A CLASSIC CASE OF DECEPTION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05460669
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2020
• Case Number: F-2013-00944
• Publication Date: June 1, 1998

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CIA Goes Hollywood
A Classic Case of Deception (U)
Antonio J. Mendez
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The operational
involvement of GAD
officers in the
exfiltration from Iran
of six US Department of
State personnel on 28
January 1980 was a
closely held secret until
the CIA decided to
reveal it as part of its
50th anniversary
celebrations in 1997.
99
Antonio J. Mendez served in the
Directorate of Operations and the
Directorate of Science and Technology.
When briefing the CIA's Directorate
of Operations (DO) or other compo-
nents of the Intelligence Community
(IC) about the Office of Technical
Service's (OTS) exfiltration capabil-
ity, I always made a point to remind
them that "readiness" is the key.
This is one of the full-time concerns
of my former OTS office, the Graph-
ics and Authentication Division
(GAD).
In arranging for the escape of refu-
gees and other people of potential
intelligence value, who are subject to
political persecution and hostile pur-
suit, prior planning is not always
possible because they show up at odd
hours in out-of-the-way places. Cur-
rent surveys and collection of up-to-
date intelligence regarding travel con-
trols and procedures are vital. OTS
engages in this activity worldwide.
The readiness to move clandestine
agents out of harm's way using quasi-
legal methods is equally important.
CIA's policy and practice is to bring
its valuable human assets out of the
cold when they can no longer remain
in place. Sometimes, this includes
their families. Public Law 110 gives
the IC the authority to resettle these
people in the United States as US
persons when the time comes and the
quota allows.
OTS/GAD and its successor compo-
nents have serviced this kind of
operation since OSS days. "Authen-
ticating" operations officers and their
agents with personal documentation
and disguise, cover legends and sup-
porting data, "pocket litter," and so
forth is fundamental deception trade-
craft in clandestine operations.
Personal documentation analysts,
personal disguise specialists, graphic
artists, and other griphic specialists
spend hundreds of hours preparing
the materials, tailoring the cover leg-
ends, and coordinating the plan.
Infiltrating and exfiltrating hostile
areas are the most perilous applica-
tions of this tradecraft. The mental
attitude and demeanor of the subject
is as important as the technical accu-
racy of the tradecraft items.
Sometimes, technical operations
officers actually lead the escapees
through the checkpoints to ensure
that their confidence does not falter
at the crucial moment.
Going Public
The operational involvement of GAD
officers in the exfiltration from Iran
of six US Department of State per-
sonnel on 28 January 1980 was a
closely held secret until the CIA
decided to reveal it as part of its 50th
anniversary celebrations in 1997.
David Martin, the CBS News corre-
spondent covering national security
issues in Washington, DC, had the
story early on, as did Mike Ruane of
The Philadelphia Inquirer. The
Canadian Broadcasting Company
and The Reader's Digest both have
done serious pieces since the CIA
opened the files on this important
success story.
Jean Pelletier's book, Canadian
Caper, published in 1980, mentions
that some CIA help was given to the
Canadians in the form of forged
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66
entries in Canadian passports to
enable Canadian Ambassador to Iran
Kenneth Taylor to engineer the
escape of the "houseguests." A brief
passage in Hamilton Jordan's book,
Crisis, alludes to CIA officers on the
scene in Tehran. After he left office,
former President Carter, in state-
ments to the media, gave some hints
of even more credit due his adminis-
tration for the only true operational
success of the hostage crisis.
My recollections of the long national
emergency, which began on 4
November 1979 with the takeover of
the US Embassy in Tehran and
which ended with the release of the
53 hostages on Inauguration Day in
January 1981, encompassed several
major plans and operational acts sup-
ported by OTS and focused on Iran.
These included intelligence gather-
ing; deception options for defusing
the crisis; rescuing the hostages; secret
negotiations with the Iranian Gov-
ernment; and the exfiltration of
agents and the "Canadian six."
In those days, the atmosphere in CIA
was one of full alert. OTS, like many
Agency components, was buzzing
with intense activity. There are
numerous stories about technical and
operational innovations resulting
from the emergency-like environ-
ment; the rescue of the six is one of
many.
New Job, New Challenge
On 11 December 1979, about a
month after the takeover of our
Embassy in Tehran, I moved from
my job as Chief, OTS, Disguise Sec-
tion, to Chief, OTS, Authentication
Branch. I had operational responsi-
bility worldwide for disguise, false
A failed exfiltration
operation would
receive immediate
worldwide attention.
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documentation, and forensic (coun-
terterror and counterintelligence)
monitoring of questioned documents.
I had already spent the first days of
the crisis creating a deception opera-
tion designed to defuse the crisis.
President Carter decided not to use
this option, however, and he has
since lamented that decision.
The requirement for dealing with the
six State Department employees hid-
ing under the care of the Canadian
Embassy in Iran was one of many
chores I had to address on my first
day on the new job. I immediately
formed a small team to work on this
problem.
The issues facing us were typical for
exfiltration planning. The fact that
we were concerned with six Ameri-
cans with no intelligence background,
coupled with the task of coordinat-
ing a plan of action with another
government department and the
administrations of the US and Cana-
dian Governments, appeared
particularly troublesome. A failed
exfiltration operation would receive
immediate worldwide attention. It
would reflect badly on the United
States, the President, and the CIA,
and it would make life even more dif-
ficult for all American hostages in
Iran. The Canadians also had a lot to
lose, including the compromise of
their Embassy in Tehran, but we had
a perfect record of success with this
kind of operation over many years.
Collecting Basic Data
We had recently moved one agent
out of Iran through Tehran's Mehra-
bad Airport. As a result of this
operation, we had a body of techni-
cal data on the airport controls and
the efficiency of the groups operating
them. The task of collecting and
analyzing current document intelli-
gence simply calls for verifying fairly
recent information and ensuring that
it is up to date.
We also had continued to support the
infiltration and exfiltration of a few
intelligence officers and agents who
were traveling in and out of Iran on
intelligence-gathering and hostage-
rescue planning operations, and we
could use these people as collection
sources.
We were most concerned about the
positive controls in the airport, par-
ticularly the immigration exit
controls. Long before the revolu-
tion, the Iranian immigration service
had adopted a two-sheet embarka-
tion/disembarkation form. This form
was printed on no-carbon-required
paper and filled out by the traveler on
entry. A white sheet was retained by
immigration, and the carbon-copy
yellow sheet was retained by the trav-
eler, who was supposed to present it
at immigration exit control on depar-
ture. The immigration clerk
theoretically matched the two forms
to verify that the traveler left before
his visa expired. Many countries in
the world have similar systems; few
complete the verification process on
the spot, if ever. We hoped to deter-
mine whether the militants operating
at Mehrabad were completing this
kind of positive check before travel-
ers cleared the airport. Earlier in
1979, the controls were so unprofes-
sional that the forms were not
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collected unless volunteered by the
departee. We had to confirm that
this was still the case.
