RECORD ON VIETNAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05594020
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 88
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-01666
• Publication Date: November 12, 1964

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-rdi FT
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1 2 NOV 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DMECTOR
SUBJECT: Record on Vietnam
1. Attached is a chronological listing of events, actionee
and deliberations having to do with Vietnam. The official recOrd
was compiled from documents selected for file by Walter Elder,
Significant overt happenings haying bearing on official actions are
Included in the chronology. nate on File, a weekly news summary,
was used as the source for these histoiTal events. The record
opens with the Estimates of April and July 1963. The actual chrono-
logy, however, begins in August 1965 when the pagoda raids took
place and your office began Its file on Vietnam.
2. We took your office's file, chose from it those documents
that seemed to us to be integral parts of the story, and then recorded
their substance either by quoting selectively or by summarizing.
When we found a reference to a document that was not in the file
and which appeared to be important, we asked to get
a copy for us.
3. Pursuant to your instructions. I have told only General
Carter and Mr. Kirkpatrick that this record was being compiled.
is! J. S. Earman
J. S. Zartrsan
Inspector General
Awe irgIN )zis stated
(b)(3)
E GROUP
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May 8
My to
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in Swath Vietnam"
"We believe that 4ommp. erogeteae has teen tattatedad
that the situation is improvmg Ai kv Jl no great SOS
itt neural support to the Viet Cong. changes and
which have occurred during the past year sow indicate thaliae
Viet Gong can be contained militarily and that farther preptien
can be made in expanfReg the area of geraflunent control and
in creating grater steurity in the coostes Gem ..Devebegmente
during the last year or two also show some przentse of rag
the politient weretnesees, particularly that of ineectutty at the
countryside. upon which the insurgency has fed. .. �Despite
South Vietnamese progress, the situation remains fragite.....
The government's capacity to embark upon the broader measure*
required to translate military success into lasting polities]
stability is questionable. "
Riots erupted in
RUE 510Z.53 "The Situation in South Vietnam"
"If--as is likely--Diem fails to carry out truly and promptly
the commitment he has made to the Buddhists, disorders will
probably flare again and the� chances of a coup or assassinations
attempts against him will become even better We do net
think... the Commtmiats would necessarffy profit if he were
overthrown by some combination of his non-Con.=min GlapenellalL
A non-Comrmanist successor regime might be initially less
effective against the Viet Cong, but, given continued support
from the US, could provide reasonably effective leadership
for the government and the war effort."
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Mr. Ball recommended that we astritast to roseate engtens
two bias ten= Ambassador Lodge arses and nrelents
h was agreed tat end amoeba should webs
able for
In
"Additional rep
have been received.
action, the Enaldhist
dangerous."
n
gamin nnefrtth with General Don
At a meeting between Conein anti General Don, the Weer
hod for US governrnent assurances of support for moves
against the Diem regime.
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� ed eotapintheri
this is ontictentnique to bring Sart
sarfaning of where ath who reatpower Is. Pressing this that
can maximise pa of Oblathing �iits naive.; Ens if
does not stameed, It tan substantially easiest in identilbration
of alternate or successor IrAttreawitti artgesarY drives-
abilities and ambition, to incorporate in our overell contingency
pleating and serve as focus of buildup prove/OM fly- via
comment in further *Sail after seeing mess**. if neonatally,
imt passes above at lilisman's request."
CIA cable from Saigon Itichardsonts parse:al vimvs re alternate leadership�
SAW OZG8
ent evettatave made us feel that hope for
tan government to replace Diem zeinatnietratical is tuareadlatios
solution seems even more insprobaide than ever before?.
appear that we shall have either Diem or trattary Pantee�A,
factor have not coordiestad this message with Enabasey
exchanged views fully an subject matter. "
'The Buddhist issue is South Vietnam"
/63 'There is no clear evidence that the Diem government was
practicing a policy of repression against the 13teldhists before
the initial incident in Due on 8 May. However, up to that time
no close contact was maintained by Western ahem vtge with
Buddhist spokesmen..... A case can be made that the protests
were partly political from the beginning
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State tetegram to
Darted 243
tin tat a
Mr. Main called Mr.
seed to him the abstance of
be Deptel US to Saigon. To Reims quay* litarrinaan confirteed
that the thrust of the telegram contained an funplicit fen-ent
of American forces and support it the Eib:ass were not matte&
Harriman said that the message had been cleareetvith
with the Secretary of State. and.with MX. flpatrc
Guidance to the Ambassador on imp-Tanta or replaChtg
Diem regime
The Department Informs the Ambassador that tbe US gent-
mat cannot tolerate a sitoutiop to which pawn Lies in nuts bats.
U Diem is entwining to rid Mansell of Kim, then Diem himself
� may have to go. The Ambassador is authorised: ft) to inform
the GVN that actions against Buddhists must be redressed;
(4 to tell key milttary leaders tbat the USG cannot rapport a
Diem regime that includes the Mm's and that "we will gin
them direct support in any interim perioti of breakdown attest
government mahatma"; (4 to maloa statements in Saigon
removing the military taint na the pagoda raids. "The
and country team should urgently examine all possible altarnatta
leadership and make detailed plans as to bow we might brtag
about Diem's replacement if this should become necessary.
You will understand that we cannot from Washington give you
detailed instructions as to how this oration should proceed.
but you will also know we will back you to the hilt on actions
you take to arthieve our objectives. "
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Approved for Release: 2022/01/26 bci6s6462o--
BIUMSS comment sapplansating Petal OS
"State cable sent ontrpartitidy r Inob,nsaan, 401
Course outlined is dangernaa bat all wee that
delaying Sear cut US stand is eves more dangerous. It wait
be easy tar you, but he asomred we wfil bark you all the way
Wigs. points aut danger posed by 2434 directs a MS
�
"FYI CIA not consulted reketh e loping sent separately, wiatch
forever cleared at highest levels. hi eirctunstaimes batten
CIA must ha accept direalves of policy trotters and seek
ways accomplish objectives they seek. have not seen
exact test, understand it buttes Ledge final Wenn' snt � a . Design
ha present course -of action appears be thraving nay bird Its
band before we adequately identified birds in bush. or sews
they may sing. Thus suggest a real search for ea of action
which might retain options in our hands at same time as taking
positive stand rather than waiting for situatkm to clarify fat
which point we probably unable to affect it). This boils down
to seeking some middle ground for at least interbas period..."
CIA made from ga Saigon Station meeting with General Shama
SAM 0491
Richardson reports that General Mynah requested an -
inarsediate meettng with Spare. At the xneeting Kbanh repeated
assurances that the USG would eepport the Vietnamese array If.
St should move against the Diem regime.
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So*
August eh OINTE Mai Memorandum
Igo. WO:
toteratateme Working /Aver
CIA Distributien Only
WM Saban ztutetbv s Peratela
amen Imam
The group agreed
ammo. Accept*"
allkthEton and would
thertroctionit. ilichazdsou glees
possible successor regimes.
Prospects for Smith Vietnam"
szCat balance, we believe the tea hope for the pause
US interests and attainment of US objectives in� South
ettann lies in the poodtdlity of a soup &eta by anti-
emu/nutlet nationalists with sufficient military Support to
otwinte prolonged civil. war.� Such. a group might not prove
able to savage the situation and, indeed, might eventually
prove no better a the present regime. Stash a demisevat
wan& however, swats the US and antisCommunist natie
elements to make a fresh start ortencombered and ushasapated
by political errors of past years, MOS and weeks. In
such a fresh start, we Wiese, lies the only viable hope for
the attainment at itterests and objectives in South tietnain.
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nO3 rateed�
la the
o dump the
sed Ware, Atitateal
the cuttent ITS action in
Diem to diemuis the future role
rites a the phrase "give direct support to
military commanders in Deptel 243; the question of saccession;
and what weeld happen if the action taken over the weekend
tailed. The President asked for itesaion wi Anguat ri
�.,
'With partIctpants to present biographic data on key SVN per*
onemitties and a contingency plan for the succession.
CIA cable from Saigon &Van reports instructitnas given� CIA officers seeing the gettersis
SAIG 0304
Richardson reports that the Ambassador decided that the
American official band should not show in the operation. It
was agreed that Conein would see Eiders and That Spero Nvozad
see Khenah. Conein and Spero were directed to L.onvey the
Seta:ace of Deptel 243, plus this comment "We cannot be
of any help during iittfal action of asgnrn g power of slate.
re:direly their own action, win or Lose."
liesalts of Cm approaches to the general.
ports the results of the CormairdSpera approach%
� In essence, Mach said he was not yet reser,
said he would have te check with Minh.
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Angus" 28 CUL gable:from
SA/CI
The President
unless it would etic
back at this paint. The
Lodge and Harkins be sought at the
defeat of s coups A cable Wee drafted gushing lf
with their concurrences to Detsted Zda.
"Examination cd reports to date but
leaves unanswered questions......
outlined ui Deptel 243 as modified, non
interim appraisal of present prospects.....
Ira whether you and Harkins, in tight of develop
send', favor operation as currently planned by general&
wish to give you all possible support in best available count
but not to insist on any decision ewe ifevewng evidence wan
it wise to modify.
COS believes it to late to tarnhackasmeaarae being Sated
Richardson reports that: "Situation here has reached paint
of no return... Unless the� generals are neutralized before
being able to lauach their opentions, we believe they vain Oct
and that they have good chance to all understand
that the effort Wand succeed and that whatever needs to be done
on one part must be done...
TOP SEC
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netted
NSC Emcee Conaratttee
?Meeting an Wenn CM.
identified
Record by DE/P.
Telegram� from Tat
Harkim
/CS 336843
Orming concern over poor c qtaeea 4 cae
The President Lb:squired into the St HIM plans ad
told that these were well worked out. State Dept. partiSts
inisted that Dien* and Nina bad betrayed and double-crossed its
ad we bad no obligations to -them and tbatim cannot win with
Diem and Him. The President conszsented-itat we had been
winning tomtit August. Hotting expressed his conviction that
Diem is the only man who can nut totdb Vietnam in any Whitt
to permit a ccattimance of the war art. He believed we Amid
make another try to keep Diem. Harriman directly disagreal
with him. The President directed Met a telegram be prepared
to send to Lofty and Harkins asking Sir view of the cbsorme
of satuess, expressing concern over the eadavorable ratio of
forces, and inviting their could
increase their possibilities. Th4 reMdett cafled for another
meeting later in the day.
The President met privately with Rush, McNamara, Tailor and
M. Bendy. Re reported to the rest of the Committee merely
that three telegrams were being sent to Sallow A personal
message to Lodge from the President, a general message teen
the Department to the Ambassador. and a telegram from Tt isidort
to Harkins.
Etna Harkins of Washington's second thoughts
"lropertant White House meeting on subject scheduled for
1200 ZS August EDT, your views urgently needed on overail
feasibility of operation cottemplated.....rn State to Sairm
243 was prepared without DOD or SCS participation. Authorities
are now having second thoughts.
IC
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NC Esectere Committee
Meeting cm Vietnam. CIA
participants not identified.
Record by DDP.
