THE 1985 NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE: LOOKING AHEAD

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• Publication Date: August 1, 1985

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
The 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference:
Looking Ahead (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
Seefet
GI 85-10220
August 1985
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Directorate of
Intelligence
-Seefet
The 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference:
Looking Ahead (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared 1)3 Office
of Global Issues, and has been reviewed by the
National Intelligence Officer at Large. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, International Security Issues Division, OG I,
Secret
GI 85-10220
August 1985
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Ccerct
(b)(3)
The 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference:
Looking Ahead (u)
Key Judgments
Infitrtnation available
as of 8 August 1985
was used in this report.
This year's Non-Proliferation Treaty (N PT) Review Conference the third
since the treaty entered into force in 1970 will be a major indicator of the
state of world nonproliferation sentiment and the level of confidence in the
N PT itself. Many factors that marred the 1980 Review Conference, such
as major tension in overall North-South political relations and the then
urgent scramble to lessen dependence on fossil fuels, are now much less
prominent. In addition, the behavior of significant N PT parties in prepara-
tory meetings has been remarkably free of political contentiousness.
Indications are that all major geopolitical groupings--West, neutral and
nonaligned, and the East want a successful review conference and are at
least going in with constructive attitudes
(b)(3)
We believe three outcomes are possible. A clear reaffirmation of the N PT
would add to its authority, encourage still more countries to adhere, and
demonstrate to potential proliferators the strength of international nonpro-
liferation sentiment. A more equivocal outcome, in which the conferees
neither reaffirmed nor seriously questioned the treaty, would be less
helpful, but not injurious to US goals. N PT credibility would remain
intact, and potential proliferators looking for a sign that world sentiment
against proliferation is weakening would be frustrated. These two outcomes
are about equally likely, and each is more likely than an outcome in which
conferees question N PT validity or even threaten to withdraw. Such a
negative outcome would undermine the treaty's authority and encourage
potential proliferators (b)(3)
Whatever the final outcome, debate will be contentious:
� Arms control issues, in particular, will be sharply debated. Numerous
countries repeatedly assert that, US-Soviet talks notwithstanding, the
nuclear powers have failed to live up to their N PT arms reduction
obligations and that the growing number of warheads in superpower
arsenals is a greater world security threat than the spread of nuclear
weapons to nonweapons states.
Many Third World countries also maintain that the advanced countries
have done far too little to meet their N PT obligations to help the nuclear
"have nots" acquire peaceful nuclear energy for development purposes.
(b)(3)
GI 85-10220
85-10220
August 1985
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We believe the Soviets want the review conference to succeed but are
positioning themselves to use that forum for political advantage and to
pressure the United States on arms control. In our view, Soviet announce-
ment of a unilateral weapons testing moratorium is an attempt to take the
"moral high ground" on arms control, to deflect neutral and nonaligned
arms control criticism toward Washington, and to put the US delegation
on the defensive on the issue of a comprehensive test ban.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
Significance of the 1985 Review 1
The Conference Setting: Optimism . . 1
. . . Tempered by Concern 2
Key Substantive Issues 3
Arms Control: Focus of Discontent 3
Safeguards: The Link to Security 4
Peaceful Uses: Controversial But Manageable 4
The United States, the Soviets, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 5
Prospects 6
Conference Pitfalls for the United States 8
Appendix
A. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 9
B. Parties to the NPT 13
C. Glossary of Terms 15
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(b)(3)
The 1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference:
Looking Ahead (u)
Significance of the 1985 Review
Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (N PT) will gather in Geneva on 27 August
for a monthlong assessment of the treaty's implemen-
tation over the past five years. Because the NPT is
regarded as the cornerstone of global efforts to limit
the spread of nuclear weapons, the 1985 Review
Conference will constitute a major indicator of gener-
al world nonproliferation sentiment and a barometer
of the level of confidence in the effectiveness of the
N PT
This will be the third NPT Review Conference;
previous reviews took place in 1975 and 1980. The
final document issued by the 1975 Review Conference
reaffirmed the basic value of the NPT and found that
all parties--both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons
states -had observed their basic obligations. Al-
though the 1975 Review Conference produced a final
declaration, serious disagreements emerged during its
drafting, and several parties attached statements tak-
ing exception to some of its judgments
The 1980 conferees were unable to issue any such
final document. Although no nation actually ques-
tioned the basic utility of the NPT in 1980, the
proceedings generally mirrored worldwide political
friction between the industrialized and the developing,
nonaligned nations. The latter, increasingly convinced
that the advanced nuclear states were not living up to
NPT obligations, adopted confrontational tactics. In
the end, neither group was willing to make the
compromises necessary to produce a final document,
and the conference ended in impasse
The Conference Setting: Optimism ...