The other significant problem we
faced was to select a cover story and
supporting documentation for a
group of North American men and
women. We debated three intercon-
nected issues related to this aspect of
our planning: the type and national-
ity of passports we should use, the
kind of cover, and whether we should
move the six out in a group or
individually.
CIA management had strong opin-
ions on these points, as did the State
Department. And the Canadian
Government had to be drawn into
these negotiations at some point.
Once it was, it would also tend to
take a position.
Passport Problems
The passport debate started with con-
siderations for using ordinary US
passports, other foreign passports at
our disposal, or Canadian passports.
CIA managers were not comfortable
with approving any foreign passport;
they were concerned that nonprofes-
sional persons might not be able to
sustain a foreign cover story.
Initially, no one was confident that
the Canadians would overlook their
own passport laws or expose their
government unnecessarily by provid-
ing Canadian passports. With the
elimination of these two options,
OTS was left with building a cover
for the use of US passports, some-
thing we judged would call
unnecessary attention to the sub-
jects. Our experience recommended
in favor of the Canadian passports.
The Iranians had found two OTS-
produced foreign passports in the US
Embassy that had been issued to two
CIA officers posted to Tehran. One
officer was among the hostages being
held in the Embassy. The discovery
of the passports was the topic of
extensive media coverage in Iran and
other countries.
The OTS team decided initially to
push for Canadian passports and to
concentrate on devising cover for the
group before making final recom-
mendations on the type of passport.
We began an all-source quest for
information on the types of groups
traveling in and out of Mehrabad Air-
port. In the meantime, the DO's
Near East (NE) Division was devel-
oping information on overland
"black" exfiltration options, hoping
to identify a smuggler's route or a
"rat line" into Turkey.
H. Ross Perot, the Texas billionaire,
had used a similar plan to exfiltrate
two of his employees early in the Ira-
nian revolution. He had already
offered his support to the Agency for
the hostage rescue effort.
We soon developed information
which indicated that the groups trav-
eling legally to Iran included oilfield
technicians from European-based
companies, the news teams of all
nationalities covering the hostage sit-
uation, and all sorts of curiosity
seekers and do-gooders from around�
the world; many of them were US
citizens. None fit our purposes, given
the pattern or profile of these groups
and the careful scrutiny and control
given to them by Iranian security and
immigration services. We believed
that it would be most important for
professional intelligence officers to
make the final probe into Iran and to
meet personally with the subjects in
order to access their state of mind
and ability to carry out the operation.
Contacting the Canadians
We requested a meeting with senior
NE managers to present our position
and to review the options. We were
also aware that the senior NE officer
in charge of the rescue of the six and
of the liaison with the Canadians
regarding the crisis had already been
to Ottawa, where his meeting with
officials in a Canadian ministry
included the topic of Canadian pass-
ports. Our meeting with NE
Division officers went fairly well, and
they agreed in principle with our
position.
Because the Canadians were under-
standably concerned with the
mechanics of the exfiltration and how
their passports would be used, we
suggested that OTS get approval to
go to Ottawa to explain these details.
An OTS documents specialist, "Joe
Missouri," and I arranged to depart
for Ottawa immediately. We pre-
pared passport photos and
appropriate alias biodata for the six to
take with us in hopes we could win
the Canadians over. We had already
directed many questions to Ambassa-
dor Taylor, and his replies gave us a
good feeling about his penchant for
clandestine planning.
In our meeting with Canadian offi-
cials, we learned that the Canadian
Parliament had already approved the
use of Canadian passports for nonciti-
zens for humanitarian purposes. We
immediately requested six spares for
the six houseguests to give us a redun-
dant capability for the operation. We
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also asked for two additional pass-
ports for use by CIA "escorts." The
Canadians agreed to the spares, but
they declined on the two additional
passports because Parliament had not
approved the exception to their pass-
port law to cover professional
intelligence officers.
We had an opportunity in our meet-
ing with our ministry contact, "Lon
DeGaldo," to display a bit of magic.
He thought one of the proposed
aliases had a slight Semitic sound�
not a good idea in a Muslim coun-
try. We quickly picked another
name, and I forged a signature in the
appropriate handwriting on the mar-
gin of a fresh set of passport photos.
This trick was mostly showmanship,
but it helped to establish our creden-
tials as experts.
Cover Stories
Next, we discussed cover legends.
We explained the different points of
view on group cover versus single
cover, the need to gather more infor-
mation on travelers, and our
intention to send an officer or offic-
ers into Tehran to do a final probe of
the controls and to meet with the six
houseguests.
This allowed me to try out an idea for
a cover legend that had occurred to
Inc the night before at home in
Maryland while I was packing.
Cover legends hold up best when
their details closely follow the actual
experience or background of the user.
If possible, the cover should be suffi-
ciently dull so that it does not pique
undue interest. In this case, how-
ever, I believed that we should try to
devise a cover so exotic that no one
I believed that we
should try to devise a
cover so exotic that no
one would imagine it
was being used for
operational purposes.
99
would imagine it was being used for
operational purposes.
Hollywood Consultation
In my former job as chief of the OTS
Disguise Section, I had engaged the
services of many consultants in show
business and motion pictures. Our
makeup consultant, "Jerome Callo-
way," was a technical makeup expert
who had received many awards.
(Recently, he was awarded CIA's
Intelligence Medal of Merit, one of a
few nonstaffers to be so honored.)
His motivation for helping us was
purely patriotic.
We had already involved Jerome in
the hostage crisis. One week after the
takeover, I called him to Washington
to help prepare a deception option.
He, the disguise team, and I had
worked around the clock tO com-
plete this option in five days.
When we got the order to stand
down, Jerome returned to Califor-
nia. Before he left, he reaffirmed his
desire to help in any way possible in
the rescue of our diplomats. As soon
as I checked into my hotel in Ottawa,
I called Jerome at his home. He had
no idea what I was working on, and I
simply said that I was in Ottawa and
that I needed to know how many
people would be in an advance parry
scouting a site for a motion picture
production.
Jerome replied that this would
require about eight people, including
a production manager, a cameraman,
an art director, a transportation man-
ager, a script consultant, an associate
producer, a business manager, and a
director. Their purpose would be to
look at a shooting site from artistic,
logistic, and financial points of view.
The associate producer represented
the financial backers. The business
manager concerned himself with the
banking arrangements because even a
10-day shooting schedule could
require millions of dollars of expendi-
tures on the local economy. The
transportation manager rented all
types of vehicles, from limousines *to
move the stars about to the heavy
equipment for constructing a set.
The production manager made it all
come together. The other team
members were the technicians-made-
good who create the film footage
from the words in the script.
Making movies is an unusual busi-
ness. Most people would not be
surprised by the fact that a Holly-
wood production company would
travel around the world looking for
the right street or hillside to shoot a
particular scene.
