AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05632910
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: May 17, 1985

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Africa Review
17 May 1985
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17 May 1985
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Africa Review
17 May 1985
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Page
Articles South Africa: Roots of Unrest in the Eastern Cape
Uncoordinated confrontations between blacks and police patrols in
recent weeks have led to an escalation of the violence that has been
endemic throughout the Eastern Cape for many years.
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Mozambique: Counterinsurgency Strategy
Maputo's new comprehensive program to counter the RENAMO
insurgents could improve the government's prospects over the longer
term, but provides immediate benefits for President Machel by
closing splits within the regime and reducing the potential for a
coup.
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Burundi: Disturbing Trends
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President Bagaza's obsessive security concerns have resulted in
policies that are heightening ethnic tensions, widening divisions
within the regime, and delaying needed economic reform.
Briefs
Angola: Central Committee Meeting
New Ambassador to Cuba
Zaire-Cuba: Cautious Relations
Niger-Libya: Support for Dissident Group
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, NR
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
Articles
South Africa:
Roots of Unrest in
the Eastern Cape
Violence had been endemic throughout the Eastern
Cape since long before the killing of 19 blacks on 21
March by a police patrol in the black township of the
industrial city of Uitenhage. In 1977, "black
consciousness" leader Steve Biko was beaten to death
in the Eastern Cape while in police custody. In 1980,
the police acknowledged their involvement in the
death of another Eastern Cape black leader who was
also in their custody by paying compensation to his
widow. Between 1977 and 1984, episodic community
and labor violence took scores of lives and closed
schools and industrial plants for months in Port
Elizabeth. (b)(3) NatSecAct
In the past few weeks, violence has escalated,
especially in the black townships of Port Elizabeth
and Uitenhage, in a series of uncoordinated
confrontations between blacks and South African
police patrols. According to Minister of Law and
Order Louis Le Grange, approximately 100 blacks
have died in the Eastern Cape since 21 March, and
property damage has exceeded $25 million. As both
press and Embassy accounts point out in graphic
detail, most of the attacks have been directed against
black employees of the South African Government�
policemen, minor bureaucrats, and members of local
councils�and their families.(b)(3) NatSecAct
Almost immediately following the Uitenhage
incident, Pretoria backstopped the police in Port
Elizabeth with units of the South African Defense
Forces. Since then, Army and Air Force units have
cooperated with the police in joint operations in the
five townships of Port Elizabeth. Management of the
security forces is almost certainly under the direction
of the Eastern Cape Joint Management Center, which
coordinates the local security responsibilities of the
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(b)(3) NatSecAct;
Army, the police, and other public services. The Joint
Management Centers�nine were established in the
early 1980s�operate under the aegis of the Cabinet
and the State Security Council as part of a National
Security Management System.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
A Tradition of Resistance
The eastern segment of Cape Province between the
industrial city of Port Elizabeth and the Kei River is
the heartland of the Xhosa people and the historic
stronghold of popular support for the African
National Congress (ANC). The Eastern Cape was the
scene of protracted African resistance to white
authority in the 19th ' century and the center of ANC
activity against the Nationalist government in the
1950s.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
The present generation of ANC leaders, including
imprisoned President Nelson Mandela and Acting
President Oliver Tambo were reared and educated in
the Eastern Cape. Beyond the primarily Xhosa-
speaking townships of Cape Town, the ANC
"defiance campaign" of the 1950s had its greatest
successes in the Eastern Cape. Although it went into
decline in the Eastern Cape in the 1960s as a result of
the government's efforts to suppress it, the ANC
maintained its near-legendary reputation as the leader
of black resistance. (b)(3) NatSecAct
'It was the Xhosa�rather than the Zulus�who gave the
Afrikaner voortrekers and the British military the greatest
difficulty in establishing white authority. In nine frontier wars from
the 1790s to the 1870s, the Xhosa-speaking Mfengu, Thembu,
Ngqika, and Gceleka tribes contested white domination. South
African anthropologists have noted recently that the story of their
resistance is still the subject of oral history and
legend'i(b)(3) NatSecAct
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Following the riots in Soweto in 1976, black
opposition to the Nationalist government in the region
crystallized over the issues of citizenship and
resettlement:
� Pretoria's decision to grant "independence" to the
Transkei in 1976 and to the Ciskei in 1981 stripped
4.2 million Xhosa of their South African
citizenship.
