EL SALVADOR: CONTROLLING RIGHTWING TERRORISM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05508262
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2020
• Case Number: F-2019-00695
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985

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Directorate of
Intelligence
El Salvador:
Controlling Rightwing Terrorism (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
ALA 85-10011
February 1985
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Directorate of
Intelligence
El Salvador:
Controlling Rightwing Terrorism (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office of
African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. (u)
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America�Caribbean
Division, ALA, on
-getrel,
ALA 85-10011
February 1985
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El Salvador:
Controlling Rightwing Terrorism (u)
Key Judgments
Information available
as of 10 January 1985
was used in this report.
Rightwing violence in El Salvador has declined significantly since the
beginning of 1984. Figures supplied by the US Embassy put the total for
confirmed political killings by both the left and the right throughout the
year at 757�less than half the total for 1983 and only a fraction of the fig-
ure for the peak years 1980 and 1981. While statistics differ among
observers, virtually all�including rebel supporters�confirm the sharply
downward trend.
The decline occurred despite partisan maneuvering during the spring 1984
presidential campaign and balloting, the coming to power of the moderate
Christian Democrats led by President Duarte, and guerrilla planning for a
major offensive. In our opinion, the reasons for the reduction include:
� Warnings from Washington, highlighted by the visit in December 1983
of Vice President Bush.
� Disciplinary measures by the military high command�such as transfers
and discharges of enlisted men and officers involved in human rights
abuses�to discourage such activities within the armed forces.
� Actions by the Duarte administration to reform the judicial system and
to find legal means to make extremists more accountable for their
activities.
� Self-imposed constraints by rightists themselves as they perceived the
tactical and political trends undermining support for the insurgents.
We believe President Duarte deserves high marks for his human rights
initiatives and his ability to convince many armed forces leaders to
cooperate with him in seeking new approaches to the leftist threat. Still, the
President's successes in institutionalizing restraints on rightwing violence
by means of judicial reform have been modest, and he may be approaching
the limits of his ability to control extremist elements. For example, rightist
political factions last summer emerged from legislative infighting to
dominate judicial and legal appointments, complicating Duarte's efforts to
pursue legal solutions. Further, the rightist-dominated Assembly passed a
budget measure in December 1984 that would strip Duarte's judicial
reform commission of all funding, as well as possibly frustrate his efforts to
create a "criminological institute" to investigate rightwing terrorist acts.
111
ALA 85-10011
February 1985
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Faced with these and other reactions from the extreme right, Duarte has
utilized ad hoc measures, such as personnel shifts in the armed forces, to
prompt changes in the military's behavior, but he has probably come close
to breaching the military's tolerance for some of his moves. The most
notable example of this was in January 1985 when the President backed
off�in the face of coup rumblings�from efforts to promote to general
officer rank the moderate Vice Minister of Defense Lopez Nuila, a
noncombat officer viewed by some commanders as too sympathetic to
Christian Democratic politics.
We believe, moreover, that there will be growing incentives for some
extremists to intensify violence soon. Of paramount interest to the right
are:
� The legislative and municipal elections scheduled for March 1985, which
will determine the balance of power between the far right and the
moderates for the next three years.
� The Duarte government's handling of dialogue with the insurgents.
� The guerrillas' increasing use of urban terrorism, which invites similar
tactics by the right.
We believe that these issues, together with continuing political and
economic problems, are likely to generate increased terrorism by military
and civilian extremists during 1985. In recent months, alleged plots to
assassinate members of the Christian Democratic government and US
officials have been reported by a variety of sources. Since talks with the in-
surgents began in October 1984, President Duarte has been publicly
sentenced to death by one rightist death squad.
Despite official efforts to discourage extremist activities, both the vehicles
for and the rationales behind rightwing terror remain largely intact. A
substantial body of reporting indicates that ultrarightist standard bearer
Roberto D'Aubuisson and members of his Nationalist Republican Alliance
(ARENA) cooperate with and direct some terrorist groups. Although we
perceive ARENA's internal terrorist network to be one component of the
much broader phenomenon of rightist violence in El Salvador, the party's
attitudes and goals probably influence extremist perspectives in general
and, by extension, help determine the prospects for resurgent violence by
less organized ad hoc groupings of both civilians and the military.
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Although we judge that resurgent rightist violence probably would not
exceed and may not reach the levels of 1983, a potential rise in the political
death rate would work against US policy interests in El Salvador. An
increase in violence�reversing the highly publicized downward trend of
1984�would be used by leftists in El Salvador and their propagandists
abroad to discredit the Duarte government and generate public and official
pressure in the United States to reduce its assistance to the country. In our
view, just as was the case during Duarte's provisional 1980-82 term,
opponents would use any rise in violence to discredit the President's
political initiatives, making it more difficult for him to carry out such
activities as the dialogue with the guerrillas.
Moreover, in our judgment, the extremists' frustrations over their inability
to undercut US support for moderate transition in El Salvador pose a
growing threat to US officials in the country. This is especially true in light
of Washington's support for President Duarte's peace initiative. Extremists
have publicly charged US agencies and the Embassy with imposing a
harmful reform process and with rigging Duarte's election victory in May
1984. We believe, therefore, that some rightwing fanatics may now be
more willing to try to intimidate Washington directly by attacks against
US personnel in order to weaken Christian Democratic policies.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
111
Introduction
1
Legacy of Violence
1
Structure and Operations of the Extreme Right 3
D'Aubuisson and ARENA 4
Rural Vigilantes 6
Armed Forces Death Squads 7
Scope and Method of Operation 8
Constraints on Rightwing Violence 9
Changes in the Military 9
Revamping the Justice System 10
Self-Imposed Constraints 12
Potential for Renewed Violence 14
Rightist Attitudes and Goals 14
Ramifications of Increased Violence 16
Implications for the United States 17
vii
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viii
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El Salvador:
Controlling Rightwing Terrorism (u)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Introduction
Politically motivated civilian killings in El Salvador
fell sharply in 1984 as the government took action on
a variety of fronts to rein in death squads. That
reduction, in conjunction with significant political and
military developments, has aided democracy and the
promise of an eventual resolution of the civil war.
Recent death threats against President Duarte and
other government officials over the issue of dialogue
with the insurgent left, however, have underscored the
truculence of powerful rightwing terrorist groups that
in the past acted with virtual impunity. Some recent
events, such as rumors of impeachment maneuvers
against Duarte in the Assembly and coup plotting
within the military, suggest that the President may be
approaching the limits of his ability to constrain
extremist violence. Moreover, the press of political,
military, and socioeconomic issues may make
Duarte's task more difficult over the coming year.
This assessment is a descriptive and analytic overview
of the structure and goals of the Salvadoran extreme
right and its terrorist capabilities. It reviews those
factors that have contributed to a reduction in rightist
terrorism, examines prospects for resurgent violence,
and outlines the implications for US policy.
Legacy of Violence
Violence is part of the cultural history of El Salvador,
just as it is in neighboring countries. Salvadorans are
at once intensely nationalistic and community orient-
ed, while also being fierce champions of personal gain.
