DCI TALKING POINTS FOR 26 JULY NSC MEETING: SOUTH AFRICA DOMESTIC SITUATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
05477333
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
February 24, 2023
Document Release Date:
February 24, 2023
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2014-00485
Publication Date:
July 25, 1985
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 59.39 KB |
Body:
Approved for Release: 2017/11/16 C05477333
IteRE-T--NeFeRN�
A/NIO/AF
25 July 1985
DCI TALKING POINTS FOR 26 JULY NSC MEETING:
SOUTH AFRICA DOMESTIC SITUATION
Pretoria has and will use the resources needed to end the current wave
of violence in black townships, restore a semblance of order, and resume
gradual reforms. Its hopes of nurturing a moderate black leadership willing
to follow Pretoria's lead, however, are increasingly unrealistic. The root
causes of black unrest are likely to intensify and future outbreaks of
violence are inevitable.
The government will not abandon its commitment to reform, but will
not tolerate being seen as "buckling under" either to black pressures
or foreign criticism. If need be, the government will expand its
emergency powers and crack down even harder.
Once the government feels in control, it may well attempt to present
a "package" of "more significant" reforms. These are likely to
Include movement on issues of common citizenship and amendment of
influx control laws inhibiting black migration to urban and "white
areas." While we do not believe the government is there yet,
ultimately Pretoria could agree to discuss some form of limited power
sharing with blacks and perhaps entertain more serious discussion on
releasing ANC leader Nelson Mandela.
In the short run, the state of emergency is likely to hurt
antigovernment groups by depriving them of leaders and weakening
organizations. Nevertheless, black townships will remain highly volatile
and subject to sudden outbreaks of violence as the gap between black demands
and the government's willingness to reform widens. In the longer term,
black militancy will increase and those in the "moderate middle" will be
forced to harden their views or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant.
����
Attacks on black collaborators probably will continue despite pleas
from people such as Bishop Tutu to end black-against-black violence.
-- Rivalry between antigovernment organizations and tribal groups is
likely to continue and there is no shortrun prospect that any one
organization can end the fighting, exercise widespread control, or
bring all groups together. Some young blacks are likely to go into
exile but most will remain behind. Internecine violence will
undercut the threat posed by black militancy.
-- Over time the already wide generation gap between increasingly
militant youths and their parents is likely to grow making it more
difficult to control the pace of change.
-- Harsh economic conditions--particularly housing shortages and high
unemployment--for urban blacks will not get better soon, will fuel
unrest, and will work against serious black-white dialogue.
Approved for Release: 2017/11/16 C05477333