Cover Options
Recommending this kind of coverage
for most clandestine operations would
be out of the question, but I sensed
that it might be just right for this
operation. I tried the idea on Lon,
our contact in the ministry, and he
was intrigued with it. Certainly, it
was not incompatible with the Cana-
dian passport option. Film
companies are typically made up of an
international cast of characters. The
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Canadian motion picture and televi-
sion industry was well established.
We discussed the motion picture
cover option as well as another idea or
two. Lon had also thought about the
problem of cover, and he had an idea
for a group of food economists who
might be seen traveling to various
places in the Third World, The State
Department had already given us their
idea about a group of unemployed
school teachers looking for jobs in
international schools around the
world. We felt obliged to mention
this idea, even though we were not
too excited about it.
We adjourned our meeting and made
arrangements for follow-up meet-
ings. We then sent a cable back to
CIA Headquarters outlining our
accomplishments and included our
discussions on the three cover
options. This was be the first time
that we mentioned the movie idea.
Over the next week, I commuted
between Ottawa and Washington.
An OTS team began forming in
Ottawa to prepare the documenta-
tion and disguise items for the
Canadian pouch to Tehran. The
GAD team at OTS continued to col-
lect information on Iranian border
controls. All worldwide messages
were sent and answered with the
Flash indicator, CIA's highest
precedence.
CIA managers did not summarily
reject the Hollywood option, which
had its advantages. The task of rescu-
ing the hostages by paramilitary
means seemed impossible at the out-
set, given the geographic location of
Tehran. The ideal approach would
be to pre-position the Delta Force
close by the target before they
launched the final phase to breach the
Embassy compound.
Hollywood was an ideal
place to create and
dismantle a major
cover entity overnight.
99
The movie cover might allow us to
approach the Iranian Ministry of
National Guidance with a proposal to
shoot a movie sequence in or near
Tehran. The Ministry had been
charged with countering the negative
publicity by promoting tourism. It
was also looking for ways to alleviate
some of Iran's cash-flow problems
caused by the freezing of Iranian
assets in the United States. A motion
picture production on Iranian soil
would be an economic shot in the
arm and would provide an ideal pub-
lic relations tool to counteract the
adverse publicity of the hostage
situation.
Because a moderate was about to be
elected President of Iran, we judged it
possible that he could be sold on these
points and then win over the radical
factions of the government. If so, the
cover for infiltrating the Delta Force
as a team of movie set construction
workers and camera crews to prepare
the set was a natural. We imagined
that it might be possible to conceal
their weapons and other material in
the motion picture equipment.
Forming a Film Company
On a weekend, between trips to
Ottawa and planning sessions with
NE Division, I made a quick trip to
California. I brought $10,000 in
cash with me, the first of several
black-bag deliveries of funds to set up
our motion picture company. I
arrived on a Friday night and met
with Jerome and one of his associates
in a suite of production offices they
had reserved for our purposes on the
old Columbia Studio lot in Holly-
wood. I had invited a CIA contracts
officer to the meeting to act as wit-
ness to the cash delivery and to follow
up as bagman and auditor for the run
of the operation. It would take two
years to clear all accounts on these
matters.
The production company, "Studio
Six Productions," was created in four
days, which included a weekend.
Our offices were formerly occupied
by Michael Douglas, who had just
completed producing The China
Syndrome.
Jerome and his associate were mas-
ters at working the Hollywood
system. They had begun applying
�`grease" and calling in favors even
before I arrived. Simple things like
the installation of telephones were
supposed to take weeks, but we had
everything we needed down to the
paper clips by the fourth day.
We arranged for full-page ads in
Variety and The Hollywood Reporter,
the two "trades" most important to
any business publicity campaign. We
tried to keep Jerome's well-known
name hidden, but the trades had their
reporters hot on our trail, and the
word was out that something big was
brewing in the industry.
When the press discovered that Jer-
ome was connected with this
independent production company,
interest mounted and more press play
followed. Hollywood was an ideal
place to create and dismantle a major
cover entity overnight. The Mafia
and many shady foreign investors
were notorious for backing produc-
tions in Hollywood, where many
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fortunes are made and lost. Holly-
wood is also an ideal place to launder
money. Our efforts to keep Jerome's
involvement secret actually added
credibility to our company.
Picking a Script
Once Studio Six Productions was set
up, we tackled the problem of identi-
fying an appropriate script. Jerome
and I sat around his kitchen table dis-
cussing what the theme should be.
Because Star Wars had made it big
only recently, many science-fiction,
fantasy, and superhero films were
being produced. We decided we
needed a script with "sci-fi," Middle
Eastern, and mythologic elements.
Something about the glory of Islam
would be nice, too. Jerome recalled a
recent script which might serve our
purpose, and he hauled it out of a
pile of manuscripts submitted for his
consideration.
The script fit our purpose beauti-
fully, particularly because no
uninitiated person could decipher its
complicated story line. The script
was based on an award-winning sci-fi
novel. The producers had also envi-
sioned building a huge set that was to
become a major theme park. They
had hired a famous comic-strip artist
to prepare the concepts of the sets.
This gave us some good eyewash to
add to a production portfolio.
We decided to repackage our bor-
rowed script by decorating it with the
appropriate logo and title markings.
The only copy of the script we
needed would be carried by me as a
prop to be shown to the Iranians in
my role as production manager�and
only in the event we were questioned
at the airport in Tehran.
ROBERT SIDELL AND ASSOCIATES
PRESENT
A STUDIO SIX PRODUCTION
A COSMIC CONFLAGRATION
FROM A STORY BY TERESA HARRIS
COMMENCING PRINCIPAL PHOTOGRAPHY
MARCH 1980
Argo
Jerome and I then set about picking a
name for our movie. We needed
something catchy from Eastern cul-
ture or mythology. After several tries,
we hit on it! During our 10-year
association, he had proven to be a
great story and joke teller. He once
told a group of us a profane "knock-
knock" joke, with the word "Argo" in
the punch line.
This became an in-house disguise-
team recognition signal and battle
cry. We used it to break the tension
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that quite often built up when we
were working long hours under diffi-
cult circumstances preparing for an
important operation. Jerome remem-
bered this. He also recalled that the
name stemmed from mythology. He
looked up the definition of Argo and
confirmed it as the name of the ship
which Jason and the Argonauts sailed
on to rescue the Golden Fleece from
the many-headed dragon holding it
captive in the sacred garden. Per-
fect! This precisely described the
situation in Iran.
I quickly designed an "Argo" logo,
which we used for full-page ads in the
trades. The ads proclaimed "Studio
Six Productions Presents 'Argo'... A
cosmic conflagration.., story by Ter-
esa Harris." (Teresa Harris was the
alias we selected for our story consult-
ant, which would be used by one of
the six awaiting our arrival in
Tehran.)
Calling the Iranian Consulate
On my last day in California, I made
our first business call from our stu-
dio offices to the Iranian Consulate
in San Francisco, using my alias. I
said I required a visa and instructions
on procedures for obtaining permis-
sion for scouting a shooting location
in Tehran. My party of eight would
be made up of six Canadians, a Euro-
pean, and a Latin American.