� The forced resettlement of Xhosa from urban and
rural "black spots" affected almost every black
family in the Eastern Cape. According to
demographic statistics published by the University
of Cape Town, over 400,000 blacks were resettled in
the Ciskei and Transkei between 1965 and 1980. At
Thornhill in the Ciskei, 50,000 were resettled on
white farms that previously had supported 17 white
families.
� The living conditions of those resettled deteriorated:
in the Ciskei, infant mortality climbed to over 250
per thousand, more than twice the figure for blacks
living in urban areas.
Black trade unions in the Eastern Cape in the late
1970s developed in the automobile, tire, construction,
and service industries. Union leaders in the black
townships of Port Elizabeth, East London, and
Kingwilliamstown played a key role in the formation
of civic associations, which remain the most credible
black political organizations.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Eastern Cape
was the scene of labor and political violence on a
massive scale:
� Strikes affected South African and multinational
plants, raising the political consciousness of workers
at a time when the area's major industry�motor
vehicles and parts�was retrenching. Economic
recession forced the merger of two major car
companies�one of which was Ford�leading to
more than 2,000 layoffs last year, but black unions
were able to win concessions from several
automobile and tire companies.
� School boycotts closed black schools in all black
townships in Port Elizabeth, East London,
Kingwilliamstown, Craddock, and Grahamstown in
1980 and 1981. Students and their supporters killed
three Ciskeian policemen as well as "informers" and
"sellouts" in a series of riots in 1981.
� School and transportation boycotts repeatedly led to
violent confrontations. We believe that the handling
of these disturbances by the police and local black
authorities radicalized many younger blacks,
effectively making them the "shock troops" of the
current violence.
The ANC developed its covert politico-military
presence in the Eastern Cape in the early 1980s, when
ANC militants traveled from Lesotho and through
the Transkei into the townships of Port Elizabeth and
East London. Between 1979 and 1982, the ANC
carried out approximately 15 attacks in the region.
Following a raid by the South African Defense Forces
on ANC premises in Lesotho in late 1982, however,
insurgent activity dried up.
Black Politics and the Street
We believe that the ANC has had only a minor role in
coordinating the recent unrest in the Eastern Cape,
although it has given wide publicity to the violence in
its international radiobroadcasts from Lusaka and
Addis Ababa.
The United Democratic Front, a multiracial national
coalition of opposition political organizations, has
organized funerals for the victims of the 21 March
shootings, conducted massive protest meetings, and,
according to US Embassy reporting, instigated
attacks in early May against leaders of the Azanian
People's Organization�a "black consciousness"
organization�that left several dead. We agree with
the US Embassy's opinion that the detention of top
front officials in April has exacerbated the situation
by removing any effective leadership of that
organization.
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The trade unions in the Eastern Cape, which
conducted a generally successful three-day
"stayaway" in Port Elizabeth in mid-March, prior to
the incident at Uitenhage, have become increasingly
divided on ideological and tactical issues in the past
two months. We would concur with a recent US
Embassy assessment that the trade unions have
become irrelevant in the present politics of the street.
The black townships of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage
are in anarchy, according to the press and the US
Embassy. Most of the killings since 21 March have
been the product of mob action directed against
unpopular officials, although in a number of cases
innocent bystanders have been burned or lynched.
Furthermore, a wide variety of US Embassy contacts
in the black community agree that much of the
violence is largely unfocused and undirected,
frequently carried out by youngsters in their teens.
The Threat of White Backlash
Recent US diplomatic reporting indicates that the
white community in the Eastern Cape is beginning to
feel threatened. Last month, a black mob attacked
two whites and�according to the press�set one of
them on fire. We believe such violence has increased
the likelihood of a serious white backlash.