Numerous factors that complicated the environment
surrounding the 1980 Review Conference are now
either absent or much less pronounced:
� The general contentiousness that tended to mark
North-South relations some years ago is subdued.
The Treaty on Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
The NPT was drafted in 1967-68 and entered into
force in March 1970 with 43 parties. Today the NPT
counts 129 parties and is the most widely subscribed
arms control�related treaty in history. In addition to
the United States and the Soviet Union, major parties
include most of Western Europe and Japan. Signifi-
cant nonparticipants are China, France, and states of
proliferation concern such as India, Pakistan, Brazil,
Argentina, South Africa, and Israel. (u)
The treaty's broad objectives are to prevent the
further spread of nuclear weapons, promote peaceful
applications of nuclear energy, and encourage arms
reduction efforts by the major powers. Because of its
inclusive nature, it bears not only on arms control
issues but also on nuclear trade and technology
transfer, thus affecting the commercial aspirations of
advanced and newly emerging nuclear supplier states
as well as the efforts of nations aspiring to acquire or
expand nuclear know-how. Consequently, the NPT
impinges on East-West and North-South relations
and, indeed, on security and economic relations
among members of each group. (u)
The treaty represented a "bargain" between the nu-
clear weapons states and non-nuclear-weapons states,
in which the latter agreed to foreswear the acquisition
of nuclear arms (Articles I and II of the treaty) in
exchange for the pledge by the weapons states to work
toward arms reductions (Article VI) and to assure
access by the nonweapons states to nuclear technol-
ogy for peaceful, development purposes (Article IV)
subject to NPT-mandated safeguards (Article III). (u)
Streret
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That contentiousness contentiousness produced a string of demands
from the nonaligned nations in numerous world
forums for increased power and a greater share of
the world's resources.
� World concern over the price and availability of
fossil fuels is much less pronounced than in 1980,
when oil scarcities and escalating prices spurred
many nations, especially in the developing world, to
scramble for energy security via nuclear power.
� Nuclear trading partners of the United States have
grown to understand, if not to agree with, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978.'
At the last conference, they were still smarting from
its effects.
� The world economic situation, particularly the debt
crisis, complicates and slows efforts to undertake or
follow through on expensive nuclear projects. For
(b)(3)ample, Brazil and Argentina have, for financial
reasons, had to curtail or stretch out some portions
of their respective nuclear programs.
Several important aspects of the world nuclear scene
also contribute to optimism going into the review
conference:
� In the five years since the last review and indeed
since 1974 when India tested its device, no addition-
al country is known to have detonated a nuclear
explosion.'
� Since 1980, 18 additional nations have adhered to
the NPT, adding weight to the arguments of nations
urging nuclear restraint.
� According to press and diplomatic reporting, a
growing number of countries even outside the NPT,
such as China, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa,
are adopting a requirement for safeguards on their
'See appendix C for Glossary of Terms. (u)
'Technical specialists still disagree on whether a nuclear device was
tested in 1979. A panel of experts concluded in 1980 that a
suspicious signal picked up over the South Atlantic probably was
not a nuclear explosion, but the possibility of its having nuclear
origin could not be ruled out entirely.
Seer-et-
nuclear exports and acknowledging the need for
restraint and accountability in nuclear commerce.
Preconference meetings and contacts have been
marked by a noteworthy lack of political posturing,
This was
particularly true of the third and final NPT Review
Conference Preparatory Committee Meeting in Gene-
va in late April, attended by most of the significant
NPT parties. The Soviets left believing that the
outlook for the conference had improved considerably,
and the US Mission noted that delegates of all stripes
were consistently businesslike, despite the airing of
some potentially contentious issues.
decisions on conference committee
structure, presiding officers for committees, and the
conference president proved much easier than in
previous years. In 1980, by comparison, procedural
issues were not resolved until the conference itself and
then only after considerable wrangling.