Taft� s. cable: to Ifitrkins causes
"At 0145 hours, Richardson, Spera and Cain,
Of wham were sckeduled tG contact Gasends ifftitt, and
0815 same morning, were ehoWil a message from Gemmait-tayint
to nereral Rarkins 'stating aspects of Vietnam situatitm being
siiewed at White Reuse and commenting that second thoughts
were beginning in Washington. Paced with this inforaiatiam and
given strictly limited time factor. y(14h, chardeeEl dettided that
the meeting with Generals Minh and Ehtsm ehoulcl not be post*
paned tut that contacting officers would make this meeting
fact-finding mission without encouraging or discouraging
General Minh."
"When Spera and Casein returned fr�va their meeting odtb�
Khiem and Minh, we proceeded e to make our
report. The Ambassador came 111 advised hien
of our meeting with General Weeds, of Taylor's cable, end of
the decisions which Richardson bad made as a result ef the
Taylor cable. Ledge was angry and espreased the view that
Ricitardacm's decision had destroyed the possibilities of carrying
out a coup. Richardson expressed a firm dissenting opinion:1'
Steps to be taken to get the coup bath on the track
� The consensus was that Harkins shouhl confirm to the
generals that eke approaches from CM were beam fide and repair
seated the views of the VS govereonast. fore was afireament
that better information was needed on what the generals were in
fact planning to do and whether it was rititailly feasible. A
telegram giving the sense of the meeting was drafted for
Presidential approval.
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�
Pt.
PIA
pats- Da Da, &
Record by VTR.
Retard by WS.
, & c
"OA Par.cauPipcbantat
rreet to recent cal4e.tnalitia mad said that he was
not en ante who we were diaringwiS op-u4nd. - they were
&Image 14144Ittaarapohitaa out -Renee wee some qpiestbso
whether the gesieradS ever did -hetet piano Dm* said he !lad
rented the earlier traffic and tutted that they ;Iner said they
Gen. Carter ..4046 he be.eitettd. that the generals' coup
not Maly at ttt$S dageondtbatin another kmeek wet ma be
onimastely where we were. before the stemtrk on the Deddblet
Bendy suggened we consider additional contingenciee
before the group and whether the assumption that Mal is
is -well fethtedk.
kin' meeting with Cameral, /Mem
"General Datitins was authorised to meet with�Khiem to
give Ithiem assurances of USG backhig Kblem showeti a rfah2Ci�
tante to talk and suggested that Eipvicins meet with General
Rhiem commented� that ktinh had railed off the
was waiting on other methods which Rhinos would not describe*
Rbiem further stated the -Generals were not ready as they did
not have -enough forces under their contatL Harkins decided'
not to give Miami assurances which he had been antluntsed to
impart. Lodge approved Harkins' decision on 3/ Angastkefter
Daritbis reported:"
Dittmesion of ways ha Wilda* we MIS tin vitith the Diem S
ggested we look at precisely that in the Vietnam
situation made us think of a coup and whet might be done to
improve conditions in Vietnam. McNamara suggested the eat
requirement was reestablishment of cmarannication batsmen
Lodge and Harkins. Rusk directed that a telegram be prepared
for Saigon ratitg suggestions as to what we might ask the cvn
to do.
TOP SECE7
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ter NV .Bider
. ST
COW. who ed in A
Prepared this itannary
"in the discussions during the the position of the
Department of State, led by Ball. Harriman, and rilialnatt� was
that the Diero-lahu government had double-crossed the US gonna,
tient because of the attack on the pagodas and that US oblisatinate
to the government were no longer valid. �norther that a g Mara"
=lent so discredited could not conduct succestifolly the was in
Vietnam and would prove an undesirable liability to the US
Govertzment elsewhere in Asia. Because of these moral, roalseiry
sad political conclusions, the Department recommended that it
must give all support to a group of generals who allegedly were
disaffected to the point that a clear indication of US action was
the only ingredient lacking for them to pest ever a discredited,
unpopular and weak Diem government.
"The position of the Department of Defense was that while it
deplored the sensational aspects of the Buddhist situation, it
nonetheless felt that an effort shouSbe continued to deal with
Diem and try to bring abonta conminnifse, and at the same time
to keep in touch with the generals and support the coup efforts,.
if this proved to be the only alternative left. This was eases,:
tidily the view of General Harkins and of Ambassador Notting.
This was considered by the Department of State ..be a font*
dragging and weak position.
tdent viewed the State Department's �position with
reserve but was willing to eleplOrel the cm, idea
. He and the Attorney General (as well as GIN were
apparently appalled at the speed with which the State detiefen
was reached on Saturday afternoon. 24 Aug. anxi felt tint
more thought, analysis and preparation shaedd have preceded
the instruction to Lodge."
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aA.caa.from Saigon Saigon Station reports collapse of August
SAM 04199
"This particular coup is finished Generals did act ferdi
ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces Mace
is little doubt that GVN aware US role and may have canna
detail
Saigon Richardson's damage assessment report
Richardson concluded that Diem and the Nh&s are fatly
aware that the USG encouraged the generals t fl a Capp
and that CIA was the instrumentality of this encouragement.
He judged there was an even possibility that all r programs
could go forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilemma
the Station's future relationships with Col. Tung. He noted
his dissatisfaction with Tung as a tan( liaison vehicle through
which to conduct PM programs, but noted that the GVISI had
offered no alternative. Unless we are willing to discontinue
our NVN, Laos border, and cross-border programs, we must
continue to work with Tung.
Times of Vietnam
of CIA atop platting
The Timeschf Vietnam published charges that the CIA was
plotting and financing a coup and giving asylum to the chief.
anti-Diem Buddhist leader. The story was picked up and widely
played by the New York Daily News. the Ghicagla Tribune.
Ba/timore Sun, and other prominent newspapers.
TOP Stz(1
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Approved for Release: 201/27671/8-6065-94.620
atlitember to Prentdentinl interview by
n1/22ratey snd Braila:Ley
CIA cable from Saigon
SAPS 0760
1,71,2nber dinsesion of ways 0 WOflbSS Jena
Rusk stressed S immediate 4eat4 -P9-nt*1 between
Lodge and Diem. Bundy pointed out
Lodge not to have a real alunv-downwth
(-0rd:teaming meeting, as one of Lodge
beaded very meth in this *action. Rush
The Presidettt agreed with the desirability
Nisi but expressed some doubt that participation was 00
fatal as State seemed to say it was. Rusk commented that the
onutry team bad stated its feeling that Whtt must go toarta*
the Freeldwit replied that they may have been operatthleandes
directives received from here.
Win services and prombmnt newspapers carr
Special Forces troops whoraidedaspagedas on
still being paid secretly by -411�. This stow was
a highly reliable seance .intWsehingtatt actsfistwe
to Col. Tong in the atnowd;Of $3 Son anntallty, az
SZSO thousand on 3 September. This atalt was ditteared in
Washington and hitaitla.
David Bell warned (in a television inberviewt
ight cut beck aid to South Vietnam unless the Diem govnentettsi
Changed its policies.
The Pr Went denied the charge that CM.
Richardsoes views on prospects for immediate tarn
"Mn inclined to Seel general -placers
accoromedation with Diem (if he pairits them
overall situation early detartor there is brettleftwas
civil order or governmental machinery, or name
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SO** to
foots
SAM
fen Saigon begins to go backward seriously Despite damages suffered
fewattal state 8 May and 21 August, am inclined to believe we shot be
able resume successful prosecution of war in rointlry and
civil sections Do not align myself with the view that USG
should suspend aid
as his findingst is vs. pS/be
newt vrtTh one voice
Gen. Krulait reported his findings in Vietnam. His conclueiems
were that the war is going ahead at an impressive pace and that
the Viet Cong war will be won if current QS military atel socio-
logical programs are continued. �Mendenha the State mime-
senizitive who accompanied Kralak, empreered the view that
there was a complete breakdown of the Saigon civilian gavenrandt
and the security situation in the provinces bad didealorated.
The President asked whether the two gave bad visited the
same country. Rusk suggested that the focus should be on what
happened in July and August tha.t reversed the optimistic judge:mute
La May and June. Mr, McCaw pointed oat the National Estimate
in May Aprii7, which indicated that we could win, WAS
teliewed by a Special Estimate on 10 July stating that E'VBI relations
with its public and the US are deteriorating and that victory It
doubtful if not 'impossible. The President emphasised the neon-
cant that different agencies not as differing views cal the
situation, quoting various press stories to this effect. Re stated
that it is necessary to bring our goy together eqatalt
as one government. Mr. McCune talked from a personal telegram
he bad received from Richardson recommending against any cut
in aid.
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Executive CommaItee
on Vietnam.
ea, 'pants: DCI
MR. Record by Cl
September U ClA cable from Saigon
SA= 0797
State tele
No. 478
em
ove-ttp meeting on points re:wed by President 427
Bundy stressed the need to unify the US government peit�ere.
to coordinate press guidance, and to control outgoing messages
to Saigon. Be eraphasited the importance of folloudng the
President's guidance on this delicate 'Vietnam problem, despite
intpnsely different views as to Mshould be done. how, the
risks, minimum objectives. and' the)-ficts. McNamara stated
that his position was vigorously against throwing out this
government without seeing an alternative and that none appeared
to exist. Mr. McCcme c ted that the problem: was net so
much the existence of an alternative as how to put one into
power. Bundy summarized the Presidentas poet ion: as one in
which we must express our reservations as to the mistakes and
misdeeds of Diem but not be in a position where we cannot deal
with him further.
Saigon Station reports disagreements among countta Manx inenthere
Richardson reports that the country team attempted to agree
on a six-page summary cable to answer a cable from the Depart-
ment requesting views. The team was unable to agree once on
the first three pages of the summary. Weed e and Richardson
dissented on the basis that the draft summary was too sweeping
and too negative, concluding definitely about the country as a
whole on an inadequate basis of data. "In some ways we seem
to have reached the point in official American cm:m=44 that,
if you think we can win with present government. you are simply
not running in right direction with the majority. "
Lodge estimates situation worsening rapidly and urges sersciksos
"My best estimate of the current sithaticm in Vietnam is:
(a) that it is worsening rapidly; (h) that the time hai arrived for
the US to use what effective sanctions it has to bring about the
fall of the existing government and the iftorallation of another;
E 1/4/I I
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telegram from
(Contsti)
Presidential Meeting on
Vietnam. CIA pare:apatite.
Del & C/FE, Record by
C/FE.
NSC Executive Committee
Meeting en Vietnam.
CIA participant.s: DCI &
C/FE. Record by C/FE.
and (c) that intensive study should be given by the best braille
in the government to all the details, procedures, and varbutts
in connection with the suspension of alt"
Discussion of steps-necessary before deciding to cut
McNamara pointed cat that Lodge has had little contact with
Diem and has not been out of &algal:. Mr. MeCone commented
that he believed OLP* we should move cautiously, that we shottld
talk seriously to Diem and that Lodge should be urged to visit the
countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effect of
suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach
be made to Nktu to seek his cooperation in a depart:ere. The
President asked whether we had carefully studied the detailed
effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared by Ilibtreani.
It was evident that the effects had not been studied. The
President asked DOD and C/A to analyze the Ellismart paper.
Re also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking Mm to
try to reduce the press leakage in Saigon and to estate**
some real contact with Diem. Any current plass fin Sid nego.
tiations should be stalled, and the President said he shmdd he
well informed of any steps taken in this context--such as the
incident involving CIA payment to Col. Tang last week.