An Afrikaner political scientist recently told US
diplomats that the recent black-white violence had
intensified anti�National Party sentiment in the white
community, causing defections to rightwing
opposition parties. The chairman of the Transvaal
branch of the Conservative Party told US diplomats
last month the party would benefit from the
government's handling of the situation, a prediction
apparently supported by the party's strong showing in
an Orange Free State byelection on 1 May, where it
received over 40 percent of the vote in a district
carried by the National Party without opposition in
1981.
Outlook
We believe that the Eastern Cape is going to be the
scene of violent unrest for the next several months at
least, but we doubt that it will pose a serious threat in
the near term to the white community or to the
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region's industrial infrastructure. In our view, the
longer the violence continues, the greater the chance
that white support for the ruling National Party will
be undermined. We believe that the National Party
will move forcefully to contain future violence, even at
the risk of considerable foreign protest over black
casualties, in part because a white backlash would
benefit the parties of the right�perhaps not only in
the Eastern Cape.
Escalating violence in the townships could undercut
Pretoria's ability to maintain control over the longer
term, however, particularly if the government is seen
to be unable to protect black officials. As a short-term
expedient, we expect Pretoria to expand black police
and police auxiliary units in the townships, perhaps
giving local black leaders control of these forces.
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Mozambique:
Counterinsurgency Strategy
Maputo hopes to implement a comprehensive
political, economic, and military program to counter
the insurgency of the Mozambique National
Resistance (RENAMO). Over time, the plan could
improve Maputo's prospects somewhat by providing
better policy guidance for officials and commanders
at all levels, but resource limitations probably will
preclude effective execution. For now, the main
beneficiary of the new plan of action is President
Machel. Because it is acceptable to both pro-Soviet
hardliners and moderates, the plan closes, at least
temporarily, splits among the ruling elites and reduces
the potential for a coup in Maputo.
The Mozambican Council of Ministers issued a
communique that announced the new strategy on 31
March, following a series of Politburo meetings and
sessions with provincial authorities. The communique
criticized unnamed senior officials for poor
management, corruption, and isolation from lower
levels of the party and government. It called for more
decentralized execution while acknowledging that
centralized planning of political, military, and
economic programs would still be done in Maputo.
The bureaucracy is to be streamlined, training
increased, and a system of regular inspections of
government operations instituted. Senior officials are
to reestablish links with government workers and the
people, and to allow local officials more authority.
Recent insurgent attacks on rural officials, however,
may blunt whatever additional plans Maputo has to
increase the government's presence in the countryside.
Three provincial officers were killed in a guerrilla
ambush 40 miles north of Maputo on 19 April, for
example, and a government representative died when
a UN relief project was overrun a week earlier in Tete
Province. Such attacks will make other officials
reluctant to leave the security of the cities and larger
towns.
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War Economy
The council's communique also declared that 1985
would mark Mozambique's transition to a "war
economy." It called for increasing agricultural
production to reduce food shortages that the
insurgents exploit by blaming the government. It also
stressed expanding exports to earn foreign exchange
desperately needed to pay for imports of military
supplies and other essential goods.
The council tied prospects for an enlarged food supply
to success at improving the productivity of small
private farmers. This is a reversal of Maputo's policy
established in 1977, which stressed communal
villages, cooperatives, and state farms rather than
family farmers. Since the Fourth Party Congress in
1983, however, the ruling Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique (FRELIMO) has moved away from
emphasis on Soviet-style agriculture. The Congress
called for aid to subsistence farmers, who were
producing about three-quarters of the food grown in
Mozambique despite receiving little official support.
We believe that FRELIMO changed its agricultural
policies in part because the government's efforts to
move and collectivize rural dwellers had alienated
many peasants and contributed to the growing rural
support for RENAMO.
Maputo has identified restoration of railways and
ports, and increased exploitation of Mozambique's
mineral resources, as the best ways to earn foreign
exchange, Although
Mozambique receives most of its development aid
from the West, Maputo recently concluded several
new agreements under which Moscow will provide
assistance in ship repair, fishing, reconstruction of
railroads and electrical lines, and the mining of coal
deposits in northwestern Mozambique.
