SOUTH AFRICAS CHANGING POLICY AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05612443
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• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985

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Director of
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Distribution of this Estimate is strictly urn
officials who require /KOOS to the subjec
the performance of their duties.
SN1E 73-85/
July 1985
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SNIE 73-85/L
SOUTH AFRICA'S CHANGING POLICY
AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS FOR
US-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS
Information available as of 17 July 1985 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved on that date by the National Foreign
Intelligence Board.
WARNING: The material in this document is sensitive.
Distribution of this Estimate is strictly limited to those
officials who require access to the subject matter for the
performance of their duties.
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CFrPPT
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
The Department of Commerce
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS 1
DISCUSSION 5
Bases for Increased Cooperation 5
1983-84: Cooperation With the United States 7
1985: Changing South African Perceptions 7
Changing South African Policy Agenda 7
Relations-Damaging Variables 9
Relations-Stabilizing Factors 10
Alternative Scenarios 11
Restabilization 11
Serious Deterioration 12
Implications for the United States 12
ANNEX: Impact of New Economic Sanctions 15
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Changed perspectives and policies in Pretoria are likely to continue
straining US�South African bilateral relations. We believe this deterio-
ration will continue for the next several months as Washington and
Pretoria�both under increasing political pressure at home�react to
each other's statements and actions. There is a reasonable likelihood,
however, that after a few months renewed cooperation on matters of
shared interest will resume. Nevertheless, given South Africa's volatile
domestic and regional problems, any present judgment must be tenta-
tive, and we do not rule out a sharper deterioration that could last for a
longer period.
While the freedom of action of the Botha government to undertake
internal actions that would ease the strain in bilateral relations is
limited�given its preoccupation with restoring domestic order�it
could pursue certain actions that would have this effect. The most
fundamental of these would be to make substantial progress in resolving
the issue at the root of domestic disorder in South Africa: the exclusion
of blacks from national political life. One key development would be
winning the agreement of Zulu Chief Minister Buthelezi and other
major black leaders to participate in the government's reform process.
Approval of Buthelezi's plan for multiracial administration of Natal
Province would help, but Buthelezi and others have also made clear that
the government must give a statement of intent, recognize South
African citizenship for all blacks, and release the imprisoned African
National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela. New South African
Government actions and reforms that would essentially meet these
conditions would diminish opposition to the government and be a
positive stimulus to bilateral relations.
Pretoria's perceptions of US statements and actions are also
important to restoration of cooperative relations. The Botha administra-
tion appreciates that Washington condemns apartheid and desires
sociopolitical change in South Africa, but it is sensitive to US actions that
derive from that condemnation, such as possible new economic sanc-
tions. Successful efforts to block or diminish such proposed new
sanctions would alleviate South African concern. Continued efforts by
the United States to persuade the surrounding states that the presence of
ANC guerrillas fosters insecurity, and consequent aggressive behavior,
in Pretoria would speak to Pretoria's perception that Washington does
not understand its legitimate concerns. Renewed efforts to assist the
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cpropr
Mozambique Government and encourage additional European support
would respond to frequent complaints by South Africa that the West
has not helped it to strengthen the Nkomati Accord as a key element in
regional stability. Similarly in Angola, any action by the United States
that would improve the prospects for Cuban troop withdrawal or an
accommodation between the ruling Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola (MPLA) and the insurgent National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) would also be seen as underscoring
US appreciation of broad security concerns in southern Africa.
In the 1983-84 period, the South African Government pursued
policies that acknowledged the United States as an important interlocu-
tor in regional events. Examples include the Nkomati and Lusaka
agreements with Mozambique and Angola in 1984. Pretoria also
appeared to pay greater heed to US suggestions, criticisms, and quiet
pressures to speed domestic political and social reforms. The govern-
ment's willingness to undertake new initiatives was based in part on its
reading of the attitudes of the new US administration, the recognized
utility of US diplomacy in resolving persistent regional problems,
increasing concern over Soviet Bloc threats, and the belief that conser-
vative governments in Washington as well as London could offer a
unique opportunity to blunt South Africa's growing international
isolation.
Revised and changed South African perceptions of regional events
and domestic pressures have led Pretoria to policy adjustments in 1985.
Domestically, it has become preoccupied with the need to reassert order
over its black population and reassure its white electorate in the face of
black protests, riots, strikes, and general dissidence.