... Tempered by Concern
At the same time, problems are diverse and complex:
� The superpowers are more vulnerable now to
charges of inadequate arms reduction efforts than
they were in 1980 because of the failed promise of
SALT II (strategic arms limitation talks), the Soviet
walkout from the strategic arms reduction talks and
intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations in
1983, and the US decision in 1982 not to resume
talks on a comprehensive test ban.
� Third World allegations that developed nations have
not lived up fully to a major NPT obligation have
escalated in response to increased, concerted efforts
by suppliers to control exports of sensitive nuclear
technology.
� Countries of great proliferation concern�Pakistan
and Argentina, for example�have made significant
technological strides in recent years while remaining
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
outside the NPT. Their example serves as a conspic-
uous reminder to the nonweapons states of the
treaty's less than universal reach and efficacy.
� In February 1985 six nations NPT parties Mexi-
co, Sweden, and Greece, and nonparties India,
Argentina, and Tanzania met in New Delhi for a
conference that strongly criticized the major
powers' arms control efforts.
� In June 1985 a larger group of nations convened for
a privately sponsored meeting in Geneva specifically
to discuss nonproliferation. The superpowers were
again the object of serious criticism on arms control,
and there were proposals for greater sharing of
peaceful nuclear energy
Key Substantive Issues
The substantive work of the review conference will be
conducted by three main committees, each chaired by
one of the major geopolitical groups represented in
Geneva�the neutral and nonaligned, the East, and
the West. No neat division of labor and issues will
exist, however, and debate intile roup will affect or
overlap debate in the others
Arms Control: Focus of Discontent
Chaired by a representative from one of the neutral
and nonaligned countries, Committee I will deal with
arms control. This committee's agenda also includes
the treaty's nonproliferation provisions, whose imple-
mentation record is considerably better today than
most observers had expected when the NPT entered
into force.
Chances for a balanced debate are not good, however,
given the depth and breadth of feeling on arms control
matters. Many non-nuclear-weapons states are active-
ly seeking a comprehensive test ban (CTB), and
demands for such a ban have been made repeatedly in
the ongoing Conference on Disarmament (CD). Mem-
bers from all major groups�neutral and nonaligned
(Sweden and Mexico), East (USSR), and even some in
the West (Australia and Canada)�have advocated a
ban and some will raise it in the review conference,
3
Yugoslavia in recent weeks has emerged as the
chief advocate of strong arms control criticism of the
superpowers and that neutral and nonaligned nations
are inclined to go along with such criticism.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The United States is apt to take a good deal of the
heat on the issue of a test ban. At the Conference on
Disarmament in June, Brazil accused Washington of
failing to live up to its NPT disarmament obligations
and to its commitment under the 1963 Limited Test
Ban Treaty (LTBT) to seek to end weapons testing.
We believe that in the same forum, Argentina op-
posed establishment of a test ban committee out of
fear that it would enable the West to claim that
progress had been made and thus deflect Third World
arms control criticism. Although neither Argentina
nor Brazil is an NPT party, we expect numerous
Third World countries that are parties to reflect
similar attitudes in the review conference. Moscow's
recent announcement of a unilateral test moratorium
will, we believe, incline Third World nations all the
more to use the review conference to criticize the
United States on this score (b)(3)
Sentiment on the disarmament issue seems unmitigat-
ed by ongoing arms reduction talks between the
United States and the USSR. At the Conference on
Disarmament, for example, Sweden observed that
"the mere existence of bilateral negotiations is not
enough, in the context of Article VI (on disarmament)
of the N PT." Moreover,
the delegates of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations are preparing a joint statemen(b)(1)
takes a similar position.
Secret-
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Safeguards: The Link to Security
The East will chair Committee II, which will examine
NPT safeguards provisions and their relationship to
the treaty's nonproliferation provisions. Committee II
will largely reflect the views of Moscow. Because the
Soviets also strongly favor the NPT and nonprolifera-
tion, we judge that they will try to prevent Committee
(b)(3) from becoming mired in polemics.
