POLITICAL STABILITY: THE NARCOTICS CONNECTION

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05596950
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• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-01097
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986

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Directorate of
Intelligence
1;
-10- AI
Political Stability:
The Narcotics Connection
An Intelligence Assessment
GI 86-10014
March 1986
"P' 5 4 1
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Political Stability:
The Narcotics Connection
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper, prepared by.
incorporates assessments done by analysts in the
narcotics branches of the Office of Global Issues
and the Office of Imagery Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Terrorism/Narcotics Analysis
Division, OG I
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GI S6-1001 4
Ai arch /956
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(b)(3)
key Judgments
/0,17riatir)n available
al I., January IQS6
�na, ii,ed III thi.s rep,a7
Political Stability:
The Narcotics Connection
The narcotics trade has the potential to affect political stability in several
ways:
� Large criminal trafficking organizations can use money and intimidation
to influence political, economic, security, and social institutions.
� Insurgents operating in narcotics producing and trafficking areas can
gain access to large amounts of money and smuggling networks to
enhance their antigovernment operations.
� Urban terrorists can make enough money on a single, large transaction to
finance annual operating costs.
� Hostile states can use criminal narcotics organizations to obtain hard
currency and to smuggle arms to insurgent or terrorist clients and to
support other subversive activities beyond their borders
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Criminal narcotics trafficking organizations can exert significant economic
and political influence over some regimes in the Western Hemisphere,
including The Bahamas, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Jamaica, and
Panama. Such organizations are becoming important in Belize and certain
Eastern Caribbean ministates. The extent of their influence enables these
traffickers to undermine US-sponsored counternarcotics programs and
could pose a threat to democratic institutions in some of these states. (b)(3)
The value of the illegal drug industry totals tens of billions of dollars
annually. Large trafficking organizations, such as the Colombian cocaine
networks, can earn billions of dollars in only a few vears of supplying the
US market. The infrastructures of these organizations rival most legiti-
mate businesses and some governments. Traffickers have extensive finan-
cial and commercial networks and co-opt or intimidate political and
security officials. They have shown remarkable resilience in the face of
international control programs, moving their operations to avoid interdic-
tion and instituting countermeasures that complicate moves against them.
(b)(3)
The adverse influence of a large narcotics industry can take many forms:
� Increased violence against officials associated with counternarcotics
programs, including assassinations and bombings of property.
� Subversion of democratic political institutions through corruption of
government officials, contributions to political parties, organization of
antigovernment demonstrations by peasant growers, and manipulation of
public media.
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� Loss of government revenues or the ability to control key economic or
financial sectors through movements of illicit profits, manipulation of
banking institutions, and dominance of local economies.
� Degradation of the effectiveness and political reliability of military units
through extensive involvement of officers and enlisted men in drug
trafficking.
� Social disruption from increased drug abuse and drug-related crime.
� Tension with neighboring states over aggressive narcotics interdiction in
sensitive border areas.
Insurgent involvement in narcotics production and trafficking can provide
access to large amounts of money for weapons and political action. It also
can give insurgents contacts with smuggling networks capable of moving
weapons through government checkpoints. Colombian (FARC), Burmese
(BCP), and Kurdish insurgents regularly exploit narcotics trafficking for
their own ends. Peruvian (SL) and Tamil groups are showing interest, and
changing patterns in the drug trade could bring other insurgent groups into
close contact with drug traffickers.
Terrorist groups have shown less interest in drug trafficking, perhaps
reflecting relatively fewer opportunities. Most terrorists obtain sufficient
funds from other sources, but some, reportedly including some Palestinian
terrorist groups, occasionally participate in drug deals
Cuba, Bulgaria, Nicaragua, Syria, and North Korea have been implicated
in drug trafficking. Motives vary, but involvement would enable officials to
obtain hard currency and also provide access to established smuggling
networks that can be used to further subversive political activities at the ex-
pense of the United States and its friends:
� Cuban authorities have aided selected traffickers since the 1970s,
facilitating transshipment of drugs through Cuban territory.
� Bulgaria, through its state trading corporation KINTEX, has been
directly involved in aiding drug traffickers since the 1960s. Since a US
demarche in 1982, such activities have been much less visible, but we sus-
pect they continue.
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(b)(3)
� Syrian officials have taken advantage of changing drug trafficking routes
between Southwest Asia and Europe to participate in the drug trade, but
the level of involvement is not well documented.
� North Korean overseas missions were implicated in drug trafficking
between 1976 and 1983, an apparent response to hard currency con-
straints that forced individual missions to finance much of their own
operations. (b)(3)
The influence of criminal trafficking groups and the involvement of
insurgents, terrorists, and hostile states constrain US drug-control pro-
grams in the Western Hemisphere. The consequences of aggressive
government control programs under such conditions could pose severe
political challenges to friendly regimes, especially those with democratic
institutions, and spark increased social and economic disruption. Even so,
we judge that most governments could do more to contain the problem, to
keep traffickers off balance, to curtail their freedom of action, and to raise
their costs of doing business. (b)(3)
We judge that a concerted regional effort could have a demonstrable
impact on the problem in the Western Hemisphere by undercutting the
traffickers' ability to shift operations to escape enforcement pressure. Some
Latin American governments have already called for a coordinated
regional approach to countering the narcotics trade; Colombia has con-
ducted joint interdiction efforts with some of its neighbors. Such programs
will take time and resources to implement, and it is by no means clear that
the governments involved can or will assign the priority to narcotics control
that will be required to assure adequate resources. We expect traffickers to
use every trick at their disposal to thwart control programs, including
violence and political intimidation (b)(3)
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(b)(3)
Contents
1'c/ix
Ke\ Judgments
Scope Note
Introduction
Criminal Trafficking Organizations and Political Stability
Drug-Related Violence
ix
Subversion of Political Institutions
3
Destabilization of Financial and Fconomic Institutions 5
Undermining Effectiveness of the Military
7
Social Disruption
9
Tensions With Neighbors
10
Countries of Most Immediate Concern
10
Insurgent Involvement in the Narcotics Industry 13
Groups Heavily Involved 14
Groups Well Placed To Participate 16
Changing Trafficking Patterns: Creating the Potential 20
for Involvement
'terrorist Use of the Narcotics Industry
20
State Involvement in the Drug Trade
24
Cuba
24
Bulgaria
15
Nicaragua
26
Syria
27
North Korea
27
Iran, I.aos, Vietnam, and Afghanistan
28
Implications and Options
28
Appendixes
A.