Regionally, the South African Government has lowered its expecta-
tions as to the usefulness of collaboration with US regional diplomatic
efforts, and it has moved to reassert its interests through unilateral
actions, including a return to overtly coercive actions such as the June
1985 raids into Botswana and Angola. Pretoria sees the Namibia/Angola
negotiations as at an impasse and is disappointed that the Lusaka
Agreement and the subsequent South African withdrawal from Angola
were not followed by any agreement by the MPLA to patrol the
Namibian-Angolan border to control incursions by the South-West
Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).
Foremost among Pretoria's responses are increased and heavyhand-
ed efforts to curb protest and intimidate dissenters, to strike at the ANC,
both internally and regionally, and to continue efforts to win over
leaders of black opinion in order to persuade them to begin consulta-
tions with the Botha government and participate in the government-
ordered political process. Relations with neighboring states as well as
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international relations have been subordinated to these domestic con-
cerns. Heightened white resentment of Western criticism and threats of
sanctions have reduced the Botha government's receptivity to US and
Western demarches and attempted interventions to change specific
South African domestic actions. While it still desires constructive
relations with Washington, Pretoria's expectations in terms of using the
United States to break out of isolation or to advance its regional security
interests have been diminished and may be further reduced if Washing-
ton should increase its criticism or even invoke sanctions.
During the next 12 months, several volatile factors could work to
further strain US-South African bilateral relations. These include:
� The South African Government's determination to regain con-
trol over the increasingly militant black population, leading to
use of repressive tactics that in turn would provoke new outcries
in the West and demands on Washington to take punitive
actions.
� A continuing South African recession that hits hardest at the
black population by raising unemployment and cutting govern-
ment services.
� Heightened concern in South Africa for its sovereignty, which
could cause greater scrutiny or interdiction of official and
private US efforts to fund and promote activities inside the
country. US programs that provide assistance to education,
human rights groups, and nonwhite trade unions could suffer.
� Continuing ANC and SWAPO programs of sabotage and terror-
ism that will generate demands among the government's most
important constituencies to strike back at home and in the
region.
At the same time, however, other factors will work to limit the
bilateral fallout and stabilize relations. These include:
� The Botha government's continuing recognition that it must
avoid total isolation from the West, a view shared by the
increasingly influential business community. Concern about the
psychological effect of Western sanctions and increased isolation
on white citizens also will temper South African reactions.
The Botha government's continuing implementation of socio-
political reform and pursuit of dialogue with black opinion
leaders, including even discreet contacts with ANC President
Tambo. This will work to Pretoria's favor even if talks do not
bear immediate fruit.
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US and Western dependence on South African minerals as well
as South Africa's need for Western markets, which will not
lessen in the next 12 months.
The concern shared by Pretoria and Washington about Soviet
Bloc activities in Africa and their common goals of circumscrib-
ing and rolling back Soviet advances.
The increased diplomatic interaction and cooperative exchanges
with some African states, particularly the Frontline States,
which South Africa's diplomatic efforts have brought and are
gains that the regime will be reluctant to forsake. They provide
a variety of opportunities for South Africa to exercise influence
and seek to achieve its regional and domestic goals through
behind-the-scenes exchanges with black African leaders.
Whether relations stabilize after some months or continue to
deteriorate, the current attenuation of US-South African relations
contains important implications for the United States. Over the next
several months:
� Pretoria will become increasingly nonreceptive to US advice,
requests, pressures, and efforts to consult.
There will be increasing domestic pressure on the Botha
government to retaliate against US criticism and possible sanc-
tions, but Pretoria will attempt to defuse such pressures pri-
marily by rhetoric. The harassment or interdiction of official US
programs such as scholarship, human rights, or trade union
financial aid programs cannot be ruled out.
The momentum for voluntary disinvestment by US companies
in South Africa is likely to accelerate, reducing US leverage and
weakening a significant force for nonviolent reform in South
Africa.
Continuing heavyhanded repression by South Africa of domes-
tic dissent and attacks on ANC facilities outside its borders will
create new pressures on Washington to -punish- South Africa.
At a minimum, new UN Security Council resolutions proposing
Chapter VII mandatory sanctions may be expected.
Any new restrictions on US nuclear technology transfer to South
Africa could derail discussions concerning further increase of
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) surveillance and
safeguarding of South African nuclear production.
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DISCUSSION
1. Recent South African Government actions have
strained US-South African relations and altered the
pattern of relations prevalent during the 1983-84
period. In our judgment, these stresses and changes
have been caused by changes in South Africa's percep-
tions and priorities and have driven corresponding
changes in its policies.
