SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE QUERY: DO STUDY ON SEIZURE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05580565
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-02113
• Publication Date: February 24, 1986

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Priority Handling
Congressional
Action
SL.3JECT:
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE QUERY:
di Arabian Embassy in Khartoum
OP������
FRO :
TO: S cer esigna ion, room num er,
and building
7.
8.
RET
I 3 -
Counsel/DO
SA/ODUO
C/OCA/Senate
DATE
RECEIVED FORWARDED
EXTENSION
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
DATE SENT
24 Feb 8
RE NUMBER
(b)(3)
COMMENTS (Number each commen 0 S
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
to whom. Draw a line across column after commenP)(3)
Please advise if a copy (b)(3)
the 1973 DO study, Seizure
of the Saudi Arabian Embassy
in Khartoum, can be released
to the Senate Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism. If
so, it is requested that NE
Division furnish a copy of
the study which can be
forwarded to the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
1 TO 4: Herewith is a copy
of the requested study.
We defer to ODDO for
decision on whether the
document should be made(b)(3)
available to the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
P\4:60
t..;)
7401/47-24..4..4
c ).)
4.41mA14.0-4,..
SSCI
SUSPENSE DATE:
28 Feb 1986
C c
/lc
(b)(3)
Congressional
Action
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S-E-C-R-E-T
5 March 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT
Associate General Counsel/DO
Study on Seizure of Saudi Arabian
Embassy in Khartoum
I see no reason not to provide a copy of the DO study to
the SSCI as requested by Senator Specter. However, the similar
request from Joel Lisker, the Staff Director of the Senate
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism,
raises again concerns on how to respond to the nonintelli-
gence committees when they seek Agency materials. One option
would be to refer Mr. Lisker to the SSCI so that he can review
the study--assuming the SSCI agrees--in a secure environment.
It may be useful to solicit the SSCI's views on how they would
like to proceed, but I do not think the Agency needs to respond
routinely to requests from nonintelligence committee staffers,
absent a showing of particular need.
Attachments: Queries (2)
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SUBJECT:
BACKUROUND:
QUESTION:
Senate Judiciary Committee Requests Copy of DO
Study on Seizure of the Saudi AraUian Embassy in
Khartoum
Joel Lisker, Chief Counsel and Staff Director of
the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism discovered a footnote
reference to the DO study, Seizure of the Saudi
Arabian Embassy in Khartoum in a footnote
reference in a 1974 DARPA document entitled
Decision-Making, Bargaining, and Resources which
had been declassified in 1975. Lisker said he is
engaged in an analysis of PLO involvement in the
incident in preparation for a 23 April 1986
Security and Terrorism Subcommittee public
hearing on Arafat and the PLO at which the
Attorney Ueneral has been invited to testify.
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism has requested a copy of
the July 1973 DO study, The Seizure of the Saudi
Arabian Embassy in Khartoum.
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THE SEIZURE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN
EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM
June 1973
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THE SEIZURE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN
EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM
Summary
In the early evening hours of 1 March 1973, eight Black
September Organization (BSO) terrorists seized the Saudi Ara-
bian Embassy in Khartoum as a diplomatic reception honoring
the departing United States Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) was
ending. After slightly wounding the United States Ambassador
and the Belgian Charge d'Affaires, the terrorists took these
officials plus the United States DCM, the Saudi Arabian Ambas-
sador and the Jordanian Charge d'Affaires hostage. In return
for the freedom of the hostages, the captors demanded the re-
lease of various individuals, mostly Palestinian guerrillas,
imprisoned in Jordan, Israel and the United States.
The Khartoum operation was planned and carried out with
the full knowledge and personal approval of Yasir Arafat,
Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and
the head of Fatah. Fatah representatives based in Khartoum
participated in the attack, using a Fatah vehicle to transport
the terrorists to the Saudi Arabian Embassy.
Initially, the main objective of the attack appeared to
be to secure the release of Fatah/BSO leader Muhammed Awadh
(Abu Deud) from Jordanian captivity. Information acquired
subsequently reveals that the Fatah/BSO leaders did not expect
Awadh to be freed, and indicates that one of the primary goals
of the operation was to strike at the United States because
of its efforts to achieve a Middle East peace settlement which
many Arabs believe would be inimical to Palestinian interests.