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Military Expansion
In the area of military policy, the Council of Ministers
announced that the militia is to be expanded, trained,
and used in static defense. Statements by government
officials confirm that the militia is to replace
gradually soldiers now used to patrol the cities, who
will be freed for increased use in counterinsurgency
operations in the countryside. The US Embassy
believes that the militia also will be used for political
mobilization and to provide local security for
economic facilities.
Machel recently told a journalist that efforts to train
and arm a popular militia began in 1982. According
to the press, over 1,500 students and teachers in Beira
began the 17th running of a 45-day course of militia
training in December 1984. The militia may be
having trouble finding sufficient new members,
however, because the press also reports that press
gang methods have been used in Beira to gain
recruits.
Efforts to expand and invigorate the armed forces
seem most energetic in central Mozambique, where
the insurgents currently are most active and receive
the greatest popular support.' Machel visited central
Mozambique last month for several days of public
rallies and meetings with grassroots political
organizations. Press accounts indicate that Maputo
recently has used MIG-17 fighter-bombers against
insurgents in the central provinces.
Diplomatic Offensive
The council's communique made a special appeal for
continued international support. In doing so, it
thanked the Lusophone and Frontline African states,
the Organization of African Unity, Nonaligned
Movement, European Economic Community, and the
West for their assistance, but made no mention of the
Soviet Bloc. Foreign Minister Chissano and other
senior officials followed up the appeal with visits in
April to Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and
' Guerrilla attacks in the central provinces are more frequent and
aggressive than in the south, despite a recent upturn in insurgent
efforts to isolate Maputo. Whereas most incidents in the three
provinces around the capital are ambushes and raids by small
guerrilla units against civilian targets, larger guerrilla units farther
north are attacking military targets, including Mozambican Army
battalion bases.
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the Nonaligned Nations meeting in India. The
officials were seeking military aid, political support,
and help in sealing Mozambique's borders to prevent
supplies from reaching the insurgents
Maputo's diplomacy has paid dividends, although
probably not as great as the Mozambicans had hoped.
President Mugabe has announced that Zimbabwe will
send additional troops to Mozambique, and Dar es
Salaam has agreed to train more Mozambican
soldiers in Tanzania. Portugal and France have
provided some military training and nonlethal
assistance, and the United Kingdom may soon decide
to do so. Lisbon is considering ways to limit the
activities of insurgent spokesmen living there, and
South Africa and Mozambique have established an
office on their common border to coordinate efforts to
block arms deliveries to the insurgents as well as other
matters of mutual interest.
Outlook
The apparent Politburo consensus in support of the
new strategy lessens the potential for a coup in
Maputo, although it will contribute little of
immediate value to counter the insurgency. The
Council of Ministers had been split deeply as of
October 1984, according to the US Embassy, when
the left wing was highly critical of Machel's decision
to sign the Nkomati accord with South Africa. Since
then, Embassy sources have reported frequent rumors
of coup plotting by pro-Soviet hardliners or military
officers. Machel now
appears more confident and relaxed, probably because
the breach in the Politburo has been narrowed.
Machel has only bought time, however, because the
fragile consensus in Maputo could evaporate
is not seen on the battlefield.
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Burundi: Disturbing Trends
President Bagaza's nine-year-old regime�dominated
by the country's minority Tutsi ethnic group�has
become obsessed with security in the past year. His
concerns revolve primarily around fear of the Hutu
tribal majority and have led to some disturbing
developments that eventually could threaten his rule.
In our view, Bagaza has become politically isolated
and increasingly dependent for advice on family and
clan members�many of whom are poorly educated
and hold hardline negative attitudes toward ethnic
reconciliation, religious tolerance, and good relations
with the West. These trends have resulted in policies
that have heightened ethnic tensions, further
factionalized the government, and delayed needed
economic reform.
Although we believe Bagaza will remain in control,
his insecurity probably will lead him to rely
increasingly on his security apparatus to protect the
regime from perceived enemies, thereby aggravating
recent trends. In the near term, rival Tutsi clans
probably have the greatest potential for removing
Bagaza, but over the longer term a serious Hutu
opposition could form if Bagaza implements harsh
security measures, tougher economic austerity, and a
vigorous campaign against the influential Catholic
Church.