2. A recent National Intelligence Estimate de-
scribed the South African Government's determina-
tion to exploit its potential as the dominant regional
economic and military power and, at the same time,
reshape its domestic society and polity. In recent
years, South Africa has followed a variety of policies in
pursuing these goals; the period 1980-83 featured a
heavy use of coercion regionally, combined with the
beginnings of systemic domestic reform. During the
1983-84 period, South Africa pursued cooperation
with US regional diplomatic efforts and at least a
modicum of attentiveness to US concerns regarding
domestic developments. In 1985 there has been a
revival of the use of coercion, both regionally and
domestically, a continuation of reform efforts, and a
deemphasis on the utility of US regional diplomacy.
Bases for Increased Cooperation
3. Shortly after assuming office in 1978, South
African State President (then Prime Minister) P. W.
Botha emphasized the importance for South Africa of
breaking out of its increased isolation from the West.
Senior South African officials repeatedly stated�and
apparently believed�that Pretoria was facing a "total
onslaught" by the growing strength of Soviet Bloc
forces in the region and that, unless relations with the
West were improved, South Africa ultimately would
have to face the "onslaught" alone. In 1978, P. W.
Botha also sketched out a regional policy proposing a
-constellation of states" that would be economically
interdependent and joined by mutual nonaggression
pacts.
' NIE 73-84, South Africa and Its Regional Policies Through the
1980s, November 1984.
NIE 11/70-85, Soviet Policies in Southern Africa, February
1985.
4. The Botha government also perceived the need
to make changes to accommodate rising black aspira-
tions�changes that clearly ran the risk of further
dividing and polarizing the white electorate and un-
dermining the traditional bases of support for the
ruling National Party. While not retreating from
continuing white control of decisionmaking, P. W.
Botha lectured his white constituents that they must
"adapt or die" and began a series of reforms that
included granting limited political rights to Colored
and Indian minorities and the relaxation or abolition
of provocative racist social laws in an effort to co-opt
large elements of the nonwhite population.
5. South Africa's neighbors gave no support to the
1978 Botha plan of a "constellation of states" and
formed the Southern African Development Coordina-
tion Conference, a regional organization excluding
South Africa that was designed to eliminate black
states' economic dependence on South Africa.
6. In 1981, from South Africa's perspective, the
new US administration, as well as the Conservative
Thatcher government in the United Kingdom, was
seen as sympathetic to South Africa's conservative,
anti-Communist, anti-Soviet attitudes. Pretoria saw
this as a unique opportunity to establish closer cooper-
ative relations with Western governments, escape from
the growing isolation, and at the same time better
resist Soviet encroachments.
7. Pretoria's regional agenda during this period
emphasized coercive measures. Military incursions,
paramilitary raids, and not very clandestine support of
insurgents were hallmarks of this policy, which contin-
ued through 1983.
Despite its Western parliamentary democracy structure, the
South African leader, State President P. W. Botha, is an autocrat
who relies on ad hoc consultations with trusted lieutenants, Afrika-
ner society and business leaders, and military/security advisers at
the expense of those in more formal structures such as the Cabinet,
the State Security Council, or the caucus of the ruling National
Party. Intelligence on this process is sketchy, but it is clear that
major decisions are made primarily by P. W. Botha. The ad hoc
nature of this decisionmaking process helps explain the occasional
appearance that the government is pursuing contradictory policy
lines.
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Angola
Congo
BRAllAVILLE CP
KINSHASA
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Angola
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WINDHOEK
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1983-84: Cooperation With the United States
8. For a number of reasons South Africa changed its
tactics in late 1983 to capitalize on past coercion and
utilize US diplomatic efforts to achieve its regional
objectives�which have remained constant through-
out. This shift was very likely based on the following
considerations:
� Belief that the United States could "deliver"
neighboring states into public agreements consis-
tent with core South African interests at a lower
cost and more effectively than previous strictly
coercive policies.
� Belief in the need for regional tranquillity while
undertaking contentious domestic reforms, in-
cluding a major constitutional change.
� Concern about the costs of the continued admin-
istration of Namibia and the lack of a credible
alternative policy there.
� Concern about where the paramilitary involve-
ment in Mozambique was ultimately leading
South Africa in terms of an open-ended commit-
ment of resources and end-game vision.
