SYRIA'S OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05459392
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2021
• Case Number: F-2020-00397
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Syria's Offensive
Chemical Warfare Capability
An Intelligence Assessment
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NESA 85-10220JX
SW R5-101291X
November 1985
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Syria's Offensive
Chemical Warfare Capability
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, and
Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
on 351-5955.
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NESA 85-10220JX
SW 85-10129JX
November 1985
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 15 October 1985
was used in this report.
Syria's Offensive
Chemical Warfare Capability
We believe Syria has developed a substantial chemical weapons stockpile
of indigenously produced binary-type chemical munitions, principally
aerial bombs and warheads. We assess that Syria could produce 7.8 metric
tons per month of the nerve agent sarin. We believe Syria could produce 10
Scud missile chemical warheads and 60 500-kilogram chemical bombs per
month.
Within the next five years we believe Syria will develop a more persistent
chemical agent, such as soman or VX. Either of these could be used to neu-
tralize enemy rear areas that the attackers do not plan to occupy
immediately. Syria probably is also experimenting with chemical warfare
applications for conventional artillery systems.
We believe that only President Assad can order the use of Syria's chemical
weapons. In our view, he would authorize their use only if Syria's defeat or
an enemy chemical attack appeared imminent or in retaliation for a
chemical attack. In the event of Assad's death or removal from power, this
policy would change little, if at all.
An embargo against shipments to Syria of Western equipment, precursor
chemicals, and technical support would not slow Syrian production of
chemical weapons.
We have no evidence of Soviet provision of the production facilities,
chemical precursors, or scientific expertise that would aid nerve agent
research.
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The relatively muted public reaction to Iraq's use of chemical weapons
against Iran and the proliferation of these weapons in the region suggest a
lower threshold for the use of chemical weapons in future Middle East
conflicts. Syria is the fourth Middle Eastern nation, after Egypt, Iraq, and
Israel, known to produce chemical weapons. Iran and possibly Libya are
also trying to develop these weapons. Other countries in the region, such as
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait, are concerned about their inadequate
chemical defense capabilities and are taking steps to enhance them.
-1r6p-SeCieL, iv
TCS 3109185
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Contents
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Page
Key Judgments
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Stockpile and Delivery Means
7
Chemical Warfare Planning
11
Regional Implications of Syrian CW Production Capability
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Outlook
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Syria's Offensive
Chemical Warfare Capability
We believe Syria emerged from the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war determined to develop an independent capability
to produce chemical weapons. The Egyptians, who
apparently supplied Damascus with chemical muni-
tions such as aerial bombs and artillery rounds in
1973, could not be counted on in a future conflict.
Concern in Damascus over Israel's chemical warfare
program probably further spurred Syrian chemical
weapons research.
The Syrian view of chemical weapons as a last resort
was demonstrated in the final days of the 1973 war
the
fall of Damascus to advancing Israeli forces seemed
imminent
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The Army's Defensive
Chemical Units
Since the 1960s, Syria has considered the prospect of
chemical warfare a serious threat. The measures it
has taken to provide its troops with defensive training
and equipment laid the foundation for development of
an offensive capability. The Syrian Army has worked
closely with Soviet military advisers to train and (b)(1)
equip defensive chemical units that are assigned to (b)(3)
all of its major elements. Most Syrian military
personnel probably have at least a basic understand-
ing of the uses and effects of chemical weapons and
how to protect themselves against them.
Development of the Chemical Weapons Program
After 1973, Syrian Brig. Gen. A'dib Trabzali�an
expert on Soviet chemical warfare doctrine and head
of the Syrian Army's Chemical Administration
Branch�was charged with the responsibility for de-
veloping an offensive chemical warfare capability,
Under his super-
vision, Syria's chemical weapons development pro-
gram probably relied initially on the expertise of a
small number of senior officers who led ostensibly
defensive chemical warfare units. These same officers
may have helped select the Scud surface-to-surface
missile (SSM) and aerial bombs as delivery systems
for lethal chemical agents.