33
(b)(1)
B. Major Narcotics Cultivation Areas and Trafficking
Routes 35
vii
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(b)(3)
Scope Note
Political Stability:
The Narcotics Connection
(b)(3)
This assessment examines the ways in which narcotics production and
trafficking can interact with political, economic, and security institutions
to affect the stability of producing or trafficking countries. It is by its
nature, therefore, a one-dimensional perspective on problems of political
stability and makes no attempt to place narcotics-related "threats- on a
continuum with other factors affecting political stability. Rather, it is an
attempt to indicate how drug trafficking can complicate existing problems
or be exploited by those who wish to do so. For most countries, available in-
formation allows us only to raise the issue that the narcotics trade is likely
to become an additional factor working against political stability. An
understanding of the potentially destabilizing nature of a narcotics trade is
important in assessing the potential constraints facing drug control
programs (b)(3)
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(b)(3)
Political StahlHO:
The Narcotics Connection
Introduction
The multibillion-dollar international narcotics indus-
try has ramifications far beyond the immediate con-
cerns of domestic law enforcement in consumer na-
tions. It can also threaten the stability of countries
friendly to the United States:
� large criminal trafficking organizations use money
and intimidation to influence economic, political,
security, and social institutions in order to blunt
I.lIS-sponsored counternarcotics programs and pre-
vent local government action against them.
� Insurgents operating in narcotics producing and
trafficking areas can gain access to large amounts of
money, and to smuggling networks that can be used
to acquire or move arms, equipment, and personnel.
� Urban terrorist groups can make enough money on
a single, large transaction to finance their annual
operating costs.
� I lostile states can use criminal narcotics smuggling
networks to obtain hard currency, to smuggle arms
to insurgent or terrorist clients, and to support other
subversive activities beyond their borders.
� The problem is most severe in Latin America and
the Caribbean where all four factors are present to
some degree, but the drug trade also poses a threat
to governments important to the United States
elsewhere
( riminal Trafficking Organizations
and Political Stability
The existence of a large narcotics industry and power-
ful criminal trafficking organizations in a country can
threaten political, economic, and security institutions
in a variety of ways. Countries with democratic
(b)(3)
institutions are particularly vulnerable because traf-
fickers, by manipulating these institutions, jeopardize
the basic system of government. The effect on US
interests can range from a regime that is unwilling or
unable to cooperate with US counternarcotics pro-
grams to a government that has lost effective control
over territory, elements of its judiciary or military, or
its ability to plan and manage the economy. If the
government affected is friendly to the United States
and integral to US diplomatic and security. planning
in a given region, the ramifications for American
interests go far beyond concern for the effectiveness of
narcotics programs. Trafficker influence over friendly
governments is an immediate problem in Latin Amer-
ica, but it is a potential problem in virtually any Third
World country with a flourishing narcotics industry,.
Most such states have weak political and economic
institutions, and their security forces are generally
mismatched in any contest with the trafficking
organizations.
(b)(3)
Of immediate concern to us wherever narcotics traf-
fickers can exercise strong regional or national influ-
ence is their ability to twist public perception of the
narcotics issue, making it part of the anti-US or anti-
Western debate in the Third World. Through control
of media, influence with public officials, and associa-
tions with key opinionmakers, traffickers have been
able to arouse public opinion against control measures
by appealing to nationalist sentiments. Such activities
affect more than bilateral cooperation on narcotics
control measures: they can undermine the ability of a
government to cooperate with the United States on a (b)(3)
wide range of foreign policy or securit,N initiatives.
They also plav into the hands of the USSR, Cuba,
and other regimes that seek to foment or exploit anti-
American sentiment. Pravda, for example, was quick
0/ S6 /OH/ 4
Ii OW,
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Figure 1. Aftermath of a ear bomb explosion on
the street outside the US Embassy in November
I4S4. he bombing was believed to be part of a
campaign by Colombian drug traffickers- to in-
timidate t'S and (Wombian drug law enlOrce-
ment agent
to portray US demarches to Mexico after the Febru-
ary murder of a US Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) agent as Washington blaming the Third
World for American problems
Drug-Related Violence
One of the most obvious manifestations of a powerful
drug industry is an increase in drug-related violence
against government narcotics control officers and
high-level officials identified with drug control, in-
cluding foreign citizens such as US embassy or nar-
cotics control personnel. Traffickers have demonstrat-
ed a willingness to use terrorist tactics in an attempt
to undermine government authority and will to insti-
tute strong counternarcotics measures. We see a
direct correlation between enforcement successes and
trafficker-sponsored violence against officials.
Colombia. The assassination of a high-level assistant
in the Justice Ministry in February 1984 and that of
Justice Minister Lara Bonilla in April 1984 were
traced to drug traffickers. The latter played a key role
in government antinarcotics programs, and the former
had publicly supported implementation of an extradi-
tion treaty with the United States directed at drug
traffickers. The respected Superior Court judge inves-
tigating these murders was killed, presumably by drug
traffickers, in July 1985. The Colombian Govern-
ment's agreement to extradite traffickers triggered
death threats to President Betancur among other
Colombian officials, as well as senior US Embassy
personnel and the Spanish Ambassador. Drug traf-
fickers were probably responsible for a bomb that
exploded near the US Embassy in Bogota in Novem-
ber 1984, and perhaps for another near an American-
owned language school.
Peru. Nineteen members of a US-financed coca eradi-
cation team were murdered in November 1984 during
operations in a key coca-producing region, probably at
the instigation of traffickers. The increased violence
led to the resignation of large numbers of local
officials and temporary suspension of eradication
programs.
Bolivia. Traffickers, in November 1984, attempted to
kidnap a Bolivian legislator who was investigating
links between the government and the cocaine trade,
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Mexico. In February 1985, traffickers abducted and
murdered a DEA special agent and his Mexican pilot.
Since 1982, press and DEA information indicate that
some 100 Mexicans associated with narcotics control
programs have been murdered by traffickers.
Subversion of Political Institutions
The narcotics trade directly threatens government
stability' when traffickers subvert political institutions
in order to undermine or prevent narcotics control
programs and influence government and popular opin-
ion in their favor. Corruption of bureaucrats, politi-
cians, and police is a way of life to criminal traffickers
and a common phenomenon in all important narcotics
producing and trafficking countries. In some, howev-
er, traffickers have gone beyond merely buying com-
pliance from whomever is in charge to actively pro-
moting politicians and policies that favor them.
Attempts to manipulate local and national public
opinion in favor of the narcotics industry are most
common in Latin America but also occur elsewhere.