� Satisfaction that earlier diplomatic efforts, which
appeared in synchrony with US regional efforts,
were producing results in terms of economic and
security understandings with Swaziland, Botswa-
na, and Zimbabwe.
� Hope that increased regional cooperation could
draw South Africa closer to the United States and
the West, breaking out, to at least some degree,
of the previous pattern of increasing isolation
from the West.
9. Domestically during this period, the Botha ad-
ministration also began to implement substantive re-
forms it hoped would have a beneficial side effect of
appearing responsive to US calls for societal change.
While no South African Government has ever wel-
comed outside criticism or suggestions for domestic
change, at least some effort was made to accommodate
specific expressions of US concern on individual
human and civil rights cases.
1985: Changing South African Perceptions
10. South African policies and perceptions have
changed in 1985 to the detriment of US-South African
relations. In particular, Pretoria appears to view US
diplomacy in southern Africa as less relevant to its core
interests. Confronted with growing black unrest, the
South African leadership has focused its attention on
domestic concerns, especially the need to restore or-
der, suppress dissent, and reassure the white electorate
that reforms will not result in the loss of white control.
New arrests, detentions, and trials of dissident fig-
ures�many of whom are considered in the United
States and Europe to be part of the legitimate political
opposition�and the heavyhanded suppression of riots
and demonstrations have provoked Western outcries
of protest. The South African military also has re-
newed attacks into neighboring states designed to curb
the activities of the African National Congress (ANC)
and the South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO).
11. In Namibia, the South African Government
installed a new, pliable "transitional" regime and has
become more ambiguous in its commitment to the US-
sponsored negotiations seeking a Namibia/Angola set-
tlement. The Botha administration sees the Nami-
bia/Angola negotiations as at an impasse, with the
Americans unable to "deliver" the Angolan regime�
under the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA)�either on a Cuban troop withdrawal
proposal satisfactory to South Africa or a follow-on
border control agreement to supplement and replace
the 1984 Lusaka Agreement.
12. There has been a reevaluation by South African
security officials that the Soviet Bloc threat was
neither so massive nor so imminent as previously
believed; senior South African intelligence officials
now state that the Soviets are on the defensive in much
of Africa.
13. There also has been a growing perception in
Pretoria that US domestic pressure eventually would
force Washington to alter its policy and support some
economic sanctions against South Africa. This belief
was fostered late last year by the burgeoning anti-
apartheid campaign in the United States and Washing-
ton's strong public condemnations of Pretoria's meth-
ods to counter increasing black unrest. It has been
reinforced this year by the number of sanction bills
introduced in Congress and by Washington's responses
to continued heavyhanded South African police tactics
and to military and paramilitary forays into Angola
and Botswana.
Changing South African Policy Agenda
14. In recent months the South African policy
response to these changed circumstances and percep-
tions has become increasingly discernible. While the
component elements of this policy agenda are not
new, the mix and emphases now given to domestic
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PRETORIA
ereening
0 10Kilometers
0 10Miles
Black Homelands and Sites of Major Unrest, July 1984-July 1985
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*PRETORIA
*
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enlargement
MBABANE
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Free State
Bophuthatswana
Cradock
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Uitenhage
23Grah m town
oft Elizabeth
() Black homeland
"Independent" black homeland
n� Site of major unrest
200
Kilometers
705495 (A02333) 7-85
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concerns mark a significant shift from those in the
period from 1981 to early 1985. The driving force is a
renewed preoccupation with internal developments,
particularly the continuing black unrest and outright
opposition to President Botha's reform measures. The
major government effort to give black residents local
self-government, which began in 1983, has collapsed
in the face of black boycotts and intimidation and the
murder of black participants (29 of 32 town councils
are no longer functioning). Black violence, particularly
in the Eastern Cape region but prevalent in other areas
as well, has resulted in the murder and intimidation of
those blacks perceived as collaborators with the gov-
ernment�policemen, civil servants, and businessmen.
The South African Government continues to ascribe
many of its troubles to the machinations of external
illegal organizations such as the ANC. In any case, the
government sees itself as having no choice but to
respond to the triggering of the deep-seated white fear
of losing control of the black population. The govern-
ment's response thus far has included:
� Suppression of domestic black dissent by intimi-
dation, including arrests, detentions, and trials of
those perceived by the government to be leaders
of the dissent.
� A preoccupation with the ANC�objectively an
overpreoccupation, given its limited resources
and membership�and determined efforts to
suppress it both domestically and regionally.
Relations with neighboring states increasingly are
driven by real or imagined support such states
lend to South African dissident organizations.