Roots of Ethnic Conflict
Since independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi
has been beset by political problems caused primarily
by the ethnic conflict between the large Hutu
majority and the powerful Tutsi minority that for
centuries has ruled in a feudal style over the Hutus.
Ethnic tensions reached a peak in 1972 when Hutu
dissidents killed nearly 1,000 Tutsis in an abortive
attempt to overthrow the Tutsi-dominated
government of former President Micombero. The
Tutsi-dominated Army responded with a sustained
campaign of selective genocide�killing over 100,000,
including virtually every educated or prominent Hutu
in Burundi.
President Bagaza
Camera Press 0
Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza took power in 1976 in a
bloodless coup, purging Micombero and his associates
from the government. Last July, he was elected to
another five-year term as president and head of
Burundi's only political party. Until recently, Bagaza
aggressively pushed a policy of ethnic reconciliation
by reducing the influence of the Tutsi-dominated
military, eliminating laws that discriminated against
Hutus, and appointing Hutus to several Cabinet posts
and to one-third of the ruling party's Central
Committee.
The underlying problems that led to the 1972 uprising
remain, however, as Tutsis control all important
political, economic, and military positions. Ethnic
tensions continue to permeate Burundi political life,
causing a national paranoia that divides Hutus and
Tutsis, Tutsis of different clans, religious
organizations and the state, and affects bilateral
relations with foreign countries.
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The Bagaza regime has become obsessed with
security during the past year primarily because of
fears that dissident Hutus would attempt to
embarrass the government as it played host to the
Franco-African and Preferential Trade Agreement
summits in December, and the European Economic
Community Parliamentarians' Conference in
January. We believe the government's ill-conceived
and at times irrational response to its security
concerns, mounting economic problems, and the
difficulties of hosting international conferences could
eventually threaten political stability.
Recent Developments
Bagaza's Isolation. Bagaza in the past six months has
shown signs of becoming overwhelmed by the
problems his government faces. He has responded by
withdrawing from contact with all but a few family
and clan members, whom he increasingly depends on
for advice.
the office of the presidency�the
government's primary decisionmaking body�is now
dominated by members of Bagaza's family and clan,
many of whom are unqualified.
Bagaza often does
not listen to the counsel of his cabinet ministers, many
of whom are qualified technocrats, because they are
from rival Tutsi clans.
Increased Hardline Influence. We believe Bagaza's
recent obsession with security has also allowed his
security advisers, most of whom are poorly educated
and hardline, to gain considerable influence at the
expense of more moderate advisers, many of whom
are from other Tutsi clans. In our view, Lieutenant
Colonel Mandevu, Bagaza's cousin and Director
General of Immigration as well as head of the border
police, has emerged as the President's most trusted
and influential adviser. According to the US
Embassy, Mandevu has the equivalent of a primary
school education, is confrontational in attitude, and
distrusts foreigners.
An example of Mandevu's increased influence was the
decision by Burundi custom authorities in late 1984 to
seize 45 American diplomatic pouches and demand
that their contents be declared and inspected. The US
Embassy reports that Mandevu convinced Bagaza
that the pouches, which the Embassy refused to open
on principle, were suspiciously large and he suggested
that they were being used to smuggle arms to Hutu
dissidents. According to the Embassy, Mandevu's
actions were designed primarily to broaden his
influence and power over internal security matters,
normally the domain of the Director of Surete
Nationale Lieutenant Colonel Ndabaneze. In our
view, Mandevu's high standing with Bagaza was
clearly evident during the three-month pouch
incident, as the Foreign Minister and other cabinet
ministers refused to get involved, and Ndabaneze,
normally an influential official, was unable to resolve
the issue. Although Bagaza finally intervened and
released the pouches when the United States
threatened to reduce substantially the size of its
mission and aid program, we believe Mandevu's
position was enhanced.
Antireligion Campaign. Religious organizations�
particularly the Catholic Church, whose members
make up some 65 percent of Burundi's population�
have played an important and influential role in the
country's development. In addition to proselytizing,
religious organizations have been instrumental in
establishing educational, medical, and social work
facilities and in contributing to the development of an
elite and leadership class.