In some places, traffickers exploit ethnic conflict to
turn growers against the central government
Colombia. One of the best examples of concerted
attempts to manipulate the political system and public
opinion in support of traffickers is the manner in
which Colombia's extensive trafficking organizations
operate. Traffickers contribute to campaigns of both
parties to ensure themselves of friends in the Colombi-
an Congress, and they have obtained a loyal cadre of
representatives, largely from the northeastern mari-
juana-growing region, who protect their interests. US
Embassy officials report that one major marijuana
trafficker, Pablo Escobar Gaviria, secured appoint-
ment as an alternate Liberal Party member to Con-
gress, and another founded his own political party. A
friendly legislator used his position as President of the
Senate Committee on Health and Education to rally
public opposition to proposed aerial spraying of herbi-
cides on narcotics crops in 1984. Embassy, press,
3
(b)"
indicates that Colombian traffickct ,(b)(1)
are perhaps the most advanced in their ability to kb)
manipulate the media. One major trafficker, Carlos
Lehder, owns a weekly newspaper to ensure continued
favorable coverage; he also finances full page adver-
tisements aimed at undermining government antidrug
efforts by playing on nationalist themes. Other traf-
fickers use sympathetic journalists to place articles
depicting them as local benefactors and heroes. Some
large traffickers finance civic projects such as parks,
zoos, and publ'c housin2 protects to burnish their
popular image
(b)(3)
Bolivia. Journalists report that traffickers stimulated
an antigovernment demonstration by peasants in a
major coca-growing area in 1984 in response to
attempts to regulate the coca trade. Subsequently, the
congress of the country's largest labor union called for
free marketing of coca leaves and abrogation of US-
Bolivian accords on drug control. According to the US
Embassy, the narcotics industry contributed large
amounts of money to both parties in the 1985 election
to ensure a strong cadre of support against any plans
to implement more effective control programs. The
Interior Minister in the outgoing Siles administration,
who controlled appointments of narcotics officials,
was implicated in drug-related corruption. The situa-
tion at the national level in Bolivia is an improvement
over the earlier regime of Garcia Meza, who took
power in 1980 in a coup that was financed by major (b)(3)
traffickers. (b)(3)
Belize. Government concern about opposition from
politically influential marijuana farmers caused re-
peated postponement of aerial eradication of marijua-
na crops in
Jamaica.
1985, according to Embassy' reporting.
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
Jamaica also ha!(b)(i )
a strong "marijuana lobby" that successfully manipu-
lates public opinion to thwart government actions; this
"-Szt-pit�
(b)(1)
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lobby staged an "environmental" protest in 1984 to
prevent an agricultural development project that
would have flooded a prime growing area for a high-
grade form of marijuana. Reporting from a variety of
US Mission sources indicates that payoffs and politi-
cal contributions from drug traffickers are an increas-
ingly important source of funds for Jamaica's political
parties. Although neither major party systematically
solicits money from drug dealers, individuals in both
the ruling Jamaica Labor Party and the opposition
People's National Party have used drug money to
support their activities. The Embassy reports that the
People's National Party and the small but vocal
Marxist Workers' Party of Jamaica purchase arms
with drug money for use in the political wars.
Peru. Narcotics-related corruption has been wide-
spread, reaching to high levels of public and private
institutions. Persons arrested for complicity in the
drug trade in recent years have included doctors,
senior police officials, a prominent member of the
Chamber of Deputies, and the president of the Board
of Directors of the national airline.
implicated more than a dozen senators and deputies in
some aspect of the illegal drug business. Under the
Belaunde administration, traffickers so thoroughly
suborned the judicial system that few were arrested
and even fewer convicted;
Recently
elected President Alan Garcia has taken several high-
ly publicized steps against drug-related corruption,
including firing many high-ranking police officials,
but it is too soon to judge the long-term impact of
these moves or whether he will be able to sustain
them
Mexico. Pervasive corruption at all levels has under-
mined narcotics control programs and resulted in
police and government officials actively abetting traf-
ficking operations. Several members of the Mexican
Federal Judicial Police were implicated in the abduc-
tion and death of a US DEA agent in February 1985.
According to DEA reports, known associates of one
influential trafficker include state governors, close
friends of the Attorney General and of the President
of Mexico, and a former Mexico City police chief.
Figure 2. Mexican federal drug control agents
killed by drug traffickers in November 1985.
Reports from the US Embassy and
Police reportedly provide protection
for the narcotics industry and sometimes act as
middlemen in transactions
The Bahamas. Investigations by a Royal Commission
of Inquiry in 1984 indicate that drug-related corrup-
tion is widespread among lower level officials, and
testimony suggests that substantial corruption exists
at the middle levels, especially among the judiciary.
The Bahamas has long been a major transit area for
cocaine and marijuana to the United States. Although
the commission cleared Prime Minister Pindling in
1984 of charges of personal involvement in drug
trafficking, testimony before the commission impli-
cated several high-level officials, including cabinet
ministers. Despite a cabinet shuffle and subsequent
4
(b)(3)
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offers of cooperation in US narcotics efforts, drug-
related corruption continues to be a fact of life, and
we suspect that those large traffickers with well-
placed friends are likely to escape the consequences of
any intensified counternarcotics program undertaken
to mollify the United States
Pakistan. Most opium is grown in northwest Pakistan,
in areas that have traditionally sought autonomy at
the expense of whatever government is in power.
Traffickers are able to exploit strong tribal resent-
ment or central authority to contest government at-
tempts to control poppy cultivation and processing. In
February 1985, villagers in Dir, North-West Frontier
Province, made common cause with poppy growers to
keep government eradication teams out, according to
Embassy reports. In March 1985, government moves
against a heroin laboratory in the tribal area of the
Khyber Agency, North-West Frontier Province, re-
sulted in a sharp firefight with local Pushtun tribes-
men. Adding to government concern, these areas are
along the border with Afghanistan, and Islamabad
does not wish to provoke unrest in this crucial security
,one
Thailand. Most opium is grown in tribal areas along
Thailand's borders with Laos and Burma, areas of
poor security and weak government control where the
inhabitants do not identify with the regime in Bang-
kok. Embassy reports suggest that some in the govern-
ment, particularly the Royal Family, fear that a
strong stance against poppy cultivation could lead to
active 'antigovernment conflict and a resurgence of the
Communist Party of Thailand insurgency, which was
formerly strong in these areas. In the last year, the
King has permitted eradication operations in some
hilltribe areas in conjunction with rural development
programs for poppy farmers.
Destabilization of Financial and
Economic Institutions
The impact of the narcotics industry on national
financial and economic institutions and policies is less
well documented than that for political ones. A chief
difficulty lies in determining how much of the narcot-
ics earnings returns to the countries that produce and
process the drugs. Offshore banking centers, particu-
larly in areas that serve as crossroads for drug
Figure 3. Thai King Rhumihol receives a small
rose plant during a visit to a crop substitution
project ill northern Thailand. The Thai royal
family comider. hill tribes people, many at
whom grow rTII1111, 1,1 be under their .yeeial
protection
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
trafficking, derive some of their business from moving
drug money, but we cannot determine whether the
share is large enough to influence national policy.. (b)(3)
Individual banks or financial institutions, however,
may be totally dependent on drug money and vulnera-
ble to manipulation. At a minimum, a government's
ability to monitor and control economic affairs is
diminished by the presence of a pervasive under-
ground economy fueled by drug money. Drug money
movements are influenced not only by the same
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A Profitable Enterprise
US Government sources estimate that, worldwide, the
dollar value and related cost to society of the illegal
drug industry may total $150-300 billion annually.