Supporters of military and paramilitary opera-
tions against the ANC, SWAPO, and the Pan-
African Congress (PAC)�previously balanced
by, if not subordinate to, those in government
who argue that a more balanced approach should
drive regional policy�now appear to be once
again in the ascendancy. Evidence of this can be
seen in the June 1985 raid on ANC facilities in
Botswana and the June 1985 brief incursion into
southern Angola by armed forces in hot pursuit
of SWAPO guerrillas.
New government efforts and reforms designed to
lure blacks into participating in local and region-
al government. As these efforts continue to be
rejected by blacks as inadequate, the government
may pay more attention to the tribal homeland
black leaders and those township -leaders" who
are more or less responsive to South African
Government pressures.
� Increased testiness with and negative reaction to
international criticism as the South African Gov-
ernment retreats into the "laager" mentality
(referring to the circle of Boer pioneer wagons
used as a defensive formation against native
attacks). This response results in intemperate
government statements and includes a refusal to
acknowledge even the most egregious excesses.
This will inhibit at least for a time the govern-
ment's ability and willingness to cooperate or
even discuss certain issues with the United States
and the West.
Relations-Damaging Variables
15. We believe there are several factors at play in
South Africa and between South Africa and the United
States that could work to further strain bilateral
relations and drive South Africa into an even more
isolated, -laager" mentality reminiscent of its interna-
tional stance in the 1960s:
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� As Washington and other Western capitals con-
sider new economic sanctions (see annex) against
and measures to increase the isolation of the
South African Government, that government and
the white electorate will react and respond at a
minimum by verbal outbursts against the "of-
fending" governments. In addition, Pretoria is
likely to decrease the depth of diplomatic dia-
logue with the -offenders." It is quite likely that
US and other Western missions in Pretoria will
be -sent to Coventry" for a time in terms of
senior official contacts. This will come at a time
when pressures from the aggrieved states and in
the United Nations are demanding that the
United States and other Western states curb
South Africa's regional aggressiveness.
Increasing Western public criticism of specific
policies and actions of the South African Govern-
ment will make it even more difficult to amend
or reform such policies and practices, for fear of
being seen by the white constituency as giving in
to external public pressure. The operative word is
public, given that South African leaders have
shown some responsiveness to discreet, nonpublic
external pressures.
� South African Government efforts to regain con-
trol over black dissidence�including arrests, de-
tentions, and trials of black political figures well
known in the West and new cross-border raids�
will escalate the rhetoric on all sides, making it
all the more difficult to find a -middle" ground.
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� The continuing South African economic reces-
sion and the desire for budgetary austerity to
fight a 15-percent inflation rate will limit the
growth of government services to black residents
at a time when demands for education and
housing are increasing. Black unemployment�
already about 25 percent�will increase, espe-
cially among young, already alienated blacks just
entering the job market.
� Continuing and probably increased ANC, PAC,
and SWAPO sabotage and terrorism�as wit-
nessed by the high-visibility June 1985 Transkei
bombings�will add to the pressure to strike out.
Relations-Stabilizing Factors
16. We also note that a number of factors will work
to stabilize relations:
NR
� The Botha government remains concerned about
the impact of further isolation from the West.
This concern is based in part on the psychological
needs of the white electorate, and in part on the
government's frustration over its perception that
the West does not appreciate South Africa's
importance as a bastion of European "civiliza-
tion' and an outpost for
Western, Christian, democratic, and anti-Com-
munist values. The government also recognizes
the potential for new Western investment to
improve mediocre economic prospects as well as
the need for Western markets for South African
products. While the need for general Western
imports is less acute, Pretoria still depends on the
West for advanced technologies.
� The increasing willingness of important South
African business leaders�including Afrikaners
with access to government leaders�to pressure
the Botha government to continue political re-
forms will work to blunt differences between the
West and South Africa.
The Botha government continues to show a
determination to pursue political, economic, and
social reforms despite domestic opposition and
the lack of favorable international recognition.
The pace and nature of reforms in the last few
years is breakneck by South African standards.
Furthermore, reforms that ultimately could pro-
duce power sharing with blacks at local and
regional levels may yet garner at least private
acknowledgment and encouragement from some
Western observers.