Religious freedom, however, has been seriously
affected by the regime's security obsession and
increased hardline influence. According to the US
Embassy, the government distrusts the church
because of its autonomous nature, its links to
Burundi's colonial past, and its close ties to the Hutu
majority. The more radical Tutsis believe that the
church is educating a new Hutu elite that will rise up
and overthrow the government and take revenge for
the 1972 massacre. In addition, the US Embassy
reports that Bagaza and his wife as well as several
other influential senior Burundi officials, have a
strong anticlerical bias.
The regime's antireligion campaign first surfaced
more than a year ago when crucifixes were banned
from public display, and a law was passed limiting
worship to Saturday afternoons and Sundays. The
Seventh-Day Adventists came in for particular
scrutiny because they are a minor religion, and their
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Saturday sabbath conflicts with a government
requirement that peasants spend Saturday mornings
working on public development projects. As a result,
Adventist churches were closed down in much of the
countryside.
The campaign was reinvigorated late last year when
Interior Minister, Lieutenant Colonel Kazatsa, issued
written orders to provincial authorities to strictly
enforce the regulation prohibiting religious services at
any time other than Saturday afternoon or Sunday.
We believe this action was primarily directed at the
Catholic Church, which had continued to hold
weekday services. In addition, the government refused
to renew residence permits for foreign missionaries
and denied visas to priests seeking entry into Burundi
to replace those who were forced to leave. According
to a Burundi official, hardliners, led by Kazatsa,
argued that any resistance to the official regulation by
religious organizations should be swiftly put down to
prevent Hutus from viewing lack of action as a sign of
weakness on the part of the government. According to
the US Embassy, the campaign has led to the forced
departure of 44 foreign priests since January, the
arrest of a number of priests and students on
subversion charges, and orders that the Adventist
mission headquarters dismiss all its employees and
dispose of its property
Kazatsa, after vigorous diplomatic pressure and
growing internal tension, agreed last month�
reportedly with Bagaza's concurrence�to stop the
arbitrary expulsions of missionaries and to permit
weekday religious services after five o'clock in the
evening, according to the US Embassy. The decision
to stop expulsions, however, was made without
Mandevu's approval, and on his return from a trip to
the United States, he criticized Kazatsa for promising
Burundi's bishops that the expulsions would be
stopped. The US Embassy reports that Mandevu,
claiming presidential authority, last week refused to
renew the residence permits of 36 foreign
missionaries.
In our judgment, this incident further illustrates
Mandevu's growing power and influence. The
majority of Burundi leaders do not support the
antireligion campaign, but are powerless because
Bagaza supports Mandevu and other hardliners,
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according to the US Embassy. In addition,
the antireligion campaign has
deepened the division between Mandevu and
Ndabaneze�who does not support the expulsion of
missionaries�thereby further factionalizing the
government. In our view, the open conflict among
Mandevu, Kazatsa, and Ndabaneze, all senior
military officers with close ties to the President, on an
issue as sensitive as religion raises further questions
about Bagaza's leadership.
Growing Ethnic Tensions. There are many indicators
that the regime's actions in response to its security
Concerns have heightened ethnic tensions between
Hutus and Tutsis and among Tutsi clans. According
to the US Embassy, such concerns have caused senior
officials to place the Army on extended alert in the
countryside, to arrest several Hutus on questionable
subversion charges, and to accuse the United States
and Belgium of supporting Hutu dissidents. The US
Embassy reports that the antireligion campaign has
angered Hutus. Moreover, a recent decision by the
church leadership to allow its clergy to explain to their
parishioners that reduced church social services are
solely the government's fault probably will aggravate
ethnic problems further. We have no evidence,
however, of an organized Hutu opposition. In fact, we
believe that Bagaza's blatant favoritism toward his
own family and clan, the recent increase in arbitrary
arrests which have included Tutsis as well as Hutus,
the power struggles within the government, and the
antireligion campaign have exacerbated rivalries
among Tutsi clans to the point that serious opposition
to Bagaza is more likely at this time to come from
rival Tutsis than from Hutus.