State Department begins to see no alternative to working with Diem
Rusk said he believed that we were not Likely to achieve an
independent Vietnam unless we could eliminate Nina. At the seine
time he was not willing to say that Diem should go, as he sam
no alternative. Rusk commented that we should work through
Lodge on Diem to take over the real leadership and beame the
real President. Mr. McCone suggested also the d
of negotiating with Nhu. Bundy read off a CIA suggestion for
a process of negotiating with Elm.
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Sheldon's views on Vietnam; Ledge ste. pursubagoeup
Mr. Sheldon reports his views on the situation ha lriettara.
He included as part of his report the substance of a discussion
with rch4 Trueheart: "The Ambassador is considering char.*
MACV with making approach to SVN military, he mentioned Gen.
Don, to attempt stimulate early amp action 'with appropriate
US assurances. I inquired had Ambassador made Etna proposal
to Washington and was told this was within Lodge's sal/ fay."
September IS Press reports of dissension Neil Sheehan writing from Saigon stated that the various elements
within US mission and of the US mission in Vietnam were so badly divided that
within CIA Saigon Station Washington had intervened. He said: "The only civilian official
still strongly in favor of going along with the Ngo family regime
La the Chief of tht, Central Intelligence Agency here," On the
same day David Halberstam stated that high US civilian officials
in Saigon were making an au-out effort to convince Washing/4a
that the military and political situation is deteriorating. He
said that "the Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency favors
all-out support for the present regime but that almost an other
members of his staff are embittered over the raids on the pagodas.
They also feel that their Chief's etas* association with atm.
while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence gathestreg "
September 16 CM cable from Saigon Saigon Station's views on need to work with Di em regime
SAM 0923
Richardson replies to Washington request for Ms leftmost
on desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washingtea
is in the course of constructing an agreed plan for steps ahead:
"We must go on trying to vrin war with current administration Ito
as long as it persists in power We shcrald not �etteropt
publicly to achieve objectives with respect to �wit when
probability of attainment is virtually nil We cannot covertly
tinker with or engineer a coup unless general situation is
����
TOP S 'TT
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111101flober 16 Ca agile Er= Saigera
taxa MUG 0922 tronVd)
reasonably propitious and if we are unable to establish f
working contacts with Vietnamese leaders willing and eiba to
-do the jab with necessary means......Do not believe that IMO=
and Nhu are at this point in time as oblivIdus to 115 and world
opinion as some observers,think Amhussatler now,
Truehearts and COS consider it virtual impossibility pende
or pressure Diem into removing NNa or to silence Ntatlezne
Mut for any period of time. Nor are we sanguine that ars
temporary withdrawal from scene can be achdeved.....laeaving
Men to CIA COS is not enough to achieve appropriate bettnence
through him on Diem.....Agree we should careftp# retrain,
and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed
to pressure Diem, within context of pending him, to take steps
needed. These measures would be more effective if they are
limited to practical and at-hievable objekstives....."
September Memorandum for the ram conversation with David Smith re possible ouster of Itiebardium
Prepared by nop
"Smith...discussed with me... reports that Lodge warded
get rid of Mr. Sohn Richardson.. ... Mike Dunn... had told
Conein... that Lodge was going 'to get rid of Etichardeon' On
one occasion Dunn asked ilonein, 'Do you think that Dave iinatth
can run the station for a teu.vorary period while a new Station
Chief is being sent out here V" ries also entry for October 57
September 19 State telegram from SMgo Lodge changes position; agrees must work with Diem nein
No. 544
Lodge to the President: 9 agree that no good opportunity
for action to remove present government in immediate futon
is apparent and that we should, thereon, do wha.e.,42, we can
as an interim measure pending such an eventuality.....Frankly,
I see no ow.Artnsrlty at all for substantive changes."
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telegram from Saigon Lodge views Wastdngtouls proposedacs as.
Lodge to the President:"! am in general agreement with
list of 'possible helpful action& with the important TAUS,
that items are for most part not possible of attainment They
involve leopard's changing his spots.... "
Personal letter fn.n The DC! offers to reodrieutatallar but considers Lansdale trot
acceptable a/3 replaceinentini �Efirliardson
McCune to Lodge
"I was told by Dean Rusk that you had ?repneed that General
Lansdale... replace Richardson as Chief at Station I stab
to emphasize that the Agency will reorient the Saigon OSA=
In any practical way to meet your desires. Persarmel., Insiuding
the Station Chief, can be replaced Lansdale would not be
acceptable to the organizaticm or to me personally If the
decision is to abandon all hope of working with the regime. then
Richardson probably should be replaced We have no current
intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which would teed us
to the conclusion that the present regime can be disposed of.
or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better.
This is not however to say that a coup might not occur even
before you receive this letter
September 213 State telegram from Saigon Lodge stresses the need for pressing on with the Diem sesbne
No. S55
Lodge to the President: "I believe that we might Ease a
situation after the appropriation hill has been voted to with*
no coup has taken place and in which we are faced with the
simple but unpleasant choice of pressing an vigorously with
Diem and Nina or else not pressing on at all. Under these cir-
cumstances, I think we should definitely press on....."
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'mud Briettog Subcommittee of House Arinedavites
The Director said there did not appear to be any wiliterille
military group capable of ousting the Diem regime, ised-buther
that there appeared to be no r .eplaitunert for the then ratirent
regime which was capable of roasting the government. A new
regime probably would be no batty,. Cansecinently. the Agency
was urging a cautious, slow approart to the problem.
September VI p0ad by r'CIA Activities in South Vietnams'
Mr. McCort
This seven-page memorandum gives a brief history at the
Saigon Station. It records that the Director travelled extentavely
in South Vietnam in June 1962 and reparted upon his return that
repressive measures of the regime were casing considerable
criticism and that there was danger of a coup. Patti nes*
eighteen months COS, Saigon, at the direction of the Ambassador,
met once every two weeks with atm The memantradurn gives
a concise account of the Agency's position during the Intel days
of August 1963: nit cable was.sent Ts the Ambassador buitterting
him to insist on effective reform' Stitaiding reducing the
influence and authority of the Nbule and if this could not be
accomplished by persuasion to take such action as waoltraccont-
plish this objective, even though it meant removing the regime.
At this point CIA was asked by the Ambassador and
Harkins to query certain military leaders and to determine
whether the resentment had created a body of opinion aseisug the
military, the Security Forces.and the peak that would SWF
off a coup and establish a new Government: CIA reported% that
this condition did not exist. During the week of Aragon 16 and
without taking a position as to whether the regime should or
should not be removed, the Agency urged care and deliberation.
It pointed out that to act precipitoualy and without assamince od
success a civil war would inevitably ressalt, the war against the
Viet Gang would be lost, and the Communists would take over.
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Ler A
fie" 06 Mentarratdem Deviated by This position was higidy exasperating. to those who abe�
d to
talltari. Ma Mee move precipitously. It is for this reason that the ativerattint
(ratifl) of action to move precipitously without coordination and
without intelligame suppert are now earryleg an a are
stgainst the CIA and the StatiOn. "
arctemater 28 as
No. 609
Saigon Sources of support for Col. 'Ames forces
"CAS provides per diem allowances to the 31st and 17th
Special Forces Groups, elements of which participated in the
pagoda raids, when engaged in jointly approved operations
against the Viet Cong. All other expenses are derived from
MAP funds. During the recent martial law phase. CAS dine
allowed Co!. Thug's request for per diem paytreents for those
units while they were in Saigon..... The degree of support
piuvided by CAS to projects serving current politicalky repressive
activities is rather limited and in the eases of Tunes service
and the police is overshadowed by the far greater degree of
support provided by the US Special Forces and the Public asiaty
Division respectively."
Lodgets reply to the DCI's letter in wMcb the DCI
accept Gen. Lansdale as Chief of Station, Saigon
"I am really disappointed by your decision as I think Ed
might have been the man to get things started here. I will,
of rousse, welcome whoever you plan to send out and am
delighted to have you say that you would reorient matters here.
Very frankly. I do not understand how it all operates here end
It appears to the that a number of reorientations should be ma.
Bob McNamara is here and he and I have talked about It and
I believe he will talk to you."
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ed Mcliateara*Tagler The report concludes the war is Ipaing well and time bons tS
minim to Vietnam forces can he withdrawn by the end of 1965
The President on 11 September had directed Taylor and
McNamara to proceed to South Vietnam to appraise the attoutton.
Their trip lasted fres: September �4 to October 2. The most
signigcant era:elusions of the report were: (I) The military
campaign has made great progress and continues to progress.
(2) There are serious polittcal tensions in Saigon (a) Metre
is no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful comp.
The most significant recommendations were: (t) A program be
established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now
performed by US military personnel can be casaied out by
Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It shotdd be possible to withdraw
the balk of US personnel by that time. (2) Card:hum to withhold
commitment of funds in the commodity import program*
(3) Advise Diem that support for Col. Twig's forces will be
cut off unless they are promptly assigned to the control of
the Joint General Staff and transferred to the field. (i) Maintain
the present purely "correct" relations with the top levels of
the GVN.
October 3
Personal letter from Lodge confirms his desire that PRichardecsa be replaced
Lodge to McCone
rl I agree with what 1 understand McNamara has said
to you. The time has come for a paterface. But, / also think
of Richardson as a devoted and rt American ft
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As a personal matter, law wool, d beillastgrad_ sae
to C1 indicated that
the US should not go in with its' own forces and fight this war.
that US strategy to train South Vietaarnese to de their an
fighting is sound. On the other hand, the US could not simply
pull out of South Vietnam and should "play the hand out".
With respect to the then current Vietnam leaders, it was
indicated that many of them are responsible and with coavdder-
able abilities but reiterated there is evidence of developing
tensions and rivalries.
December 7 CIA cable to Saigon
DIR 97710
White House cable to
CAP 63633
Saigon is informed that Peer de Silva is appointed COS and
David-Smith to be DCOS
The President informs Lodge of the de Silva appoisOonest
It
It is of the first importance that there be the most
complete understanding and cooperation between you and him* . .
I am concerned not only to sustain elective cooperatdon, but
to avoid any mutterings in the press. flock to you all to emture the
ccnnplete absence of any backbiting and the establishment asid
maintenance of a relationship of genuine trust and landentteedIng
at all levels. I cannot overemphasize the importance which I
personally attach to correcting the situation which has existed in
Saigon in the past, and which I saw myself when I was mit there."
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to Saigon
intonns Lodge of de Silva's appottazsent awl
"Acting on direction of Higher Alathority I preset; plat to
arrive in Saigon on or about the morning of December Pi
accompanied by Krulak, Colby, and de Silva. manta piens
to arrive by separate means on December 19."
Deeendser /1 CIA ragtaa to SaIgon DCI replies to Lodge's letter of December 3 urging
DIR 88564
Smith's appeititzriaut as
It FYI my presonal recommendation was that Dave coutizase
as COS. However, I could not in honesty state that he was 'the
most capable senior executive in the whole outfit,' and since this
was the criterion placed on me by the President, there was no
choice open but to assign Peer de "
� Desember 12 Memorandum for DC! Forrestal's comments on transfer of CIA responeThiliatee to
from M. V. Forrestal the military
When President Kennedy approved 'Operation Switchback'
about a year ago, the concept was that all paramilitary operatic/NS
of an overt nature in South Vietnam should be transferred from
the Agency to MACS' Although I do not believe it was ever
set down on paper, those of us who participated in the discessiate
at the time felt that any cross border operations which might
be in apparent violation of international custom or agreements
should remain -under the control of the Agency 1 Sib* there
are two essential requirements for any operation across the
border of South Vietnam. The first is that such operations be
disavawable The second is that they be subject bathe meet
direct and rapid control from the highest political levels in our
Government The transfer of these cress border operations
to MACV, in my opinion, jeopardizes both of the requiretotenite
of covertness and control Cooperation betweea the Agency
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Madam for OCI and State has been exemplary it this very delicate
from M. V. Forrestal not think that the military chain of command will permit this
(contid) kind of dose supervision..... These views are purely pernital
pcmi I have not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with
President Johnson. I do think, however, that they reflect the
views of the people over here who were dose to the parolees
when 'Operation Switchback' was being discussed."