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US and West European dependence on South
Africa's minerals will limit to some extent the
ability and willingness of the West to impose
punitive sanctions against it just as South Africa is
constrained by its dependence on Western mar-
kets. South Africa, for example, accounts for 90
percent of non-Communist production of plati-
num-group metals, about 60 percent of vanadi-
um, 50 percent of chromium, and 25 percent of
manganese. It is the world's third-largest produc-
er of uranium and the largest producer of gold.
South Africa provides the United States with one-
half or more of its supplies of chromium and
platinum and roughly one-fourth of its industrial
diamonds, manganese, vanadium, tin ore, and
fluorspar. We do not see this dependence lessen-
ing in the next 12 months, although stockpiling
and new technologies attenuate it to a small
degree.
The extent of West European investment in and
sales to South Africa also will inhibit a unified
Western approach. West European investment
and loans total $16 billion, and annual trade is
valued at $11 billion. Over 200,000 British jobs,
for example, are estimated to be directly related
to exports to South Africa. US investment and
loans in South Africa total almost $7 billion;
annual trade is valued at nearly $5 billion.
� There remains a fundamental shared concern
about Soviet Bloc activity in Africa that includes
an interest in circumscribing and rolling back
Soviet Bloc gains. In Angola, for example, the
West can take some satisfaction in South African
support to the insurgents of the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),
which raises Moscow's costs and draws attention
to the impotence of the Soviet-Cuban military
force garrisoned in Angola.
The South African Government�frustrated as it
is�is unlikely to abandon all regional diplomatic
efforts or attempt to completely deny the United
States a regional role. Botha recognizes, for ex-
ample, that the diplomatic efforts of the past few
years have brought his government some success-
es and recognition.
The increased diplomatic interaction and cooper-
ative exchanges with some African states�par-
ticularly the Frontline States�that South Africa's
diplomatic efforts have brought are gains the
regime will be reluctant to forsake. They provide
a variety of opportunities for South Africa to
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
exercise influence and seek to achieve its regional
and domestic goals through behind-the-scenes
exchanges with black African leaders.
� Elsewhere, statements by Foreign Minister R. F.
Botha indicate that an "internal solution" option
in Namibia is not really viable. As a consequence,
South Africa is likely to continue to participate in
US efforts to seek a Namibia solution within the
framework of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 435, while continuing to explore what
we see as the unlikely option of luring SWAPO�
or a faction of SWAPO�into a coalition govern-
ment outside the ambit of that Resolution.
Alternative Scenarios
17. The interplay of variables tending to disrupt
US-South African relations and those that work to
promote more stable ties suggests two plausible scenar-
ios during the next 12 months: (1) a finite decline
followed by restabilization of relations or (2) a more
precipitate decline as South Africa retreats into the
"laager." Overall, we believe the first scenario more
likely and envision a deterioration of relations for
some months followed by a stabilization that will
permit renewed cooperation on matters of shared
interest. In our judgment, relations will not deteriorate
to the level of 1977, when then Prime Minister B. J.
Vorster stated that the United States presented a
greater threat to South Africa than international Com-
munism. But this period of deterioration could last
through much of the next 12 months, and there is a
real possibility that the interplay of factors, particular-
ly the action-reaction possibilities described below,
could deepen and extend it beyond our Estimate.
Restabilization
18. We envision a stabilization scenario similar to
two earlier periods of stress in US-South African
relations. Following the 1960 Sharpeville massacre and
the enactment of draconian security laws, the United
States imposed unilateral sanctions (banning arms
sales, naval visits, and Export-Import Bank financing
of exports to South Africa). Similarly, following the
1976 Soweto riots and subsequent security crackdown,
the United Nations in 1977 imposed mandatory sanc-
tions on arms sales and the United States imposed new
unilateral bans on sales of all goods and services to the
South African military and police. The US Govern-
ment also endorsed the Sullivan Code of fair employ-
ment practices for US businesses in South Africa. In
both cases the initial period of mutual recriminations
and somewhat frigid relations was followed by quietly
resumed dialogue and cooperation. The "stabilization
factors" were instrumental in both situations in the
thawing of bilateral relations. Factors that promote
this scenario would include:
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� Continued public posturing against US criticism
and sanctions by South Africa's leaders to ap-
pease domestic constituences, but no substantive
retaliation. Diplomatic contacts, for example,
would quietly continue while public contacts and
associations were temporarily cut back.
� Severe limitation of South African cross-border
military and paramilitary attacks into neighbor-
ing regions. South Africa may give private assur-
ances that its military goals are limited and have
been achieved. Except in cases of egregious and
highly visible terrorism, we would look for the
government to rely on public and private pres-
sure to energize neighboring states to take meas-
ures against ANC, PAC, and SWAPO activities.
