November and December near their common border by ANC
guerrillas operating from Zimbabwe.
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South Africa: Talks With the African National Congress
The ANC has scored major propaganda victories as a result of
meetings with white South African politicians, businessmen,
students, and black clerics in neighboring states.
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South Africa: Opposition to Conscription
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The End Conscription Campaign, an affiliate of the multiracial
antiapartheid United Democratic Front, has many sympathetic
followers, but Pretoria's flexible conscientious objector policy is
likely to siphon off serious opposition to conscription.
South Africa: Emigration Growing
Emigration from South Africa during July and August exceeded
immigration for the first time since 1978�a result, we believe, of
the current political and economic uncertainties in the country.
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Somalia: Uncertain Prospects Toward Economic Reform
Somalia made limited progress toward improving its ailing economy
in 1985, but major problems remain. Chief among these are a
growing external debt, continued high balance-of-payments deficits,
and slippages in implementing the 1985 IMF reform package.
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Ivory Coast: An Apolitical Military
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Despite a history of military coups in West Africa, the traditionally
apolitical Ivorian military would be likely to intercede only in the
event of a prolonged, destabilizing struggle to succeed the
octogenarian President Houphouet-Boigny.
Swaziland: Prince Ousted
The fall of Prince Mfansibili from the leadership of the Liqoqo
marks the latest event in a struggle for power that has plagued the
Kingdom of Swaziland since the death in 1982 of King Sobhuza.
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Briefs South Africa: Few Incidents of Vigilantism
Mauritius: Weakened Governing Coalition
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Niger: Political Infighting
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis, NR
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Articles
South Africa�Zimbabwe:
Rising Tensions
Relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe have
become increasingly strained following a series of
landmine attacks in November and December near
their common border by African National Congress
(ANC) guerrillas operating from Zimbabwe.
Officially, Harare does not allow ANC military
activity from its territory but finds it difficult to
control. Despite bellicose public posturing by Pretoria
and Harare, both governments are maintaining
private contacts and assuring the other of their desire
to avoid escalating the crisis. Nevertheless, the
situation along the border remains tense. Pretoria's
patience is wearing thin and, in our judgment,
additional ANC activity from Zimbabwe will provoke
South African retaliation against Harare.
Border Problems
The ANC has claimed publicly its responsibility for
the landmine explosions, which occurred just inside
South Africa's border with Zimbabwe and killed
seven people and injured 12. The first of six separate
incidents occurred on 26 November in the Weipe
area, about 35 miles west of the town of Messina, in
South Africa's northern Transvaal Province,
according to press reports. The last�and most
deadly�explosion happened on 15 December, killing
six whites, four of them small children.
Despite the ANC claim that the mines were placed by
its units operating inside South Africa, Zimbabwean
Government officials are convinced that the ANC has
been mounting operations from Zimbabwean
territory, according to US Embassy reporting.
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African National Congress Activity in Zimbabwe
To avoid provoking Pretoria, official Zimbabwean
Government policy is to prohibit African National
Congress members from carrying weapons or using
Zimbabwean territory to infiltrate South Africa. In
addition, Harare tries to closely monitor the group's
presence in the country. Despite these measures,
however, the ANC has managed to increase its
activity in Zimbabwe during the past several years:
� The US Embassy reports that the ANC continues
to operate a number of transit facilities and
safehouses in both the Harare and Bulawayo areas.
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public comments as a necessary "political" response
to Pretoria's statements. He also conceded that ANC
infiltrators have and could pass through Zimbabwe on
their way to South Africa.
Talking Tough
In the wake of the explosions, Pretoria publicly
charged that the ANC guerrillas responsible were
seen crossing into Zimbabwe and demanded that
Harare take immediate measures to prevent any
further such incidents. In late November Pretoria
announced that it would begin replacing its police on
border duty with regular Army troops,' and South
Africa's Defense Minister warned Zimbabwe that
Pretoria would "take action against terrorists
wherever they were hiding."
The Zimbabwean Government continues to deny any
complicity in the landmine explosions and has
reiterated its official policy of not allowing its
territory to be used as a springboard for attacks
against neighboring states. At the same time, Prime
Minister Mugabe has charged Pretoria with
deploying commando units along the border, and
Minister for State Security Munangagwa has accused
South Africa of preparing to invade Zimbabwe.