The question of attacks on peaceful facilities�grow-
ing out of Israel's virtual destruction in 1981 of a
safeguarded reactor in Iraq�carries the greatest
potential for controversy in this committee. At issue is
whether the application of International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA)3 safeguards can or should be
taken as ironclad assurance of a given facility's
strictly nonmilitary nature. Egypt, seconded by Aus-
tralia, has proposed formal steps leading to a blanket
"prohibition" on attacks against safeguarded facili-
ties. Should this proposal prevail, the Iraqis and other
countries that apply safeguards but still have weapons
aspirations would gain a political victory and at least
a marginal degree of added security for their facili-
ties. In contrast, some that have bitter rivals and
unsafeguarded facilities could feel even more vulnera-
ble than before to preemptive attack because their
facilities would not be included in the ban. Indeed,
Pakistan may feel particularly concerned on this
(b)(3))re, given its tense relationship with India
Arab delega-
i inns addressing this issue at the April preparatory
(b)(3)etings did so in brief, businesslike fashion. None-
(b)(1 )less, we judge that the issue will remain conten-
tious. Other developments that could complicate
Committee II discussions of the issue include:
� Possible attendance by an Israeli observer. Israel, a
non-NPT party, sent an observer in 1980. Its pres-
ence this year would improve Egypt's chances of
attaining a favorable vote on its proposal.
' The IAEA is inextricably linked to the NPT by virtue of Articles
III and IV of the treaty, which address safeguards and technology
transfer, respectively. It is largely through the Agency's safeguards
inspection program that Article III is implemented, and the
Agency's technical assistance program is an important means by
which nations fulfill their Article IV obligations. The IAEA,
headquartered in Vienna, numbers among its 112 members all five
weapons states and some conspicuous non-NPT parties, such as
Pakistan, India, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa. (u)
-Seeret-
� Iranian charges that Iraq attacked its Bushehr
reactor construction site early this year
The attacks on peaceful facilities issue arises from an
even more fundamental question, that is, whether
safeguards are or can be made effective enough to
ensure that diversions of nuclear material can be
detected and traced.
Peaceful Uses: Controversial But Manageable
During Committee III discussions of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and transfer of technology, chaired by
the West, we expect substantial neutral and non-
aligned criticism of Western positions and policies.
Third World discontent with the extent to which the
nuclear "haves" are sharing nuclear technology has
emerged repeatedly in past review conferences and in
a variety of other settings, such as the privately
sponsored meeting in Geneva in June. It also was
clearly a major concern of delegates to the review
conference preparatory meetings
where countries such
as Egypt and Bangladesh called for much greater
access to peaceful applications of atomic energy.
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Relations among Western suppliers as well as suppli-
er-recipient concerns will condition debate on technol-
ogy transfer issues. Fundamentally, the US instinct to
monitor and control the spread of sensitive nuclear
know-how often conflicts with the desire of many
Western suppliers to expand export opportunities or to
pursue advanced technologies domestically. For ex-
ample, only after considerable diplomatic pressure
from Washington did Brussels, which was seeking
expanded markets for its lethargic nuclear industry,
decide not to pursue a potentially lucrative nuclear
cooperation deal with Libya.
Another example of the potential for friction among
Western suppliers is the Swiss request to retransfer
US-origin plutonium from France to West Germany.
Because of concern about Bern's export policies and
practices, as well as the proliferation potential of
recycling plutonium, Washington delayed giving its
permission, thereby arousing considerable Swiss ire.
Although Switzerland finally received approval, it
was conditional and on a one-time-only basis.
The United States, the Soviets,
and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
We believe the Soviets attach great importance to this
year's review conference and are disposed to make
efforts in behalf of its success:
� In the April 1985 preparatory meeting, the Soviets
were helpful in securing approval of the new confer-
ence committee structure
� During US-Soviet nonproliferation bilaterals this
year and last, the Soviets agreed on the need to
highlight NPT security benefits to all nations, to use
the conference to strengthen the treaty, and to avoid
polemics.