The clandestine nature of the trade complicates not
only estimates of its profits but also any attempt to
determine the destination of the profits, in particular
what share eventually returns to the countries in-
volved in production and trafficking. According to
our estimates, for example, some $5-15 billion in
drug revenues left the United States in 1983, but
much of this did not return to the Latin American
countries that are the major source of drugs reaching
the US market
We suspect that drug money returned home by
traffickers probably did not constitute more than 10
percent of the GNP of any producing country, but
such dollars probably represented the principal un-
regulated source of hard currency in many source and
transit countries. In 1983, for example, earnings
removed from the United States by Colombian traf-
fickers were roughly double Colombia's external
current account deficit that year. The temptation to
tap into this seemingly unlimited flow of money is
strong not only for individuals interested in improv-
ing their personal financial situation but also for
governments or subnational groups short of cash and
not particularly fastidious about where they acquire
it. We judge some of the officials of debt-ridden
governments might see a deal with the traffickers as
preferable to domestic austerity measures.
Most of the income from drug sales is earned by
distributors in major markets, with significantly less
accruing to those involved in production and trans-
port. Profits on a given transaction vary greatly
depending on the point in the production/trafficking
chain the closer to the retail sales end of the chain,
the greater the markup. Even though the grower
receives very little relative to the street price in the
United States, his profit is still subtantially greater
than it would be from any other agricultural crop.
Estimates of farm income in one coca-growing area
conclude that annual profits from coca were as much
as $1,800 to $2,400, in sharp contrast to $750 to $900
for cacao, $750 for rice, and $260 for corn
The billionaires of the international narcotics indus-
try are the large Colombian cocaine-trafficking orga-
nizations that supply the US market, for their control
extends from acquisition of the raw materials in the
coca-producing countries of South America through
wholesale distribution in the United States. We esti-
mate that gross receipts of Colombian trafficking
organizations from US sales in 1983 were $6-8 billion
and that about half of this was profit. In terms of
affluence, the Colombians' closest competitors are
the Mexican traffickers, who also handle multiple
drugs and operate deep within the US market. One
Mexican trafficker this year claimed a personal
fortune of $3 billion. Such large profits provide a
slush fund to underwrite anything the traffickers
choose to do, including instituting countermeasures
against drug-control efforts.
economic forces that motivate other investors but also
by countermeasures against the drug trade all along
the trafficking route. We judge that the erratic ebb
and flow of drug money is destabilizing to both the
money supply and the exchange markets in affected
areas
Whether the national economies of the producer and
trafficker countries reap economic benefits or prob-
lems from the narcotics trade is less important than
the perception of leaders and citizens that the benefits
are enormous. This perception can prevent govern-
ments with large foreign debts and failing domestic
economies from invoking strict counternarcotics pro-
grams. Revenues returned to source countries can give
the traffickers a strong grip on rural drug cultivating
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or trafficking areas. In some producing countries,
drugs have become the leading agricultural export: in
all of them, the income from drug crops greatly
exceeds that possible from any alternative use of the
same land and labor, according to US and other
agricultual experts. In some areas of Mexico. DEA
reports that drug plantations are the principal
employer
Some observers are also concerned that the growing
attractiveness of drug cultivation may divert needed
resources, including manpower, pesticides, herbicides,
and fertili.zers from lcoil export crops and needed
foodstuffs.
Colombia. Embassy estimates indicate that drug
money flows into Colombia during the 1970s substan-
tially blunted the impact of the oil price increase on
foreign exchange balances. The clandestine inflow of
drug dollars was sufficient to create a major upheaval
in the exchange markets. In 1980 as much as $2
billion in drug money may have entered Colombia.
This declined to less than $1 billion in 1984, partly in
response to government abrogation of banking regula-
tions that had encouraged drug money return. The
Betancur government in 1985 discussed legislation
that seemed designed to reverse this trend, despite a
continuing national campaign against the drug trade
spurred by last year's assassination of Justice Minister
Lara Bonilla.
Panama. A favorite crossroads for moving and supply-
ing the drug trade, Panama also is a major financial
center for drug money laundering and investment.
Panama's strict bank secrecy laws and general
laissez faire attitude toward financial activities work
to the traffickers' advantage. Panama's emergence as
a major banking center coincides with the expansion
of the Colombian narcotics industry. DEA reports
indicate that a Panamanian bank, when it opened in
1975, had as a major investor and officer the Colom-
bian drug trafficker Gilberto Rodriguez Orjuelo. One
recent report suggests traffickers also use Panamani-
an institutions as investment centers. Drug money
dollars probably play a bigger role in Panama than in
any other Latin American offshore banking center,
and traffickers and their beneficiaries could bring
strong pressure to bear on the government should it
try to move against them
7
Peru. The impact of a booming narcotics industry on
the local economy can be seen in the town of Tingo
Maria in Peru's Upper I luallaga River Valley. A
small jungle village before the coca boom, visitors
report it now features a market filled with expensive
consumer goods, new hotels, a thriving commercial
sector, and people with money to spend. Soil and
climatic conditions in the area are generally unfavor-(b)(3)
able to the cultivation of other cash crops, and lack of
transportation would make it difficult to get them to
market. As long as the farmer can make an estimated
$100 from a hectare of coca, compared with only $10
from a hectare planted in rice or corn, any attempt by.
(b)(3)
the government to end the narcotics trade without
compensating economic aid could bring severe eco-
nomic depression to the area and could trigger a
serious antigovernment backlash
(b)(3)
Undermining Effectiveness of the Military
The impact of the narcotics industry on the military is
of direct concern because many Third World govern-
ments depend heavily on their armed forces both for
internal security and for political support. In many
countries military officers have been directly implicat-
ed in drug trafficking in their areas of responsibility.
Such involvement can degrade the overall effective-
ness of the military in performing its security mission.
Even in countries where there is limited direct in-
volvement, the narcotics trade can be a source of
dissension within the military and between military (b)(3)
and political leaders. Frequently, only the armed
forces have the equipment, training, and skill to
combat effectively a large, well-equipped drug traf-
ficking organization. Government attempts to involve
the military forces in drug control, however, can meet
with resistance from commanders who see drug con-
trol as a police function or who fear the corrupting
influence of involvement in narcotics control. (b)(3)
Mexico. The Army, along with the Attorney
al's office, is involved in eradication programs
(b)(1)
low-level military men accept payoff(b)(1)
to burn fields after, rather than before, the harvest
and to allow traffickers through roadblocks estab-
lished to search for illegal drugs. In major drug-
producing areas, battalion and zone commanders have
(b)(3)
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Figure 4. Member of the Mexican armed forces
during a raid on an opium poppy field in Mexico.
been implicated in protection of or participation in the
drug trade, according to DEA sources
least protect favored associates or family members.
The current armed forces commander General Nor-
iega has close business and social ties to several people
cited by DEA as drug traffickers. Investigations
connected with the destruction in 1984 of a cocaine
laboratory being built by Colombian traffickers in
Darien Province brought allegations that the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Armed Forces General Staff had
accepted sizable bribes from Colombian trafficker
Jorge Luis Ochoa in return for protecting the labora-
tory operations from enforcement.