M.G.-a...Loa 13 CIA cable f,tnn Saigon Lodge as replying to DC1's request that de Silva's cover
SAIG 3085 be protected
I certainly cannot take responsibility for keeping
any man's name out of the press who works for the US govern-
ment in Vietnam.. ... It is not clear to me what his cover is.
In fact the whole arrangement is still somewhat obscure to me
Memorandum foe DCI from Conditions in Long An Province
CIA Vietnam Working Group
"It would appear that security conditions in Long An Province
have been unsatisfactory for some time. Although...there were
some indications that the strategic hamlet program in the
delta...was not progressing favorably, the thrust of
reports from Saigon did not convey the seriousness of thew
situation which now appears to have developed rt
�
attember 17 Mentora:mitsm for IX:I Various Aspects of the Post-Coup Sit:swam in Sega Vietnam
A/COS. Saigon
rt the necessary potential leadership already casts in
the junta in the person of Minh..... The. is a millstone around
the neck of Minh and his early depart=re would be desirable.
There is a very real possibility of a power split in the junta....
Civilian aspirations for more democratic rule are largely
centered in the shies Long An is probably not typical of
most other delta provinces but represents an emirate example
01-'SEC
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th 1)Ca from of the problems the govern=
on coup d'etat will probably result
Peillormanoe of the military establishment. b
tions sheadd not be too high in view of the fact
essentially the Bann, group of officers as before
question for
develop within Sou
and others will teas
he would receive US support.
policy remains that of standing by firmly
Tri Saigon
he had a single
that if there nthd
exit,
lied whether
replied that US
keep Vietnam free."
DCI's conference with Corneral Hargrins in Saipan. Decorah*, 10
"Harkins stated that communications and relationship
wiTh Lodge were satisfactory, however, it was a *one-way
atreett...../ntelligence en the success or Whine In Oa wee
effort was net good and it was dependent upon the repeats 4
provincial chiefs, many of whom had toisted* their acteaude fin
political or for other t. With i.t.distasaka. tO the genera
situation, Harkins contbnied to be optindatie. He CMS)* he bad
been badly misled in some regards, pa.rticularly the Leg As
Province..... ,He stated. 'This operation wilt be reduced to
a police action after the middle of 1964.' 1 perseeally de net
feel this optimistic, but it indicates the feeling of Genera
Harkins at this time
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10P.
for the Rec d DCI ion with Arntasndcr. bodge in Saigan
The purpose of the meeting was to introduce de Sitta
DC/ and the Ambassador then met privately. "With reepeet
to the war effort, McCune stated that there was a ftdientenhf
intelligence and this should be corrected. There tme no
excuse for the kind of reporting that we had gotten on the Lang
An Province; it was totally erroneous and Lodge agreed...."
ernerandum by DCI Highlights of Discussions in gestate December Itiel0
"There is no organised government in South Vietnam at this
time it is abundantly clear that statistics received over
the past year or more from the GVN officials and reported by
the US mission on which we gauged the trend of the war were
grossly in error It is my COIICUISiell that the comp came
when there was a downward trend which was more settens
than was reported and, therefore, mere serious thaas realised
The military government may be an improvement over the
Diem-Nhu regime, but this is not as yet established and the
future of the war remains in doubt.. ... The political atablitty
of the new goverrmient under the MRC is subject to aterienste
doubt In my judgment, there are more reasons to doubt
the future of the effort under present programs and saSsa
extensions to-existing programs than there are reaSeas to be
optimistic about the future of our =tee in South Vietteetn."
Memorandum for the
President from McNamara
Summary of McNamara's conclusions after his visa to Vietnam.
December 19-W
"The situation is very disturbing. Current trends0 unless
reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to nentreation at
best and more likely to a Coranurnistecontralled state. The
new government...is indecisive and &Male The Canary
Team lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not
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on plan.... As tetzegnve
Detene and CM
to improve 1.
are acting vigor ������
Cong progress has been great twin the period at
comp, with my best guess being that the situation has
been deteriorating in the coantryside since July to a far
greater extent than we realized because of our undue cispoideace
on distorted Vietnamese reporting Possible
of Vietnam is strongly opposed by Minh, add our attitude
is somewhat suspect because of editorials in the US press.
My appraisal may be overly pessimistic. Lodge, Harkins.
and Minh would probably agree with me on specific pedals.
but feel that January shod see significant inaprovement....
McNamara's report to the President on his trip to Vietnam.
December 19-20; DCI's =moments
McNamara gave an extensive r
his written memorandum to the Pt
the Secretary identified is the complete failure �f. kw
for which DOD assumes its full measure of responsibility
which Mr. McCorte said that CM also accepts. Steps are beteg
taken to remedy this situation, but the depth of our leak 4
knowledge of the true situation is now coming to light.... Mr.
Me Cone stated that he might not be quite as pessimistic SS
Secretary McNamara about the overall situation, bet Chet be
also forma more realness for cense= as to the =tetanus thee
not. He stated that the answer cannot be found In additiosel
US strength, as the Vietnamese themselves must carry the
main burden. He particularly pointed out that we must inapsere
the intelligence and that the CIA. station must insure tbet the
situation is covered and not limit its efforts to the Viet Cons
Movement Secretary McNamara stated that Hi hops.
were in an improvement in leadership by General Minh. but
Mr. McCune stated that another coup or even another thereafter
might occur ietaam."
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liketember 23
1964
Samoan 6
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biemeressdurn for the Da's written Comment on McNamara9a. D.21 Knell*
President from DCI on Vietnam
DCI refers to a separate memorandums which was left with
IA. Bandy earlier in which his observations were retarded.
"There is no substantive difference between Secretary hicifeasara
and myself except perhaps I feel a little less pessimistic than
he. Nevertheless... there are more reasons to be pessimistic
than to be optimistic about prospntb of our success in &Met
Vietnam I am dispatching to Saigon a number of our tad
South Vietnamese bands' for temporary duty to assist In deve-
loping the necessary covert resources of native case 902nere
and agents to inform us concerning the effectiveness of the
MRC and the public acceptance of the new government. This
has not been CIA's role in the past, as intelligence of this type
has came through military channels. However I believe the
next few months are so critical that Information covertly deve-
loped will complement reporting received through the her
channels
General Minh signed a series
of decrees that placed the
t.estssata y under virtual centred
of himself and two other
senior generals.
listsuary 27 Ser.Def Congressional
Brie-fin
Closed session of the House Armed $072ViC
US military commitments throughout the world
McNamara said (according to press reports) that the net
Cong had "made considerable progress" since the coup. life said
that the US still hoped to withdraw most of its troops before
the end of 1965.
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Zi-a0 kuutitkg up to qulorAlp0 Whonh's successful coup, which began eafltmorniza Pil
The sequence of ant0 cannot be developed from a chronological IiSt:ing sceraing,
because none at those reporting had the complete story until after the event. The
documents used in co.. this part of the chronology are listed at left.
CIA cable from Saigon
SAW 4093. Inman, 28
State teleg from Saigon
No. Km. January 29
State telegram from Saigon
No. 1432. jacnusry 30
State telegram from Saigon
No, 1433. January 30
Harkins cable to Taylor
MAC 0325 Jannary 30
CIA cable Goal Saigon
SAIG an. January 30
CIA cable from Saigon
SAW 4154. January 30
De Sin Memorandum for
Colby. January 31
Late morniag, Sanuary 27 ( ....mu de Silva memo): De Silva
learned through an tthiia�.tu,. Meath that Khanh wanted
to see de Silva in Danang crn Tanuary 28'.? De Suva britruoted
that Kbeth be told that de Silva had an important prior
commitment in Saigon for Sazuary ...but would go to Damns
either January 29 or 30 or would send Cousin. Kliardes
emissary said "it mould be better to forget the whole thing."
Afternoon, January 27 (from de Silva memo): be Silva told
the Ambassador of the approach and the response to be given
Khanh.
1500 hours. January 28 (from MAC 032,5)j Harkins first learned
of the coup plotting when Cut, Wilson visited him at the
direction of Ithan.h. Harkins told Wilson to go immediately
to the Embassy and relate his story to the Ambassador. bi
the meantime. Harkins checked with CIA to see ltehey had
any pertinent information.
1630 hours. Sanitary 2.8 (from de Silva memo): Two officers
from MA.CV 1-2 came to de Silva's office and told Han of the
developing situation reported by Col. Wilson, be Silos pre-
pared SAIG 4093, showed it to the Ambassador at IMO bona
and sent it immediately thereafter.
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ii
possibly as early as January 31
generals. Once the coup was success
perpetrators would immediately call for the neutralisation
of South Vietnam.
1915 hours, January 28 De Silva map,
/erred with rhanh's etnilsary and aiked that asi apiaseigtetulti
he arranged for de Silva to ace ithanh in Saigon on Sassy 211.
Morning, January 29 (frees de Silva memo): De Silva Informod
Lodge of de Silva's plans to see ithards. Later than morribm
Lodge called de Silva in and directed that he was not to see
Khanh. De Silva arranged to get trend to flash that de Silva
was sick in bed and would be unable to make the meeting with
Kbanh, which was set for 1900 hours, January 20.
30 hours, January de Silva memo): De Silva asked
the-Ambassador's office it there were any Se yet from
a meeting scheduled for that day between Eiszah and
Wilson. De Silva was told that Wilson had not yet )...larti
in to the Embassy.
Afternoon. January Z (from
Lodge and was informed of Wile
The result was Embtel 1431, which
Harkins, but not with de Silva.
18.30 hours, January Z9 (from de Silva
called to the Ambassador's office and was
Ambassador bad already seen Wilson, had v.
and that de Sihm would get a copy. De Silva left
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patty Z7-30
itteactad)
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Z049 hours, January 29 (file time *am
is profoundly dishirbed by his expectitin
towards neutralism by the government which
take place either tomorrow or Friday
thinks if it is not vigorously crushed,
wants US assurance that we are opposed to neutralism... Fie
wants to use Col. Wilson as his exclusive contact with us and
has asked Wilson to stay in Saigen..... Wilson said that thardt's
absolute refusal to deal with any American other than Wilson
In due to an unfortunate experience 'with a CIA representative
named Spera, before the Oct. 31 coup' Am limiting know.
ledge of this to Ilarkins and de Silva Evant% is ccadacting
Wilson again later today, so there may be more to report...
Harkins has seen this message and agrees."
0ZI5 hours, January 30 (from MAC 0325): Elarkins reports:
" Mr. Dunn asked to come by as he had some more dope.
Dunn told me 0400 local today (30th) was Ifehour.....1
suggested letting Washington know immediately however was
informed Ambassador did not want to send msg. at that time."