Although Libya is a party to the NPT, it has repeatedly and
publicly proclaimed its desire to acquire nuclear weapons. (u)
5
Assisting Developing Countries:
UK and Egyptian Proposals
Cairo and London have pushed proposals for new
mechanisms to finance nuclear projects in developing
countries that belong to the NPT. The British plan
would cover diverse projects involving nuclear medi-
cine, agriculture, and power; the Egyptian initiative
would focus on power !ants, in which Cairo has a
particular interest. (b)(3)
Both proposals have provoked considerable debate
within the Western and Eastern Groups. The United
States, Japan, the USSR, Turkey, the Netherlands,
Yugoslavia, and Italy, among others, registered con-
cern over just how such new funds would be financed;
whether they would undercut existing IAEA mecha-
nisms; and, with their clear preferential treatment for
NPT parties, whether they would give rise to charges
of discrimination in the IAEA, many of whose mem-
bers are not NPT signatories (b)(3)
At other times, the Soviets have taken more ambiva-
lent nonproliferation positions, either because of their
own regional interests or to gain political advantage
on the world stage:
� In 1974 Moscow acquiesced in India's nuclear test,
rather than risk straining its ties to that nation.
� In years past the Soviets have publicly impugned
Western efforts to convince Israel and South Africa
to join the NPT, thereby gaining stature among the
world's nuclear "have-nots."
� In May 1985 the Soviets exploited the periodic
meeting of the Latin American Non-Proliferation
Organization, an agency of the Treaty of Tlatelolco
with which both the United States and the Soviet
Union are associated.
(b)(1)
the Soviets reiterated their support (b)(3)
NPT but criticized the United States in a num per of
arms control areas.
Serret
(b)(3)
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Despite agreement agreement with the United States on the need
to help the review conference succeed, the Soviets are
likely to find opportunities to diverge from the United
States.
al-
though Moscow would not use Its arms control con-
cerns in ways detrimental to the NPT at the review
conference, US officials should not expect Moscow to
come to Washington's defense if others criticize the
United States on arms control issues.
On the basis of various sources, we believe that
Moscow intends to avoid polemics at the conference
and will not encourage nonaligned nations to make
East-West arms control progress a prerequisite for a
successful review conference. But if Third World
Secret
nations do single out the US arms control record for
criticism, we expect the Soviets to feed that criticism
by subtly maneuvering on the margins of the confer-
ence. If other factors make the review go awry, we
fully expect that Moscow will make every effort to
deflect blame and redirect it toward Washington.
Prospects
We envision three possible outcomes for the review
conference. Two we judge to be equally likely:
� A clear reaffirmation of the NPT, which concludes
that treaty benefits outweigh disadvantages.
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The Soviet Union:
Taking the Moral High Ground
The Soviets are positioning themselves to use the
conference to political advantage and to pressure the
United States on arms control. Moscow announced a
unilateral weapons testing moratorium beginning 6
August, running through 1 January 1986, and invited
the United States to do the same, in which case
Moscow claims the halt on testing could be extended.
We believe Moscow hopes the move will impress
delegates both at the Conference on Disarmament--
where test ban sentiment has been growing�and at
the review conference. The move also aims, we be-
lieve, to portray the Soviets as conciliatory, innova-
tive, and -committed- to arm.s reduction
Moreover, early this year Moscow completed a long-
pending accord with the International Atomic Energy
Agency to apply safeguards at selected Soviet peace-
fitl nuclear facilities. The Soviets agreed to inspec-
tions of 29 power reactors and four research reactors.
By comparison, in a similar agreement, the United
States lists as eligible for IAEA safeguards all
facilities not of specific national security concern
numbering some 230. Even so, the scope of the Soviet
oiler was broader than expected. At the review con-
ference, we expect Moscow to talk up both moves as
it seeks to enhance its image and de ect criticism on
arms control toward Washington
� An equivocal or indeterminate result, in which
conferees merely sum up the proceedings without
either revalidating or questioning the treaty's worth.
And one we see as less likely than either of the above:
� A clearly negative outcome in which delegates
strongly criticize the utility of the N PT, or even
threaten to withdraw from it
An unambiguous reaffirmation would be most favor-
able to US nonproliferation objectives. It would facili-
tate inducing still more countries to adhere to the
N PT, a major US objective. It would also demon-
strate to nonparty potential proliferators and to signa-
tories still keeping open a weapons option that inter-
national nonproliferation sentiment continues to grow
7
and with it the potential political cost of running
counter to that sentiment. An equivocal outcome
would do less for US objectives but would still
constitute an improvement over the 1980's more
negative results. Under this scenario, N PT credibility
would, we believe, remain intact, and potential proli-
ferators looking for signs that world nonproliferation
sentiment has weakened would find none (b)(3)
We believe the chances for a reaffirmation of the
N PT, after a recitation of its shortcomings, are better
than they were before the 1980 Review Conference.