Quiet Actions
Despite hostile rhetoric on both sides, Pretoria and
Harare appear to want to defuse the crisis and prevent
a further souring of relations.
The
US Embassy reports that liaison channels continue to
work effectively, and Munangagwa characterized his
' In our view, the decision to replace police with Army personnel
was most likely made prior to the landmine incidents and follows an
earlier decision to withdraw police from the operational area in
northern Namibia to reinforce police battling the domestic unrest.
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Prospects
Most Zimbabwean officials probably believe that
South Africa will strike at ANC personnel and
facilities in Zimbabwe in the near future. In our
judgment, however, South Africa is likely to refrain
from taking retaliatory action until it has first
exhausted its political and economic options with
Harare. Nevertheless, the killing of six whites in the
15 December incident probably will force Pretoria to
retaliate against the ANC, most likely in Zambia,
Lesotho, or Botswana, and further increase Harare's
worries. By using this type of leverage, Pretoria
probably hopes to force Harare to crack down on
ANC guerrillas in Zimbabwe and thereby remove the
threat of South African reprisals. If, however, ANC
operations continue to be mounted from Zimbabwe,
we believe South Africa would not hesitate to act
militarily.
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The Zimbabwean military, in our judgment, would
not provide a credible deterrent to South African
cross-border operations against ANC targets in
Zimbabwe. If the South African military did strike
into Zimbabwe, Mugabe could be forced to appeal to
Moscow for specialized military assistance�
especially air defense assets�to counter Pretoria.
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South Africa: Talks With the
African National Congress
The African National Congress (ANC) has scored
major propaganda victories as a result of meetings
with white South African politicians, businessmen,
students, and black clerics in neighboring states.
Despite South African President Botha's
condemnation of those talking with the allegedly
"Communist-controlled terrorist organization," the
ANC leadership has been lauded by the participants
in the meetings and by some sectors of the South
African media as intelligent and moderate. The talks
have increased domestic and international pressures
on the government to hold its own talks with the
group. Many observers believe the ANC must be
included in any South African political solution. The
ANC, meanwhile, remains committed to its military
campaign, highlighted by recent bombings near the
Zimbabwean border, and has called on blacks to carry
the struggle into white areas.
Business Leads the Way
Liberal businessmen�primarily English speaking�
have become outspoken advocates of reform and have
urged the government to negotiate with credible black
leaders. Leaders of several of South Africa's largest
corporations took part in the informal discussions with
ANC Acting President Oliver Tambo and other
senior members of the ANC last September in
Zambia. The businessmen characterized the attitudes
of the ANC officials as moderate and realistic. One
participant told the press that the ANC was under no
illusion that the South African Government was
about to collapse. In addition, he said that the quality
of ANC leadership was far above the level of black
leaders within South Africa. The businessmen were
not convinced, however, that an acceptable solution to
the country's problems required ANC participation.
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Officials of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), the
official opposition party in the white chamber of
parliament, met next with the ANC in October.
The ANC had earlier
attacked PFP participation in the new parliament,
which includes Coloreds and Indians but excludes
blacks, and the PFP's close relationship with
KwaZulu homeland chief Buthelezi. The politicians
were nonetheless impressed by the ANC's insights on
the South African scene and its good will.
The PFP participants went so far as to accept publicly
the necessity of the ANC's armed struggle to
eliminate apartheid. Despite this concession, however,
the ANC leadership apparently considered the
meeting a failure.
All the two
sides could agree on was the possibility of another
meeting.
The government prevented a group of college students
from traveling to Lusaka in October by denying them
passports. This action drew criticism even from the
normally progovernment Afrikaner press. Pretoria
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also warned several church leaders that they might be
arrested if they attempted to hold talks with the
ANC. The government did not act, however, when
students and churchmen subsequently held informal
talks with members of the ANC and its smaller rival,
the Pan-Africanist Congress, at a World Council of
Churches' meeting in Harare in December. Following
the meeting, the students and clerics claimed that the
government was to blame for the ANC's turn to
violence and that Botha should engage in meaningful
negotiations with the group.
Outlook
By meeting with South African groups, the ANC
succeeded in its strategy of further isolating Pretoria
domestically and internationally, and it is likely to
continue such meetings. It is unlikely, however, that
Pretoria will agree to open-ended political talks with
the group unless it renounces the use of violence.