0315 hours. January 30 (file time of Erk)was 14324: "Gen.
IChanh has informed us through his contact, Col. Wilson, that
he together with Generals Phat and Ebb= intend to move at
0400 this morning to secure changes in the cmnposition et the
hiRC. General IChanh states that General Minh has been
informed of this move and agrees. The only definite statement
we have yet is that Premier The must go....."
0315 hours, January 30 (from MAC 0325): Harkins directed
Weede to go to Embassy and suggest getting word en the wire.
Upon arrival at Embassy, Weeds found nag had already
been filed. (Enibtel 1432)
TOP
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30
oxLoq
1431. Want you to know that
at 0430 hours on 30 Jan. after CoMpleCtital2
then had in no way beets Wormed of Information c
that telegram "
boars. 30 J of SAW 404): De
rds to Pleadtptexters the vetbatirn test of Dabber'
: The Secretary of State had sent a loan copy of Embial
431 to the DCI's Office on the morning of January 30.)
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February 29
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Da "Sage Vietnam - A Prevost"
The primary ttrfne
to be defensive, not offensive. � � � �
for their own defense, but will not
The Viet Cong... effort against the Strata
with the tendency toward regularising and
patrols the irregular forces turned over wader Project SWITCHBAC2C
It may now be too late to resume the defensive and imaginer
approach to the war in Vietnam.. �It appears essential. however,
to make such an effort in order to avoid a repetition of the
French experience TI
telegram from Saig.n Lodge urges pressure against North Vietnam
094
"For the President from Lodge
pressures can and should be applied to North Vietnam to cane
them to cease and desist from their murderess intrusion tots
South Vietnam In light of recce terrorism against Americans
in Saigon, I believe North Vietnam should be told secretly that
every terrorist act against American in South Vientiane will
provoke swift retaliation avii-sst North Vietnam
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The paper sets forth a se
.omnzarniats of the impres nee they may
ea.d, forward movement, discourage them
further advance in Laos, and give them raison to bd
is prepared to escalate the c in order to digest
Zion in Southeast Asia and reverse the remit coarse
developments.
The paper essentially recommends that the Priptident
authorise the Secretaries of State and Defense to tarry on. puts
of Phase U of the program of grradeetted actions consabotd Is
WSAM 256 of July 31, 1963. It is made clear that a dolawithm
of authority only is requested...and that ft is not intswled to
implernerxt actions at this time.
With respect to actions to be undertaken nettle of Laos, the
most significant are the deployment of additional US crania!
forces to Thailand and the movement of an aircraft carrier
romp to the coast of South Vietnam. In addition, certain
diplomatic actions are proposed which, in effect, cousin of
bringing our friends into our confidence and galaing that!
support for these actions and warning our opponents of the
seriousness of our purpose.
the State Dept. Meeting on State's proposed
Icipant: Mr. Myers
Record by C/FE. "It was agreed to revamp the object
Department draft on what the movement of US forces to northeast
Thailand was expected to accomplish so that the JCS could
decide what was required " (Nate: This LlasITSCIdegg was for
The purpose of discussing the draft rnemoranclum which appeared
under date of February ZS. See preceding entry )
a
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March 3 nalernotrandum on Vietnam" Memorandum tzanszni ted to DC1e.
prepared by CITE finding mission beet-twang
"Following my trip to Saigon in late Den:train, 1963, 1
concluded that.... there were more reasons to be pestriazistitt...
than there were reasons to be optimistic.. ... The military
situation, bad in December, has worsened and the problem
reversing the trend is formidable... The V2t2SICIZIS atdch
were trained for the purpose of defending their own afratie
hamlets should be used in this way Intelligence bats been
spotty. There has been submersion of bad hews and art euett-
tuntnnent of good news I conclude that our military speCellates
In South Vietnam have not been as successful as we assumedup to
last December. I think the whole cancept has to he reviewed.....
With these steps Thiscussed in the meantrrandenii we sitsold be
able to strengthelithe Elsanh govertmaent enough to permit us to
decide whether continuance along that line will be attemputte to
defeat the Viet Cong or whether these steps must he stepplemseeted
by operations against North Vietnam.. In the absence of these
steps, operations against North Vietnam would in any case not
likely be worth the cost
March 4
4.3-64 "The Outlook for North Vietnam"
"We believe that the North Vietnamese leaders look at
Communist prospects with considerable confidence. In South
Vietnam, they probably feel that GVN will to resist is waning
and may feel that the same is true of the US. They may seek
to speed the process by a step-up in current Viet Cm% iattillte
of pressure and terror We think Hanoi will stop short of
introducing sizable DRY military units into South Vietnam.
lest this bring about a major US military retzliarlion, '1
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�.. --
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biliech
Facbanding mission
arrives in Saigon. lambda&
ittaientets, Taylor, Syteeeter,
Mersa W, Bundy, & Steibeen
Met prepared by
Intelligence Survey Team
Mtn is the group of CIA
"old South Vietnamese
bands� which the D4:3
mezdttonst being rent to
Vita TDY in his
memotestsitarn to the
Presider* December 33.)
Marsh 9 Memorandum prepared
the DC?
Record of the survey team' evert to Lodge on March 3
"/The Ambassador sa1d7 it was gratifying to him to know
that the US has an agency witch cradd assemble suet a Keay
qualified and experienced team, place it into a complas area
like Vietnam, and produce such a comprehensive piston of
the situation." Items discussed included the followiragt
(1) Absence of top-level GVN policy directives and gabbroe
on major counterinsurgency programs; (3) Need for ea*
effective political advice to GV/4; (3) Need for the govertoneat
to create a political base; (4) essicsonwie of islands of arena
which should be fully supported; (5) General attitudes of apathy...
and fear of the VC among the natal populace; (6) Need for
bolstering the military's awareness of the political espartos of
the VC insurgency�relative ineffectiveness and lack of
follow-through in peruse, civic action and political cgitirations;
(7) Tendency toward "conventionalisation" of grit-int Forces...
need for reorientation of au military operations toward
unconventional operations; (8) Concentration by the niniarY
on "combat" intelligence; (9) The team's conclusion that
despite the grim situation, the war can be won if the problems
are adequately, recognized and deliberate action taken to solve
them one-by-one.
Questions from the briefings and presentations on Marsh 8
"The conclusions of the CIA Special Team. This team was
sent here to (1) determine, based on their extensive experience
and covert contacts in will, on a 'spot check' basis, the
situation throughout SYN... (2) to establish coven &Intents
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htetesranduin prepared toy throughout SAM who could and would pro
the De the future The events leading up to the.
freati'd) axe not clear. Col. Wilson had a clear signal
on January 27(t) in Da Nang when he said -
determine if government will support an mati-earS
governmant or will go along WU
The answer that we would support
government was passed to
was a clear indication that Khan& meant
not reported by MACY, Lodge, or CAS not informoilt
remota:Ibis scenario of events leaves doubt as to Sate
were alert to the indicators, axaslysed them for their art
en US policy and attempted to direct them. Also, why was
the COS ended from the play even after the Lodge repertbss
telegram went out? n
Briefing at MACY
fit
Can. Harkins states that. them
Be eat
government since August or of
ard to say whether we
his outlook as one of 'guarded
meeting was confronted with conflitting
and question was raised by General Taylor and Setaretney
McNamara, 'Does MACT see CINCPAC and Washington estimates
Conversely, when do Washington and PAC get the bete
on which they make their estimates ?"'
DCPs Notes Meeting at U.S. Embassy DCL, 14 members of the lotalligence
Survey Teazu, W. Bundy. and Sullivan
It. . Mr. Colby pointed out a change in concept from
mobile local forces to conventional farces with static Mena
perimeters. Opinion was offered that the oil spat program
would have been a good thing two years ago but that new the
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Merit 9
timed)
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Dahl raw mita was almost gone and we were now favirois oar
gontein The Montagnard units were reported to bait
&ablated into conventional units of the VielusialUusk
farces with the restating loss of MS in tetelligencespeetahms
and 100% in offensive operations "
March 14 Memareathtm for the
President from
Secretary McNamara
"ability Of the thanh. governmente
".. mit is our judgment that the Meath Goverat gine
enough promise of irtakility within the next sist mortest for us
to bet 012 it and, since it evident:se the will to Wien rain
in consonance with ours, it deserves our hill support .
Mcria3nara's report his factsfimtbannatessiate VIStatun
"..... The military tools and concepts of the COMM
effort are generally sound and adequate.r.... fiebstiattial
reductions in the numbers of US military trainin prnmestal
should be possible before the end of 1965...The altattlen
has unquestionably been growing waree� es least sines
September..... Large groups of .a popslation are new showing
signs of apathy and indifference. and there are Berne IUDS of
frustration within the US continge:nt...,. In the last 90 dart
the weakening of the government's posftion has been pant-
abarly noticeable..... There isa constant threat of nosaaainution
or of another coup.... The young Kbanh government weds
the reinforcement of some significant success against the
Korth if the Khank Government can stay in power and Ohs
rrecommended7 actions can be carried ant rapidly, Iris my
judgment that the situation in South Vietnam can be significantly
improved in the next four to six months...."
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no:v*01W Driefteg
April 17.20 Secretary Brisk visited Sixth
Vietnam to emphasize US
support to Premier Khania
and his regime's war against
the Viet Cense
CIA Subcommittee of the Rouse Appropriations Cantoilta
The Director indicated that the station in Saab Vila
wa not goad and that there are more reasons to be psalmist
optimistic. On the blameable side he pointed out that
ithaith has shown potential sagacity and has a mdratattlial
government. But on the trafavorable side he pointed oat that
over the last six months the Viet Corqg have stepped a their
attacks and increased their military effectiveness. fa athilidaa,
the Viet Gong an taking actions in the politicalard civic action
fields and today control larger areas. Consequently, the
people are getting discouraged and more apathetic.
Secretary McNamara indicated
at a press conference that the
administation had amended its
plans to wttbdraw most US
military personnel from Soath
Vietnam by the end of 1963.
May 4 State telegram from Saigon ifhtuth asks Lodge if he should put the cottiSy on a war footing
No. 211033
letarth asked Ledge's view on pu&tiag aa4conntry OD a. War
footing. Re suggested an aratmancenient be made to Hanoi that
any further interference in South Vietnam's internal affairs
cold lead to reprisals. He said he said not enthuse about
"making the agony endure" and could not see the Stogie a
taking heavy casualties simply in order to stand still.
TOP SECRET,
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Meal= prepared by "MO Level Milting Paper, for Canadipsw
W. H. Witham
".. It is imperative that our ocammunication we Meta
be made precise at tide time and we know of no case shannel
than the Canadians to bring this about . � � �A 'lack Sr* by
Mac Bundy /for discussions with the et:ma/seri to also indicated
He should be prepared to spell out the Preside�We feeling Sett
(1) we cannot afford to lose Southeast Asia: (2) we are lagn kt
it
serious danger of such a loss; and 43) that he mast, if nesatinary,
be prepared to go to Congress to seek their ccassent to meta"
whatever means are csquired to bring a bait to North Vicestrese
aggression
Stabs telegram to Saigon Rusk asks further details on Lodge's report of Rhodes seezabe
Deptel 183S despair (Ernbtel 2108)
1i What is your assessment of Khania's mottsations?.....