Colombia.
some local military commanders in Colombian drug-
producing areas are heavily involved in drug-related
activities and tell of
military personnel loading drugs on aircraft, Air
Force personnel operating their own drug-smuggling
operations out of a Colombian air base, and bribery of
field-level officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
We have no reports of high-level participation in the
drug trade, although this situation could change as
junior field-grade officers are promoted
Peru. The military is not involved in drug control, and
reports from various Embassy sources indicate that
senior officers have resisted efforts to include it
because they fear the potentially corrupting influence
on military units.
extensive corruption already exists at the
field level. Some officers have been accused of looking
the other way when drug shipments arrive at border
checkpoints in the drug-producing region of north-
eastern Peru. Air Force officers have been accused of
permitting drugs to move through airports under their
control, and some reports allege that Air Force planes
have been used to transport drugs from growin areas
to collection centers
Panama. Drug control falls under the purview of the
Panama Defense Forces, and DEA reports
have indicated over the past several years that senior
officers participate directly in the drug trade or at
Bolivia. Direct military involvement at high levels has
probably lessened since the late 1970s and early
1980s, when drug-related corruption was the norm at
the highest levels of the military and government. US
officials in La Paz reported that, during that period,
Col. Luis Arce Gomez, a leading field commander
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and subsequent Interior Minister, operated his own
cocaine network and demanded a percentage from
other traffickers. The most notorious military drug
traffickers were purged during the recent Siles admin-
istration, but the problem continues at the field levels,
particularly in the drug-producing regions. Reports
also continue to allege associations between drug
traffickers and high-ranking officers. Bolivian Air
Force personnel and equipment continue to be impli-
cated in the transport of drugs
F�Havy boats assigned to patrol against drug and
other smuggling are being used to transport drugs on
the interior waterway
Pakistan.
All
of involvement by field-level officers are com-
mon and seem credible, given the overall level of
corruption in Pakistan and the widespread problems
of narcotics trafficking
Thailand. In the past, high-ranking officers of the
Thai military, including former Prime Minister
kriangsak, were implicated in the narcotics trade, but
this no longer appears to be the case. One high-
ranking police officer, however, allegedly runs a nar-
cotics smuggling ring
Involvement at the midlevels exists, especially
among units charged with suppression activities along
the Thai-Burmese border in northern Thailand
A
I hai investigation discovered some Arms officers
��ere running their own heroin trafficking network
from a camp in central Thailand that serves as a
distribution point for both civilian and military traf-
fickers. Because military personnel and vehicles are
not subjected to searches at police checkpoints intend-
ed to control drug smuggling to Bangkok, poorly paid
militar� personnel can earn large profits, especially as
national control programs succeed in tightening up
the overall situation
9
Figure 5. Btoldhi.ct monk mealint; a na
whit," al a temple in I hadand
Iii
Social Disruption
The social disruption caused by the drug abuse and ODX1)
violent crime that frequently accompany a well-devel-
oped narcotics industry can also lead to political
problems for the government. Almost every major
drug-producing country is experiencing a rise in do-(b)(3)
mestic drug abuse, a byproduct of burgeoning narcot-
ics production and the desire by the traffickers to find
new markets. Coca-producing countries have always
had a large population that chewed the coca leaf, but
now they are developing urban addict populations that
use semirefined and refined coca products. Jamaica
and The Bahamas, countries that are major traffickopm)
ing and transshipment points for South American (bvi)
cocaine en route to the United States, have begun t(i jk
experience cocaine abuse problems of their own. (b)(1)
Pakistan, though it long had a number of opium (b)(1)
smokers, reports an increase in heroin addicts from
almost none in 1980 to an estimated 200,000 to
300,000 in 1985.
((b)(1)
The governments of countries involved in the narcot-
ics industry also report a rising rate of violence,
including crimes by those seeking to buy drugs and by
those trafficking them. Violence between competing
trafficking networks have spilled over into the streets
endangering the general public. Officials in Trinidad
(b)(3)
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and Tobago point to their country's growing impor-
tance as a transshipment point in the Caribbean
narcotics trade as the reason for the recent upsurge in
illegal weapons imports. The methods used to smuggle
the drugs can also be used to bring in the weapons
For the Caribbean states heavily dependent on foreign
tourists, a reputation for a high crime rate can dry up
this important source of hard currency for the nation-
al economy.
Tensions With Neighbors
Because narcotics operations, whether growing or
trafficking, frequently occur in areas far from the
government's control and often in regions where
international borders are poorly defined, aggressive
narcotics control programs by a country can some-
times lead to tensions with its neighbors. Pakistan, for
example, must take care that any major operations
against opium growers and refiners in its North-West
Frontier Province not provide the Afghan regime and
its Soviet advisers with an excuse to allege provoca-
tion and launch military attacks against Pakistan.
Thailand and Burma have regarded each other with
distrust for years in the area of the Golden Triangle
heroin centers, and Thai operations in pursuit of
opium traffickers can cause friction with Rangoon,
which suspects Bangkok of supporting anti-Burmese
insurgents in the area. Similar problems have existed
in South America, for example, along the Ecuador-
ean-Peruvian border. At present, however, the prevail-
ing trend in South America and elsewhere is toward
greater cooperation against drug traffickers.
Countries of Most Immediate Concern
We judge that criminal trafficking organizations can
already pose a serious threat to the political or
economic well-being of several Latin American or
Caribbean countries important to the United States.
In any of these countries, a large-scale antinarcotics
campaign would be disruptive to the national life and
could precipitate a serious confrontation with consid-
erable violence. We judge, however, that, despite their
public statements, none of these governments can or
will put sufficient pressure on traffickers to force a
showdown in the near term. We believe that govern-
ment counternarcotics programs probably can put the
less influential or powerful traffickers out of business,
but we expect the major traffickers to remain secure,
although their operations can be disrupted and made
costlier. For their part, traffickers would prefer to
maintain the status quo, avoiding a confrontation that
would upset existing business relationships
Traffickers in Colombia have
been able to avoid most of the consequences of the
state of siege, either by moving their operations or by
blunting government activities. If they believed that
they were in serious danger, we expect the traffickers
would make good their threats of assassination and
bombing against local and foreign officials. They
could also precipitate capital flight, which could
severely undercut the country's financial stability. In
a democratic country, like Colombia, trafficker pene-
tration of the media and elected political bodies could
be used to turn popular opinion against the govern-
ment even though polls indicate t at many Colomhi-
1-
ans oppose the narcotics industry.