The absence of animus thus far and the virtually
universal endorsement of the need to work construc-
tively and objectively indicate, in our judgment, that
delegates will approach the 1985 review conference in
a positive manner. We also believe that over the past
five years, general acceptance of the need to restrain
countries' nuclear behavior has grown, despite criti-
cisms heard about specific NPT provisions.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Despite our view that a favorable outcome is more
likely, a number of factors could work to undermine
the conference and produce a negative outcome. We
judge it reasonable to expect that the lack of polemics
so far will give way during the lengthy conference as
complex issues tax the patience and diplomatic tact of
the delegates. In particular, we expect the arms
control issue to be fraught with possibilities for a
conference-threatening impasse because of the persis-
tent criticism of the superpowers in recent yean(b)(3)
Other factors could pose problems. Several Western
countries have shown a desire to alter some N PT-
related practices, a tendency that could call attention
to treaty flaws rather than strengths:
Stiefet
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Such proposals, if made at the review conference,
would not only open additional, complex areas of
debate but also signal neutral and nonaligned nations,
who are already wary of some aspects of the NPT,
that even US allies are critical of it. We believe this
i could lead to still greater neutral and nonaligned
questioning.[__
In addition, some nonparties may lobby allies who are
parties to affect, and possibly complicate, the confer-
ence outcome.
Conference Pitfalls for the United States
Moscow's recent announcement of a unilateral testing
moratorium was timed, in part at least, to shift
criticism toward the United States at the conference.
By rejecting Washington's suggestion that the two
superpowers make a joint statement of support for the
NPT just before the conference, Moscow further
indicated the limits on Soviet-US cooperation at the
conference. Thus, the stage is set for the United
States to bear the brunt of Third World and Western
criticism on the disarmament issue. In particular, we
"Siveret
expect the US delegation to be confronted with calls
for Washington to join in the moratorium, to ratify
the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explo-
sions Treaties, and to resume trilateral negotiations
(with the United Kingdom and the USSR on a
comprehensive test ban treaty.
General US involvement with Israel, South Africa,
and Pakistan�all of proliferation concern�also has
the potential to draw substantial criticism at the
review conference. We believe that numerous neutral
and nonaligned nations are considering voicing the
contention that US nonproliferation policy is not
consistently or uniformly applied. In such a formula-
tion, the United States would be charged with dealing
extensively with threshold states, such as the above
three, while "discriminating" against other countries
like Libya, Iran, and Iraq, all NPT signatories. We
believe this kind of charge, no matter how spurious,
could fall on fertile ground
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Appendix A
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
Signed at Washington, London, Moscow July 1, 1968
US ratification deposited March 5, 1970
Entered into force March 5, 1970
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "Parties to the Treaty,"
Considering the devastation that would be visited
upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the conse-
quent need to make every effort to avert the danger of
such a war and to take measures to safeguard the
security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an
agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of
nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the applica-
tion of International Atomic Energy Agency safe-
guards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development
and other efforts to further the application, within the
framework of the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding
effectively the flow of source and special fissionable
materials by use of instruments and other techniques
at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful
applications of nuclear technology, including any
technological by-products which may be derived by
nuclear-weapon States from the development of nu-
clear explosive devices, should be available for peace-
ful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether
nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all
Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the
" Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 1982 edition, US
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 91. (u)
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fullest possible exchange of scientific information for,
and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other
States to, the further development of the applications
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race
and to undertake effective measures in the direction
of nuclear disarmament,
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment
of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties
to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in
the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its
Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all
test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to
continue negotiations to this end,
Desiring to further the easing of international tension
and the strengthening of trust between States in order
to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing
stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals
of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery
pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarma-
ment under strict and effective international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, States must refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the
establishment and maintenance of international peace
and security are to be promoted with the least diver-
sion for armaments of the world's human and eco-
nomic resources,
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Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty un-
dertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices direct-
ly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encour-
age, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to man-
ufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such
weapons or explosive devices.