Highly ingrained in the national psyche are the
interlocking values of ownership of property, loyalty
to family and friends, and pride of the individual. The
historical record shows that retribution can be swift
against those who challenge such principles, and the
practice of violent vendetta traditionally has been
common among all socioeconomic classes and along
1
the entire political spectrum. Even during the compar-
atively peaceful and prosperous years of the late
1960s and early 1970s, the relative level of common
domestic violence�resulting from property feuds,
spontaneous duels, and crimes of passion�was among
the highest in the world, according to international
statistical references. By the mid-1970s, homicide was
the third leading cause of death in the country, as
indicated by Salvadoran Government records.
Political violence, similarly, has occurred for genera-
tions. We believe that, before the Marxist insurgency
in 1979, such violence largely reflected the various
military regimes' efforts to neutralize what were
perceived to be subversive elements. During the past
five years of insurgent war and transition toward
democracy, the public record shows that thousands of
noncombatants have disappeared or have been killed
by unidentified persons and vaguely identified groups.
President Duarte has publicly placed the death toll at
over 40,000 and has primarily blamed rightwing
death squads.' We agree that a large but unknowable
percentage of the political violence in recent years has
been carried out by rightwing civilian and military
extremists.
' US Embassy statistics on civilian political deaths indicate that
there have been just over 10,000 killings confirmed by civil
authorities and the local media since January 1981. Many thou-
sands more reportedly were killed during 1980, before records were
systematically maintained. Unsubstantiated totals�which Catholic
Church observers, the foreign media, and organizations supportive
of the left have produced�often range from 40,000 to as high as
60,000. According to US Embassy investigations, part of this
discrepancy is due to leftist-oriented church and human rights
groups that have counted guerrilla battle casualties as civilian
political killings attributable to the right wing. The insurgent left
has contributed significantly to the total by carrying out over the
past five years several thousand ajusticiamientos (justified execu-
tions). Guerrilla targets have included government personnel, sup-
porters, and their families, as reflected in captured guerrilla
documents and public admissions made by rebel spokesmen.
Th.ce,
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-----Secktts�
Evolution of the Extreme Right
(b)(3)
Rightwing political violence had its genesis in El
Salvador's late-19th-century conversion from mer-
cantilism to capitalism. At that time the government
confiscated peasant farmers' subsistence holdings and
turned them over to large coffee growers in order to
develop an agricultural export system. A semifeudal,
social-Darwinian system soon evolved around land-
less wage-earning laborers, a tiny managerial aristoc-
racy, and a constabulary army to maintain order.
By December 1931, however, the world depression
had gutted the economy, and a newly elected civilian
government was threatened by growing unrest. The
Army staged a coup and established a military
dictatorship. A month later, impoverished Indian
laborers seeking return of their lands launched a
small uprising in the western provinces. According to
a variety of academic sources, the rebellion was
fomented in part by Communist Party militants who
were attempting to integrate rural workers with the
'fledgling socialist trade union movement in the capi-
tal. Fearing a widespread conspiracy, the Army and
the civilian elites reacted by massacring as many as
(b)(3) 30,000 peasants in a few weeks.
The resulting endemic national paranoia over the
Communist threat reinforced authoritarian rule by
the armed forces and its affluent civilian backers for
the next half century. The chain of military regimes
provided order and stability, and largely gave the
plantation owners and monopolist businessmen a free
hand over the economy. Combining with favorable
international economic trends and foreign aid, this
system of rule resulted in substantial material prog-
ress for the upper and middle classes, and develop-
ment of a strong physical and institutional economic
base. Given these historical roots, order and stability
also became closely identified with institutionalized
violence against dissident leftist elements, as well as
intimidation of the rural peasant and urban labor
classes.
Control over society was handled by the military
government and civilian elites largely through para-
military constabulary forces, regular Army units,
and numerous official and private vigilante organiza-
tions. The historical record shows that, given the
inherent weaknesses of the formal judicial process,
these security bodies would often function at the local
level as judge, jury, and executioner of individuals
perceived to be criminals or subversives.
The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in July 1979
shocked Salvadoran military leaders and provided
the catalyst for a reformist coup in October, as
indicated by US Embassy and other reporting. Con-
vinced that dramatic political, social, and economic
changes were needed to deter a popular insurrection
among the urban and rural poor during a period of
economic downturn and leftist unrest, the new armed
forces leadership formed a civil-military junta with
the moderate Christian Democrats that was commit-
ted to democratic elections and socio-economic re-
forms.
perhaps 20 percent of the entire officer corps was
subsequently purged, which, in part, had the effect of
neutralizing many corrupt senior officers and their
subordinates who had long ago been co-opted by
rightist civilian elites. With the Army backing re-
form, the political and economic power of the oligar-
chy was quickly reduced, with many of its key
members liquidating assets and opting for self-im-
posed exile in Guatemala and the United States.
2
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Structure and Operations of the Extreme Right
In our view, the violent attitudes and actions of the
extreme right represent much more than just the
conservative political spectrum. We believe that the
extreme right is distinguishable from the mainstream
right wing by two basic characteristics:
� Absolute intolerance of any element that has con-
tributed to change in the pre-1979 status quo.
� Willingness to confront that change with active
subversion of the constitutional system and with
violent terrorism.
In our view, the extreme right does not predominate
in any one social, economic, or political sector. Rath-
er, it is a fanatic fringe drawn from all elements of
society.
Indeed, despite a relative neutralization of the old
order by the 1979 coup, we judge that El Salvador
remains a decidedly conservative society, with rightist
political tendencies running deep in the military, the
private sector, and the general public. This was
illustrated in the 6 May 1984 presidential election,
which gave only a narrow margin of victory to
Napoleon Duarte. Nearly half of the vote�in the
largest and most honest election in the nation's histo-
ry�went to the extreme rightist candidate, Roberto
D'Aubuisson. Despite repeated public allegations of
his terrorist links, D'Aubuisson won 10 of 14 depart-
ments and a majority of the rural vote over the
progressive Duarte. A body of reliable information
suggests that many Salvadorans perceived D'Aubuis-
son as representing a no-nonsense conservatism that
would lend itself to reestablishing law and order and
eradicating the insurgency.
Furthermore, in the absence of an effective criminal
justice system and, until recently, an Army capable of
containing the insurgency, the extreme right has been
fighting what it considers a legitimate clandestine war
against the left. According to US Embassy sources,
rightwing extremists have viewed government reform-
ers as national security threats equal to those posed by
the guerrilla movement. Hence, rightwing violence�
as reflected in overall levels of civilian political
deaths�has generally increased as insurgent opera-
tions have escalated, when the battlefield performance
of the armed forces has diminished, or when political
and economic issues have been intensely debated in
the Legislative Assembly
3
The Public View of Rightwing Terrorism
The phenomenon of rightist violence, while publicly
denounced by the leaders of virtually all sectors of
Salvadoran society, evokes mixed feelings among
average citizens in private discussion. While some
talk about "death squads" only in hushed tones,
others express detachment and even gallows humor
over the disappearance or assassination of individ-
uals. Occasionally, some will claim to have close
friends on the right who allegedly engage in violence
or who have personal knowledge of specific terrorist
activities. Conversely, others choose to believe that
rightwing terrorist groups do not exist.