Recent bombings near the Zimbabwean border and in
Durban that killed 13 white civilians�including
young children�will harden white attitudes against
the ANC and counter attempts by the group to
portray itself to South African opinionmakers as the
unwilling participant in a war directed by the Botha
government.
The ANC has set its own preconditions to talks with
the government. According to press sources it has
demanded:
� The release of jailed ANC President Nelson
Mandela and other political prisoners.
� The removal of troops from the townships, and the
lifting of the state of emergency.
� The lifting of the ban on the ANC and political
activity.
The release of Mandela would dramatically improve
the climate for dialogue. ANC leaders emphasized to
both businessmen and the PFP the importance they
attach to Mandela's release.
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South Africa:
Opposition to Conscription
The End Conscription Campaign, an affiliate of the
multiracial antiapartheid United Democratic Front,
was formed early this year to oppose South Africa's
compulsory national military service. This small but
vocal organization�mostly made up of white,
educated, and affluent English speakers�has many
sympathetic followers, but we believe South Africa's
flexible conscientious objector policy will continue to
siphon off serious opposition to conscription.
Opposition to compulsory military service and the
"militarization of South African society" has
widespread appeal among young South Africans,
churches, and some business sectors, according to the
The End Conscription
Campaign reportedly obtained about 1 million
signatures on a petition to end the draft, and
applications for religious objector status have
increased by 35 percent this year, according to press
reports.
Police have detained some members, but, in our view,
Pretoria has shown no signs of serious concern over
the group's activities. A statement by the group in
September that the number of men failing to register
for military service had dramatically increased to
more than 7,500 since the Army entered the
townships was met by a rapid and detailed denial by
the military and a brief crackdown on the
organization's leadership, according to press reports.
which is one of a handful o white
antigovernment organizations, receives media
attention out of proportion to its influence.
The group's efforts to stir active opposition to
conscription have been hampered, in our view, by
broad provisions in South Africa's national service
commitment laws that provide alternatives to the two-
year military service requirement. Political objectors
to conscription are prosecuted and sentenced to prison
terms. Conscientious objectors, however, are
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categorized by the degree of their religious objection:
some will wear a uniform but not carry a gun, others
want no association with the military. They serve
various lengths of alternative duty�from two to six
years of noncombatant service to six years of
community service and annual periods in government
camps. The Board of Religious Objection, which
handles applications, has been lenient since it was
formed in 1983,
Out of 334 decisions between December 1983 and
June 1985, only four applications were rejected,
according to press reports.
Outlook
Because of South Africa's flexible application of
conscientious objector policies, we believe the End
Conscription Campaign will not gain a large, active
following of political objectors sufficient to cause
serious concern in the military or threaten troop
morale. Neither draft evasion nor desertion from the
military appears to have increased, and the group
apparently has little support in the Afrikaner
community. Its popularity could increase, however, if
continued black unrest forces a prolonged
commitment of conscripts in the townships. This
remains a possibility because Pretoria announced
recently that the military has been granted broad
police powers in areas not under the state of
emergency.
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South Africa: Migration
Number of Persons
5000,
4500-
4000 -
3500
3000-
2500-
2000-
1500-
1000 -
500-
0
(�'N
Immigration
Ert_liaration
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1981 1982
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1983 1984 1985 1986
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South Africa:
Emigration Growing
Emigration from South Africa during July and
August exceeded immigration for the first time since
1978, according to South African Government
figures. A net population loss of 631 for the two
months is a result of a 50-percent fall in immigration
and a 60-percent rise in emigration over the same
period last year. Historical data indicate that a
similar pattern of net population loss occurred during
other periods of unrest�after the Sharpeville riots in
1960 and during the two years following the Soweto
shootings in 1976.
Although the current unrest has touched few whites
directly, we believe political and economic
uncertainties probably have combined to encourage
emigration. The economy is expected to decline by
about 2 percent this year and most forecasts indicate
growth next year will be only 2 to 3 percent. Record
high taxes and persistent double-digit inflation have
reduced consumer buying power, making employment
opportunities outside the country more attractive for
professionals with marketable skills. In a recent
survey of 500 whites, 12 percent said it was likely or
fairly likely they would emigrate within the next 10
years.
While domestic economic recession is encouraging
emigration, South Africa's international financial
woes, ironically, probably are acting to restrain it.