Negotiations with the BSO terrorist team were conducted
primarily by the Sudanese Ministers of Interior and of Health.
No effort was spared, within the capabilities of the Sudanese
Government, to secure the freedom of the hostages. The ter-
rorists extended their deadlines three times, but when they
became convinced that their demands would not be met and after
they reportedly had received orders from Fatah headquarters
in Beirut, they killed the two United States officials and
the Belgian Charge. Thirty-four hours later, upon receipt
of orders from Yasir Arafat in Beirut to surrender, the
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terrorists released their other hostages unharmed and surren-
dered to Sudanese authorities.
The Khartoum operation again demonstrated the ability of
the BSO to strike where least expected. The open participa-
tion of Fatah representatives in Khartoum in the attack pro-
vides further evidence of the Fatah/BSO relationship. The
emergence of the United States as a primary fedayeen target
indicates a serious threat of further incidents similar to
that which occurred in Khartoum.
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THE SEIZURE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN
EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM
Introduction
This study of the attack on the Saudi Arabian Embassy in
Khartoum, Sudan, and the murder of the United States Ambassa-
dor to Sudan, his Deputy and the Belgian Charge d'Affaires by
Fatah's Black September Organization (BSO) is based on infor-
mation available .through 31 May 1973. Immediately after the
surrender of the terrorists, Sudanese President Numayri ap-
pointed a special committee to investigate the incident and
prohibited release of information on the incident by police or
security officials. The special committee submitted its re-
port to the President on 24 March 1973
this study includes all the
information available at this time concerning both the attack
and the clear and direct involvement of Fatah's leader, Yasir
Arafat, in its planning and in the murders of the hostages.
Planning the Operation
Planning for the attack in Khartoum apparently began in
mid-Feb7ary 1973 when BSO leader Salah Khalaf (Abu Ivad) re-
guested
an
operation to secure the release of imprisoned BSO/Fatah leader
Muhammad Awadh. (Abu Da'ud). Awadh had been captured along
with 16 of his followers by Jordanian authorities on 9 Febru-
ary 1973 as he was planning an attack against the United
States Embassy in Amman.
It appears likely that Fatah had been considering an
operation against United States officials in Khartoum prior
to the decision to attack the Saudi Arabian Embassy. For some
time before the attack several Palestinians resident in Khar-
toum, and subsequently identified as contacts of Fatah repre-
sentatives in Khartoum, had been spectators at sports events
of the staff of the United States Embassy in Khartoum. Re-
calling these occasions, members of the Embassy staff have
stated that these individuals appeared to be more interested
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in observing the United States officials present at these
events than in the events themselves. These surveillants may
have identified the various officers of the Embassy to the
Fatah representatives in Khartoum who planned or participated
in the murder of the United States Ambassador and his deputy.
The attack in Khartoum was planned to occur on a national
holiday celebrating the first anniversary of the end of the
Sudanese Civil War, and on the occasion of a state visit by
Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.
There is no specific information to explain the BSO deci-
sion to strike on the occasion of the Saudi Ambassador's recep-
tion, nor to explain why the terrorists selected Ambassador
Noel or Mr. Moore as their victims. Some reasons may be de-
duced, however.
The Saudi Ambassador is the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps
in Khartoum and his farewell reception for Mr. Moore (a cus-
tomary event for departing senior diplomats), to which all the
senior diplomats in Khartoum were invited, could be expected
to bring together all those in the Khartoum diplomatic communi-
ty whom the terrorists wished to capture. Since the occasion
was only for the diplomatic corps, there were no Sudanese
guests. The terrorists quite possibly saw this as an advan-
tage. Their initial statement from the captured Embassy noted
that the operation was not directed at the Sudanese. Past
Saudi receptions for departing chiefs of mission were always
stag and the lack of dependents at the reception could elimi-
nate possible complications. The Saudi Embassy.itself is well
suited for withstanding a siege. It does not have common walls
nor is it in close proximity to other buildings. It has a
high outer wall and an unobstructed view in all directions
from the upstairs balconies. Since the Fatah representation
in Khartoum was in diplomatic and social contact with other
Arab diplomats locally, an Arab installation offered them bet-
ter access for casing purposes than other non-Arab installa-
tions where the targeted diplomats may have gathered. Finally,
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the terrorists also may have anticipated that the Sudanese
security services would be heavily committed in protecting the
visiting Ethiopian Emperor.