These contrasting attitudes are evident throughout
society and reflect a great ambivalence about the
national role played by rightwing terrorists. Many
Salvadorans, of all economic classes, believe that,
however repugnant the methods used by rightist
vigilantes, their impact on Marxist subversion has
been largely positive. Such people applaud govern-
ment efforts to professionalize the armed forces and
crack down on official corruption and abuses. At the
same time, however, they denounce the US "obses-
sion" with human rights and rationalize the need to
fight leftwing terrorism with "whatever means are
necessary." Often cited in such arguments is the
official treatment meted out during the 1970s to the
Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Montoneros in Argentina,
and the Miristas in Chile, as examples of extraordi-
nary measures sometimes needed to save a society
from chaos.
Against this backdrop, local criminals probably can
continue to operate as mercenaries for hire to settle
personal scores or fill the ranks of ad hoc death
squads for fanatic rightists. Such an environment,
moreover, will continue to make it difficult for San
Salvador to investigate, prosecute, and convict local
security force personnel who may still feel compelled
to act on their own against suspected insurgents and
their sympathizers.
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The rightwing extremist minorities of the various
social sectors often wield enough power to influence
events in ways disproportionate to their numbers.
Important members of large agricultural, industrial,
and commercial organizations are well-known right-
wing zealots. US Embassy sources indicate, for exam-
ple, that a number of wealthy Salvadoran expatriates
living in Miami have lent both overt and covert
financial and organizational support to paramilitary
groups associated with coffee exporter Orlando De-
Sola and others. Money and personal connections in
El Salvador permit such individuals to aid or even
participate in illegal activities in that country with
relative freedom from prosecution because of their
ability to bribe and intimidate Salvadoran Govern-
ment and military officials. Accountability for ex-
tremist activities is constrained further because most
of the Salvadoran media are privately owned by
archconservatives, whose editorial policies include
fierce criticism of even moderate government pro-
grams and praise for the hardline positions of the far
right. A US Embassy informant with excellent access
to rightwing groups has reported that some civilians
are "untouchable," moreover, because of the power
they wield through control of death squads.
D'Aubuisson and ARENA
The creation of rightwing political parties over the
years also has served the interests of the extremist
minority in El Salvador. The most powerful of these
groupings is the Nationalist Republican Alliance
(ARENA). Founded in 1981 by Roberto D'Aubuis-
son--a former Army intelligence officer who was
cashiered by the military following the 1979 coup�
ARENA has evolved into the second-largest political
party after the ruling Christian Democrats. Polls and
election results show that it commands enthusiastic
support from a broad spectrum of society and, as a
multifaceted organization with important contacts
among foreign governments and groups, it has helped
legitimize extremist calls for retrenchment on reforms
and eradication of the insurgent left through more
radical use of force.
According to US Embassy
behind ARENA's legitimate exterior lies a ter-
rorist network led by D'Aubuisson henchmen and
funded by wealthy Salvadoran expatriates residing in
Guatemala and the United States. According to the
Thztve<
ARENA party leader Roberto D'Aubuisson campaigning with his
then wife Yolanda Mungia for the 1982 Assembly elections
Embassy, a body of evidence strongly implicates
D'Aubuisson loyalists in the 1981 murder of two US
labor advisers. Public confessions by the two National
Guard triggermen and reports by eyewitnesses have
connected various civilian and military associates of
D'Aubuisson to the crime. A pro-ARENA Supreme
Court judge has been successful in using legal maneu-
vers and personal influence to free Army Capt.
Eduardo Avila from prosecution for the crime, ac-
cording to US Embassy sources. One of these sources
also reported that D'Aubuisson personally arranged
for lower courts to drop charges against Lt. Isidro
Lopez Sibrian, another junior officer implicated in the
murders.
In 1983, D'Aubuisson confided plans
by security force personnel to eliminate suspected
leftists. He claimed that safeguarding human rights
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The D'Aubuisson Connection
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Before leaving the armed forces in the wake of the
October 1979 military coup, Maj. Roberto D'Aubuis-
son had served much of his career as an intelligence
officer with the National Guard. He and several
colleagues�graduates from the academy classes of
1963-64 and 1965-66�worked directly under or in
cooperation with Gen. Jose "Chele" Medrano, former
National Guard Director and a powerful figure in
military and rightwing civilian circles. Medrano's
proteges focused on counterintelligence and rural
security, and, during the 1960s and 1970s, D'Aubuis-
son and his colleagues helped develop civilian intelli-
gence networks and vigilante organizations controlled
by the National Guard. According to a variety of past
reporting, they also allegedly engaged in illegal de-
tentions, torture, and the killing of prisoners�habits
that some US and Salvadoran officials believe stayed
with them after the 1979 reformist coup.
Among some of D'Aubuisson's most notorious asso-
ciates in the security forces and the Army were
Lieutenant Colonels Staben, Zacapa, Zepeda, Cruz,
Ochoa, and Ponce, all of whom are now serving in top
field and staff commands in El Salvador. These and
other middle-grade officers were in turn the mentors
of a new generation of junior officers who, according
to various reports, have been involved in death squad
and other illegal activities. The murder of two US
labor advisers at the Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador
in January 1981, for example, was authorized by two
junior officers known for their criminal activities and
close association with D'Aubuisson and other
extremist officers, according to US Embassy
In May 1980, D'Aubuisson was jailed and then
exiled by the reformist junta for coup plotting. He
left for Guatemala and, with some wealthy civilian
associates, formed the Broad National Front (FAN),
a semiclandestine political organization bent on over-
throwing the reformist regime in San Salvador. At
the time, reporting indicated that FAN was receiving
significant funding from a number of wealthy Salva-
doran exiles living in Guatemala and the United
States, and some sources alleged FAN links with US
politicians and businessmen. The FAN used black-
market contacts to arm a small paramilitary organi-
zation in El Salvador that included both civilian and
military personnel, some of whom probably belonged
to existing death squads loyal to D'Aubuisson, ac-
cording to
By the fall of 1981, D'Aubuisson had reorganized the
FAN into a bona fide political party known as the
Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA). He con-
vinced businessmen, landowners, members of other
rightist parties, and, according to some reports, a
number of military officers to affiliate with ARENA
and support candidates in the March 1982 Constitu-
ent Assembly elections. During that period, rightwing
gunmen allied with ARENA killed several Christian
Democratic Party members, civil servants, and labor
figures, according to US Embassy sources.
was impossible in an insurgent war and advocated
"extraofficial" operations to combat the enemy. Since
that time, a variety of reports have indicated that
ARENA's terrorist components�directly managed
by some of D'Aubuisson's closest advisers�remain
intact and are preparing for future operations against
the left, government officials, foreign journalists, and
diplomatic personnel
ARENA's clandestine activities appear to be largel,/
the responsibility of party security chief Dr. Hector
Regalado
5
reported in April 1984 that Regalado was recruiting
some 30 former policemen for work in death sauads
said that Regalado had
commissioned triggermen to eliminate key leaders of
the Popular Democratic Unity (UPD), a large labor
coalition that has joined the Christian Democratic
government to administer agrarian reform programs.