1
Units of the Army's 28th Chemical Regiment are
assigned to the Army General Headquarters, the
divisions, and maneuver brigades. These elements are
officially charged with providing smoke concealment
for maneuvering forces and destroying enemy forces
and materiel with flamethrowers. Below the brigade
level, chemical units are assigned as needed by the
brigade commander (see figure 3).
on-Searpt
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Syria's CW Research Center
The chemistry department of the Centre d'Etude et
Recherche Scientifique (CERS), headquartered in
Damascus, is responsible for Syria's chemical weap-
ons research.
surrounding the program, few of the center's person-
nel have had a role in the center's chemical research,
and even fewer know that Syria has developed a nerve
agent for use in Scud missile warheads
CERS is subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of De-
fense and functions as Syria's authority for weapon
systems research and development,
The center conceals its chemi-
cal warfare research activities in agricultural and
medical research programs
In our view, because of the secrecy
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by which time all the equipment purchased in 1983 (b)(1)
would be installed�indicates that Syria's chemical (b)(3)
weapons stockpile could consist of as many as 70 Scud
missile warheads and 560 500-kilogram bombs. If
Syria produced these munitions at maximum produc-
tion capacity-10 Scud missile warheads and 60
bombs per month�its munitions stockpile would
grow dramatically.
Stockpile and Delivery Means
Syria may be
stockpiling chemical agents as a safeguard against
Analysis based on the expected production rates,
and the assump-
tion that full-scale production began in early 1985�
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international trade restrictions on certain chemicals or
destruction of some of its CW facilities.2
In the years since Syria began its CW program, some
Syrian military personnel have heard rumors of chem-
ical weapons stockpiles, but few apparently have
detailed knowledge
We suspect that Syria has selected the Scud as a
primary means of launching a chemical attack be-
cause it has a much greater range than the Frog or
SS-21, the only other SSMs in Syria. Israeli cities and
military installations�the presumed targets of
Syria's CW program�are well within the Scud
missile's 300-kilometer maximum effective range.
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Syria would use
fighter-bombers, such as its SU-20/22 or MIG-23
(Flogger F) aircraft, to deliver chemical bombs. We
doubt these would be used as readily as the Scud
missiles because of the greater vulnerability of air-
craft to enemy fire.
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Chemical Warfare Planning
Extensive Soviet assistance since the early 1960s in
developing Syria's defensive chemical warfare regi-
ment suggests that Syrian chemical warfare doctrine
is modeled on Soviet doctrine, which regards chemical
weapons as weapons of mass destruction. We believe
Syria would use chemical weapons against such tar-
gets as the enemy's major troop concentrations, air-
fields, and command and control facilities.
The nerve agent sarin is particularly well suited to the
small theater of operations that would be the setting
for another war with Israel. Sarin is a "nonpersistent"
chemical agent that dissipates within a few hours of a
chemical attack, allowing advancing troops to enter
the affected area without great risk. In the confined
geographical area where future Syrian-Israeli battles
might take place, only a nonpersistent nerve agent
would allow the user to overcome rapidly enemy
troops and occupy enemy territory.
If Assad contemplated launching a chemical attack
against Israel, he would have to consider wind condi-
tions over Israel and western Syria. During the sum-
mer and early fall, prevailing surface winds in Syria
are eastbound and can gust in excess of 17 knots,
greatly increasing the danger that chemical agent
would be blown toward Syria's civilian population and
troops. Wind conditions during the rest of the year
generally are more favorable
Regional Implications of Syrian CW Production
Capability
Syria's development of a CW production capability
and the absence of a major international outcry over
Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran suggest a
lower threshold for the use of chemical weapons in
future Middle East conflicts. In addition to Iraq and
Syria, Egypt and Israel are known to produce chemi-
cal weapons. Iran and possibly Libya are also trying
to develop these weapons. Other countries in the
region, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait,
are concerned about their inadequate chemical de-
fense capabilities and are taking steps to enhance
them.