South African law permits an emigrant to take
100,000 rand from the country, but at the current
depressed exchange rate this amounts to only about
$30,000�an effective deterrent to well-paid
professionals who have accumulated assets.
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Economic Impact
Professional and technical workers comprised the
largest category of emigrants, according to
government statistics. Immigrants, mostly unskilled
labor, are not replacing them, however, raising
concerns about a possible brain drain of technical
talent. In commencement speeches at a major
university recently, school officials appealed to the
new graduates to defy the crisis of confidence and
remain in South Africa.
Industry representatives already are concerned that
the country's shortage of technical workers�
particularly engineers�will hamper high-technology
undertakings, including the country's drive toward
energy self-sufficiency. A continued brain drain of the
already limited number of skilled white workers also
would further erode South Africa's international
competitiveness at a time of foreign economic
sanctions and creditor demands for debt repayment.
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Somalia: Uncertain Prospects
Toward Economic Reform
Somalia made limited progress toward improving its
ailing economy in 1985, but major problems remain.
Chief among these are a growing external debt,
continued high balance-of-payments deficits, and
slippages in implementing the 1985 IMF reform
package. Although the stabilization effort continues,
Somalia's enthusiasm for economic reform in 1986
probably will be tempered by continuing opposition
from many of President Siad's supporters in the
government and military. Siad's overtures to Libya
and the Soviet Union have netted him only limited
assistance thus far. In the end, we believe Siad�
despite mounting political opposition�will come to
terms with the IMF in 1986 to avoid jeopardizing
essential Western and Arab aid.
Background to the 1985 Reform Program
The Somali economy has not recovered from the
severe drought of 1974-75 and the Ogaden war with
Ethiopia in 1977-78. The war prompted a steady flow
of refugees into Somalia and an end to Soviet
financial and technical assistance. To counter these
problems, Mogadishu substantially increased
government expenditures in 1978 and 1979 while
foreign grants declined, leading to high budget
deficits. Government bank borrowing to finance these
deficits pushed the inflation rate higher and widened
the current account deficit.
Mogadishu undertook some reforms to accommodate
IMF standby arrangements in the period 1981-83, but
heavy borrowing kept current account deficits high.
Efforts to establish a medium-term economic program
in late 1983 and early 1984 were abruptly postponed,
and Siad rejected a new IMF agreement in reaction to
pressure from his supporters who stood to lose
financially if effective reform measures were enacted.
The combined effects of a failing stabilization effort,
a Saudi Arabian ban on livestock imports from
Somalia because of disease, and the fallout from the
1983-84 drought brought Mogadishu's economic and
financial situation to crisis proportions in 1984. The
inflation rate topped 90 percent (three times the
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average of 1981-83), the budget deficit (including
grants) increased from 3.3 percent of GDP in 1983 to
6.9 percent in 1984, and the balance-of-payments
situation worsened drastically.
The Program
Siad introduced an ambitious reform package in
January 1985, along with another IMF standby
agreement, in response to mounting economic
pressures. The acute economic deterioration in 1984,
and assurances of increased foreign aid flows,
probably weighed heavily in overcoming his critics'
objections to reform. The new package aimed to
increase economic growth from 2.3 percent in 1984 to
4 percent in 1985, to dampen inflation from 92
percent in 1984 to 20 percent in 1985, and to reverse
the balance-of-payments deficit from $139 million in
1984 to a surplus of $18 million.
The linchpin of the program was a devaluation of the
Somali shilling. The government allowed the shilling
to float for most private foreign exchange transactions
and devalued the official rate from about 4 to 3 US
cents per shilling. The government also eliminated
most controls on trade and payments and the licenses
for most import and export transactions.
The program also targeted fiscal and monetary
improvements. It sought a substantial rise in tax
revenue by applying the market exchange rate for
certain transactions and by liberalizing imports. The
government undertook to reduce the civil-service
sector and to strengthen controls on expenditures.
Limited Successes and Deep Problems
The economic reform efforts have achieved mixed
results. Despite a shortfall in government revenue,
Somalia probably came close to meeting targets set
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for the budget deficit and for banking system credit to
the government, according to IMF data and Embassy
reporting. Although inflation is still in excess of IMF
targets, it is down by more than one-half to about 40
percent, according to IMF estimates. Exports were
expected to increase by 60 percent because of
favorable weather conditions over the past year,
efforts to diversify export markets, and the lifting of
the Saudi ban on noncattle livestock. Furthermore,
real GDP will come close to government targets and
grow by about 4 percent during 1985, according to
IMF estimates.