The newly elected government of Bolivia has an
uncertain hold, and the fragile economy could with-
stand few shocks. Some rural areas are a coca mono-
culture with no other economic base. Any sign that
the government planned a significant move against
the narcotics industry could bring serious local unrest
in the growing areas, economic dislocation, and prob-
ably strong reprisals from within the regime, perhaps
from the military. In Peru, where the economy is in
disrepair and democratic institutions have a tenuous
hold at best, large numbers of peasants earn their
living from the narcotics industry. A concerted assault
on the coca trade in rural areas without parallel
economic development could bring depression there
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Trafficking Organizations
Criminal drug trafficking organizations range from
small, specialized operations active in one segment of
the production, trafficking, or distribution of a .specif-
ic drug to large, sophisticated enterprises that resem-
ble a vertically integrated multinational company in
their size, scope, and manner of operations. The best
examples cif the latter type are the large Colombian
organizations, which dominate the production, pro-
cessing, and distribution of cocaine for the US mar-
ket. Such organizations may distribute thou.sand.s of
i/o,Qranis of cocaine to the United States, earning
billions of dollars in just a few years of operation.
These large networks handle all aspects of the trade:
purchase of the raw product in Bolivia, Peru, or
elsewhere; processing either nearby or at an interme-
diate stop such as Mexico: and wholesale distribution
in the United States. Although a large trafficking
network may specialize in one drug, such as cocaine,
it Call use its infrastructure and contacts to handle
other drugs in response to shifting market preference
or to exploit targets of opportunity; for e.vample,
Colombian marijuana traffickers began supplying the
1'5' market with methaqualone when that became
popular. Members of the drug trafficking fraternity
usually know one another and cooperate on occasion,
ft r example, to send a large shipment: they also
compete, sometimes violently, as one attempts to
increase his .share at another's expense.
The infr astructure of a large network rivals most
legitimate businesses and even some national govern-
ments in the amount of property. sophistication of
equipment, and network of financial, political, and
commercial contacts. Large cocaine trafficking orga-
nizations,1Or e.vample, frequently control .fleets of
Nmall aircraft Many With sophisticated communica-
tiOnS gear and reconfigured with extra fuel tanks
that are used to carry drugs, people, and 111011ey
between Latin America and the United States. These
operations are supported by a network of clandestine
airfields, sonic of them fairly large with concrete
runways, others .small dirt strips. The organizations
al.so have sizable numbers of trucks, small and large
boats, helicopters, and any other form of tran.sport
needed to move the drugs ji-om remote growing areas
to clandestine processing sites and eventually to the
LS market. To disguise and facilitate their illegal
activities, traffickers buy or create cover businesse.s,
including transport companies, machine shops, ship-
yards, crop-dusting firms, and ranches. Traffickers
also need access to financial networks capable of
moving and laundering their profits and arranging
payments to creditors. These networks consist of both
underground anti legitimate financial in.stitution.s. A.s
a re.sult, most traffickers have cultivated important
contacts among banks, money exchange houses, and
investment jirms.
(b)(3)
In addition to their extensive financial and commer-
cial networks, trafficking organizations shield and
protect their operations by co-opting or intimidating
political and legal out In some small towns
or rural areas, the trafficking network may function
a.s a de,fa cto political institution paralleling the
government apparatus. Traffickers' bribe politicians,
finance political campaigns, and corrupt government(m3)
narcotics enforcement officials at all levels. Law
enforcement personnel are particularly vulnerable in
most Third World countries because they are poorly
paid, have low morale, receive inferior equipment,
and are generally regarded as .second rate by compar-
ison with the armed .1Orces. Trafficking organizations
may also employ private armies, in some case.s
composed of local police .forces, to protect or further
their operations.
(b)(3)
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that alienated the peasants and encouraged antigov-
ernment dissidents. We do not expect the govern-
ments of Colombia, Bolivia, or Peru to launch such a
frontal assault, but, if they did, we are concerned that
the involvement of military personnel in the coca
trade in all three countries would undercut the reli-
ability of any local units commanded to assault the
traffickers
Jamaica has been a major supplier of the US market
for marijuana and has recently become an important
transshipment point for cocaine. Government moves
against cultivation of marijuana have aroused a
strong political lobby against the present regime, but
thus far major traffickers have not sought to exercise
their muscle. Some reportedly believe they are im-
mune from government interference because they
have subverted enough police or military personnel to
guarantee the safety of their operations. Most can
probably afford to miss a few harvests, given the
recent oversupply of marijuana on the US market. In
our judgment, recent evidence that the government is
serious about moving against the narcotics trade will
cause traffickers and growers to step up pressure on
Seaga by increasing attempts to corrupt or co-opt
local political institutions.
Panama differs from the preceding countries in that
its involvement is largely financial. We judge that
drug money is a crucial ingredient in Panama's
success as an international banking center, although
we cannot estimate the extent. Consequently, traffick-
ers have financial leverage in addition to the influence
they have acquired through close associations with
key military personnel in the ruling circles. If Colom-
bian traffickers begin to relocate refining operations
to Panama, we would expect the drug-related corrup-
tion to spread d-ener into the military and civ'l
administrations
The charges against the Pindling government of The
Bahamas in the media and as a result of the High
Commission investigations in 1984 represented a ma-
jor political scandal but evidently did little damage to
the Prime Minister's political position with his constit-
uents. We judge that, despite evidence of some coop-
eration with US counternarcotics programs, the Pin-
dling government will do little that might threaten
traffickers with good political connections to the
regime
Figure 6. Bahamian Prime Minister Pindling
(center, carrying papers) leaves the House of
.4ssembly in Nassau October 1984 cdier his first
appearance in Parliament following the depar-
ture o/ Jive Cabinet ministers .from office in the
wake of drug corruption investigations.
Several Latin American countries on the fringes of
established producing or trafficking areas are being
drawn into the narcotics trade as a result of changing
situations elsewhere. In some cases, these countries
have weakening economies in which traditional crops
or industries are suffering a declining world market,
and the drug trade may well become an attractive
alternative to unemployed peasants. We consider
these countries vulnerable to increased influence by
traffickers
The marijuana lobby already exerts political influence
in Belize, according to Embassy reporting, but we
judge that the growing importance of marijuana as an
export crop could markedly increase this. The decline
of traditional cash crops, such as sugar, and the
availability of easily cultivated land make Belize
attractive as an alternative growing site to Colombia
and Jamaica, where government eradication efforts
continue. The need for alternative processing facilities
for coca have led to increased use of Argentina as a
site for cocaine laboratories and as a transshipment
point, according to DEA assessments. We are con-
cerned that, given past military involvement in the
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narcotics trade, the traffickers might establish alli-
ances with dissident rightwing political groups to
ensure protection. Various states in the Eastern Ca-
ribbean could become important transshipment points
for cocaine from South America as US enforcement
efforts make present Western Caribbean routes less
attractive. We judge that few of these states have
police forces capable of dealing with an influx of well-
organized criminal trafficking organizations and that
these ministates risk coming under the influence of
such networks before they are sufficiently aware of
the problem to take action
Insurgent Inlohement in the Narcotics Industry
Involvement in narcotics production and trafficking
by antigovernment insurgent or separatist groups in
countries friendly to the United States can increase
the threat to government stability and jeopardize US
diplomatic and security interests in the region. Sever-
al major rural insurgencies regularly obtain money
and weapons through direct or indirect participation
in the drug trade. The size of the narcotics trade has
increased so dramatically in the last decade that these
groups have been able to find a niche without threat-
ening the activities of criminal trafficking organiza-
tions. For purposes of this discussion, we differentiate
between insurgents and terrorists. Among insurgents
we include those groups that seek to control territory,
generally have an army of sorts, and frequently
engage government forces in unit-sized confronta-
tions. Insurgents also tend to operate in rural areas
beyond government control. We consider as terrorist
groups those that are generally urban; tend to attack
civilian, noncombatant, or unprotected targets; and
usually avoid setpiece battles with police or military.