Syrian ability to wage chemical warfare will raise the
level of tension between Syria and Israel and between
Syria and moderate Arab states such as Jordan
Chemical weapons production by Syria and Iraq has
increased the likelihood of Israeli airstrikes against
their suspected storage and production facilities.
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Israeli
military actions to reduce Syrian chemical warfare
capabilities probably would result in retaliatory Syri-
an attacks and could lead to war
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Israeli airstrikes on Syrian chemical warfare facilities
probably could slow, but not stop, Syria's CW pro-
gram. The production and storage facilities almost
certainly are not colocated, and destroying all of the
facilities would be difficult. Moreover, we believe
Syrian chemical experts could design and build new
facilities without outside assistance.
Efforts to gain acceptance for an international treaty
banning chemical warfare may prove futile in the
Middle East. Middle Eastern states would be unwill-
ing to forgo newly acquired CW capabilities if they
believe that their hostile neighbors will not accede to
or comply with a treaty banning chemical weapons.
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Israel almost certainly will increase pressure on the
United States to convince its West European allies to
control exports of chemical warfare materiel to Syria.
If recent experience is an accurate guide, most Euro-
pean governments will attempt to cooperate but will
have difficulty imposing embargoes unless they have
proof that their nationals are aiding Syria's CW
program.
In any case, an embargo on all Western-origin materi-
el with chemical warfare uses probably could not
slow, much less stop, Syria's production of chemical
weapons.
In our view, moreover,
Syria's stockpile of surplus chemical precursors and
the expertise of its scientists would ensure that the
CW program continues despite embargo efforts.
Outlook
We believe Syria would use chemical weapons as a
last resort in an all-out war with Israel when its own
defeat appeared imminent or if it believed an enemy
was about to launch a chemical attack. As long as
Iraq is engaged in war with Iran, Syria will not be as
concerned about Iraqi CW capabilities.
As long as President Assad is in power, there probably
is little chance that Syria would try to surprise Israel
by using chemical weapons early in a war because of
the certainty of massive Israeli retaliation. We do not
believe that Assad will relinquish his strict control
over the chemical weapons program because of the
danger that unauthorized individuals would misuse
the weapons. In the event of Assad's death or removal
from power, a successor regime�eager to establish its
legitimacy and authority�probably would maintain
strict control over chemical weapons.
Syria's intentions regarding its stockpile of excess
chemicals and chemical weapons are unclear. Assad
probably views them as a safeguard against interna-
tional trade restrictions on the sale to Syria of chemi-
cals and materiel with CW-related uses. Syrian scien-
tists may also intend to use some of the excess
chemicals to produce other types of nerve agents. We
do not believe Syria would provide chemical weapons
to Lebanese militias and Palestinian organizations
because it has only limited control over such groups.
Syrian desire for an Iranian victory in the war with
Iraq, however, may persuade Assad to offer chemical
weapons to Iran
Such a transfer
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would provide an opportunity to test the weapons in
combat.
Syria probably will apply its chemical weapons re-
search to conventional artillery systems within the
next five years. CERS may already have done this
with the Soviet-made BM-21 multiple rocket launcher
(MRL), which has twice the range (20.5 kilometers) of
other MRLs in Syria. The BM-21 is a particularly
suitable delivery system for sarin because it can
quickly disperse the nerve agent over a large area, has
excellent mobility, and has a high revolution rate that
would aid mixing in a binary system
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Syrian Regular Army Chemical Warfare Organization
General Headquarters
1st Armored Division
3rd Armored Division
9th Armored Division
11th Armored Division
569th (Assail) Division
HChemical company
5th Mechanized Division
7th Mechanized Division
10th Mechanized Division
28th Chemical Regiment
Hlioa qat/rt
Six independent brigades
emi
inchain.
HFlamethi
battalion
Chemical platoon
306573 11-85
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ecret
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