Article H
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to
seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article HI
I. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance
with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of
its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view
to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peace-
ful use to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by
this article shall be followed with respect to source or
special fissionable material whether it is being pro-
duced, processed or used in any principal nuclear
facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards
required by this article shall be applied on all source
or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear
activities within the territory of such State, under its
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or
(b) equipment or material especially designed or pre-
pared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State
for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special
fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards
required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be
implemented in a manner designed to comply with
article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the
economic or technological development of the Parties
or international cooperation in the field of peaceful
nuclear activities, including the international ex-
change of nuclear material and equipment for the
processing, use or production of nuclear material for
peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of
this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth
in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty
shall conclude agreements with the International
Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of
this article either individually or together with other
States in accordance with the Statute of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such
agreements shall commence within 180 days from the
original entry into force of this Treaty. For States
depositing their instruments of ratification or acces-
sion after the 180-day period, negotiation of such
agreements shall commence not later than the date of
such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force
not later than eighteen months after the date of
initiation of negotiations.
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without dis-
crimination and in conformity with articles I and II of
this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate,
and have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scien-
tific and technological information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a
position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing
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alone or together with other States or international
organizations to the further development of the appli-
cations of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, espe-
cially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the
needs of the developing areas of the world.
Article V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropri-
ate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this
Treaty, under appropriate international observation
and through appropriate international procedures,
potential benefits from any peaceful applications of
nuclear explosions will be made available to non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-
discriminatory basis and that the charge to such
Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as
possible and exclude any charge for research and
development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant
to a special international agreement or agreements,
through an appropriate international body with ade-
quate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.
Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon
as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring
may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral
agreements.
Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relat-
ing to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.
Article VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group
of States to conclude regional treaties in order to
assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their
respective territories.
Article VIII
I. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments
to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment
shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments
which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty.
Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more
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of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Govern-
ments shall convene a conference, to which they shall
invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an
amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved
by a majority of the votes of all the parties to the
Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which,
on the date the amendment is circulated, are members
of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force
for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratifica-
tion of the amendment upon the deposit of such
instruments of ratification by a majority of all the
Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all
other Parties which, on the date the amendment is
circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of
the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter,
it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the
deposit of its instrument of ratification of the
amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty,
a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in
Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation
of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the
Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years
thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may
obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the
Depositary Governments, the convening of further
conferences with the same objective of reviewing the
operation of the Treaty.
Article IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signa-
ture. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before
its entry into force in accordance with Paragraph 3 of
this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and in-
struments of accession shall be deposited with the
Governments of the United States of America, the
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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
which are hereby designated the Depositary
Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratifica-
tion by the States, the Governments of which are
designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other
States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their
instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this
Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or
other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1,
1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into
force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the
date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification
or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly in-
form all signatory and acceding States of the date of
each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument
of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry
into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any
requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary
Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of
the United Nations.
Article X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sover-
eignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it
decides that extraordinary events, related to the sub-
ject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the
supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of
such withdrawal to all Parties to the Treaty and to the
United Nations Security Council three months in
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized
its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the
Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide
whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinite-
ly, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period
or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority
of the Parties to the Treaty.
Article XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish
and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic,
shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary
Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty
shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments
to the Governments of the signatory and acceding
States.
This appendix is Unclassified.
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Appendix B
Parties to the NPT a
Afghanistan Guinea Philippines
Antigua and Barbuda Guinea-Bissau Poland
Australia Haiti Portugal
Austria Honduras Romania
Bahamas, The Hungary Rwanda
Bangladesh Iceland St. Lucia
Barbados Indonesia St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Belgium Iran San Marino
Benin Iraq Sao Tome and Principe
Bhutan Ireland Senegal
Bolivia Italy Seychelles
Botswana Ivory Coast Sierra Leone
Brunei Jamaica Singapore
Bulgaria Japan Solomon Islands
Burkina Jordan Somalia
Burundi Kenya South Korea
Cambodia Laos Sri Lanka
Cameroon Lebanon Sudan
Canada Lesotho Suriname
Cape Verde Liberia Swaziland
Central African Republic Libya Sweden
Chad Liechtenstein Switzerland
Congo Luxembourg Syria
Costa Rica Madagascar Taiwan
Cyprus Malaysia Thailand
Czechoslovakia Maldives Togo
Dominica Mali Tonga
Dominican Republic Malta Tunisia
Ecuador Mauritius Turkey
Egypt Mexico Tuvalu
El Salvador Mongolia Uganda
Equatorial Guinea Morocco Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Ethiopia Nauru United Kingdom
Fiji Nepal United States
Finland Netherlands Uruguay
Gabon New Zealand Vatican City
Gambia, The Nicaragua Venezuela
German Democratic Republic Nigeria Vietnam
Germany, Federal Republic of Norway West Samoa
Ghana Panama Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of
Greece Papau New Guinea Yugoslavia
Grenada Paraguay Zaire
Guatemala Peru
As of 1 August 1985.