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ARENA has cast its net wide in identifying the threat
from the "left." Following President Duarte's election
in May 1984,
ndicated that the party's security appara-
tus also was targeting members of the Christian
Democratic Party for assassination. Former National
Police personnel�some of whom were believed to be
members of another death squad�were to be paid
$500 monthly for their participation in this special
project.
Rural Vigilantes
Violence linked to ARENA is only one manifestation
of rightwing terrorism in El Salvador. To eliminate
challenges to its power, the extreme right traditionally
has used civilian vigilante organizations, elements of
the armed forces, and death squads led by ideologues
and mercenaries, according to US Embassy
that ARENA
elements were establishing a base of operations in
Guatemala City for the purpose of organizing armed
resistance against the Duarte government. The group
seeks to conduct terrorist operations against the
Christian Democratic Party and the US Embassy in
San Salvador. that ARENA leaders
and other extreme rightists have decided on this
course because they fear that the Duarte administra-
tion might launch investigations against suspected
terrorists and thus interrupt their domestic activities.
In another report that ARENA
directed two sharpshooters to prepare for possible
assassination attempts against President Duarte and
other Christian Democratic leaders.
These and other operations are often planned and
implemented by individuals working out of safehouses
belonging to known rightist civilian or military offi-
cials
a wealthy ARENA party
member and close personal friend of D'Aubuisson
owns a home that is used as a base for terrorist
operations and to store weapons and ammunition. The
house, located in a middle-class residential area of the
capital, is said to be used by members of
the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA), a rightwing
terrorist group that past US Embassy reporting indi-
cates has been ARENA's primary instrument for
clandestine operations over the past three years.
the ESA has occupied a second
house in the same neighborhood throughout most of
1984.
where a large cache of dynamite, time fuses,
and blasting caps also is hidden
S�a
In the 1960s and 1970s, a surge of political activity
among left-of-center opposition parties, peasants, ur-
ban workers, and student groups inspired the creation
of several official and clandestine rightwing organiza-
tions, both ad hoc and permanent. The National
Democratic Organization (ORDEN), for example,
was a government-sponsored civic group formed in
1966 and comprising tens of thousands of conservative
peasants, many of them former Army enlisted person-
nel who were part of the nation's inactive reserve
force, according to the public record. Until its official
dissolution in 1979, ORDEN served both as an
intelligence-gathering body and instrument of en-
forcement against real or suspected enemies of the
regime.
Although the limited evidence available to us suggests
that such government-directed groups have been inac-
tive for several years, vigilante violence�albeit de-
clining, according to the US Embassy�has continued
in the countryside. A US Embassy source claims that
ORDEN's structure generally has remained intact,
with many of its former members having joined the
Territorial Service and Civil Defense Forces�Army-
run militias that provide local security in outlying
villages and tactical intelligence to the military. We
believe these militias too often function without offi-
cial authorization as peasant vigilantes. The abduc-
tion in late 1983 of nine agrarian reform workers from
the town of San Pedro Masahuat in La Paz Depart-
ment, and their subsequent torture and murder in the
Zaragoza hamlet of La Libertad Department, was
attributed by US Embassy sources to local Civil
Defense personnel. So, too, was the 1982 massacre of
peasant farmers in the La Florida hamlet of Santa
Ana Department and killings of Christian Democratic
party members in the jurisdictions of El Paisnal and
Aguilares in San Salvador Department
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More recently in San Salvador Department, in the
town of Nejapa, Civil Defense personnel have been
engaging in abuses against peasant farmers affiliated
with one of the larger democratic labor unions
1984 that seme-40 Civil Defense personnel were being
employed by their local commander as a "death
squad." that the local commander
was being assisted by elements within the regular
armed forces and is responsible for the deaths of 11
people in the immediate area, including two children.
Labor officials have delivered a protest note to the
military high command in San Salvador, according to
In addition, the government's Human
Rights Commission is investigating a case involving
the murders of some 30 local peasants near the town
of Armenia in Sonsonate Department. During 1981
and 1982, Civil Defense
personnel from the Armenia jurisdiction abducted
neighbors suspected of subversion and, after brutally
killing them, threw their bodies into a deep well. Four
vigilantes have been arrested in this case, and one has
confessed to the crimes.
Rural vigilantism is augmented in the towns and cities
by civilian mercenaries and fanatics allied with specif-
ic individuals or groups who routinely have waged
their own vendettas against suspected subversives and
political enemies. For example,
reported that a US soldier of fortune, who onee
served with Rhodesian Army intelligence, was hired
last year by rightwing paramilitary organizer and
ARENA loyalist Mario Radaelli as a "hit man" in
unspecified operations. Rightist terrorist cells also use
both active-duty and retired military personnel in
their campaigns, according to an Embassy informant
in the security forces.
Armed Forces Death Squads
In addition to ARENA and rural vigilantes, the
military has also been responsible for a share of
rightwing violence in El Salvador. Despite the now
relatively moderate character of the military high
command, the armed forces' staff and field commands
are largely controlled by a younger generation of
ambitious officers who have proved themselves to be
among the best trained and motivated in a talent-
deficient officer corps
7
Unfortunately for the Duarte administration,
many of these officers are former academy classmates
and military colleagues of D'Aubuisson who share his
ultrarightist views. Although they generally have
abided by the moderate doctrine of their superiors in
San Salvador, several,
are alleged to have associa-
tions with rightwing terrorist organizations and, in
some cases, to have been leaders of death squads
within the Army and the security forces
According to a body of reliable reporting, death
squads in the armed forces operate out of both urban
military headquarters and rural outposts. They are led
by senior enlisted personnel and junior officers, and
they may function with or without the knowledge of
immediate superiors. In 1983, for example, at least 20
and perhaps as many as 75 members of an Indian
agrarian reform cooperative in the Las Hojas hamlet
of Sonsonate Department were abducted and later
executed by regular troops of the 6th Detachment,
according to US Embassy and
These sources indicate that some military officers
in Sonsonate were influenced by disgruntled landown-
ers to take action against the Indians. Neither the
leader of the operation, Capt. Salvador Figueroa
Morales, nor his commanding officer, Lt. Col. Elmer
Gonzalez Araujo, have been disciplined by their
superiors. Indeed,
implicated both Gonzalez
and Figueroa in a plot to assassinate Julio Rey,
Prendes, Minister of the Presidency and a top Chris-
tian Democratic leader.
The November murder of a Lutheran minister in San
Miguel Department illustrates that some actions are
committed by regular military personnel without su-
pervision. Spokesmen for the armed forces have an-
nounced publicly that two Army enlisted men from
the 3rd Brigade confessed to killing the minister on a
whim, apparently assuming he had links to insurgents
in the area.