Do you detect any pique? Has he reached the condeekan
that he cannot successfully win the war in the South mattes be
undertakes military action against the North? Does he
want to move now regardless of progress in the South ft
becomes most important to us to know whether this convereation
represented an accumulation of frustrations... or whetbe; it
is a forced effort to determine the ultimate US intention...,"
State telegram from Saigon Lodge's reply to Rusk's questions in Deptal 1838
No. 3125
9 believe Khanh is thinking much as any professional
soldier would think whose whole training is to get a victory as
expeditiously as possible. I do not detect any pique. I think
he honestly is trying to answer the questions in his own mind
TiMD S-crl
I
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blarsitatento a Convereatien LedgesMultivan tailts in Saigon re pressure on Werth Vietnam
prepared by W. E. �
There should be a steady escalation of the ittendeseet
operations...under Plan 34.A. At an appropriate point. he
believed these operations should include air strata...They
should be disavowed entirely by both the Vintean-pene and the
Americans Re would expect the Canadians to tell the
North Vietnamese there would be retaliatory action scptinst
the North on a tit-for-tat basis They could expect this sort
of action so long as they harassed South Vietnam I said
that my discussions with Secretary Rusk and Bill fitmdy did not
indicate to me that there was meeting of the minds on this
whole approach
May 12-13 McNamara and Taylor were
in Saigon on another fact-
finding mission.
May IR CIA cable to Saigon
MR 20682
DC1 cable to Colby, then in Saigon, expressing IICIle concern
that we may net have an accurate picbare of Vietnamese sibtation
"I am deeply concerned that the situation in South Vietnam
may be deteriorating to a greater than we realise
I am not satisfied that the sum total of all... indicators have
been evaluated and the consequences to the US position clearly
appraised.....I sin concerned tha* rthe esnemf could possibly
develop a capability to strike with bah surprise and unexpected
power I wish you to analyze the sibiation before leaving
especially as to whether intelligence reporting from us and
Vietnamese intelligence services and US Mission analysis is
providing proper appreciation of actual situation in Vietnam...."
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;it-.(..1:11
Colby* r9oly to the, concern .50 .by the MI
9 Mly share your deep concern about the sin:rafts
Despite the brave words at the top, the situation is cantimtleg
to dateriomte in the comatry and the top itself is on very this
ice. I believe that Secretary McNamara has belentUtied that
there is a substantial problem; whether be fully appreciates
how serious it is I am not so sure I believe that all of the
ritical facts are available and are being reported but there is
onsidered need for frequent and objective overall appraisals
of their significance I an Itantenieli primarily at a tersieney
toward chasing wills-of-the-wisp rather than cleaving fierely
to a fundamental strategy for this war. The catatnunity here,
the advisers in the country and the Vietnamese are subentrged
ender a ftood of variegated programs, requirements for. sperrifie
statistical reporting on evenrthing from fertilizer to the 'per-
cordage of Viet Cons wounded who later die and frequent
high-level visitations which completely preempt the time and
effort of the key people. All these clearly reduce the small
number of man-hours available to carry out any fund;sznental
strategy for this war."
hiss 14 a telegram to Saigon The President asks for Ledge views on pressure on NVN
"McNamara and Sullivan reported regarding titair careversa-
ith you. 1 was particularly struck by 4r; repast
with yen in which yeu indicated yen cestesat
moving against the North.....I consider it
at all times fully and clearly =derailed
each 's minds and would therefore greatly appreciate. ft
if yen would send me urgently your precise present recontineada
lions with respect to the North including the Canadian aspect.
the timing, and the degree of visible US participation at each
stage 11
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r,
rs in
chiefs and beadle of
areas. The Director noted there were bureaucratic olotatitios
and some of the c feel they do not hare sat-
nett:it authority. judgment, there ture mate
seasons to doubt the future under present programs and
moderate extensions to existing programs (i.e., haraesting
sabotage against NVN, border crossings, etc.) than Stare elja
reasons to be optimistic about the future of our �course in
South Vietnam."
Sullivan suggests a
tf The vani
laid out for themselv
them... have placed um
of the Vietnamese Government
a greater stress on the far reaches of
U SWAT efforts
programs which the iestnameee have
eve laid *pea
hsausowork
, �Tiara to
distribution system
in Vietnam than that system is currently prepared to bandies
Above all, an both the American and the Vietnamese side,
there is a vast need for a coordinated executive direction.
This could be accomplished eitlwr by separate and parallel
US and GVN management teams which svould oversee aka mare
military and civilian effort... or it could be an intogiseed
operation zuoving Americans directly into Vietnamese ininistries....:
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Slay 15 State ft:100am from Haig= Ledge replies to the Presi444s, reonest Bel** On
No. gal
I think the Canadian interlocutor on his first trip
to Hanoi should state that the Americans are utterly debsrmlned
to win the struggle in South Vietnam and will de whatever is
necessary to win it.....14 prior to the Canadian's trip to
Hanoi there has been a terroristic act of the proper reagaitude.
then I suggest that a specific target in North Vietnam= be
considered as a prelude totis arrival... . .1 ranch prefer
a selective use of Vietnamese air power to an overt OS effort ...
Wary IS
Menscourndum for the "Possible Acttbrt Against North Vietnam"
Pu.sitletrt from W. P. Bundy
Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCune and I are setting
tr
down in this memorandum our thinking...... We all agree that
a decision may be required considerably sooner than we had
hoped over the past three months Kharth has not put the
fabric of political life together atitnto successfully and the
security front is precarious Reluctant as we may be to
hit the North with the base in Vietnam as precarious as it Is,
we have to ask ourselves whether we can expect the base to
become firmer in the next few months Since early %perch.
a select group...has been working on a possible SINEXCIICO Of
actions to be followed if a decision were taken to hit the North.
A political scenario was prepared submitted to the JCS
in late April. . The next stage would be a careful intelligence
judgment of exactly how North Vietnam Commurdst Chhsa,
and Soviet Russia would respond to the kind of precise and
graduated actions laid out in the scenario. .. at air
attacks and aerial mining would have to be an an =hums.
lodged basis.. ... The chances are at least 50-50.. .that in the
absence of action against North Vietnam, both Vietnam and
Laos would deteriorate by the latter part of this year to a
point where they would be very difficult to save o
TOP
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by Colby "A Program for Laos and South Vietnam
'To meet the cnncia ediarfalThbst threat...rovvrouitty
two extreme courses of action are now being discaseedt
(a) salvaging what we can by negotiations at Genova; or
lb) carrying the war directly to Man& Whatever the &dosage
of either coarse...the risks...are so high as to warrate a
searching e minati of yet another alternative. We Coll
this 'massive counterinsurgency. ' In brief, whit te pre-
posed is that the defense and stabilization of the ettnedteaa.. be
accomplished by a substantial change in the nature of the
counterinsurgency program and certain substantial �bac:leases
In its scale. This to be supplemented by intense psychological
warfare pressures and selected military antion... against the
Communists in South Vietnam and Laos as well as in Werth
Vietnam
State totes to Saigon Rusk asks for Lodge's views on what might be done to improve
No. ZSZ7 conditions in South Vietnam
"Situation in Southeast Asia is clearly moving toward basic
decisions both in the Free World and in the com=dat varcht
I am convinced that the American people will &Alba- has to
be done if there is something to support. The invert that
we might strike the North... only to lose the South is nottsviting.
We need your judgment as to what more can be dove to ea la via
both the reality and appearance of greater solidarity in Sate
Vietnam to improve the actual administrative perforcassum
of the government itself in grappling with its awesome problems...
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TOP SEE;
7
. I w
as as usual'
ocklail parties and black
the luxury itetas at our commissary
arnese) do not give a sense of
TT
on Lodge's proposal for
We tend to see real difficalty in apprrh4ng the
Canadians at this time with any message as specific as yen
suggest; Le. , that Hanoi be told lay the Comedians 'that they
will be punished1.... On the other question. whether banal
substantial attacks conkl be left without acknowledgement,
It is our present view here that this would simply not be
feasible
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M*y24
May a
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White
Pr
CIA participants: Del.
VTR, le Cooper.
Record by eat.
MR SO-2-64
Planning for direct action _against North Vietnam
The meeting was devoted to wide-ranging discession of
political and military actions that might be taken in Laos and
Vietnam. The most significant portion related to Vietnam In
this: "The discussion then reverted to the critical question
whether there was a positive need to act against North Vietnam.
Mr. Ball felt that it was clear that the current action in South
Vietnam is not adequate but that to carry the war to North
Vietnam!' brings many inmonderables in its 'sake. to w1lt.
whether this will really help in South Vietnams and whether it
may entail substantial dangers to South Vietnam. Mr.
McNamara felt that we are continuing to lose the war in Smith
Vietnam and nothing now in process will reverse this trend.
Rusk...suggested that it is necessary to improve the situation
In South Vietnam as much as possible. Mr. McNamara felt
that if it were shown to be necessary to act in North Vietnam
we should do it now, but that if this were not entirely clear
he felt that we could go along for sir to twelve weeks endeavoring
to stiffen South Vietnam but then be prepared to move on to
North Vietnam
"Probable Consequences of Certain US Acto a with Respect
to Vietnam and Laos"
"ASSUMPTIONS. The actions to be taken...would begin
with GV'N (US-assisted) operations against the DRV... and
might subsequently involve overt US military actions.
"CONCLUSIONS. If...the scale of attacks broadened...
we are unable to set any meaningful odds for the course North
Vietnam's leaders would adopt...though we incline to the Win
that they would lower their terms for a negotiated outcome
There would nevertheless be a significant clanger that they
would fight Communist China almost certainly would not
wish to become involved in hostilities with US forces
k�-ir
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this decision ahothd Is
a major reduction or elizobziation of Nerds
ference in Laos and in South Vietnam; and not to unveil
scenario aimed at the use of force as as end in itsolf;.....
that in the execution of this decision all separate elements 411
the problem...should be tressed as parts of a single problem.
the protection of Southeast Asia from Silber Commesdat
encroachment. It is the hope and best estirnabs of most of
your advisers that a decision of this kind can be eteettned trident
bringing a major military seply from Red China, and tern leas
from the Soviet Union.
Discussion of pros and cots of action
1.1
V
The President, throughout the evening, sepreeiped
sacs that we had not reached a conclusittanto the
of action to be followed I stated &SS
be extremely careful about action int North Vietnam... Thessansep
relight unleash forces which coed readily evefc3ne the
city forces In both Laos and South Vietnam. with the result
uld 'lose our base' in Southeast Asia. , view was
d by Deady and recognized by the Pr'
1cNarnara insisted, throughout the evening, that any treeless
against Nore Vietnam must anticipate the commitment of at
least seven Divisions in Southeast Asia... I took issue with
this point, stating that in my opinion (whist was cast, non-
professional and not supported by any *Indies) air Stack vicadd
be more decisive than this indicated and possibly coaciesive.
I furthermore said that if any anion involved the commitment a
troops to combat in South Vietnam, we had betthr forget it
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at1/4...liC I
because the American people and the Congress
support such an action ander any condition.... Threegheet
the evening the President inquired as to whether all pawed.
was being done Ia Smith Vietnam. The answer was affirmadtire
and I did not take issue with this.... The President then
�summarized the course of action he desired to follow abate
as follows: If / other actions/ failed, then we stensid
prepare for action against North Vietnam on carettolly selected
targets U this involved a positionitig of troops and other
actions, then we should be prepared to take such actions ft
May 27 Memorandum re Operation IICI talking paper for the June meetinse in Honoirdo
SWITt2t8ACIC prepared by
Ca FE
"Between 1 July and 1 December 1963, control of obtrtattY
all of Cab paramilitary operations were turned over to the
U.S. Military establishment under the terms of Operation
SWITCHBACK During the period of CIA administration
these programs made steady progress toward extentifing CHMI
control over people and territories formerly held by the VC.