The Latin American would be an
OTS authentication officer, "Julio,"
who was posted in Europe. His lan-
guages were Spanish, French, and
Arabic, and he had considerable exfil-
tration experience. We had selected
OTS-produced documentation for
his cover legend as an associate pro-
ducer representing our production
company's ostensible South Ameri-
can backers. I would travel on an
OTS-produced European passport.
The call to the Iranian Consulate was
a washout. Officials there suggested
that we apply at the nearest Iranian
Consulate in our area. This was not
surprising because many Iranian dip-
lomats were carried over from the
Shah's regime, and most were unsure
of their current status and their visa-
granting authorities.
I departed on the "redeye special"
that night with all the trappings of a
Hollywood type, including match-
books from the Brown Derby
Restaurant, where Studio Six Produc-
tions had a farewell dinner for me.
Final Technical Preparations
Back in Washington, the various
efforts being mounted against Iran
were still going full tilt. Our opera-
tions plan for the rescue of the six
was being implemented at the work-
ing levels of OTS and NE Division,
but the plan had not yet been coordi-
nated with and approved by
policymakers.
My immediate task was to partici-
pate in the final technical
preparations for our three cover
options. I had collected several exem-
plars of supporting documentation
for our production party that had to
be reproduced by the OTS graphics
specialists to pad the wallets of our
party. The script had to be altered
and a presentation portfolio prepared
for our production manager.
Joe Missouri, the document special-
ist who had accompanied me on the �
initial trip to Ottawa, had remained
behind at that time to negotiate for
ancillary documentation to support
the ostensible Canadian part of the
legend. This had required special
authorization from the Canadian
Government, which Missouri man-
aged to obtain. This was quite an
accomplishment for a young officer.
By this time, Joe had returned to
Washington and taken charge of the
Argo portfolio. Joe had always been
an artist at the typewriter. He took
the roles of various members of the
production party and fleshed them
out in the form of resumes. This
clever ploy provided briefing papers
for each subject that could be carried
in the open in the production man-
ager's portfolio. When completed,
this portfolio had everything needed
to sell even the most sophisticated
investment banker on our movie!
A week after my return from Califor-
nia, the US and Canadian document
and disguise packages were ready for
the Canadian pouch. The OTS team
in Ottawa had also been working on
the Canadian documents, applying
the finishing touches to the pass-
ports. We had 12 Canadian
passports and 12 US passports, a
redundant capability for both nation-
alities. The redundant documents
were designed for final issuance by
the Canadians in Tehran in case Julio
or I failed to get in or did not show
up at the Canadian Embassy after we
arrived. Julio and I would complete
the second set of passports in Tehran,
giving us last-minute flexibility on
site.
A highly detailed set of instructions
on the use of the documents and on
the final briefing of the subjects was
also prepared for easy reference by
nonexperts. Airline tickets were
enclosed showing around-the-world
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itineraries. Joe and I had found lapel
pins and baggage stickers of the
Canadian maple leaf for the Cana-
dian package. These were also part of
the kit.
A review of the US documents pack-
age on the night before we left for
Ottawa to load the Canadian pouch
revealed a possible embarrassing
problem. The Canadians were get-
ting several backstopped Canadian
documents. CIA's ability to obtain
similar backstopped alias documents
was too slow, and we had not been
able to obtain internal CIA permis-
sion to acquire these for our subjects.
The US document packages were
going to be terribly outclassed by the
Canadians. The only reason for
sending US alias documents was to
appease one of the policymaking lev-
els participating in the operations
planning. Thc plan was still not
finally approved or coordinated in
our own government. If our Cana-
dian counterparts took inventory of
the documents when we loaded the
pouch, we would look silly. This
bothered us. As soon as we arrived at
the US Embassy in Ottawa the next
morning, we made the rounds col-
lecting business cards and other
wallet stuffers to fill out our package.
As it turned out, the loading of the
"bag" did not include a close exami-
nation of our respective document
packages, so we were not embar-
rassed. The subjects themselves
would have the final vote when pre-
sented with the choice of two
passports, three cover stories, and the
option of moving out individually or
all together. Because my OTS col-
league and I ultimately would make
the presentation of the choices in
Tehran, we could greatly influence
their decision.
The Canadian pouch or bag turned
out to be the size of a pillowcase,
barely big enough for our exfiltration
kit of documents and disguise materi-
als. The Canadian couriers
apparently had a much easier time
than the typical US State Depart-
ment courier, who usually
accompanies several mailbag-sized
pouches. The Canadian courier is
only allowed one bag, and he keeps
this with him at all times. Some of
our extra disguise materials had to be
left out of the bag to Tehran.
During this last trip to Ottawa, it
became clear that the Canadians were
losing patience with the Americans.
We were not making the final deci-
sion on our ops plan. They had
made all sorts of concessions without
hesitation. What was taking us so
long to move? They insisted that the
final approval of all plans be accom-
plished as soon as possible. I
promised to send that word back
immediately.
The Green Light
Back at the Embassy, I prepared a
long cable outlining every detail of
the operation as I envisioned it
should be carried out. This was pre-
cisely the kind of summary we would
send in before launching an exfiltra-
don from a foreign location. It was
slightly irregular for me to send this
from Ottawa as the plan that the
Canadians and I wanted to be
approved.
I caught hell for that cable when I
returned to Washington, but then I
was told it was a fine piece of work.
The plan was finally coordinated
yvithin two days, and our materials
were en route to Tehran.
Press Probes
A disturbing bit of information
known to most of us involved in this
operation had come to light weeks
before. There were certain members
of the news media who had figured
out that the fuzzy information being
provided to the press by our State
Department spokesman in Washing-
ton regarding the exact number and
identities of the hostages being held
in the Embassy compound was a
smokescreen designed to hide the fact
that six diplomats were still at large in
Tehran.
The Canadians were aware that the
Washington correspondent of Mont-
real's La Presse had already called on
the Canadian Ambassador 'in Wash-
ington to voice his suspicions. The
Ambassador asked him to sit on the
information until after the exfiltra-
tion, promising him an exclusive on
the story from the Canadian
Government.
Ambassador Taylor's wife had also
received a cryptic phone call at their
residence in Tehran. The caller did
not identify himself, and he asked for
one of the six by name. Two of the
six were staying with the Taylors, and
the call was for one of them, Joseph
Stafford. The other four were stay-
ing in the residence of Canadian
Deputy Chief of Mission John Shear-
down. The Canadians saw their
situation in Tehran becoming tenu-
ous. They began making discreet
arrangements to close down their
Embassy before it too was overrun.
Moving to Europe
The next phase of the operation
shifted to Europe. The OTS shop
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there had been debriefing travelers,
collecting data, and obtaining exem-
plars of the Iranian visas and entry
cachets required for our up-to-date
intelligence on Iranian document
controls. Julio was gearing up his
alias document package. My alias
documentation was also being pre-
pared there.