Despite these modest gains, difficulties remain.
External debt is mounting steadily�to an estimated
$1.5 billion�and balance-of-payments problems
persist. The IMF projects a $68 million balance-of-
payments deficit for 1985, due in part to lower-than-
expected exports and aid donor receipts, and high debt
servicing requirements. External arrears totaled an
estimated $61.3 million for 1985, according to the
Embassy, up from a previous IMF estimate of $27
million. Mogadishu also has fallen behind in its
repayments to the IMF
Exchange rate adjustment continued to be a major
issue of contention between the Fund and Mogadishu
in 1985. The government ceased making monthly
adjustments to the official rate in mid-May, leaving
the official rate at 2 cents per Somali shilling, while
the free market rate has hovered at just over 1 cent.
The government continues to resist unification with
the market rate because it not only fears the potential
negative effects on the exchange rate, the budget, and
inflation, but also because it is unwilling to lose
control over foreign exchange and the benefits of the
cheap official rate, according to the Embassy. The
two sides have yet to reach an agreement on when or
if unification will take place.
Mogadishu continues to avoid taking effective steps to
reform government-owned businesses. Under the 1985
program, the Somalis were to classify existing public
enterprises into three categories: those to be phased
out of operation, those to be privatized or converted
into joint ventures, and those to remain in the public
sector. According to the US Embassy, however, the
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Somalis dragged their feet on replying�probably
fearing losses of patronage and control�and are
attempting to keep in the public sector all businesses
that benefit top Somali officials and their friends and
relatives.
Disappointed Expectations of Western Aid
Siad launched the 1985 program with the hope that
the IMF, the United States, and other donors would
quickly come to his aid. He has come under increased
criticism from senior government and party officials
over the past year, however, for failing to acquire
enough amounts of Western assistance to reverse the
country's economic and military decline, despite
adopting reforms and providing the United States
with military access,
The critics say the economy has not benefited
appreciably from the partial dismantling of the
regime's socialist economic structure and the military
has grown weaker. Those officials who opposed the
1983-84 reform program and IMF agreement, and
profited from the corruption the previous system
allowed, are again pressing Siad to reimpose socialist
economic policies.
To counter mounting criticism, Siad is seeking to
improve relations with the Soviet Union and Libya in
hopes of gaining additional aid and limiting military
and political support for Somali dissidents. At the
same time, he has become increasingly critical of
Western donors, particularly the United States but
also the IMF, blaming their "stinginess" for
Somalia's economic and military woes. So far, Libya
has provided some $20 million for a joint agricultural
project, but the Soviets have replied to his overtures
with political conditions that are unacceptable to
Siad, according to US officials. He may believe,
however, that his renewed contacts with Moscow and
Tripoli will give him some leverage in the difficult
negotiations over Western aid and Somali economic
reform in 1986.
Outlook
We believe that Mogadishu's commitment to reforms
is far from certain but judge that Siad is well aware
that the economic crisis will worsen if he does not take
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some action. The country's underlying structural
deficiencies�a resource gap stemming from a level of
consumption exceeding domestic production, high
import dependence in combination with few export
products and markets, and low productivity of
investment�will probably persist for many years
despite reform, requiring continued foreign assistance
to keep the economy afloat. Unrescheduled debt
service for 1986, including arrears, will be $224
million, almost twice the projected level of exports
($130 million) for the year, according to the Embassy.
Siad probably will face increasing pressure to reject
an IMF stabilization package in 1986, especially if
donor assistance continues to fall below Somali
expectations. More government leaders, however,
have become increasingly aware of the seriousness of
the economic situation and the need for an IMF
agreement, according to the Embassy. We believe
Siad�with little viable alternative�will accept an
IMF agreement to promote the flow of aid from
Western and moderate Arab sources, but will try to
test the tolerance of the IMF to hold him to the
unification of the official exchange rate, the full
payment of arrears, and other reforms. We concur
with the Embassy assessment that the Somalis,
fearing the potential economic consequences, are less
likely to enter an agreement if the IMF insists on a
unified foreign exchange rate rather than on a
modified dual system.