Later claims by fedayeen supporters in Beirut' that the
DCM, Mr. Moore, had been selected because he was a U.S. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee and had worked against
the fedayeen in Jordan appear to be attempts to rationalize
his murder. Moore had never had any affiliation with the CIA
nor had he served in Jordan, although another Department of
State officer with a similar name had served in Amman in an
administrative capacity. The DCM, however, had been accused
in the Libyan and Egyptian press of being affiliated with the
CIA and of being the architect of the resumption of diplomatic
relations between the Sudan and the United States.
The decision to strike at the Saudi Arabian Embassy was
made with the full knowledge and personal approval of Pales-
tinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Fatah leader
Yasir Arafat.
Initial information indicated
that the main objective of the Khartoum operation was to se-
cure the release of Abu Da'ud, who is being held by Jordan.
Information acquired subsequentlyl
reveals that the Fatah/BSO leaders did not
expect their demands to be met by Jordan, Israel or the United
States. nat only did
the Fatah/BSO leadership and the terrorist team expect to kill
their hostages, but that the primary objectives of the opera-
tion were to shock the world and to strike at the United
States, because oX its efforts to achieve a Middle East peace
settlement which many Arabs believe would be inimical to
Palestinian interests. Although it appeared that the final
decision to kill the hostages was not made until after the
U.S., Jordan and Israel had rejected the demands and after the
terrorists had received a properly authenticated message from
Arafat, the decision to murder the diplomats was in effect
made with the inception of the operation.
Despite the above, it is believed that the BSO team had
sufficient latitude to negotiate the release of the hostages
if by some remote chance their demands were met.
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Preparations for the Attack
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The terrorists were met on t4eir arrival by the local
Fatah representation in Khartoum--Fawaz Yasin Abd al-Rahman,
the senior Fatah representative; kizici Al Qas, the second in
command; and Karam Mahmoud Azzam. Al Qas, who subsequently
became the eighth member of the attack group, had lived in
the Sudan for over two years and was responsible for a daily
program, "Palestine Corner," over local radio. His inclusion
in the operation facilitated its success, since he spoke Eng-
lish and was familiar with the layout of the Saudi Embassy.
(b
(b
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Just�four�hour-s_prior to the assault Fawaz and his family
departed the Sudan for Libya.
Apparently as a result of his haste to depart
Khartoum before the attack commenced, Fawaz left in his'office
a detailed eight-page plan of the operation, which was seized
by Sudanese authorities when they raided the Fatah office. The
plans were complete with a map and a detailed breakdown of
each man's primary tasks upon initially entering the Saudi
Embassy. Two principal members of the assault group were code-
named Abu Ghasan and Abu Tariq. Abu Ghassan was instructed
to distribute a written statement to the guests and select
from a prepared list those diplomats to be held hostage. Abu
Tariq was to secure the building from outside attack, take
control of the assault group and release those diplomats not
on the list. The specific instructions to the 'other five ter-
rorists (presumably Al Qas was given his instructions orally
by the departed Fatah leader), code-named Salih, Tariq, Gamal,
Mahir and Khalid, related to securing the Embassy and being on
guard against an attack from the outside. The discovery of
the plan in the Khartoum Fatah office and the involvement of
local Fatah representatives in the attack added to the already
considerable evidence of the BSO relationship to Fatah.
Objectives of the Operation
The ostensible objectives of the Fatah/BSO operation in
Khartoum, as reflected by the demands of the terrorists, were
to obtain the release of Muhammad Awadh (Abu Da'ud) and his
16 followers imprisoned in Jordan; of other terrorists of var-
ious nationalities imprisoned in Jordan, Israel and West Ger-
many; and of Sirhan Sirhan, the assassin of Senator Robert
Kennedy, jailed in the United States As stated in the Plan-
ninz Section above.
the planners of the
operation did not expect Jordan, Israel or the United States
to accede to their demands, and that the three Western diplo-
mats were doomed from the moment they were captured.