Julio and I planned to link up in
Europe for our final launch into
Tehran, tentatively set for 23 and 24
January. Both Julio and I planned to
apply for Iranian visas separately in
European cities. In case neither of us
was successful, I had already arranged
for a fallback position. One of the
CIA officers in Europe had an OTS-
issued alias passport he used for oper-
ational meetings. We had instructed
him to obtain an Iranian visa in this
passport very early in our data collec-
tion phase so we would have an
exemplar. He got the visa. If neces-
sary, I planned to borrow his alias
and have a similar alias passport
issued to me with a duplicate of his
legally obtained visa.
Visa Applications
On 21 January, Julio left for Geneva,
Switzerland, on his alias passport to
apply for an Iranian visa. I left
Washington on the same day for
Europe. I was traveling on my true-
name US official documents, but I
was hand-carrying the Studio Six
portfolio and certain collateral mate-
rials to fill out our documents
packages.
I arrived in Europe on the morning
of 22 January, and Julio returned
from his trip that afternoon with his
Iranian visa. I still had to obtain a
visa in my alias passport. I planned
to drive to Bonn the next day and to
apply there. I hoped the Iranians
there would issue it in a few hours, as
they had for Julio in Geneva.
We received a Flash message from
Ottawa that afternoon. Our exfiltra-
don kits had arrived in Tehran, but
Ambassador Taylor and one of his
aides had reviewed the materials and
discovered a mistake! The handwrit-
ten Farsi fill-in on the Iranian visas
showed a date of issue sometime in
the future. The Farsi linguist who
had assisted our team in Ottawa has
misinterpreted the Farsi calendar.
We fired a message back through
Ottawa assuring Taylor this was no
problem The OTS officers could eas-
ily alter the mistake when they
arrived in Tehran. The fallacy in this
was that the mistake was in the set of
passports prepared for use by Taylor
if we did not arrive for some reason.
If this was the case, a follow-up mes-
sage would be prepared with carefully
worded instructions for Taylor on
how to correct the mistake.
On 23 January, one of the OTS offic-
ers and I went to Bonn. I had my
alias documentation and the Studio
Six portfolio. I had altered my
appearance slightly with a simple dis-
guise. I was also wearing a green
turtleneck sweater, which I would
continue to wear through the run of
the operation.
As we approached the Iranian
Embassy in Bonn, I noted that the
Embassy of my ostensible country of
origin was nearby. If the Iranians
chose to do so, it would be perfectly
proper for them to send me to my
own Embassy for a letter of introduc-
tion before the visa was granted. I
was dropped off down the block from
the Iranian Embassy, and I walked
back to the entrance to the consular
section.
A half-dozen visa applicants were sit-
ting in the reception area filling out
applications. A handful of young Ira-
nian "Revolutionary Guards" in
civilian clothes were standing around
scrutinizing everyone. It was then
that I realized that I had left the port-
folio in the car when I was dropped
off. I did have my alias passport and
other personal identity documents. I
filled out the forms and went to the
clerk's window to give them to the
consular official.
In response to the official's polite
questions, I said, in my best accent,
that the purpose of my visit to
Tehran was to meet with business
associates at the Sheraton Hotel in
Tehran; they were flying in from
Hong Kong today and were expect-
ing me. I also said that I did not
obtain a visa in my own country
because I was in Germany on busi-
ness when I received the telex about
the meeting in Tehran. I received my
visa in about 15 minutes.
Presidential OK
Our plan for entry into Iran was for
me to leave that evening (23 Janu-
ary), and to arrive the next day at 5
a.m. in Mehrabad. Julio would fol-
low the same itinerary 24 hours lacer.
If anything happened to one of us en
route, the other might still get
through.
As soon as I got back from Bonn, I
sent a Flash to Washington and
Ottawa that I was ready. I received
approval to launch within the hour.
Thirty minutes later, however, I
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received another message from Wash-
ington to delay my departure because
the President wanted to give final
approval and was being briefed at
that moment.
Another 30 minutes passed, and I
received the Presidential OK in a
terse message which said, "President
has just approved the Finding. You
may proceed on your mission to
Tehran. Good luck." In terms of
approvals, this case was the ultimate
cliffhanger.
Entering Tehran
Julio and I had an especially worth-
while chance meeting just before I
left for the airport that evening. We
had an opportunity to meet with
another Agency officer who had been
traveling in and out of Tehran in
support of the hostage rescue opera-
tion. He would ultimately be
responsible for creating the inside
support mechanism. He had been in
the "business" since serving with OSS
and parachuting into Europe during
World War II. He clearly was a
master of the game," and he gave us
some useful insights about the situa-
tion at Mehrabad and in Tehran.
This strengthened our confidence
and gave us a better idea about how
to behave.
Julio and I both arrived in Mehrabad
at 5 a.m. on 25 January. (I was a day
late because of delays caused by bad
weather.) Immigration controls were
straightforward, and the disembarka-
tion/embarkation form was still being
used. The difference I noted this
time from my previous experience
with Mehrabad immigration was that
the immigration officer was a profes-
sional in uniform instead of an
untrained civilian irregular. The
immigration officers had gone into
It seemed eerie
approaching the US
Embassy compound
knowing that 53
Americans were being
held inside, including
one or two CIA officers.
99
hiding at the beginning of the revolu-
tion. It appeared that they had now
come back to work.
At entry, unlike my last visit, cus-
toms and security personnel were not
overly concerned about foreigners.
Because of Iran's balance-of-payment
problems, they were especially inter-
ested in Iranian citizens leaving with
valuables like fine Persian rugs or
gold. The economic situation had
become worse in the last few months,
and we could expect the exit controls
to be even tighter.
We took a taxi to the Sheraton Hotel
and checked in. Our next step was to
go to the Swissair office downtown to
reconfirm eight airline reservations
for Monday morning to Zurich. In
an exfiltration operation, it is impor-
tant to reconfirm your space on the
airplane for the day you are supposed
to leave. Because it is difficult to
bring the subjects to the point where
they have the courage to walk into
the airport, if they then have to back-
track because their flight did not
arrive, had mechanical problems, or
their reservations were lost it would
be doubly hard for them to get up
their nerve next time. We chose
Swissair because of its record of effi-
cient and reliable service.
The Swissair office was not open yet.
From my earlier trip to Tehran, I
knew that the US Embassy was a few
blocks down the street and that the
Canadian Embassy also was nearby.
It seemed eerie approaching the US
Embassy compound knowing that 53
Americans were being held inside,
including one or two CIA officers.
Although we knew that our col-
leagues would have some rough going
during their captivity, we also knew
that there was nothing we could do
to help at the time. We had to keep
our attention on the task at hand.
The high walls were decorated with
propaganda banners and posters cele-
brating the revolution.
The Canadian Embassy
Julio and I began looking for the
Canadian Embassy. Our map
showed it to be located directly across
a narrow side street from the US
Embassy. We found the building,
but it was the Swedish Embassy.