The major emphasis... was directed at programs to win the
support of the poptaation Using this formula...thesis
programs made steady bat unspectacular progress and were
considered to have been generally successful Following
turnover of these programs to US Milftnty canto', they
suffered steady loss of momentum. Political relationships
with the local military and civilian authorities deteriorated.
There was a considerably heavier emphasis on the military
aspects of the program and the military c:oncepte of action
apparently changed from the original objective of winning
population and territories from the VC to aggressive patrol
actions against the guerrillas Most of the territory
which had been recovered by these activities in &adapt of
CIA control has now reverted to the VC....."
TOR
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Draft Memo for the
US'S. Prepared by WE
with help of a panel
(NA and MEL
a that Ledge and staff be
concept at Honolculu meetings,
S.
The Department informs the Ambassador that Washington
has been considering improving the South V" effort by
introducing American assistants into the political and ay
structure at the provincial and perhaps district level. � "fa order
to test the utility of such a proposal, we watdd suggest that
seven provinces be chiseen for this purpose." The Department
instructs the Ambassador to be prepared to discuss this pro-
posal at the Honolulu meetings and requests that�Khan% not be
told of Washington's thinking on the matter.
"New Estimative Questions Concerning US Course at Action
re Vietnam"
"The assumptions with which we worked 7Th STUB 68-24417
envisaged fairly limited US force deployments. Had we Sere
stood that a major US force of, say, several divisions, might
be involved, we would have altered the estimate in several
important ways Large-scale US force deployment...
would tend to convey precisely what it was not supposed to, that
the US was resolved to transform the struggle has a ann.
it, which the survival of the DRV reghne woad be at stake
China would take more steps to insure its tem security, but
we doubt that it would run much greater risks than indicated
in the MC The USSR would doubtless take a more active
role than indicated in the SNIE..... The greater US scales would
have ambiguous effects in South Vietnam.....
**deployment hitforce would be more likely to atteracha ualisatted
than a limited purpose We believe that bringing to be,av
lesser rather than greater power is realistic, perhaps the more
realistic course, insofar as any course can be realistic in wha
is altogether a very bad situation "
i
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TOP. SECP.
3y28
ktennor prep
the DC! by WYE
itecormanded Program of Action Low South Vitae"
The memorandum, which was solnnitted to the via 'tunny
before he left for the June rneetinip; in Banoten. ..a.aunommalusl
a comprehensive program of action for South Vietnam. Inclefisd
among its recommendations were: a shift of emphasis to
territorial or localized straten; an injection oft sense of
urgency through institution of martial law; various offssaire
actions, including hot pursuit; and all possible Free World
third country involvement.
Memorandum for the DC1 "Violations of the 1954 and 1962 Gerten Protocols on Smith
from the General Cored Vietnam and Laos"
The General Counsel's opinion. which this menvarentlesm �main-
marines, resulted from consideration of using informattandeideed
from SIGINT sources to prove publicly that the DRV had ailed
the Geneva protocols. The General Crease� felt that the 1954
Geneva Agreement on Vietnam was so completely outmoded that
it was difficult to relate it to the present situation. He felt data
the 1962 Protocol on Laos was still pertinent but that the inter-
cept material demonstrating violations by the DRV did not here
sufficient probative value to support a propaganda attack by thelIS.
He ferther observed: "While 1 am outside my ftem� 1 would
hazard a guess that the damage to intelligence would outweigh
the benefits to be derived from a US attack on North Vietnam's
violations of the Laos Protocol." This view is supported by
other more highly classified documents written by NSA and CIA
officers.
TOP SECRET
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Sete 3 Memorandum for the "Observations and Anted Actions at Ron tin hiseldemes
liesserd Prepared by DC I end flame"
" in closed meetings the views expressed by both Ledge
and Westmoreland were, if eatylblng, more attain's than
the view expressed in the larger meeting. I t. .at enception to
the optimistic view, stating the opinion that the downward
spiral would continue, that dissension was a greater threat
than vote =pressed. that iltrWintelateal3 to work ant
cense and not setting aside 'politics as trend" Was hurting
Khanh by deriving him of useful assistance. I gnestioned
mthether thinp 'would jog along and bup -�ir be seen"
throughout the year. I raised the question of the effectiveness
of the ARVII, noting the '2% contact rate* and warned that
although a dramatic victory by the SIN would be btheying;
likewise, a dramatic victory by the VC, . �would have a
demoralizing effect. I stated that passible events, such as
the death of flash, a major Cathallc-lhaddltbst bidden and
the like would break the fragile cohesion that Iffigney 41sed dere.
lOped. I further stated that there was evideenCe'ne erosion
of the will of the people to resist. This was due ter 04 tear.
not the political changes and shifts of command. b short,
was more pessimistic than the spokesmen from Saiten....."
Lodge and Westmoreland violently opposed encsdretzent and
interlarding. The plan was dropped. Borabbsg WOW was dis-
cussed. "McNamara, Rusk and tail are in agrees:tent that
we must prepare for extreme contb2gencies, even Cate we
consider them inaprobable. Hence. agreek18 to korkibil Sri
the north at any level involves possible corranitmeot of tromps
to action in Southeast Asia. Stationing of troops wesid not be
enough. This would require a joint resolottsm at Congress and
it was agreed that an act precedent to bconbing the north would
be the securing of snch a joint resolution. "
Tr
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TOP SECRET
Asia Situation
Mr. Bundy said that the following was the state as
a result of Honolulu and can events since Mr. Breidre Watt
to London:..... The readings on South Vietnam at Hanolobs had
been a 'shade less pessimistic' than these on west
basing our thinking of a week ago. Nonetheless situation
remained serious. We we re now likely to take at least ten
days to two weeks to refine OUT thinking before we attest:wend
to reach any basic decisioas. We were also conthentng to
place great stress on diplomatic and inforrnotion activities that
would make clear that we were prepared to negotiate last as
far as possible before taking other action. As to the Canadian
gambit with Hanoi, Mr. Seabcrrn would arrive in Hanoi probably
about the 8th or 9th. carrying a general message of the firm-
ness of our resolve but also that our objective was scdely to
get Hanoi out of Laos and Vietnam and not to destroy the DRIP
or remove its regime
"Treads in the World Situation"
as This memorandum was actually written in Fabreary 1964.
The Official Use Only version appeared Ender date of hoe S.
Sher an PCent's transmittal naeractranduna. dated Serie 9.
notes that the paper "has general Beard approval/. tbagli
attempt has been made to reach complete agreement es every
point of it." The paper says with respect to Vietnam: "Timm
remains serious doubt that victory can be ann, and the etteation
remains very fragile U large-scale US support
if further political deterioration within Saudi
at least a prolonged stolanannte eau be attained.
a chance that political evolution within the ovary
meats npon the world scene could lead to some Mad of eewitleaed
settlement based upon neutralisation."
TOR SECRET
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ISDP SECRET
1964
June 8 Mernorasdum for the
(caned) Da. prepared by the
General Counsel.
"Legal Aspects of the Southeast Asia Situatboa"
11 the 1954 Protocol on Vietnam is in effect
no longer operative and therefore does not constitute
either a basis for action or restriction on action
there is a serions domestic problem in taking
increasingly militant steps without any specific
congressional approval having prepared an
appropriate Joint Resolution it is up to the President
to decide if and when it should be put Lutanie the
Congress a meaningful Joint Resolution could
not be obtained in this election year and the President
is going to have to talcn the steps he thinks are
necessary without this technical backing by the
Congress " Note: This EitetriCtrat arose
out of concern over the problem of armed escorts
for reconnaissance flights over Laos; howevert_it
at least indirectly also involves South Vietnam. /
o TOP SECRET
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Syne 9
for "Waal _t*Iin_ and las Pres, a
front Sherman Kent ! t tiltar
Beard ar Matianall EstimateS
OS 4 tif
We do not believe that the loss of South Vietnam and
Laos would be followed by the rapid, successive CC=31121Zattell
of the other states of the Fax East A coistkuactIbto of the
spread of communism in the area would not be inexorable, ad
any spread which did occur would take time The loss of
South Vietnam and Laos to the Conummists watdd be profoondly
damaging to the US position in ilte Fax Paget Sanas& would
probably accelerate his movement toward act onunodation with
the Communists Thailand would *most certainly shift
toward a neutralist position The chief effect would be
upon Communist China, both in boosting its already remarkable
self-confidence and in raising its prestige as a leader of World
Communism
Sae 15 etariee, Meeting at State Department re Congressional Ream
e�
Mr. McCone received a copy of a folder, wader cover of
a memorandum from M. Bundy, containing the documents
to be considered at the meeting. They included a inemeiandarn
prepared by W. H. 'Sullivan on the situation in South Manama;
a memorandum prepared by W. P. Bundy on "Probable Dave,
lopments and the Case for a Congressional Resat*: a draft
resolution to the Congress; "Basic themes in presentiog the
resolution:a; and "Questions and answers regarding the resetutten."
/there is no record in the file of the results of this zneetima
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Congressineat Briefing CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
The Director noted that the Viet Cong still hold the
initiative throughout most of the country. He said the
government's position is most serious and that the
government's large and small scale operations against
the Viet Cong have been showing some lag in the past few weeks.
Sane 28 Amtastader Lodge left Saigon
Sully 7
General Taylor arrived in
Szdgan to assume Ms new
duties as US Ambassador
to South Vietnam
awn 19 General Ghazal called publicly
for a full-scale military ootnck
033 Meath Vietnam
Jody 23 State telegram to Saigon Increased US military assistance to South Vietnam
No. 224
"Opinion at highest level here now is that news of increase
of US military assistance to Smith Viet:Lana would better
come from eaten than from Washington..... We believe
joint announcement could say simply that two governments
have agreed on need for intensification of pacification effort,
and US has agreed to increase sithatantially its zoilftery and
civilian participation in pacification effort, aperfne'llly
including advisers with regular, paramilitary and special forces....,
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ews on itharthis stress Ort
flash, after nearly six months in office, seems to
ban reached COrtChision that frustrating and ineffective
instruments of government at his commend are not adogeste
to master Viet Can by counter-insurgency means acme. He
wad his colleagues seem to have decided that they can betas
about cessation of Viet Cong harassment only by bringing Sect
pressure to bear on North. if they are onsuccesstal In gable
US more directly bivalved, it is difficult to judge at this stess
how strong es would became wtthtn ars to see a
negotiated solution. However, there are signs that this pee
sibility cannot be excluded
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telegram Iron. Saigon Taylor rcroposes joint c
214 North Vietnam
State telegram from Saigon
was
Postai:dent/al Meeting on
Vietnam. CIA participants.
MCI and CMS. Record
by WYE.