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the terrorists were:
the main goals of (W(1)
(b)(3)
a. To strike at the United States, which many Arabs
believe is the force behind an effort to reach a Middle
East peace settlement inimical to Palestinian interests.
b. To reaffirm the credibility of terrorist threats
in operations of this kind, a credibility which had been
seriously weakened as a result of the failure of the
Bangkok operation in December 1972.
c. To prove to Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammar Qadhafi
that Fatah/BSO can carry out effective terrorist opera-
tions, and thus justify renewed financial support. (Libya
had severely curtailed such support in early January 1973
because of Qadhafi's view that Fatah/BSO was not carrying
out terrorist operations efficiently.)
d. To make clear to Arab governments that the Pales-
tinian "revolution" in general, and the fedayeen terror-
ists in particular, would continue to maintain their in-
dependence and not allow themselves to be manipulated by
individual Arab states.
e. To protest the reconciliation of Arab states with
Jordan and their possible inclination toward a peaceful
Middle East settlement.
To achieve these goals, the terrorists seized the Saudi
Arabian Embassy in Khartoum and took as hostages the U.S. Am-
bassador and his Deputy plus the Saudi Arabian Ambassador and
the Jordanian and Belgian Charges d'Affaires. The terrorists
intended also to capture the West German Ambassador, who was
on their target list, but failed because he did not attend the
reception. Upon realizing that they had not captured the
West German Ambassador, the terrorists dropped their demands
for release of terrorists from German jails. j (b)(1)
the terrorists also had hoped to capture the Egyptian(b)(3)
and Ethiopian Ambassadors, as well. Neither attended the re(b)(1)
ception, however. While it is not definitely known why the 1:)S3S
Ethiopian Ambassador was targeted, it is believed that the `
Fatah/BSO support for Eritrean dissidents and the specific
ties between the Eritrean Liberation Front and Fatah in Khar-
toum may have been a factor in the selection of the Ethiopian
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Ambassador as a hostage. The Egyptian Ambassador reportedly
was on the list because of the recent visit of Egypt's national
security advisor to the United States where it was believed
he had held discussions with U.S. officials on "a possible Mid-
dle East peace settlement.
The Attack
On the day of the attack, at least four and possibly five
of the eight terrorists were driven by Karam, the third mem-
ber of the local Fatah representation, in the Landrover owned
by the Khartoum Fatah office to a point near the Saudi Arabian
Embassy where they waited for the reception to end. Where and
how the remaining terrorists gained entry to the Embassy is
not known. Reports that three of the terrorists actually at-
tended the reception do not appear to be true, since none of
those who attended the reception can recall seeing the ter-
rorists among the guests.
The terrorists were armed with four Polish-manufactured
Kalashnikov-type automatic rifles, four pistols and eight hand
grenades. The pistols and hand grenades were manufactured in
such diverse countries as Egypt, Bulgaria the Soviet Union.
China. Belgium and the United States.
At about 1850 hours the Landrover pulled into the driveway
of the Saudi Embassy as United States Ambassador Cleo A.
Noel, Jr. was departing. The Landrover rammed and effectively
blocked Noel's car. The terrorists leapt out firing their
weapons, and slightly wounded the American Ambassador and the
Belgian Charge, Guy Eid. In the confusion several guests, in-
cluding the Dutch Charge and the Ambassador of the Soviet Union,
escaped. Other guests, including the Japanese and Spanish Am-
bassadors, were captured but released when the terrorists
determined that they were from "friendly" countries.
Having seized the Embassy and the hostages, the terrorists
set about implementing their tasks. They demanded the release
of Muhammad Awadh (Abu Da'ud), certain military prisoners im-
plicated in earlier threats against the Jordanian Goverment
and other imprisoned fedayeen. Other demands were for the
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release of Sirhan Sirhan from the United States and the release
of the two women involved in the Sabena hijacking of May 1972,
who are imprisoned in Israel. The terrorists threatened to
kill the hostages if their demands were not met.