There was an Iranian guard at the
entrance, but he could not under-
stand our questions and was perplexed
by our street map. Just then, a young
Iranian came along. He spoke to the
guard, apparently asking him who
were these confused-looking Western-
ers. He then spoke to Julio in
German. The fellow was polite and
helpful. He wrote down an address in
Farsi, hailed a taxi for us, and gave the
address to the taxi driver, who took us
a considerable way across town to the
Canadian Embassy.
Ambassador Taylor, who had been
expecting us to arrive sometime that
morning, was waiting upstairs in his
outer office. We did not immedi-
ately recognize him as the
Ambassador. He was a tall, lean,
rather young, pleasant individual
dressed in Western jeans and a plaid
shirt and wearing cowboy boots. He
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wore "mod" glasses and had a full
salt-and-pepper Afro-style haircut.
This improbable-looking diplomat
greeted us warmly.
Ken introduced us to his secretary,
Laverna, a small, elderly lady who was
also pleasant and cheerful. We had a
short meeting in Ken's office. He
explained that most members of his
staff had already quietly departed
Tehran. There would be only five
Canadians left after his family
departed that afternoon. The remain-
ing five, including himself, would
depart on Monday for London shortly
after the Swissair flight we hoped to
board at 7:30 a.m. with the houseg-
uests. Early on Monday, he planned
to inform the Foreign Ministry by
diplomatic letter that the Canadian
Embassy would be closed temporarily.
We described briefly those things we
needed to accomplish over the next
few days, starting with a meeting with
the houseguests so we could brief
them on the plan and assess their
ability to carry it off. We all agreed
the meeting would occur at 5 p.m. at
the suburban residence of John
Sheardown, the Embassy's second
officer, where they had been hiding
since November.
At this initial meeting with Ken, we
learned that at least two more ambas-
sadors in the local diplomatic corps
and some of their staff were also
involved in hiding and caring for the
six. Ken and these other ambassa-
dors were also visiting regularly with
Bruce Laingen, the American charg�
who was under "house protection" in
the Foreign Ministry. Laingen,
another Embassy staff officer, and the
Embassy security officer were to
spend the entire crisis living in the
vrooms of the Foreign Ministry, where
they had gone to protest the
demonstrations at the gates of the US
Embassy just as it was about to be
overrun. Laingen was free to depart
Iran any time, but he refused to aban-
don his colleagues.
We asked and received Ken's permis-
sion to send a message to Washington
through Ottawa, confirming our
arrival in Iran and informing every-
one concerned that we planned to
meet with the six that evening. We
were also introduced to Roger Lucy,
who was housesitting with the four
Americans who were staying at Shear-
down's house. Roger spoke Farsi
fluently, and he had been the one who
discovered our mistake on the visas.
Claude Gauthier was another mem-
ber of Ken's staff. He was a burly
French Canadian responsible for the
Embassy's physical security. Claude
earned the nickname of "Sledge" dur-
ing these final days because he was
destroying classified communications
equipment with a 12-pound sledge-
hammer. Everyone at the Embassy
was friendly and informal; they
seemed amused by our business.
When it was time to go to meet the
six, Julio and I left with Claude. Ken
had left earlier to see his wife off at
Mehrabad and to pick up the
Sraffords, the two houseguests stay-
ing with him. We all arrived at the
safehouse at about the same time.
The house was on the outskirts of
town in a well-to-do neighborhood.
It was palatial, with a high wall sur-
rounding it.
Meeting the Six
The six rushed to meet us as we
entered the house. They appeared in
good spirits and were happy to see us.
We spent the first few minutes get-
ting acquainted. The six houseguests
were two young married couples,
Joseph and Kathleen Stafford and
Mark and Cora Lijek, and two single
men, Bob Anders and Lee Schatz.
Anders, about 50, had been head of
the consular section, and the two cou-
ples had worked for him. Schatz was
a tall young man who was the agricul-
ture attache. Those from the
consulate had escaped out the back
door to the street when the militants
had been breaking in the front door.
Schatz had had an office in a building
across the street from the Embassy,
and he had gone directly to the Swed-
ish Embassy, where he hid for a week.
The Swedish flag was his blanket.
I explained that there were three
cover stories and how these were sub-
mitted for their consideration. I also
explained what had to be accom-
plished over the next two days and
how we would proceed through the
airport on Monday. There was con-
siderable discussion about the
mechanics of the controls and how
we would respond if questioned
about our presence in Tehran. Only
one exhibited anxiety about the risks
involved.
Finally, I instructed them to go to the
dining room to discuss among them-
selves whether they wanted to go in a
group or individually and which cover
story they preferred. I waited about
15 minutes and then walked in on
them. They were debating the ques-
tions, and I distracted them by doing
a bit of sleight of hand with two sugar
cubes. I had used this trick many
times to illustrate how to set up a
deception operation and to overcome
apparent obstacles. It helped to per-
suade reluctant subjects that they were
involved with professionals in the art
of deception. The six decided to go as
a group, using the Studio Six cover.
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The six showed us around the safe-
house, where four of them had passed
nearly three months in a fair amount
of comfort. The huge, well-fur-
nished house had a kitchen with
enough equipment for a modern res-
taurant. The Americans had spent a
good bit of their time planning and
cooking gourmet dinners for them-
selves and the few outsiders they saw.
They also had become masters at the
game of Scrabble.
As we were being shown around, one
of the other ambassadors and his atta-
che, Richard, arrived. They had
visited the houseguests more than
once. They wanted to meet the CIA
officers who had come to oversee the
escape of the six people they had
come to know well. Both these men
were to prove helpful to us.
When it was time for Julio and me to
go back to our hotel, Claude dropped
us down the block from the hotel.
He would pick us up the next morn-
ing to take us to the Canadian
Embassy. Saturday is the Holy Day
in Iran, but we had to put the finish-
ing touches on the Canadian
passports and to file our final plan of
action to Ottawa and Washington for
approval.
The Last Arrangements
The next two days moved swiftly.
We spent most of Saturday filling in
the passports with the appropriate
entries, including the Iranian visas
issued in Canada. This visa exem-
plar had been collected only recently
for us by a Canadian friend in
Ottawa. It was a better fit for the
ostensible travel itinerary of the Stu-
dio Six team. Their cover legend and
airline tickets showed them arriving
in Tehran from Hong Kong at
approximately the same hour that
Julio and I had arrived from Zurich.
Their flight had actually arrived on
that day and time, and passengers dis-
embarking would have been
processed by the same immigration
officers who had processed us. Con-
sequently, the Iranian entry cachets
stamped in our passports were prime
exemplars for those we entered in the
passports of the six.
The worst thing that can happen
when making false passport entries is
to forge the signature of an immigra-
tion officer on an ostensible arrival
cachet and then discover that this
same individual is about to stamp you
out of the country. He would know
that he was not at work the day your
passport says you arrived. You have
to know how all these systems work.