� An effort to draw the United States back into a
more active diplomatic dialogue, perhaps em-
phasizing shared concerns about Soviet interests
in the region.
� Following a hiatus, a renewed, high-level recep-
tion of US diplomatic personnel in South Africa,
perhaps establishing channels using Cabinet
members considered relatively liberal by South
African standards.
� Decline in black township violence or signs that
some black leaders were moving toward accep-
tance of government reforms. To cite only one
possibility, Zulu leader Buthelezi's acceptance of
some form of coadministration of Natal Province
would encourage the government to keep trying.
The semiclandestine dialogue by emissaries of
the Botha government with ANC President
Tambo in Lusaka, Zambia, combined with con-
sideration by Botha of a possible release from
prison of ANC leader Nelson Mandela, should
they result in some prospect of Western reconcil-
iation, also could change perceptions of the
regime's commitment to significant domestic
reform.
� New US actions in the region that Pretoria would
interpret as supportive of South African con-
cerns. Examples of such actions that would have
a positive impact would include: a strong effort
to deflect or diminish punitive economic meas-
ures; continued efforts to persuade southern Afri-
can states not to tolerate the presence of ANC or
SWAPO guerrillas; renewed efforts to assist the
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Mozambique Government; or actions in regard to
Angola that would be perceived in Pretoria as
improving prospects for Cuban troop withdrawal
or UNITA-MPLA accommodation.
Serious Deterioration
19. Under this scenario we see an action-reaction
sequence that could precipitate a sharp and continuing
deterioration in bilateral relations. Widespread disin-
vestment, for example, could force Pretoria to reim-
pose restrictions on the financial outflows of foreign
companies in South Africa. Such restrictions could
prompt further Western economic sanctions. Another
sequence could stem from South African Government
efforts to restore order and restrain black dissent.
Further "massacres- such as occurred at Uitenhage
last March by security forces or the detaining of Nobel
Peace Prize winner Bishop Desmond Tutu�a not
implausible scenario given Tutu's outspokenness and
political activism�most certainly would generate de-
mands in the West for tougher action. Likewise,
sizable or frequent South African cross-border raids
most certainly would further alienate moderate Afri-
can leaders and give rise to immense pressures on the
United States to react forcefully. Factors that would
promote this scenario include:
An intensification of South Africa's preoccupa-
tion with restoring domestic order and regionally
attacking ANC, PAC, and SWAPO. This would
be done at the expense of internal reforms and
regional dialogue. The South African Govern-
ment's historical inability to distinguish between
legitimate dissent and subversion would be mag-
nified by increasing arrests, detentions, and trials
of nonwhite opinion leaders. Government use of
police and military forces, ill trained in nonlethal
riot control, to suppress demonstrations and riots
could cause considerable civilian casualties.
� A decision by South Africa to react to threats of
sanctions or new sanctions by threatening or
carrying out retaliation and passing on the effects
of sanctions to neighboring states. For example,
South Africa could restrict repatriation of capital
of foreign companies and could expel non-South
African blacks from jobs in South Africa.
� Heightened concern in South Africa for its sover-
eignty, which would cause greater scrutiny or
interdiction of official and private US efforts to
fund and promote activities inside the country.
US measures such as disbursing greatly increased
funds for education and human rights, and exist-
ing programs that provide assistance to educa-
tion, human rights groups, and nonwhite trade
unions could suffer.
� Increased clandestine and semiclandestine activi-
ties in the United States designed to promote
South Africa's point of view. Such actions could
run from paid trips to South Africa to the covert
funding of individuals and groups acting as
unregistered lobbies and propagandists. A similar
program was exposed in South Africa in 1978
and served as the basis of the "Muldergate-
scandal.
Implications for the United States
20. Both scenarios�a decline followed by a stabili-
zation, or a rapid deterioration in relations�carry
significant implications for the United States. While
we believe US interests and leverage will suffer most
should the second scenario unfold, we anticipate a
distancing between Pretoria and Washington for the
next several months during which:
� Pretoria will become increasingly nonreceptive
to US advice, requests, and pressures and, at
minimum, will engage in more vociferous anti-
American public rhetoric as well as mandate a
decrease in visible official contacts and consul-
tations.
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� There will be increased pressure from hostile
domestic audiences for the South African leader-
ship to react to US criticism with concrete coun-
termeasures. Pretoria will attempt to defuse these
pressures by rhetoric rather than substance.