Rightwing terrorists have been accustomed to operat-
ing with wide latitude, and it is almost certain that
some Army and security force personnel continue to
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S � et
TIvo young ,girls become ii
II 01 a Salvadoran right icing
death .s�quad, Their alleged or
fenses and the name of the
group that killed them are
probably inscribed on the pieces
01 paper attached to their wire-
bound thumbs. )
cooperate with and participate in death squad activi-
ties. Past reporting from a variety of US Embassy
sources has indicated that the National Guard,
National Police, and Treasury Police have all har-
bored terrorist elements within their ranks. In addi-
tion to the 6th Detachment in Sonsonate, other
regular military units implicated, by past reporting of
various degrees of reliability, in abductions and death
squad activities include components of the Army
Signal Corps, the Air Force, and the 1st Brigade, all
three located in San Salvador; the Cavalry Regiment
in San Andres; the Artillery Brigade in San Juan
()pie�, the Engineers Center in 7.acatecoluca; the
former 4th Infantry Detachment in Usulutan: and the
2nd Brigade in Santa Ana. That several of these are
key units with strong political sway within the mili-
tary institution underscores the difficulty facing the
high command in its efforts to improve the human
rights record of the armed forces
Scope and Method of Operation
While we are certain of the broad sponsorship for
rightwing terrorism by ARENA, rural vigilantes, and
elements of the military, the precise scope and opera-
tions of terrorist groups is more difficult to assess. The
methods used by the extreme right �such as interro-
gating or killing victims far from where they were
abducted-- suggest a nationwide capability within at
least some of the clandestine organizations. Compart-
mentation, a rigid code of secrecy, and the shifting
whims of extremist leaders make estimating the num-
bers of terrorist organizations and their members
difficult. The geographic breadth and frequent simul-
taneity of rightist operations as indicated by 1_1S
Embassy reports of civilian political deaths around the
country suggest to us that as man\ as a dozen hit
squads may exist in El Salvador during any given
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period of time. It is our judgment that most are
nameless and largely ad hoc groups, keyed to specific
missions in local areas. Some appear more permanent-
ly organized, however, and wider ranging. Perhaps the
most notorious of these is the Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez Anti-Communist Brigade, named for the
military dictator who carried out the 1932 peasant
massacre. This group has operated for several years,
frequently publicizing its abductions and executions
of leftist student and labor leaders with notes attached
to bodies, newspaper advertisements, and radiobroad-
casts
US Embassy
reporting indicates that such
groups occasionally coordinate their activities with the
security forces, and in some cases specific missions
and personnel probably overlap different organiza-
tions. Perhaps the most outrageous instance of this
occurred in November 1980, when masked gunmen
abducted leftist political leaders during a news confer-
ence held in a Jesuit school near the US Embassy.
Security for the affair was provided by a large
number of uniformed National Police personnel, yet
the abduction of six top leftists occurred in broad
daylight without any interference from the authori-
ties. The victims' mutilated bodies were found the
following morning a few miles from the capital.
Recent US Embassy reporting has indicated apparent
working relationships among such clandestine terror-
ist organizations as the Secret Anti-Communist Army
(ESA), the National Salvation Movement (MS-28),
and the Salvadoran Anti-Communist Commandos
(CAS). Some US Embassy officials, moreover, believe
that the Martinez Brigade and the ESA have a
common leadership whose ultimate loyalties are to
D'Aubuisson and his financial backers in Miami.
Constraints on Rightwing Violence
Although the various rightwing terrorist groups re-
main active and appear organizationally intact, they
are being utilized with far less frequency than in past
years. Indeed, the level of rightist terrorism in 1984
was surprisingly low, given the stakes involved in the
presidential elections, expectations of summer and fall
9
guerrilla offensives, and rule by the moderate Chris-
tian Democrats. New policies by the government and
the military high command designed to present terror-
ists with a less hospitable climate have probably given
pause to some extreme rightist elements.
Changes in the Military
Following Vice President Bush's visit to El Salvador
in late 1983, a number of
a new willingness among senior military officers to
attempt to control rank-and-file extremists.
indicated that the high command wou
accept some US demands�such as transferring cer-
tain unsavory officers out of the country�because the
armed forces badly needed US aid. Several Army and
security force officers have since been sent overseas to
diplomatic posts. that De-
fense Minister Vides warned key ARENA security
advisers�assigned by D'Aubuisson to manage securi-
ty at the Legislative Assembly�that if they remained
in El Salvador they would be investigated for their
involvement in terrorist activities. One of these advis-
ers, Dr. Hector.,Regalado, later told US Embassy
officials that he resigned his public position as chief of
security to avoid tarnishing ARENA's image during
the spring election campaign
These actions came in the wake of arrests by the
National Police of three other D'Aubuisson security
operatives on kidnaping charges. Moreover, according
the National Police were
responsible for anonymous telephone calls to civilians
suspected of involvement with rightwing death
squads. The callers threatened them with prosecution
if they did not leave the country. The National Police
at that time also arrested Army Capt. Eduardo Avila,
implicated in the 1981 murder of two US labor
advisers. Legal maneuvers by extreme rightist sup-
porters, however, soon secured Avila's freedom, and
all serious charges against him were dropped.
the Defense
Ministry believed there was growing willingness with-
in the officer corps to investigate extremist elements.
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The calling card of the Mario
Blanca (white hand) rightwing
death squad appears on the
doors of a schoolhouse where
assassinated members of a left-
wing teacher's union were em-
ployed. (I:I
Notices were placed in the local media announcing a
campaign by the armed forces against the "death
squads," and calling for help from the public and the
justice system in identification and prosecution of the
squads' members. One such notice was signed by most
of the armed forces' staff and field commanders. In
addition, the Ministry set up an ad hoc military
commission at the beginning of 1984 to investigate
reports of criminal activities and human rights abuses
within the armed forces
Throughout 1984, moreover, the Defense Ministry--
under orders from President Duarte moved to exert
greater control over the three security forces, accord-
ing to the US Embassy and Political
moderates were placed in charge of the National
Police and Treasury Police, with the latter having
undergone a major personnel reorganization that
transferred or discharged some 110 officers and en-
listed men from its notorious intelligence and investi-
gations section. Colonel Lopez Nuila --staunchly crit-
ical of rightist violence--was appointed Vice Minister
of Defense in charge of public security. This new
position was created to better coordinate and control
the activities of the two police organizations and the
National Guard, according to the US Embassy
The present military leadership continues to recognize
that US aid levels and the effective prosecution of the
war rest in part on the Salvadoran armed forces'
human rights performance, according to Salvadoran
military sources. As a result, such actions as the
telephone warnings to civilians suspected of involve-
ment with the death squads and a reiteration of strict
guidelines for armed forces conduct are likely to
continue. In our judgment, the close relationship
between key military officers and extreme rightist
civilian politicians as indicated by US Embassy
sources reporting on incipient coup plotting during the
New Year holidays provides an effective conduit for
the military to constrain extreme rightist actions.