We believe Siad will persist in his criticism of the
West to counter his domestic critics and will seek
ways to mitigate the effects of the adjustment on his
favorite supporters. We do not believe Siad will risk a
break with the West, however, given Somalia's strong
need for economic and military aid and the low
probability that the Soviet Union and Libya will
respond sufficiently to his overtures.
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Last fall,
the
over
the possibility that another Bete might replace the
NR retiring Army Chief of Staff. also
notes a nascent undercurrent of unrest among some
junior officers from the north dissatisfied with what
they view as the inequitable distribution of wealth in
favor of southern tribes during Houphouet's reign.
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Grumbling Over Austerity. The country's relatively
prosperous economy and the government's attention
to the military's operational needs have, in our
judgment, nurtured the apolitical and stable position
of the armed forces. The Army now has a vested
interest in the system because the President has
created some lucrative opportunities for many officers
to augment their incomes in businesses, agriculture,
real estate, and state-owned enterprises, according to
for example, Houphouet
excluded the military from major deductions in
housing allowances for government employees.
Despite evidence this year that the economy has
stabilized after five years of decline, the government
continues to operate under an IMF-recommended
recovery program.
some officers believe military support for the political
system will fall if austerity measures reduce each
service's capability to perform minimum national
security functions.
Although the government's 1985 operating
budget increased defense expenditures by 1 percent�
maintaining the military's 7-percent share of the
country's economic pie�real buying power decreased
by 1 percent,
"that cuts in government spending
recently prevented the armed forces from purchasing
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Lack of Advancement.
lack of opportunities to
advance to command positions is a continuing source
of frustration among junior officers, who believe a
reduction in senior officer tenure is overdue. Despite
Houphouet's policy of absorbing senior officers into
civilian jobs, junior officer promotions are often
delayed by the meager military budget, sometimes
forcing them to fill positions normally occupied by
higher grade officers. In August
In their view, a steady salary, self-enrichment,
and personal favors, not professionalism or patriotism,
were the primary motivating factors among junior
officers.
French Role in the Military
The French presence and influence in Ivory Coast are
probably greater than in any other Sub-Saharan
African state. France stations a 450-man marine
infantry battalion there under the provisions of the
1961 Defense Accord, which provides for France to
assist in the defense of the country in the event of
external attack and to evacuate French and Western
citizens if threatened. In addition, this force is
responsible for evacuating the President�either to
the 43rd French Marine Base at Port Bouet or out of
the country, during a terrorist incident or coup
attempt�and assisting him in retaining control.
are attached to the various services, and some hold
significant positions within the Ivorian military
establishment�French officers, for example,
command the Presidential security services and the
Bouake Airbase. France conducted a major joint
exercise with Ivory Coast in November 1984, which
included 2,000 French military personnel, aircraft,
and ground units, and a sea exercise was conducted
from January to March 1985, with seven French ships
calling at the port of Abidjan.
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Swaziland: Prince Ousted
After months of manuevering behind the scenes, a
coalition of royal family members and government
leaders has successfully wrested political control from
Prince Mfansibili, leader of the influential 15-
member advisory body known as the Liqoqo.
Mfansibili's fall marks the latest event in a struggle
for power that has plagued the Kingdom of Swaziland
since the death of King Sobhuza in 1982.
Mfansibili's Decline
Prince Mfansibili was dismissed, as was George
Msibi, his chief ally in the Liqoqo, and Police
Commissioner Simelane,
Their removal was successful, in part,
because the Prince had lost much of his political
influence. The Liqoqo, which had overshadowed the
Queen Regent's authority, had become divided as a
result of infighting between Mfansibili and Msibi,
according to US Embassy reporting. A further
indication of the Prince's decline was his absence from
public ceremonies for the Crown Prince. In addition,
the Lisango�an advisory organization made up of
the late King's sons and other senior princes who
opposed Mfansibili's political maneuvering and
questionable business deals�was granted broadened
authority and countered the Liqoqo.
The Queen Regent is the nominal ruler until Crown Prince
Makhosetive, 17, assumes the throne. US Embassy reporting
indicates that the crown prince's coronation will take place on 25
April 1986. Queen Regent Ntombi will serve as comonarch
following Makhosetive's coronation, in accordance with Swazi
tradition.
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About half
the Cabinet supported Mfansibili's departure because
the Prince planned to replace several Cabinet
members with individuals loyal to him, according to
US Embassy reporting.