However, official and private US programs assist-
ing nonwhite South Africans�probably includ-
ing assistance to black students, trade unions, and
civil and human rights groups�could be put on
hold by the South African Government.
� The impetus for private US companies to sell off
their investments and branches in South Africa
could pick up steam in the face of growing
domestic US pressure and South African retalia-
tion. The 350 US companies, with a total invest-
ment of $2.3 billion and employing a work force
of 100,000 to 150,000, collectively have served as
a positive force for reforms including fair em-
ployment and housing practices, and also have
played an important role in breaking down
apartheid in terms of housing, job training, and
education of black employees and families. Their
departure would remove a significant force for
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nonviolent change in South Africa as well as
reduce overall US leverage on the South African
Government.
� New sanctions or restrictions on transfer of nu-
clear technology to South Africa could undo
recent discussions designed to bring the semi-
commercial-scale Valindaba Uranium Enrich-
ment Plant under International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards. They could also re-
verse the progress made in reducing South Afri-
ca's incentive to proceed with developing sensi-
tive new capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle
such as spent fuel reprocessing. New restrictions
would discourage future South African IAEA
cooperation and could provide an incentive for
South Africa to proceed unilaterally with
developing new nuclear capabilities that would
have serious adverse effects on proliferation.
� The United States will come under increasing
international pressure to unilaterally and collec-
tively -punish- South Africa if Pretoria steps up
efforts to suppress domestic dissent by arrests,
detentions, trials, and security force "order-re-
storing" measures in black residential areas, or if
it carries out more military and paramilitary
cross-border incursions. The United States, for
example, would almost certainly be forced to
deal with new Security Council resolutions man-
dating Chapter VII mandatory sanctions against
South Africa.
'See SNIE 73/5-84, Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security
Policies and Practices, October 1984 (Limited Dissemination).
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ANNEX
Impact of New Economic Sanctions
Pretoria has long faced economic sanctions intended
to influence its internal racial policies and end its
control of Namibia. In 1962, for example, the UN
General Assembly accepted a resolution recommend-
ing extensive economic sanctions. In 1973, the Arab
members of OPEC imposed an oil embargo against
South Africa that remains officially in force, and a
mandatory arms embargo resolution was passed by the
UN General Assembly in 1977. In each case South
Africa responded with programs of circumvention,
import substitution, and strategic stockpiling. It has
avoided heavy borrowing overseas that might provide
leverage to foreign critics of its policies and has been
willing to clamp down on economic growth if neces-
sary to conserve foreign exchange by slowing imports.
As a result, the South African economy is reasonably
well prepared to weather even widespread and com-
prehensive economic sanctions for several years. With
some exceptions, stockpiles and existing industrial
capacity probably are adequate to provide basic needs
for an indefinite period, as well as many of the
luxuries that whites have enjoyed. South Africa has
enough oil reserves to last six years with moderate
conservation measures and an expansion of coal-to-oil
facilities. Pretoria's experience and expertise in cir-
cumventing embargoes probably would allow it to
stretch stockpiles of oil and other key imports even
further.
Widespread bans on new loans or investment would
have little impact during the current recession, but
over the long haul they would undermine Pretoria's
efforts to diversify exports away from minerals and
grains and thus slow economic growth. Blacks would
suffer most because a 5- to 6-percent real economic
growth rate is needed even to hold black unemploy-
ment at its present 25-percent rate. Bans on loans or
investments imposed by only one or two of South
Africa's trading partners probably would have a negli-
gible long-term impact.
Forcing Western companies to sell existing opera-
tions in South Africa would not add substantially to the
effects of a ban on new investment. The sale of these
subsidiaries almost certainly would hurt current own-
ers more than the South African economy, which
would retain the productive facilities. At most, a
massive sell-off of foreign investments probably would
temporarily disrupt normal financial transactions in
the country as South African companies scrambled to
purchase foreign interests at bargain prices.
A cutoff of sales of South Africa's Krugerrand gold
coins to the United States�which accounted for half
of Krugerrand sales or about 8 percent of total South
African gold exports in 1984, according to press
reports�might lower slightly the world price of gold
and South African foreign earnings to the extent that
US demand for other gold coins did not immediately
replace demand for Krugerrands. Over time, gold
coins minted in other countries probably would re-
place the Krugerrand sales, and thus cancel even this
minor dampening effect on the world gold price.
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4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
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