Revamping the Justice System
Despite their preoccupation with establishing the
credibility of the political process while escalating the
war effort, both the provisional coalition government
of President Magana and the successor Duarte ad-
ministration pushed through judicial measures aimed
at controlling the terrorist element. Early in 1984, a
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Rightwing Terrorist Organizations
Salvadoran Anti-Communist Command (CAS)
Created in late 1983. Largely engaged in propaganda.
Publicly denounced Defense Ministry for imposing
human rights doctrine on the security forces. US
Embassy believes the group may only be front for
other clandestine organizations.
Death Squadron (EM)
May not be an organized group but rather a generic
label used loosely by ad hoc hit squads probably
operating out of military posts. Trademark since at
least 1979 has been initials EM carved into bodies of
victims
Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA)
One of the most active groups in recent years. Be-
lieved by some US officials to have been formed in
mid-1980 by elements that since have been integrated
into ARENA 's paramilitary structure.
White Hand (MB)
Like the EM and other nameless groups, a probable
ad hoc name for terrorists working out of the Army
and security forces. Trademark traditionally was a
handprint in white paint left on the property of
victims or near their bodies
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Anti-Communist
Brigade (MHM)
Responsible for many high-profile killings over the
past five years. Victims often found clutching leaflets
with the group's message on them. MHM has used
newspapers, radio, and even television to make an-
nouncements of acts committed and operations
planned.
Salvation Movement of 28 March (MS-28)
Group first appeared on the scene in late 1983. Its
propaganda and name-28 March 1980 was the last
day of Phase I government expropriation of large
plantations�suggest the group represents the inter-
ests of a tiny group of fanatic coffee barons, many of
whom probably reside in Miami.
Organization for Liberation From Communism
(OLC)
A group that appeared on the scene at about the time
of the October 1979 coup; its current status is
unknown. May have been absorbed by one or another
of the above groups, possibly the ESA, which some
US Embassy officials believe comprises personnel
from former terrorist organizations such as the White
Warriors Union and the Salvadoran Anti-Communist
Brigade.
White Warriors Union (UGB)
Formed in May 1977 following the leftwing kidnap-
ing and murder of Foreign Minister Mauricio Bor-
gonovo. The group was led by Roberto D'Aubuisson
and other National Guard officers, according to a
variety of reporting, and emphasized the assassina-
tion of Catholic priests perceived to be active support-
ers of the insurgent movement. The UGB appears to
have been disbanded soon after the October 1979
coup and D'Aubuisson's release from active duty.
special investigations unit was created with US finan-
cial and technical aid to help the government analyze
terrorist activities and bring to justice perpetrators of
rightwing violence. The much-publicized case against
five National Guard enlisted men charged with tor-
turing and killing four US churchwomen in late 1980
was finally resolved. All five were convicted in May
by a civilian jury and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
11
Although an initial coverup of the affair probably was
orchestrated by midlevel National Guard officers,
there has never been any credible evidence that the
killings of the churchwomen were ordered by higher
authority.
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Conservative women's group confronts visiting liberal US legisla-
tors in January 1983 with protest signs demanding that Salvador-
an President Magana refuse to dialogue or negotiate with the
rebels and calling Senator Dodd a "white rat." (u)
Judicial proceedings against civilian and military
personnel arrested for past terrorist acts also continue
to progress, albeit unevenly. One setback in this effort
was the Supreme Court's review of the case of Lt.
Lopez Sibrian, which in November 1984 resulted in
his acquittal of all charges stemming from the 1981
murders of two US labor advisers. As suggested by
US Embassy reporting, however, US pressure recent-
ly helped Duarte in December to convince a reluctant
military high command to have the lieutenant
dropped from the list of active-duty officers. More-
over, Duarte's government in November warned local
media owners of fines and other legal sanctions if they
continued to publish or broadcast declarations from
self-proclaimed rightwing terrorist organizations. Af-
ter a two-month hiatus, however, extremist communi-
(b)(3) ques and death threats are once again being pub-
lished.
The administration is now struggling with the right-
ist-dominated Legislative Assembly to create a judi-
cial commission to oversee broad reforms proposed by
Duarte for the civil and criminal justice system.
According to the US Embassy, a recent Assembly bill
would cut off funding to this and other presidential
commissions, probably forcing Duarte to veto this
legislation. These obstacles could also affect plans by
the President to activate a "criminological institute"
to investigate specific rightwing terrorist acts. US
Embassy sources report that its first priorities would
Se et
include an investigation of the March 1980 assassina-
tion of Archbishop Romero, said by other US Embas-
sy sources to have been authored by D'Aubuisson and
his backers.
Self-Imposed Constraints
In addition to changes in the military and judicial
systems, last year's reduction in rightist violence is
also attributable, in our opinion, to a variety of self-
imposed constraints. Some extreme rightists probably
concluded that, in the wake of the visit by Vice
President Bush in 1983, at least a temporary stand-
down in terrorist activities would be required to direct
the attention of the US administration away from the
issue of human rights. Almost certainly, in our view,
the US Congressional focus on political violence in El
Salvador and the need for continued US military and
economic aid provided extreme rightists additional
incentives to curtail terrorist operations.
The right wing probably also has been encouraged by
the upturn in government fortunes on the battlefield
since January 1984 and a commensurate loss in
political support for the rebel alliance. The far right
may believe that favorable trends in the military
situation have temporarily reduced the need for civil-
ian terrorist operations against insurgent elements.
The election campaign last year ironically also played
a role in reducing rightwing terrorism. It is our
judgment that many rightist leaders genuinely be-
lieved that D'Aubuisson and his ARENA party could
win the 1984 presidential elections. Hence, there was
an incentive for extremists not to undermine their
leader's public appeal with high-profile terrorist vio-
lence. Following the electoral defeat of ARENA,
moreover, the party became less cohesive, according
to US Embassy Extremist ele-
ments, therefore, may have been preoccupied less with
fomenting violence and more with sorting out their
options in dealing with the new Duarte government
and the scheduled Legislative Assembly and munici-
pal elections in March 1985.
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Some Prominent Cases of Rightwing Terrorism,
1980-84 (As reported by the US Embassy)
Salvadoran Cases
� In December 1980, National Guardsmen killed
eight members of a rural cooperative in San Vicente
after they were denounced as subversives by the
local Civil Defense. Disposition: The Guard com-
mander who ordered the killings was transferred to
another department. The military promised finan-
cial remuneration to families of the victims.
� In March 1980, Archbishop Oscar Romero was
assassinated while performing Mass in a San Sal-
vador chapel, presumably by right wing. Disposi-
tion: No government investigation or arrests.
� During 1981, atrocities occurred in two working-
class neighborhoods of the capital. Some 40 sus-
pected leftists were summarily executed by ele-
ments of the 1st Infantry Brigade and Treasury
Police. Disposition: No investigations or arrests.
� During 1981-82, some 30 peasants from Sonsonate
Department were abducted and killed by local Civil
Defense forces and their bodies thrown into a well
in the town of Armenia. Disposition: Government
investigation recently begun; three suspects
arrested.