The removal of Mfansibili, Misibi, and Simelane met
no opposition from the security forces. Simelane, an
Mfansibili appointee, did not have the support of the
officers and rank-and-file police. Moreover, the Swazi
Defense Force Commander remained neutral, in line
with his traditional stand of not getting involved in the
political machinations of the royal family, according
to US Embassy sources.
Outlook
Although the coalition was strong enough to remove
Mfansibili from power, it may lack enough cohesion
to take over fully. The failure to implement quickly
several measures suggests some indecisiveness on the
part of the new leaders. In any case, Mfansibili's
successors, as well as the Crown Prince, who is
expected to be coronated in April, will continue
Swaziland's pro-Western stance and its moderate
domestic policies that were fixed by the late King.
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ALA AR 85-028
27 December 1985
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Secret
Africa
Briefs
South Africa Few Incidents of Vigilantism
Vigilantism in South Africa remains well below expected levels despite 15 months
of black unrest. Purchases of firearms by whites have increased dramatically since
the unrest began, according to press reports, but white vigilantism generally has
been limited to sporadic incidents of individual whites acting to protect their
property or themselves against mob attacks. White residents of Kraaifontein in
Cape Province formed a "civil unit," but there have been no reports of vigilante
action by the group, presumably because of stern government warnings. The police
apparently are more tolerant of nonwhite vigilantism. According to press reports,
vigilante groups have been formed by residents of two black townships�one in
Cape Province and one in Orange Free State Province�to combat unrest and
rampant crime, in both cases operating with the knowledge and support of police.
The government of the nominally independent Ciskei homeland has called on
township residents to form vigilante groups to combat antiapartheid protest.
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Secret
ALA AR 85-028
27 December 1985
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Secret
Mauritius Weakened Governing Coalition
Prime Minister Aneerood Jugnauth's moderate three-party governing coalition,
the Alliance, lost decisively to the leftwing opposition Mauritian Militant
Movement (MMM) in municipal elections in December, a defeat that probably
damages the coalition's prospects for the general elections to be held by 1988. The
MMM swept all five urban municipalities. The Alliance had touted the elections
as a referendum on successful government efforts to improve the economy and
create jobs, but US Embassy reporting indicates that the Alliance alienated voters
by soliciting support only from the majority Hindu ethnic group�the coalition's
chief constituency. On the other hand, the MMM broadened its appeal among the
smaller Muslim, Asian, and Creole communities in the urban areas. The
government also probably lost votes by attacking rather than attempting to co-opt
its chief contender for the Hindu vote, the pro-West Mauritian Labor Party
(MLP), led by a former coalition partner and Jugnauth's rival, Satcam Boole11.
The Embassy reports that MLP supporters probably cost the Alliance a victory in
at least one municipality. In addition, the decision to withhold end-of-year bonuses
to civil servants, most of whom live in the municipalities, also probably hurt the
Alliance. Despite its electoral losses, the Alliance will retain some leverage over
the opposition through government control over municipal budgets.
The death this month of independence leader and first Prime Minister Sir
Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, a Hindu, will have, in our view, a more profound
impact on the Alliance's prospects in the general elections. Ramgoolam, widely
revered as the "Grand Old Man" of Mauritian politics, supported Jugnauth as the
leader of the strongest Hindu party and had worked with both Jugnauth and MLP
leader Boole11 for a reconciliation to ensure a united governing Hindu party.
Without Ramgoolam's influence, unity between Jugnauth and Boole11 will be
difficult to achieve, and the Hindu vote is likely to remain divided, bolstering the
leftist opposition in the general elections.
Niger Political Infighting
Niger's Supreme Military Council recently blocked a move by President Kountche
to remove several influential members from the ruling body. Kountche hoped to
replace over half of these members�entrenched senior military officers and
regionally powerful prefects�with younger officers loyal to him, according to the
US Embassy. The Council's opposition marks its first major challenge to
Kountche's authority since the group was formed in 1974 following Kountche's
successful coup. According to Embassy reports, the President was surprised by the
setback, which follows a Cabinet reshuffle and administration reorganization last
fall aimed at strengthening his hand in carrying out tough economic measures.
Kountche's unsuccessful bid to reorganize the Council may have set the stage for
future confrontations. The Council may now want to play a more active role and
could complicate Kountche's efforts to follow through on economic reform.
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