The Ambassador requests authorization to discnits ivies
Khanh a proposal for joint VS-OVN rantrntng for castes firma
of extended action against NVIt. He sees such talks 00 preritting
an outlet for the GiTN "martial head of ottani", sting Woe
to stabilize the government, providing a untie for
possible military action in the futkat.w. and allowing an owes-
tun/4'y to judge the political objet.ti the taint sees in such
military efforts.
Taylor proposes that Khanh make the anent of
US aid to South Vietnam
"On further reflection and considering importance doing
utmost to give some prompt visible support and bedidenp to
Khanh, believe I should give him opportunity to make the formal
announcement of increase to be followed up by back;grounder
by me. This will enable Kharth present Vietnamese people
with solid achievement of increased US material support and
hopefully serve in some small degree undercut pressures on
him reported in /Embtels 213 and 2.147.
Discussion of Taylor's telegrams 213, 2.14, it 2I5
The President requested that Ambassador Taylor discuss
with General Khanh a joint and secret traluation of the proppeeto
of North Vietnam operations. He fi.aLla requested the ICS to
provide additional actions which might be taken with minimum
escalation but maximum effect to improve the station in Vietnam.
The President also requested a major effort to produce an
economic achievement in South Vietnam. The results of the
meeting are summarized in Deptel 253, which is summarised
in the following entry.
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1164
Stay 236 Memorandtun for the Bc1
from Sherman Sent for the
Board of National E
"Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US or USiptemeareet
Courses of Action in Vietnam and Laos"
In response to GVN air or groraxl force raids 021 the Viet
Gong supply and infiltration corridor in the Lace
the ENE believes that none of the Communist p02902.0 tavatied
would respond with major military moves designed to change
the nature of the conflict. Reaction to air staes on North
Vietnam itself would be sha.tieer, but even in this case fear
of escalation would probably restrain the Corotramists from
a major military response. The Soviets would give Hanoi
vigorous political and propa. support, and would Ptebehly
place themselves in the forefront of these calling for an inter-
national conference--and might atom:veiny this by leading a
move in the UN to condemn the VS.
1
State telegram to Vientiane Unger's views are sought on proposal for air attacks on VC
Se Saigon. No. 261 to qatgon supply lines in Laotian PanharMe
State telegram from
Vit-eitiaue. No. 170
'Primarily for reasons of morale in South Viehatun and
to divert GVN attention from proposal to strike North Vitenama
we are considering proposing to Ambassador Taylor that he
discuss with flan!: air attacks on VC supply lines in the
Laotian Panhandle Request your views on such operations
linger's reply re proposal to bomb VC supply lines in Laos
"Air attacks on Viet Cong supply lines in Laotian Panhandle,
while helping morale South Vietnam and diverting government
there from its proposals to strate North Vietnam, would have
only marginal effect on problem of infiltration via Laos and
would greatly complicate Laotian situation When various
cross-border actions were proposed earlier, also including
air strikes, I pointed out fundamental attitude of Soaves, whici
generally shared by Lao, that use of corrWor, even though
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State beteg:rain to Saigon Reindts of July 25 Presidential teleetiag are tabled ton*"
No. 353
State telegram to Saigon
Re. 345
I f Proposal your ai5 for announcement 4rauuadtea
fully approved Re proposal imam 214, our �Wenn stearifft
be to provide channel for frustration, of what+, and generale
with committizig USG to action and with minimum risk al
disruptive leaks JCS considering urgently what additional
external measures might be taken, short of attack on DRY
itself, that would provide maximum military benefit with
inimurn risks of escalation or international complicattrusa.....w
Suggestion that Taylor MR Meath that USG willing to diesatdato
itself from General
"As part of problem of making clear our fell support for
Khania, we have been concerned that he may have the feedbag that
USG in past has been pressuring him to maintain Bilith's poilitiou
and go easy with Dalat generals You may in your &scream
suancl Khanh out whether he wishes tts dissociate ourselves
further from Minh and whether he needs our support in takisag
tough line against Dalat or other generals."
State telegram to Saigon Proposal for dramatic effort on a sitgle project or area, in SVN
00. 354
"At highest level meeting today, concern was expressed that
despite many desirable AM contributiomi to econon�tic and social
progress in rural areas, the pacification effort is not offering
the Vietnamese peasant a sharply contrasting alternator between
life under the VC and a clearly better deal with the GM it was
is, posed that US undertake with GY114 a dramatic and intensive
social and economic effort on a single frrsojett. or area which
would highlight as quickly and effectively as possible the oppor-
trinity for progress after pacification " The cable lists
several possible efforts.
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fi \di %IL-
State� tetegaani involving Lao territory, not primax. their problem.....I
allitrin Vientiane. Do. 172 believe proposed action would poba1zt.y. bring to an end pos-
Sword/ sibility our preserving even facade of government rational
union under Soliazum and :alien accords I believe it
would be exceptionally difficult to persuade Sorwzana Melina
to approve stepped up innitny actions in Paaandle without
triggering virtually if pressures for stay
linty-Pion in this part of Laos "
At-gust 2 & 4 North Vietnamese PT brats
attacked the VS destroyers
Maddox and C. Turner Joy
in the Gaff of Tonkin
ikagazet:4/5
Taylor reports discussion with Elia re possible joint
contingency plaaming
The An/boa/Or met with CZenrrnt Etna on Jaya? to
Mae up the proposal outlined in Dept./ 253. " Et csalie
cett clearly that Khania is thinking about reprisal Mitrfor-tat
bombing rather than a movement north with lint or
massive ing-to eiblit total desalinates of Barad and all
its works Tay/or suggested the desirability of jant eon.
*agency planning for an expanded ears* against the North.
Rhea said he was pleased to receive the proposal and would
Aink it over for a few days Khasi( said ,they:sossid shotelly
be t.atiy with a decree declaring a national 'stain
He said he had given up project of declaring 'state of woe
as he recognized coed not have this without 'declaring was
against someone "
US Navy planes bombed North
Vietnam coastal blies, patrol
boats, and an oil installationa
in a five-hour raid along lea
miles of coastline
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.*tatlz.
Congressional Briefing
Defense Subcommittee of the Rouse Appropriations Pormotiferep
The Directur commented on the covert ape in NM
which previously were �conducted by the Agency lest ~a bane
been turned over to MAW?. He intricated that there bed been
many disappointments with these operations; e� � it number
of teams rolled up and a lack of regstricant sabotage eMrte
The Da pointed out that he was not offering this as
but that it is disturbing since it would indicate that the people
in NVW are not rec to assist the teams.
Slate telegram to Saigon Next courses of action in Southeast Asia
4394� Vientiane, &
CVIC'PAC "The next ten days to two weeks should be short hold
phase in which we would avoid actions that would In any way
- take onus cif ........South Vietnam
not going well Our actions of last week lifted morale
temporarily, but also aroused expectations, and morate
could Planer sag bark again if VC have successes and we de
nothing further Hanoi and Peiping as of flatcar certainly net
persuaded they must abandon efforts in South Vietnam and
Laos South Vietnam still main theater Hectically
solution in both South Vietnam and Laos will require combination
military pressure and some form of cocamcnnicatiom --
which Hanoi (and Peiping) event:wily accept idea of vain out.
Negotiation without continued military action will not achieve
. our objectives in foreseeable lulus We might at some
point conclude that systematic military action against DRY
was required either became of bacidents... or because of
deterioration in b'stri situation..."
Premier Kbanh was elected
president under a new consti-
taint apprwed by the AMC.
Minh was ousted as Chief of
State, a largely ceremonial
poet that was abolished.
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tse Matthias paper
eee entry of June
was widely commented
upon fra the press. Preas
scats noted that
Om paper was made
palate because the
adeago Tribune had
apparently obtained a
copy. The press noted
Sherman Kent's entnment
that the paper had "general
Top SECRET
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1102 SECRET
*agora 22
Angust ZS
teasel val,
no attempt has been
to reach general agreement
an� emery paint" The press
sizto noted that pihrtibrIntne
afficftis said Matthias assess-
ment of Ow, South Vietnamese
taitin.1011 did not reflect
official Washington policy.
The newly-fornieci regime
of SRN President Mart
announced its resignation.
The ruling hIR.0 announced
that it bad voted to "repeal
the constitution and to meet
soon to elect a new learler."
hugest E6 State telegram from Saigon
NO. 56I
State telegram to
NO. Sn
Taylor meeting with Minh re MRC ela..ullou of a new leader
Taylor met with Minh at the latter's request. Minh
wanted to know USG reaction U someone other than Math
were elected. Taylor told Minh the best Minh could de
would be to attend the electoral meeting, take a strong
position for a united front, and support Kharalt.
The Department endorses Taylor's advice to Minh
The telegram was actnally drafted and released by
M. V. Forrestal. "Stilly concur Dave supporting Khania
you have privately taken with generals. You should
continue efforts along this line so long as you deem them
appropriate
Top. ,SECI
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"The situation in South Vietwini Se deteriorating, .. The
current political cx-isis is not yet worked out, and renewed
riots or even an attempted coop are still possible. /The
reference here is to the resignation of ttl-vnb Altgant
his staying in Dalat "for reasons of health", and the uneestain
nature of the interim gosyernmenta �.. The odds have
become very great that if we do not inject some major new
eleinants--and perhaps even if we to---the situation wilt
continue to go downhill " The
considers are a move toward taldug ever command. a maller
further ealargemeit of the advisory effort, enlarged masa
use of units now in South Vietuarn, meter new USunite fair
specific missions and areas, etc.
September 6
a from Saigon Review of the situation in sort Vietnam at
Aurdiassadorts departure for Washington
What has emerged from the recent everts is a
en within fairly broad limits of the degree to vita
Witty in government can be pushed. it ahead be
remembered that the recent fracas started when Month aoutztat
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from Stage
Septenther 8 Memorandum pr
to make his broad and cumbersome nt
BM more mire But now, after this
at goventwent improvement, we must Si
effective goverrenent, much beyond the capacUy of
had existed over the past several months, is unlikay to stint*
We may... expect to find ourselves...actively assak.ntog
increased responsibRity for the outcome follunaLg a timea
consistent with our estimate of the limited viabilfty of any
Smith Vietnamese government. .... There is no present Urge
to march north among our Vietnamese frtends; the leadership
is and frustrated following the recent disorders and
are not anxious to take on any new problems or obligations
Our objective up to about December Issliould be to get going
some kind of government worthy of the name tile altering up
morale and hblding enemy activities in check "
-
Courses of Action for South Vietnam" - conseamm reached by
by W. P. Bundy flier. Rusk, McNamara, and Wheeler
Ii We recommend: (1) US naval patrohs in the Gulf of
Temkin should be resumed immediately (2) 34A creations
by the Cii-vN should be resumed immesrmitely thereafter
43) T.,;Tnited CM air and ground operations into the corridor
of Laos should be undertaken in the near future (4) We
should be prepared to respond on a tit-for-tat basis octet
the DRY in the event of any attack on tfS unit' s or any special
DRVJVC action against SVD4 f I
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gerseraity
Vietnamese tzfrasSntture of ouPP
(43...a militant line of bringing direct military pacitin
measures to bear on North Vietavon..... All of these canes
of action have been spelled out in careful ES so wheat
Is needed is not mere paperwork but a arm polity of action.
To date we have reiesited... strategic vellivitrant....
think we have reached the point in the road where we nasal
consider the other courses of action not as " but
as essential complementary steps necessary to be taken
together and cpziady in oz dc to increase the unfavorable odds
of survival for a pro-US, anti
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