� In November 1982, Army troops stationed in Usu-
lutan abducted at least 15 youths from nearby
Santa Elena and murdered them. Disposition: No
investigation or arrests.
� The same month, Army and Civil Defense personnel
tortured and killed at least seven members of La
Florida farm cooperative in Santa Ana Department.
Disposition: No investigation or arrests, despite US
Embassy representations.
� In February 1983, between 20 and 75 Indian farm-
workers from Las Hojas jurisdiction of Sonsonate
Department were abducted and killed by Army and
Civil Defense troops commanded by Captain Figue-
roa Morales of the 6th Detachment. Disposition:
Figueroa was transferred, and three Civil Defense
suspects detained last May. No further
information.
� In November 1983, Civil Defense forces tortured
and murdered nine peasant men and women in
Zaragoza hamlet in La Libertad Department. Ac-
cording to unsubstantiated reports, Army Lt. Col.
Denis Moran�reputed death squad leader�or-
dered the killings. Disposition: No investigation
and no arrests. Lieutenant Colonel Moran recently
transferred to the Inter-American Defense School
in Washington, D.C.
� In February 1984, seven Civil Defense members
reportedly were on trial in Santa Ana for murders
committed over a four-year period. Disposition: No
information on the outcome.
� The April 1984 trial of notorious ex-Army Maj.
Guillermo Roeder�arrested in 1982 for crimes
ranging from embezzlement to murder�was con-
sidered a key test of the Salvadoran justice system.
Disposition: Roeder was acquitted of all charges.
� In November 1984, a Salvadoran Lutheran minister
was murdered by two Army personnel in San
Miguel. Disposition: The perpetrators confessed
and were remanded to civil authorities
Cases of US Citizens
� The murder of four US churchwomen in December
1980 was resolved in May 1984, when five National
Guardsmen were convicted by a civilian jury and
sentenced to 30 years in jail.
� The case of John Sullivan�a freelance journalist
abducted and killed by presumed rightists in De-
cember 1980�is unlikely to ever be fully investi-
gated by the government. US Embassy investiga-
tions have yielded no solid leads.
� The case of two US labor advisers assassinated in
January 1981 remains tenuous. Two National
Guard triggermen confessed in 1982, but two offi-
cers who ordered the killings and wealthy civilian
conspirators have escaped prosecution in civilian
courts. One of the officers was released from active
duty in December under orders from President
Duarte
13
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The relative lack of political confrontation between
Duarte and the right wing in 1984 probably also lent
itself to reducing violence. Until the beginning of this
year, Assembly debate had been low-key, as most of
the earlier reform issues were resolved before the
elections, thus removing opportunities for volatile
political crusades by the extreme right opposition.
Duarte, moreover, avoided public confrontations with
extreme rightists and skillfully undercut them by
assuaging military leaders on important decisions�
including initial plans for dialogue with the insur-
gents. In addition, his trips abroad greatly boosted the
country's international image, resulting in increased
(b)(3) foreign aid and raising potential commercial opportu-
nities for Salvadoran businessmen
Potential for Renewed Violence
In our judgment, the level of rightist violence is likely
to rise in 1985. Present political and military trends
suggest the possibility for increased rightist violence
in the near-to-middle term, despite the disincentives
that brought the rate down in 1984. We believe the
basic philosophy of the extreme rightists remains
unchanged; they apparently continue to view the
democratic transition as anathema to their interests
and violent terrorism as an effective policy tool. At
the time of Vice President Bush's visit in December
1983, a press communique by the extreme right
clearly stated this basic philosophy when it announced
the formation of a new political front, the National
Liberation Party (PLN). The group's party doctrine
called for "clandestine armed struggle as the only
solution to the Central American crisis," and urged
the Salvadoran citizenry to join in the right's clandes-
tine war against the Communist forces. We believe
the views of the extreme right remain unchanged in
(b)(3) 1985
Rightist Attitudes and Goals
One factor that may induce rightwing extremists to
escalate violence is their probable concern over re-
cently increased guerrilla activities and their likely
reaction to planned changes in guerrilla tactics. Al-
though weakened on the battlefield, the guerrillas'
continuing capabilities were underscored by a major
Army defeat in December 1984 near the village of El
Salto in La Paz Department. The insurgents have also
Figure 2
El Salvador: Civilian Political Deaths and
Guerrilla Offensive Operations, 1981-84
Total
-Guerrilla operations a
- Civilian deaths
700
a Through July 1984 only.
304695 (C00894) 1-85
stepped up their sabotage of the economy country-
wide�including attacks on agricultural targets in the
heretofore quiet western departments�and appear to
have begun a new campaign of urban terrorism. The
various insurgent factions have been planning re-
newed political agitation and violence in the capital
and other large cities, according to US Embassy
reporting.
all five guerrilla factions had been
ordered to target San Salvador's transportation, elec-
trical, and telecommunications systems. Leftist union
strikes have effectively shut down much of the coun-
try's external communications system, and guerrilla
sabotage of the power grid since early January has
forced government rationing of electricity in the
capital. The insurgents are also intensifying their war
of attrition against the government's urban security
personnel, as well as planning additional assassina-
tions of local political leaders and foreigners,
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A variety of other reporting, moreover, suggests that
the guerrilla groups will soon be taking greater advan-
tage of the more open political environment in El
Salvador to challenge central authority further and
damage the economy. Although, in our view, the
government has shown great restraint in not respond-
ing to the initial rise in leftist-sponsored activity at
yearend, the probable continuation of, or increase in,
leftist-inspired public and private labor strikes and
street demonstrations will only serve to incite extreme
rightist elements
Politically, potential exists for more bitter clashes
between Duarte and the right wing as the March
legislative and municipal elections approach and as
the Christian Democrats bring their political agenc a
to the forefront later in the year. Already, a confron-
tation in the Assembly, precipitated in December
1984 by a presidential veto of a rightist-sponsored
electoral law, has pitted the moderate administration
against the conservative opposition in what could have
become a constitutional battle in the Supreme Court.
This and other policy moves by the President likely
have reinforced rightist fears about his political inten-
tions. Duarte's perceived bid for extralegal powers,
combined with recent rumblings of coup plotting
within military circles, will likely encourage a ration-
alization among at least some extreme rightists that
they must move violently against the Duarte adminis-
tration.
Another volatile issue that could precipitate a right-
wing backlash is the dialogue between the government
and the insurgents. Strong anti-Communist senti-
ments and inherent distrust of Duarte make the right
wing particularly nervous about the President's ability
to carry on a peace initiative without losing ground to
the rebels, according to US Embassy sources. Al-
though mainstream conservatives appear willing to
support the principle of continued peace talks, thes,
sources indicate that D'Aubuisson and other ultra-
rightist leaders are increasingly restive about what
they perceive as an eventual sellout to the guerrillas
by President Duarte.