The attache, Richard, was dispatched
to the airport to pick up a stack of
the disembarkation/embarkation
forms from an airline contact. Julio
would complete the Farsi notations
on enough of these, and each of the
six would write in his or her false bio-
data and sign in the new aliases.
Again, the forms we had received and
filled in on arrival were our models.
We had spread out our forgery mate-
rials on a table in Ken Taylor's office.
He spent most of his day making last-
minute arrangements to close the
Embassy, sitting nearby listening to
our banter about some fine point of
making false documents, or consult-
ing with us on some detail of the
arrangements for the exfiltration.
Claude was wielding his sledgeham-
mer somewhere in the building and
burning and shredding classified
paper.
On Sunday morning, I completed the
long cable outlining the operations
plan, and the message was transmit-
ted to Ottawa. One of the details in
the plan explained:
. . . That the six Canadians from
Studio Six had called on the local
Canadian Ambassador hoping
that they could arrange for an ap-
pointment with the Ministry of
National Guidance to present
their proposal to use the local mar-
ket for 10 days of shooting "Argo':
. . The Canadian Ambassador
has advised them to seek a location
elsewhere if possible, but has of-
fered one of the Embassy's vacant
residences as guest quarters. . . .
They heeded his advice, and after
looking around a few days, have
decided to leave Iran. . . .
This provided details which paral-
leled the true facts. It also gave us the
option of bringing the six to the air-
port on Monday in an Embassy
vehicle with an Embassy driver,
thereby solving the problem of find-
ing reliable transportation to the
airport. Laverna could then also
reconfirm the airline reservations,
which would be a normal service per-
formed for Canadian guests of the
Embassy.
Amateur Actors
Everything was in good order by Sun-
day night, when we reconvened at the
safehouse. The six houseguests were
impressed with their documentation
packages, and we were impressed
with the transformation of their
appearances and personalities. On
Friday night, we had given each of
them their cover legend as prepared
by Joe Missouri in the Studio Six
portfolio. We also had provided them
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with disguise materials and props that
would help fill out their roles.
They had scrounged clothes from one
another and restyled their images to
look more "Hollywood." Each of
them was having great fun playing
their part and hamming it up. The
most dramatic change was made by
the rather distinguished and conser-
vative Bob Anders. Now, his snow-
white hair was a "'mid" blow dry. He
was wearing tight trousers with no
pockets and a blue silk shirt unbut-
toned down the front with his chest .
hair cradling a gold chain and medal-
lion. With his topcoat resting across
his shoulders like a cape, he made a
turn around the room with all the
flair of a Hollywood dandy.
The mental attitudes of the six were
positive. We began briefing them on
the details of their ostensible prior
travel and arrival in Iran. They soon
seemed to have grasped these details
fairly well. We warned them that
there was to be a hostile interroga-
tion staged after dinner to test their
ability to answer the questions under
stress. Roger Lucy volunteered to be
the interrogator.
Soon, Ken Taylor arrived with an
answer from Ottawa to our cable.
Apparently, the policymakers in
Ottawa and Washington were pleased
with our proposed plan of action. He
said the last line of their cable was,
"See you later, exfiltrator."
Shortly, the other ambassador arrived
with yet another ambassador. The six
served a sumptuous seven-course din-
ner with fine wine, champagne,
coffee, and liqueurs. I told them
about Jerome and the Argo knock-
knock joke. Everyone took up the
Argo cry. I also told everyone that
they would be tempted to sell the
story to some publisher after the
operation was over. I admonished
them not to yield to temptation,
because Julio and I needed to stay in
business to help others in the future.
They apparently took this advice
seriously.
After dinner, Roger appeared in mili-
tary fatigues, complete with hat,
sunglasses, jackboots, and swagger
stick. The interrogations began. The
interrogations impressed some of the
more overconfident members of the
group with the importance of
remembering the details of their
cover stories and gave them a taste of
what could be in store for them at the
airport.
During the interrogations, the sec-
ond ambassador asked me to step
into another room. He told me that,
during one of the visits the three
ambassadors had made to the For-
eign Ministry to meet with Bruce
Laingen and his aides, the US
Embassy security officer had pulled
him aside to confide that he was
planning his own escape. He had
already made one trip outside the �
building, and he asked for a glass cut-
ter. The ambassador asked my advice
about the glass cutter and if he should
also give him a gun. I said "yes" to
the glass cutter but "no" to the gun. I
thanked him for this information,
and I told him we would be back in
touch on these topics if more infor-
mation was required.
Before we left at midnight, we made
final arrangements for getting to the
airport. I would go 30 minutes ahead
of the others with Richard, who
would pick me up at the hotel at
3 a.m. We would confirm that all
was normal at the airport and that
Swissair was en route from Zurich. I
would clear customs and check in at
the airline counter, where I would
wait so the others could see me as
they entered the airport as a signal
that all was in order. Julio would
accompany them to the airport in the
Embassy van and lead the way
through customs.
Day of Departure
I was awakened in my dark hotel
room the next morning by the tele-
phone ringing next to my bed. It was
Richard calling from the lobby. It was
3 a.m., and I should have been up at
2:15 a.m. My watch alarm had gone
off, and I must have slept through it.
I rushed to get showered and dressed,
and I was in the lobby in about 15
minutes.
Mehrabad is like many Middle East-
ern or South Asian airports. Although
of fairly modern construction, the
people who pass through as travelers
or hang around to greet or see travel-
ers off make an orderly transit
impossible. This was another reason
for choosing the 7:30 a.m. Swissair
flight. If we arrived at the airport at 5
a.m., the chances were the airport
would be less chaotic. Also, the offi-
cials manning the controls might still
be sleepy, and most of the Revolu-
tionary Guards would still be in their
beds. This was the case that morning
of 28 January 1980.
As Smooth as Silk
Richard and I proceeded through the
customs check to the Swissair counter.
There were few other travelers, and
the airport employees were still
groggy. The Swissair counterman
confirmed that the flight would arrive
at 5 a.m. I stood at my prearranged
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66
spot to wait for the rest of our party.
Richard went to find the manager of
another airline, who was a useful
friend to have at the airport. He had
already provided the blank embarka-
tion forms. We would have had to
collect these ourselves on the way in
and had, in fact, picked up several
extras, but the manager had given us
plenty to cover any mistakes when
filling them out. It is rare to have an
inside contact at an airport for an
exfiltrator.
Soon the others arrived, and Julio led
the way through customs. The six
had had difficulty putting together a
decent collection of luggage and
clothing. They appeared to be travel-
ing a bit light for Hollywood types
on an around-the-world trip. They
seemed bright and eager, however,
and they had plastered their luggage
with those Canadian maple leaf stick-
ers we had found in Ottawa.