This appendix is Unclassified.
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Appendix C
Glossary of Terms
Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)
The weapons states have not succeeded in negotiating
a CTB, which would ban all types of nuclear testing,
including underground tests. Trilateral negotiations
between the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the USSR broke down over verification issues in 1980
and have not been resumed. The US position is that a
CTB remains a long-term goal that must be viewed in
the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reduc-
tions, improved verification capabilities, expanded
confidence-building measures, and the maintenance
of an effective deterrent. The United States has,
therefore, given arms control priority for now to the
achievement of arms reductions and to the strength-
ening of verification measures for existing agreements
that limit nuclear testing. The United States decided
in 1982 not to resume trilateral negotiations on a
CTB. (u)
Conference on Disarmament (CD)
The CD is the principal forum established by the
international community for the negotiation (as op-
posed to deliberation only) of multilateral arms con-
trol and disarmament agreements. Created in 1979,
the 40-member CD meets in Geneva for two three-
month periods annually. It is the first such group in
which all five nuclear weapons states participate
actively. Members of the CD are now debating a
mandate for an ad hoc committee to address the issue
of a nuclear test ban. (u)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Established in 1957, largely at US urging, the IAEA
is an autonomous international organization affiliated
with the United Nations. The IAEA has two main
functions: promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy
and applying international safeguards when requested
to do so by a member nation. Article III of the NPT
calls upon non-nuclear-weapons state parties to con-
clude agreements with the IAEA for application of
safeguards to all source or special fissionable material
in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory or
under its control (that is, full-scope safeguards). The
same article prohibits provision of such material or
15
equipment for processing, use or production of special
fissionable material to any nonweapons state unless
the source or special fissionable material is subject to
safeguards. (u)
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
Also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty, this
international instrument bans nuclear testing in the
atmosphere, under water, in outer space, or in any
other environment if the explosion would send radio-
active debris beyond the border of the country con-
ducting the test. The treaty is of unlimited duration
and has been signed by nearly 125 nations, including
the United States, USSR, and the United Kingdom,
but not China and France. In the preamble to the
Treaty, LTBT parties state that they seek to achieve
the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons for all time." (u)
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA)
The NNPA is the major piece of legislation governing
US control over its supply of nuclear material and
technology. Enacted in 1978, the NNPA established a
framework of export licensing criteria, including safe-
guards and consent rights to retransfers and repro-
cessing by export recipients. It also called for renego-
tiation of existing agreements for peaceful nuclear
cooperation in order to incorporate in them provisions
mandated for new agreements, including full-scope
safeguards. (u)
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
This agreement between the United States and the
Soviet Union was formalized in 1974 but never
ratified by the US Senate. Both parties agreed to
apply a threshold of 150 kilotons to their underground
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The PNET
is a necessary complement to the threshold test ban
because there is no essential distinction between the
technology used to produce a nuclear weapon and that
used for explosions for peaceful purposes. The US
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continues to believe that ratification should not occur
until verification procedures for the treaty are
strengthened. (u)
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)
Signed in 1972, this instrument calls upon the United
States and USSR not to conduct nuclear weapons
tests of any type with planned yields exceeding 150
kilotons. Like the PN ET, this treaty was never rati-
fied by the US Senate, and the United States contin-
ues to believe that ratification must be preceded by
improved verification procedures. Both nations have
declared their intention to abide by the 150-kiloton
threshold provided the other side does so as well. (u)
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