LATIN AMERICA REVIEW 1 JUNE 1984[SANITIZED] - 1984/06/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05509030
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984

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Directorate of -
Intelligence
Latin America
Review 3.5(c)
1 June 1984
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,Secir-dr
ALA LAR 84-010
1 June 1984
Copy 390
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
Articles
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Latin Amerie
Review
1 June 1984
3.5(c)
_Scherer-
Page
3.5(c)
Argentina: Radical arty Politics
3.5(c)
NR
Economic and political problems have exacerbated longstanding
ideological rifts within the ruling party, causing President Alfonsin
to temper government policy in an effort to maintain a balance
between competing factions and thereby preserve party unity.
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3.5(c)
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Argentina: Radical Party Politics
Economic and political problems have exacerbated
longstanding ideological rifts within President
Alfonsin's ruling Radical Civic Union Party. These
differences have affected government policy on a
range of issues as Alfonsin has tried to maintain a
balance between competing factions to preserve party
unity. Recently, however, the President seems to be
moderating his aggressive policy positions in an effort
to improve relations with Argentina's traditional
power brokers--the military and Peronists. Although
the Radicals' internal difficulties are manageable,
several factors could deepen splits, erode Alfonsin's
ability to govern, and encourage the opposition.
Alfonsin and his left-of-center Renovation and
Change faction gained control of the Radical Party in
mid-1983 after a 10-year struggle with the more
moderate National Line faction, which had
dominated the party since the 1940s. Alfonsin formed
his group in the early 1970s to move the party toward
more progressive stances that could broaden its appeal
beyond its traditional middle-class following
3.5(c)
Radical Party Factions
3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
even before
Alfonsin's election, leftists within his Renovation and
Change faction formed the "Coordinating Group."
Moderate leftists formed the rival Popular
Intransigence faction headed by a key Radical
legislator, Ruben Rabanal. More politically
conservative Radicals had no formal organization,
but they gravitated around Julio Saguier, mayor of
Buenos Aires and a close Alfonsin confidant. In 3.3(b)(1)
April, this group allied
with Popular Intransigence to form the Intransigent
Renovation, a label underscoring their adherence to
Alfonsin's programs and aimed at containing the
party's left wing. Smaller factions include the
moderate "Cordoba Clique," centered in Argentina's
second-largest city, from which Alfonsin selected his
Vice President, Victor Martinez. The party also has a
small group of hardline nationalists, including
regional bank president and well-known economist
Aldo Ferrer and legislator Luis Leon
3.5(c)
After securing the presidential nomination, Alfonsin
set out to expand the party's historic 25-percent share
of the electorate. lie pledged to reactivate the
economy, curb the power of the military and the
Peronist-dominated trade union movement, defend
human rights, and foster open government. Alfonsin
won 52 percent of the votes cast last October and took
office in December with plans to use his mandate to
implement his programs swiftly. 3.5(c)
Cracks in the Facade
The magnitude of Alfonsin's victory at first obscured
the existence of factionalism within the Radical
Party, but the problem has grown since the President
took office and is manifested in disputes on a range of
critical issues. According to press and other reporting,
there was considerable internal party debate on
economic policy as inflation far outstripped official
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projections after a slight dip in January. Human
rights advocates in the party were miffed by the
President's decision to prosecute only former regime
leaders instead of all military officers accused of
excesses. Peronist successes in blocking the labor
reform bill in late March and in provoking sporadic
labor unrest exacerbated the Radicals' squabbling.
In general, the party left has pushed for a tough line
in dealing with the Peronists, the military, and the
IMF and commercial lenders. Moreover, according to
US Embassy reporting
leftists have pressed for a more Third World�
ALA LAR LAR 84-010
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the left has
pressed for expanded ties with Cuba and Nicaragua
and support for opposition groups in neighboring
countries. Party moderates generally agree with these
policy objectives but, according to
US Embassy reporting, are more willing to
compromise with Argentina's traditional power
brokers and are more realistic in dealing with foreign
lenders. They are also more moderate on foreign
policy issues. For their part, Radical hardline
nationalists have focused primarily on debt
negotiations and the Beagle Channel and Falklands
dis elites�in which they oppose any accommodation.
3.5(c)
Alfonsin's Response
The President's initial vacillation in response to the
factional pressures conveyed the impression�
especially to the military�that he was indecisive.
he
3.3(b)(1)
armed forces saw him as susceptible to leftist
pressures and unable to put together coherent policies.
Until about mid-March, according to US Embassy
and press reporting, Alfonsin allowed party leftists to
hold sway in the administration.
they were:
� Behind the early aggressive moves against the
military. 3.3(b)(1)
� Behind the decision to push the labor reform bill
through Congress without consulting the Peronists
or other legislative blocs, thereby antagonizing
potential supporters and assuring the bill's defeat in
the Senate.
� Among the strongest advocates of a tougher stand
against the US bankers' insistence on a March
deadline for the payment of interest arrearages on
the external debt. 3.5(c)
In the wake of key legislative defeats and continuing
economic setbacks and in anticipation of budget
debates and debt negotiations, however, Alfonsin has
moved gradually toward party moderates.
the
President believed the continued support of the left
-Serra�
wing was important, but he planned to take steps to
limit its influence in Congress, in his Cabinet, and
among his close advisers
Alfonsin is also trying to distance himself from the
left by dealing with them through intermediaries.
3.5(c)
The President has made some staffing changes that
reflect his more moderate orientation. The most
visible was the replacement of his combative labor
minister in April with a moderate who has close ties to
both major party factions and is acceptable to the
Peronists. Moreover, one Argentine political observer
has pointed out that Alfonsin has allowed other
moderates among his close advisers to assume a larger
role in policymaking. Even before the shift in the
labor portfolio, for example, Alfonsin had appointed a
moderate union leader as his personal representative
to smooth over differences with the Peronists. In
economic policy, Raul Prebisch has emerged as a
voice of moderation to counter the often shrill
criticism of foreign lenders by party and
administration spokesmen. Moderate Angel Robledo,
one of the few prominent Peronists to serve in the
administration, is an adviser on military affairs.
Further, according to press reports, Alfonsin has
resisted pressures to call a party convention to elect a
new leadership. Like other Radicals elected to office,
he is bound by tradition to relinquish his post as party
leader to avoid conflicts of interest and provide the
party with full-time leadership. We agree with some
political observers who believe that Alfonsin wants to
retain control at least until the congressional election
in 1985 to help keep the lid on potential divisiveness.
3.5(c)
Outlook for the Party
Although the splits apparently are still manageable,
they will almost certainly be aggravated by inept
presidential performance, further economic setbacks,
or Peronist successes. This disunity will complicate
policymaking and diminish Alfonsin's ability to hold
his electoral coalition intact. Moreover, persistent rifts
could dash the Radicals' hopes of capturing control of
the Senate in the congressional elections.
3.3(b)(1)
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In his efforts to maintain party unity, the President
faces his greatest challenge from party leftists.
Failure to curb them would almost certainly seriously
hamper efforts to placate the military and reach an
accommodation with opposition labor and political
leaders. It would also tend to substitute opposition
charges that Alfonsin is an ineffective leader, unable
to keep even his own house in order, let alone deal
with Argentina's economic and political problems
3.5(c)
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