The Siege and the Negotiations
The terrorists initially were extremely confident.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The terrorists' only means of two-way communication was (b)(1)
bte1ephone, (b)(3)They could receive broadcasts on radios they found in (W(1)
e m assy, but had no transmitter. The terrorists used the (b)(3)
phone only to speak with the Sudanese negotiators. The captured
diplomats also used the phone but only under the supervision
of the terrorists.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Negotiations for the hostages' release were begun imme-
diately after their capture. Heavily armed troops and police
quickly surrounded the Embassy. The Sudanese Ministers of
Interior and Health were the chief negotiators. Most of their
contact with the terrorists was by telephone or through bull-
horn exchanges between the terrorists in the Embassy and one
of the negotiators outside. The Minister of.Health had one
two-hour meeting inside the Embassy with the terrorists, which
appears to have been the only extended face-to-face exchange
between the terrorists and the negotiators. The only other
person who was able to enter the Embassy and converse with the
terrorists was the Sudanese doctor who treated the wounds of
Ambassador Noel and Mr. Eid and the injury to-Mr. Moore.
The terrorists were offered safe passage out of the coun-
try in return for the hostages' freedom. The terrorists in-
stead proposed that the Sudanese let them fly out of the Sudan
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with the hostages.
One plan, (W(1)
was for the terrorists to fly to the Uni- (b)(3)
ted States with their hostages, publicly murdering them and
then surrendering to United States authorities. They considerec(W)
this plan because it would afford them the maximum amount of (b)(3)
publicity. Another plan, proposed by the Egyptian Foreign
Ministry, was for the terrorists to fly to Cairo with their hos-
tages; the BSO team rejected this proposal.
The terrorists extended their deadline three times. After
they heard radio news broadcasts which led them to belrieve the
U.S. Government.had rejected their demands, and after (W(1)
they heard a radio message containing (b)(3)
the code words indicating that it had originated from Fatah/BSI(ml)
headquarters, the fate of the three Western diplomats was seallopoS
There have been various reports concerning the above radio
messa e.
the
regular Voice of Palestine broadcast between 1730 and 1930
hours on 2 March 1973 from Cairo contained the cryptic message,
"Greetings. Your message has been received. Do what is re-
quired quickly because the blood of the martyrs is a revolution."
The Sudanese made one final unsuccessful attempt to dis-
suade the terrorists after the final deadline,,asking them to
wait until the arrival of high-ranking United States officials.
When the terrorists were ordered to kill the three diplo-
mats, the victims were instructed to write their wills and last
letters to their wives. A request by Ambassador Noel to call
his wife was.rejected. At 2100 hours local time on 2 March
1973, the three Western diplomats were taken into the basement
of the Saudi Embassy and machine-gunned to death.
The two Americans were key targets of the terrorists, as
previously noted, and their murder appears to have been planned
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from the beginning. The Belgian Charge was'killed.\
in retaliation for the BSO Sabena hijacking of
May 1972 in which two BSO members and two terrorists were
killed;
The life of the Jordanian
Charge may have been spared because of his Palestinian origin
and a family relationship with the widow of a senior Fatah
official. There appears to have been no intention to harm the
Saudi Ambassador or his family. The Ambassador's children were
released 19 hours after the seizure. His � w a ow -d
sta and both had the run of the Embass
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Despite murdering the three hostages the BSO team still
believed that they would be allowed to leave the Sudan freely,
and they demanded that they be flown out of the Sudan with
the remaining hostages. The Sudanese refused and demanded
that the terrorists surrender and release the remaining hos-
tages unharmed. With water, electricity and the telephone cut
off, the terrorists became less and less confident that they
would escape.
The key objectives of the operation having been achieved
with the murder of the Western diplomats, the Fatah leadership
apparently became concerned about the possibility of a Sudanese
assault on the Saudi Embassy with the risk of death or injury
to the Saudi Ambassador. Arafat did not want to further offend
King Faysal and Saudi Arabia and possibly jeopardize whatever
aid he believed would be forthcoming to Fatah and other Pales-
tinian or anizations.