Insurgents often have the opportunity, motive, and
capability to participate systematically in the drug
trade. Insurgency and illicit drug cultivation tend to
occur in remote regions, where the government pres-
ence is limited and rugged terrain makes it difficult
for the police and military forces to operate. People in
these areas often feel little connection to the national
regime, feelings that are exacerbated by a weak or
13
nonexistent national economic and political infra-
structure. Some insurgent leaders may have ideologi-
cal misgivings about cooperating with traffickers, and
traffickers may. prefer the political status quo because
they have made arrangements with it; but colocation
of the two activities tends to invite interaction and can
eventually lead to a systematic link. Both groups
operate illegally and will inevitably come into contact
as each searches for weapons and equipment, clandes-
tine transportation, corrupt officials, and intelligence
on police and military forces (b)(3)
(b)(3)
Certain factors may make cooperation between the
two attractive. The drug trade offers insurgents access
to sizable amounts of money to obtain arms and
equipment and to finance political and social welfare
programs. Some insurgent groups tax drug producers
and traffickers in the same fashion as any other
economic enterprise occurring in areas where they
operate. Other groups, however, encourage growers
and refiners in their area and provide protection or
transportation. Some eventually become full-fledged
narcotics trafficking operations in their own right.
The extent of involvement varies with need and
opportunity; some groups have become heavily en-
gaged in narcotics only after other sources of financ-
ing dried up. From the traffickers' perspective, well-
armed insurgents can provide protection from police.
Both traffickers and insurgents need clandestine
smuggling networks, the one to ship drugs out of the
region, the other to bring arms in. In both cases,
projecting the appearance of defending local interests
against national government actions provides a com-
mon cause and helps enlist popular support. Insur-
gents may see support to local peasants involved in
drug cultivation as a convenient way to side with them
against the national government.
Insurgent involvement in the drug trade probably has
a relatively small impact on the overall narcotics
situation. Access to the money available from narcot-
ics, however, can significantly enhance the capability
of insurgent forces a particularly serious concern in
countries where the national military forces arc poorly
armed and trained. Insurgents who can establish their
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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own arms pipeline based on narcotics smuggling are
also less dependent on outside supporters. The types of
weapons most insurgent groups favor are low-cost,
small arms easily purchased on the gray arms market.
Thus far, insurgents involved in the narcotics industry
have been largely restricted to growing and refining
the drugs, the least profitable part of the industry.
Nonetheless, if they can control production or refining
from a large area, they have a very lucrative business,
one that is much more profitable than any other
enterprise available to groups operating in remote
Third World areas. The only comparable support
would be an unlimited money and equipment pipeline
from a major state supporter
We are also concerned that, in addition to using the
narcotics trade to acquire revenue, insurgent and
other dissident groups may capitalize on the resent-
ment that could be aroused in rural areas by aggres-
sive government narcotics control programs. Active
counternarcotics programs that upset rural economies
and make enemies of peasant growers could play into
the hands of insurgent groups looking for adherents.
The insurgents need not make the first approach;
traffickers and growers seeking to shield their activi-
ties from government enforcement might well ap-
proach the insurgents offering cooperation against
government forces.
Groups Heavily Involved
We judge that the involvement of certain insurgent
groups in the narcotics industry is extensive enough to
enhance the threat they can pose to regimes friendly
to or important to the United States. We believe that
the continued growth of the international narcotics
trade, including the opening of and spread to new
markets, may lead these insurgent groups to expand
their involvement and, thus, the benefits they derive.
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
The largest and most formidable insurgent group in
Colombia, FARC was established in 1966 as the
military arm of the Colombian Communist Party.
FARC involvement in the dru trade is well docu-
mented in Embass reports, which also
indicate that about half of its front groups operate in
areas where coca or marijuana is grown. It first
became involved in narcotics in about 1977 when it
began exacting fees from growers and traffickers in
FARC-controlled territory and obtaining arms from
traffickers in return for protection. This activity was
sanctioned by the National Directorate in May 1982,
FARC is an example
of a group whose initial ideological reservations about
involvement in the drug trade were overcome as it
realized the benefits that could be derived. According
to US Embassy reports, FARC has established pro-
duction quotas for coca in some areas under its
control, and at least one FARC front in southeast
Colombia was formed expressly to organize profits
from coca production to support activities by other
fronts. FARC units in the Golfo de Uraba trade drugs
for guns with organized smuggling networks. Some
reports indicate that the Communist Party may be
directing this activity and may be using its channels
and contacts to find markets abroad. If so, this would
give FARC access to the high-profit end of the drug
trade and make it the first Latin American insurgent
group to control drug production from growing
through marketing the finished product
Burmese Communist Party (BCP). A large number of
ethnic separatist groups and insurgents are involved in
opium cultivation and trafficking in Burma, but the
only one that poses a military threat to the central
government is the BCP. Reports from the US Embas-
sy in Rangoon indicate that BCP leaders were initial-
ly opposed to opium cultivation in areas under their
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Figure 7
Narcotic Production and Operating Areas of
Major Trafficking Groups in the Golden Triangle
India
Tauoggyi.