Economic Neglect. In our judgment, the
government's preoccupation with security issues and
the hosting of international conferences has distracted
it from dealing with Burundi's troubled economy.
According to the US Embassy, Burundi is faced with
soaring inflation, stagnant production, a growing
budget deficit, increasing foreign debt, and a
flourishing black market. Despite these problems, the
Embassy reports that for the past eight months
virtually the entire government has been mobilized to
support international conferences, considerable sums
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of scarce foreign exchange have been spent to prepare
Bujumbura to serve as host, and Bagaza himself has
not focused on economic issues.
In our view, poor management also has contributed to
Burundi's current economic state. According to the
US Embassy, Finance Minister Ngenzi has appeared
intransigent in his negotiations with the IMF for a
standby agreement that would provide a much-needed
infusion of foreign exchange. Commerce Minister
Muganga also has hurt the economy by actively
discouraging the development of the private sector.
The US Embassy reports that import licenses are
virtually impossible to acquire, debt payments are in
arrears, and foreign businessmen are trying to
liquidate their assets even if it means incurring a loss.
The Bagaza regime's antireligion campaign has the
potential to create additional economic hardships.
Burundi's economic development is dependent on
foreign aid, and the campaign has created tensions
between Burundi and its major foreign aid donors�
the United States, France, and Belgium�which could
lead to reduced aid levels in the future. Moreover, the
foreign churches are the single most important
provider of fundamental services such as health care,
social services, and, to a lesser extent, education; any
reduction in their numbers and role will have an
immediate adverse impact on the rural population.
Outlook
Although Bagaza is likely to remain in firm control in
the near term, we believe that the regime's ill-
conceived policies and security paranoia could create
opposition among both Hutus and Tutsis that might
eventually threaten his rule. In our view, a military
coup is unlikely any time soon because the Army is
well cared for and key positions are held by Bagaza
loyalists. We believe, however, that economic
problems and internal dissension will heighten
Bagaza's security fears, and he will increasingly rely
on his security apparatus to protect him from
perceived enemies. In addition, he will turn
increasingly to his close personal friends and cronies
for support, further increasing hardline influence and
incompetence in his government. Consequently, we
probably will see increasing ethnic tensions, open
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power struggles within the government, economic
mismanagement, and worsening bilateral relations
with Western countries.
In our view, rival Tutsi clans, many of which are well
represented in the government and military, could
decide to organize an opposition movement because of
Bagaza's bias toward assigning his family members to
influential positions, his anticlerical views, and
personal animosities within the ruling Tutsi elite. Less
likely, in our view, is a Hutu uprising. Despite the
recent increase in ethnic tension, Bagaza remains
fairly popular with most Hutus, and there is no
organized Hutu opposition movement around which
dissidents could rally. In the long run, however,
government austerity measures, harsh security
crackdowns, and increased religious discrimination
could spark a Hutu revolt.
In our judgment, Burundi's internal problems and
cooler relations with the West, although unlikely to
lead to increased Soviet influence, could result in a
greater Libyan presence in the near term. The Soviet
military assistance program, although Burundi's
largest, has totaled only $15 million over the past four
years and we do not believe Moscow will expend the
resources�both military and economic�necessary to
significantly increase its presence. The Libyans are
more likely to look for opportunities to increase their
influence, and might even offer some new economic
aid in hopes of gaining a better foothold to use
Burundi as a base for destabilizing efforts against
Zaire. Qadhafi traveled to Bujumbura last week,
reportedly at Bagaza's invitation, to discuss improving
bilateral relations and increased aid. In our view,
Bagaza's invitation to Qadhafi suggests that he wants
to improve bilateral relations, which had recently
cooled, in hopes of receiving new economic aid.
Bagaza is likely to be wary of Libyan intentions,
however, because of Tripoli's inability to fulfill past
promises of economic aid. In addition, according to
the US Embassy, Bagaza has stated that he will not
lend his support to Libyan subversive activities in the
region.