Arafat then sent a telegram (W(1)
ordering the surrender of (b)(3)
t e terrorists and the release of the hostages.
After receiving further assur- (W(1)
ances from Sudanese authorities that they would receive a fair (b)(3)
trial, the eight terrorists surrendered at about 0700 hours on ,
4 March, nearly 60 hours after the operation had begun.
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Conclusions
The Khartoum operation again proved the capability of the
BSO to strike at a place and time of its own choosing.
Fedayeen terrorists and guerrillas have conducted opera-
tions against Jordanian officials and installations since
September 1971, but the Khartoum attack showed a willingness
to strike at an embassy of a country which had provided finan-
cial support to Fatah and do it in an Arab country with a
government friendly to Fatah.
As in most BSO operations outside Israel, the attack took
place in a country which hosted Fatah and PLO representatives.
In this instance, however, for the first time a local Fatah
office was openly involved in the planning and execution of
an attack.
As in Bangkok, which also was considered an unlikely place
for an Arab terrorist operation, the attack in Khartoum caught
its victims completely by surprise and occurred on a day of
national celebration.
The Khartoum murder of the three hostages re-established
the credibility of BSO threats to kill hostages. The murders,
furthermore, were the first instances in which a BSO threat to
kill hostages in cold blood was carried out without some out-
side influence such as that which occurred at Munich when West
German authorities attempted to secure the release of Israeli
hostages by shooting the BSO terrorist team.
Although the slaughter of the three hostages was repug-
nant to many Arabs, the attack succeeded in boosting the morale
of some supporters of the Palestinian movement by removing the
stigma of recent failures, most notably at Bangkok, and by
showing the world in general and the Arab population in par-
ticular that fedayeen terrorists could strike at United States
interests with impunity. There have since been reports from
reliable sources that United States officials and installations
are now primary targets of the fedayeen terrorists.
These results were not gained without some costs. The
direct and open involvement of the Fatah representatives in
Khartoum in the operation has resulted in the loss of the aura
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�
of "moderation" which Fatah leaders had sought to project to
the world. The incident further demonstrated that Fatah and
the BSO are one and the same.
14
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SECRET
Approved for Release: 2021/11/22 C05580565
Approved for Release: 2021/11/22 C05580565
� .1 k
a"----""�����
_ �
Crude sketch plan of Saudi Arabian embassy, drawn for guidance
of terrorist squad by Al Fatah representative in Khartoum, Fawaz
Yassin Abdel Rahman. Sudanese police found it when they raided
his office. Below, transliteration of the plan. 1, Stores block is actually
about same size as main building; 2, pyramid effect crudely repre-
sents four-storey embassy; 3, rough indication of office block on
pillars.
An esimidates
house
Hostage's
house
WALL (2 metres high)
AMBASSADORS:--1
STORES ROUSE )
0 2 metres r---j�VS1-1 2 metres
offes St4sItadng
' to house
Iron windows Iron windows
Steps.
Garden
II Garage
fountain
OFFICES
AN����� Ammo.
gain Entrance
0
Empty place
�In
'Door
TO
? LICE
for oartir.
MAIN ROAD
Pavement
Figure
1:
Plan of the Saudi Arabian Embassy
in Khartoum, Prepared by the Local
Fatah Representative.
Approved for Release: 2021/11/22 C05580565
Approved for Release: 2021/11/22 C05580565
Figure 2: Fatah Terrorists in the Saudi Arabian
Embassy in Khartoum.
Figure 3: Surrender of the Fatah/BSO Terrorist
Team to Sudanese Authorities.
Approved for Release: 2021/11/22 C05580565
Approved for Release: 2021/11/22 C05580565
Figure 4: One of the Khartoum Terrorists
Approved for Release: 2021/11/22 C05580565
Approved for Release: 2021/11/22 C05580565
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Figure 5: Photograph of Palestinian contacts of Fawaz Yassein Al-Rahman
found in The Roxy Hotel in Khartoum. Al-Rahman, Rizig El Qas
and Karam Mahmoud Azzam are identified, as are two of the per-
sons suspected of having surveilled United States Embassy
personnel.
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SECRET
Approved for Release: 2021/11/22 C05580565