tj
Burma
China
BCP headquarters
� Poppy cultivation
Operating areas
BCP (Burmese
Communist Party)
trX�. SUA (Shan United Army)
MI CIF (Chinese Irregular
Forces)
Refining areas
;40 BCP controlled
SUA controlled
25Kilorneters
25 Miles
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control, but, in the late 1970s, they sought to compen-
sate for reduced Chinese financial support by system-
atically exploitating the opium business. According to
the Embassy, the BCP now sponsors opium cultiva-
tion and trafficking activities in areas under its
control; these areas account for some 70 percent of
Burma's production, making the BCP the principal
purchaser of raw opium from Burmese farmers. The
value to the BCP of merchandizing this is estimated
at $4-8 million. The BCP earns most of its narcotics
revenue from transporting opium and opium products
to the Thai border area for other trafficking organiza-
tions to refine, but it is a growing source of refined
heroin. At present, the BCP's heroin markets are
concentrated in northern and central Burma, al-
though it sells to Indian traders in western Burma and
sends small amounts south to Rangoon. Embassy
sources indicate that the BCP has formed alliances
with a number of major traffickers in order to harness
their expertise to develop its narcotics trade. One
result of this activity has been a growing tendency for
the BCP to become more of a narcotics trafficking
organization and less of a political group committed
to the overthrow of the Rangoon government
As for the other Burmese groups heavily involved in
narcotics cultivation and smuggling, expert observers
of the drug situation in the Golden Triangle report
that, unlike the BCP, they show little interest in
seizing and holding territory beyond what they need
for their narcotics business, and they have long since
abandoned any political agenda. The Shan United
Army, though once a politically motivated ethnic
separatist group, is today solely a criminal trafficking
organization seeking to acquire a monopoly of opium
refining along the Burmese-Thai border. The Chinese
Irregular Force, involved in drug trafficking since the
1950s, is also a refiner and trafficker in heroin and
has connections with Chinese crime syndicates in
Hong Kong and elsewhere. The Thai Revolutionary
Army and the Kachin Independence Army also tax
opium production, extort money from local traffickers
and caravans, and act as brokers between growers and
refiners. The latter, which has recently begun refining
heroin, still maintains some political interests and
activities, whereas the former expends all of its ener-
gies in the narcotics business.
Kurdish Dissident Groups. Kurdish dissidents in the
Iranian-Turkish-Iraqi border area became prominent
in the drug trade in the mid-to-late 1970s as Turkish
traffickers sought new sources of supplies in response
to a crackdown by Ankara on domestic production,
Iranian Kurds supplied the opium, either
from local production or by trade from Afghanistan,
and Turkish Kurds acted as refiners and traffickers.
ome Kurdish
groups regularly trade narcotics for weapons, andE
a Kurdish insurrection in Iran in
late 1980 was armed in large part through barter
arrangements involving drugs. Martial law was im-
posed in the Kurdish areas in eastern Turkey in 1981,
but recent reports indicate that drug refining and
smuggling continue. Turkish authorities allege that
Kurds from Turkey have established major smuggling
networks in Europe where they exchange drugs for
weapons that are smuggled into Turkey, both for
Kurds themselves and also for Turkish political ex-
tremist organizations. Reports indicate that Bulgaria
is often the source for the weapons. Embassy reports
show that, unlike other insurgents involved in the drug
trade, the Kurds are involved all along the trafficking
chain from production through refining, often in
eastern Turkey, and marketing in Europe. As a result,
they have access to greater profits as well as a
smuggling infrastructure for moving supplies to the
rebellion.
Groups Well Placed To Participate
The following groups bear watching because they
have shown some occasional interest in narcotics as a
fundraising proposition or because they are located in
areas where the narcotics industry is expanding rapid-
ly. In some cases the groups are small and pose no
particular threat to the government, but systematic
exploitation of narcotics money and connections could
change this
The National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN).
ELN is a small Marxist-Leninist organization estab-
lished in the early 1960s with cells throughout Colom-
bia. It allegedly extorts money from coca growers and
16
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Figure 8
Narcotics Cultivation and Rural Fronts of Principal Insurgent Groups
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Colombia
Peru
11
Coca cultivation
Marijuana cultivation
Cocaine hydrochloride
processing area
Principal insurgent groups
FARC (Revolfrhonary Aimed
Forces of (olombia)
M-19 (19th of April Movement)
EPL (People's Libmation Army)
ELN (Army of National Liticration)
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cultivates some marijuana itself, but most of its
operating expenses are covered by bank robberies,
kidnapings, and extortion from legitimate businesses.
Colombian
drug traf ickers have solicited protection from the
FIN during the recent government drug crackdown.
Peoples Liberation Army of Colombia (EPL). A small
group active in the Golfo de Uraba area and Cordoba
Department, EPL was associated with the now-de-
funct pro-Bejing Colombian Communist Party/Marx-
ist-Leninist. Colombian authorities suspect that the
FPI. gets some weapons from drug traffickers in the
Golfo de Uraba area and that it may also cultivate
and traffic in marijuana. We believe, however, that
most of LPL's funding, like most of the ELN, comes
from other forms of crime
,S'endero Luminoso (SL). In contrast to the preceding
two minor insurgencies in Colombia, the SL of Peru
has sustained a debilitating insurrection against the
government. It is based primarily in the Ayacucho
region, a coca-growing area, but in 1984 it opened a
second front in the upper Huallaga River Valley near
the center of Peru's illicit coca industry. The SL's
stated goal is to mobilize Peruvian Indians against the
government. Peruvian Indians are the main coca
growers and would be major losers in any serious
government attempts to control coca cultivation. Thus
far, Embassy reports indicate that SL involvement
with narcotics apparently has been limited to extort-
ing, money from traffickers operating in its territory
individual
SL operating units, especially in the Upper Huallaga
River region, may find narcotics trafficking a conve-
nient way to obtain funds for improved weapons and
other material. The longer the SL operates in major
coca-producing areas, the more likely it is to be drawn
into the trade, first on an ad hoc basis and ultimately
in a more systematic fashion
Tamil Dissidents. Tamils in Sri Lanka have increas-
ingly resorted to terrorist tactics to press their sepa-
ratist insurgency they
have tried to exploit Sri Lanka's growing importance
as a transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin
to obtain funds for their movement. Most of the
evidence so far comes from European drug investiga-
tions of Tamil couriers. The insurgents still obtain
most of their financing from extortion and robberies
in Sri Lanka and from funds provided by Tamils
living overseas. India, which previously provided some
weapons and other support, has recently backed away,
according to Embassy reports, and this move could
stimulate further Tamil involvement in drug smug-
gling to compensate for lost support
Tamils are seeking to
establish a full-fledged trafficking network in Europe,
but it is by no means clear that the insurgents are
directly associated with this activity; the operation
could be simply a criminal enterprise. We judge,
however, that drug trafficking is likely to become
more important to the insurgents if support from
India and overseas Tamils continues to decline
Lebanese-Based Palestinian Guerrilla Groups. These
groups allegedly benefit from drug smuggling, but we
have little evidence to indicate that it is more than an
occasional sideline. Hashish is produced in the Bekaa
Valley in Lebanon, and we also have unconfirmed
reports of heroin refineries in the vicinity. Some
groups unable to acquire support from other sources
undoubtedly participate in the drug trade, as do
individual members of all groups. We consider it
unlikely that drug trafficking will become a major
activity for these Lebanese-based Palestinian guerril-
las as long as other sources of income remain
available.
The New People's Army (NPA). The NPA of the
Philippines has allegedly developed small marijuana
cultivation and processing operations in northern and
central Luzon
The
NPA also reportedly sells some marijuana on the
international market, but we have no information on
the trafficking network it uses. Thus far, evidence
from press, sources
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Figure 9
Coca Cultivation and
Sender() Lutninoso (SL) Insurgent Operating Areas
Tumbes
Cajamarca.
Coca cultivation
Cocaine hydrochloride
J processing area
,*