Reflecting their distaste for the negotiation process,
ultrarightist leaders in the Assembly are already
maneuvering to block an administration proposal for
broad amnesty for the insurgents, as indicated by US
15
US Ambassador Robert White stands over the shallow grave in
which four US churchwomen were buried following their torture
and murder by members of the National Guard in La Paz
Department, 2 December 1980. (u)
Embassy sources. These sources believe that any
amnesty acceptable to the right wing would have to
exclude top guerrilla leaders and include pardons for
rightist criminals involved in death squad activities.
says that ARENA will seek
to block any amnesty plan proposed by Duarte with a
counterproposal that would pardon all rightwing ter-
rorists on an equal footing with leftist rebels. We
suspect that such a proposal would include pardons
for the five National Guardsmen already serving
prison sentences for the killings of the American
churchwomen, as well as those being investigated for
the murders of other US citizens.
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In our judgment, Duarte is likely to reject such a
counterproposal, although some of his own advisers
might be inclined to accept a reciprocal compromise
as necessary for reaching an accord on an amnesty.
Should Duarte remain firm, however, rightist extrem-
ists may seek to supplant legitimate political debate
with terrorist activities to scuttle the amnesty initia-
tive altogether. Rightists may already be targeting
government officials who are actively seeking a politi-
cal end to the war
that extreme rightists were
plotting to assassinate Julio Rey Prendes, Duarte's
principal troubleshooter and a key figure in the
government's current peace initiative. A rightwing
radio communique already has announced the "sen-
tencing" of Duarte to death for his October meeting
in La Palma with insurgent representatives.
The extreme right also is concerned that it has lost
influence over domestic issues and has publicly scored
Duarte's social and economic policies.
that the conservative business
community despairs of Duarte's economic policies
because it views them as having done nothing to
alleviate socioeconomic decline while actually damag-
ing the nation's potential for recovery. Duarte's per-
ceived antagonism toward the private sector continues
to undermine investor confidence in the government's
willingness and ability to support business initiatives
that would help regenerate economic growth, accord-
ing to various sources. As dissatisfaction grows within
the business community, small groups of extremists
may target labor leaders and Christian Democratic
officials involved in the reform process or other
economic planning as a way to demonstrate their
displeasure and to intimidate the Duarte administra-
tion into adopting policies more favorable to large-
scale private enterprise.
Ramifications of Increased Violence
We judge that an increase in extreme rightist violence
would complicate efforts by the Duarte administra-
tion to strengthen the country's moderate elements
and its weak democratic institutions. While the level
of violence probably would not exceed the levels of
1983�an average of 140 confirmed political killings
per month�any rise in the rate of political deaths
would reverse the significant downward trend in 1984
and make the government a more vulnerable target
for criticism at home and abroad.
An upsurge in rightist violence would sorely test a
judicial system that generally has failed to function
even during the best of times. Despite the efforts by
President Duarte to introduce legislation aimed at
streamlining the judicial process and making it more
effective, both the Attorney General's office and the
Supreme Court remain overwhelmingly rightist in
orientation. Moreover, unless the Christian Demo-
crats can capture a majority of the Assembly seats in
the March 1985 election or forge a working coalition
with moderate rightists, the prospects for enacting
any of Duarte's judicial reforms are poor
Increased rightwing violence and Duarte's inability to
control it could cost the government some of its
important political support from urban labor and
peasant organizations, the church, and other moder-
ate interest groups. Some Christian Democratic Party
members might react to increased violence by drop-
ping out of public service or political activity altogeth-
er, thus leaving the field more open to the conserva-
tive opposition
The adverse international impact of resurgent politi-
cal violence probably would offset some of Duarte's
initial accomplishments overseas, which have included
garnering broad political and financial support from
governments and private groups. Significant new po-
litical and financial support from a variety of West
European and Latin American countries to El Salva-
dor is, according to the US Embassy, based largely on
Duarte's progressive image, as well as public expecta-
tions that he will crack down on those responsible for
political violence. Foreign adversaries of the govern-
ment, as well as the insurgents' overseas propaganda
network, would benefit from a Duarte presidency
tarnished by rightwing violence
Duarte's ability to counter resurgent rightwing terror-
ism may be severely limited, in our opinion. Apart
from the fact that judicial mechanisms are not yet in
place to investigate and prosecute extremist groups,
we doubt that military leaders�whether or not they
are sympathetic to the goals of the ultraright�would
allow a comprehensive purge of extremists from the
ranks. Indeed, any move by Duarte to investigate' and
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ss'Seckt.t...
(b)(3)
Political violence was a central
issue during the 1982 Constitu-
ent Assembly elections. The
government created this poster
which reads: This is the scene
that we do not like to see. How
sad! Thousands of lives extin-
guished by hate and violence.
Your vote can make the differ-
ence. El Salvador deserves
your vote." (u)
prosecute members of the officer corps for political
abuses or human rights violations would be strongly
resisted by military leaders, probably compelling even
moderate officers to side with their conservative col-
leagues against the civilian government. Such an
institutional crisis would almost certainly result in
renewed coup plotting among selected senior staff ar d
combat commanders, pressured from below by a
substantial portion of the junior officer corps
17
Implications for the United States
We believe a resurgence of rightist violence would
affect US policy, by:
� Giving the insurgents a highly exploitable propagan-
da issue that they would use to discredit the dia-
logue with the government and to justify their
continuing refusal to participate in the democratic
process.
"---Seczttss
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� Creating a situation conducive to mounting public
and official pressure in the United States for a
reduction or cutoff of assistance to El Salvador.
� Complicating any efforts by Washington to gener-
ate international financial and diplomatic support
for the Duarte government.
Beyond these policy considerations, it is our judgment
that the frustration of the extreme right over its past
inability to undercut US support for moderate transi-
tion in El Salvador poses a growing threat to US
officials in country. Extremists publicly charge the
US Agency for International Development with hav-
ing imposed an allegedly harmful reform process on
the country, the US Congress with financial and
political constraints on the Salvadoran war effort, and
the US Embassy with rigging the May 1984 presiden-
tial elections in favor of the Christian Democrats.
Indeed, shortly after Duarte's election victory, a spate
of reporting from sources of undetermined reliability
indicated that extremists were plotting to strike at US
ersonnel in El Salvador.
that ARENA had hired several Uruguayan
assassins to devise a plan to assassinate the US
Ambassador. The killing reportedly would be carried
out in the style of a leftist terrorist attack.
that the US Ambassador was under
surveillance, and indicated that an attack against the
Ambassador was being planned possibly as part of a
larger conspiracy by ARENA to target a number of
US di omats and other officials.
that an unidentified hit man was paid
o begin targeting US Embassy officials. Top
ARENA leaders were aware of this and other plots
against US officials, and concurred in the financing,
arming, and sheltering of the terrorists,
We believe that threats from the right against US
personnel are especially serious in light of Washing-
ton's support for President Duarte's peace initiative.
As the dialogue with the guerrillas progresses, the
armed forces and the private sector may increasingly
fear that Duarte risks being politically outflanked by
the rebels in future peace talks or, worse, militarily
strapped by an unfavorable cease-fire arrangement.
Some rightwing fanatics may now be more willing to
try to intimidate Washington directly by attacks
against US personnel in order to weaken Christian
Democratic policies.
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