After they had cleared customs and
checked in at the airline counter, we
all proceeded to the immigration
checkpoint. Lee Schatz was so eager
that he had gotten way ahead of us
and was already clearing immigration
with no apparent difficulty. The oth-
ers began presenting their documents
and the yellow embarkation forms. I
waited for each to clear in case one
got into trouble. I would get
involved quickly as the production
manager responsible for the well-
being of his preproduction crew. I
was armed with the Argo portfolio
and would overwhelm anyone stand-
ing in the way with Hollywood talk.
The immigration officer could not
have cared less. He stamped each of
us out and collected the yellow forms.
One yellow form floated off his
counter and was some distance away
on the floor. When no one was look-
ing, I picked it up and stuck it among
We were all a bit on
edge. The roving
guards continued their
random interrogations
of other travelers.
99
my papers. It was the form we had
forged for Bob Anders.
We were in the departure lounge, and
we still had to go through the final
security check before we arrived at
the waiting area by our gate. The six
were wandering around in the gift
shops like ordinary tourists. A few of
the fatigue-clad Revolutionary
Guards were scrutinizing everyone.
Richard appeared with the airline
manager. They had been watching us
clear through immigration. I shook
hands with the manager, and he
asked me why we had not booked his
airline; he would have arranged for
red-carpet treatment. I told him to
stand by as we might still need his
flight if Swissair had any problem. I
noticed the two elderly ladies from
the Canadian Embassy starting to
arrive in the departure lounge for
their flight. Ken Taylor and the men
of the Embassy would leave later in
the day after we had departed.
Last-Minute Delay
The Swissair flight was called for the
first time, and we proceeded through
the security check into the small
glassed-in room by our gate. We
were just a short bus ride from the
aircraft. Then the PA system
announced that the Swissair flight
was delayed for departure because of
mechanical problems! I reassured our
party and walked back through the
security checkpoint to find Richard
and his friend.
The departure lounge was filling up.
Several flights were arriving. I won-
dered whether I should switch to one
of these if Swissair was to be delayed
too long.
I found Richard and his friend. They
had already spoken to Swissair and
learned the mechanical problem was
minor. We would not be delayed too
long, perhaps an hour. We discussed
the options of switching flights, but
we decided that that would be too
complicated and that it would call
unnecessary attention to us. I
returned to our gate and reported this
to the others.
We were all a bit on edge. The rov-
ing guards continued their random
interrogations of other travelers. We
made small talk and tried not to
attract any attention.
After a tense hour, the Swissair flight
was called. Everyone was suddenly
anxious and excited about the pros-
pect of pulling it off.
A Great Success
The bus trip was brief and as we
started up the ramp to board the air-
plane, Bob Anders punched me in the
arm and said, "You arranged for
everything, didn't you?" He was
pointing at the name lettered across
the nose of the airplane. The name
of our airplane was "Argau," a region
in Switzerland. This was a sign that
everything was going to be all right.
We had to wait until the plane took
off and had cleared Iranian airspace
before we could give the thumbs up
and order Bloody Marys.
By lunchtime, Julio and I were sit-
ting in the Zurich airport restaurant
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Deception
waiting for our connecting flight to
Germany. Some of the six dropped
down and kissed the tarmac of the
Zurich runway after they came down
the ramp. The other passengers
viewed this as rather strange behavior.
US State Department representatives
met us at the other side of Swiss
immigration and customs. The six
were whisked away in a van to a
mountain lodge. They left Julio and
me standing in the parking lot. I
loaned one of them my topcoat
because it was chilly. It was US Gov-
ernment property; Julio and I had
bought European-style clothing, top-
coats, and shoes for our trip to
Tehran. I never retrieved the top-
coat, and I would be admonished by
our Budget and Fiscal people when I
did my accounting. Just another typ-
ical TDY. All part of the job.
A Lot of Publicity
A few days later, the story hit the
streets in Montreal. I was still in
Germany when the story came over
the Armed Forces radio station. Two
days later, I arrived in New York, and
at the airport I picked up a copy of
The New York Post with the headline,
"Canada to the Rescue!"
When I boarded the flight in Ger-
many, I was carrying a large tin of
Iranian caviar that the Staffords had
bought for me in the departure
lounge in Mehrabad. I asked the
stewardess if she would keep it cold
for me. She said, "No, it is either
Russian or Iranian, and we don't like
either!" The Soviets had invaded
Afghanistan in December, and Presi-
dent Carter had withdrawn from the
Olympics. The other 53 Americans
were still being held hostage in
Tehran.
Chapter 21 of the Pelletier book, The
Canadian Caper, covered the impact
of our success on the world at large:
To the Embassy staffs heroism was
added a typically Canadian touch
ofmodesty. It was important, said
Ken Taylor in an interview later,
for the Americans to say thank you.
. . . They did more than that. They
went wild. It was the first good
news after three months of nation-
al trauma. . . . The maple leaf was
flown in Oklahoma City, in Livo-
nia, Michigan, and in a hundred
other American towns and cities.
Billboards sprang up throughout
the American countryside with gi-
ant letters that spelled Thank You,
Canada. A major US bank
bought a full-page ad in The New
York Times to commemorate the
Canadian deed.
Jerome took out an ad in his local
Burbank paper which said, "Thanks,
Canada, we needed that...."
Ken Taylor became an instant hero.
He was described as "the Scarlet Pim-
pernel of diplomacy." He returned to
Ottawa, covered in glory. Eventu-
ally, he was involved in a whirlwind
tour of appearances, some with the
six. He was made an Officer of the
Order of Canada, received a Congres-
sional Medal from the United States,
and was awarded several honorary
degrees. He lived his cover all the
way.
By the time Studio Six folded several
weeks after the rescue, we had 26
scripts, including some potential
moneymakers. One was from Steven
Spielberg.
Meeting the President
On 12 March 1980, I accompanied
the Director of Central Intelligence,
Admiral Turner, to his morning
meeting with President Carter and
National Security Adviser Brezinski.
I was to have two and one-half min-
utes of Turner's meeting with the
President. At first, the President was
confused about what I had done and
thought that I was the "old hand" we
had met the night before I went to
Iran and who was still in Tehran at
that point working on preparations
for the military rescue operation. I
did have a chance to show the Presi-
dent some of the cover materials used
in the operation and to tell him the
Argo/Argau story. Because of some
indecision about whether the White
House photographer should take my
picture shaking hands with the Presi-
dent (I was then under cover), I had a
total of nine minutes in the Oval
Office. Later that day, I was pro-
moted by the director of OTS. In
May, Julio and I each received CIA's
Intelligence Star award.
Reunion and Recognition
Later that same month, I invited the
six to my farm for the weekend. Jer-
ome came out from Burbank to join
us in a secret reunion. The next
week, the six and Ken Taylor were
honored guests at a game in Yankee
Stadium, where they were cheered by
30,000 fans.
In September 1997, after being
selected as one of the CIA50 Trail-
blazers, Agency representatives asked
me if! would agree to be interviewed
by CBS Evening News about the res-
cue of the six. I agreed, and the
public thus finally learned the true
story of the hostage rescue operation.
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