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Africa
Briefs
Angola Central Committee Meeting
The 16th session of the Central Committee ruling Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola, slated for next month, may lay the groundwork for
personnel shifts in the party. Changes have been rumored in Luanda periodically
since the last Central Committee meeting in November 1984, but thus far no
major shakeup has occurred.
President dos Santos has said the agenda will center on preparations for the
Second Ordinary Party Congress scheduled for next December. Speaking to a
party planning session on 26 April, dos Santos asserted the party must create
conditions for "open, frank, and honest debate" of Angola's problems and must
make use of valid ideas at all levels to strengthen its actions. He added that some
party members, presumably including himself, are arguing that criticism,
including self-criticism, is needed to strengthen the party's cohesion. The
President's words suggest that dos Santos might use the upcoming meeting to
shunt aside party hacks in favor of younger, more motivated and capable cadre
able to tackle the nation's growing economic and political problems.
Angola New Ambassador to Cuba
President dos Santos has named ruling party Central Committee member Manuel
Pedro Pacavira as Luanda's new envoy to Havana. Pacavira, a black nationalist
who fell from favor in mid-1982 when he was ousted as party secretary for agro-
industrial and energy affairs, has emerged from political obscurity to take his new
post. In 1982, Pacavira's enemies accused him of incompetence, as well as of
advocating increased ties to the West and talks with the UNITA insurgents�
positions now somewhat more in favor with dos Santos. Over the years, frictions
have arisen in relations between Angola and Cuba, and dos Santos may have
turned to Pacavira as a forceful defender of Angola's interests in dealings with this
important ally.
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Zaire-Cuba Cautious Relationsn
Relations between Cuba and Zaire may be improved by a Zairian-proposed
meeting in July of a joint commission to set up cooperation accords and Havana's
invitation to the Zairian Foreign Minister to visit Cuba. Recent Cuban efforts
have helped keep the Zairian Embassy in Havana open;
Havana offered Zairian personnel the chancery and
residences free of charge. Moreover, the Cuban
Embassy in Kinshasa is trying to foster commerical relations by offering to help
Zaire exploit its natural resources, specifically timber and zinc.
Zairian President Mobutu may see improved relations with Cuba as a way to bring
about a political solution in Angola which includes UNITA, and improve his
regional image with radical black African states. Nonetheless, Kinshasa probably
will continue to be cautious in its dealings with Havana.
Mobutu has been wary of Cuban overtures. He recently
closed a Cuban cultural exhibition because of the pressure tactics used by Cuban
officials in obtaining authorization for the display. Mobutu, however, may permit
Foreign Minister Mokolo to visit Cuba in the next few months to initiate a
dialogue on Angola and to discuss possible economic cooperation. Havana
probably shares these goals, and through them hopes to curb Zairian support to
UNITA.
Niger-Libya Support for Dissident Group
A Libyan official met last month with Nrrien dissidents in Benin to arrange for
their travel to Libya for military training,
The dissidents are members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger,
formed in Europe last year by former Lieutenant Bonkano, the architect of an
abortive coup in October 1983. Although the US Embassy reports that the
opposition group is small, it successfully circulated tracts among government
workers last March calling for the overthrow of moderate, pro-Western President
Kountche.
Niamey began to normalize relations with Libya in late 1983, despite Kountche's
longstanding mistrust of Tripoli's motives, according to the US Embassy. The
Embassy indicates that Kountche believes improved relations will help minimize
frictions with Niger's more powerful neighbor and could result in some Libyan
financial aid for his hard-pressed Sahelian state.
In our view, Niger's economic troubles make it particularly vulnerable to promises
of Libyan economic aid. The effects of severe drought resulted in a decline of more
than 10 percent in real gross domestic product in 1984. The drought, together with
neighboring Nigeria's closure of its borders, also has reduced government revenues
and raised the cost of imports. Moreover, heavy debt service payments make it
unlikely that Niger will be able to stay within IMF performance criteria this year.
Consequently, the IMF has recommended further reductions in government
spending, increased taxes on petroleum products, and removal of subsidies on some
agricultural products, according to the US Embassy. Such measures would
increase popular discontent if implemented.
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