IMPLICATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05445827
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2021
• Case Number: F-2020-00397
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
71ZirSeerret
Implications of Chemical
Weapons Proliferation
National Intelligence Estimate
NIE 5-85
Sc 02881-85
August 1985
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NIE 5-85
IMPLICATIONS OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
Information available as of 15 July 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the intelligence organization of
the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
The National Security Agency
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
1
KEY JUDGMENTS
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DISCUSSION
5
Trends in Proliferation
5
Expansion of Capabilities
5
Role of External Support
5
Political and Economic Impact: Problems and Prospects
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Security Aspects of Proliferation
9
Role of CW in Recent Conflicts
9
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan
9
Iran-Iraq
10
Impact on Balance of Power
11
Middle East
11
Asia
11
Africa
12
Central and South America and the Caribbean
12
Implications for US Forces
13
Potential for Terrorist Use of CW
13
Implications for Arms Control
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SCOPE NOTE
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This Estimate addresses the spread of offensive chemical warfare
(CW) capabilities outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact arena. It is con-
cerned mainly with those agents developed during and since World
War I and commonly considered -traditional chemical agents." Al-
though the importance of biological weapons and the potential for
development of new agents by application of advances in biotechnology
are recognized, our data base is less cohesive and the issues are
sufficiently different from chemical weapons proliferation to warrant
separate treatment in a future paper.
This Estimate examines the implications of CW proliferation for
-
the following areas:
� National security.
� Arms control.
� Potential for terrorist use.
� Economic and political spheres.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Proliferation of chemical warfare (CW) capabilities imperils the
prospects for consummation of an effective global ban on chemical
weapons. States with recently acquired CW capabilities may be unwill-
ing to ratify or accede to a treaty banning chemical weapons if they
doubt accession or compliance by hostile neighbors. Further, the
growing availability of chemical weapons increases the likelihood of
their use.
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Since the early 1960s, chemical weapons capabilities have been
acquired by 10�and possibly 12�nations, primarily in the Middle East
and Asia. At least a dozen additional nations are now in the nascent
stages of CW program development. This trend will continue because:
� The technology is readily available.
� Chemical weapons are relatively inexpensive.
� There is a perception of increasing CW threat from adversaries.
� Chemical weapons increasingly are seen as a militarily useful
adjunct to conventional weaponry.
� The political costs of chemical weapons possession or use are
judged to be acceptable.
� There are no international constraints on possession of chemical
weapons.
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The success and publicity of the Iraqi CW program and minimal
international sanctions in response to CW use may have been strong
motivators to a number of the Middle Eastern states. Thus far, Iraq's use
of CW has helped�but has not been essential to�Iraqi success on the
battlefield. We judge that Iran now possesses a limited supply of
chemical weapons and is likely to use them in retaliation to Iraqi use.
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The ready availability of chemical weapons in the Middle East and
their growing presence in Asia significantly increase the potential that
US or Allied forces deployed to these regions, in either military actions
or peacekeeping roles, will be direct or inadvertent victims of chemical
attack.
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Likewise, the spread of CW capabilities into Third World states
increases the likelihood that terrorists will acquire these weapons and/or
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the capability to produce and deliver them. We cannot discount the
possibility that states such as Libya or Iran would sponsor or assist
terrorists in acquiring chemical weapons.
Proliferation of CW programs has created a growing international
market in sales of CW-related materiel and technological expertise. The
expanding Third World petrochemical, pesticide, fertilizer, and pharm-
aceutical industrial base has created an essential precondition for
further growth. International controls, placed on CW precursor chemi-
cals and processing equipment have been largely ineffective at slowing
the rate of proliferation. The profits to be made through sales and the
dual-use nature of relevant materials and technologies make effective
control over them extremely difficult.
As Third World chemical warfare programs and CW-materiel
industries mature, CW training and logistic and production assistance
increasingly will be sought from countries that have recently developed
strong domestic programs. Concurrently, the ability of the industrial-
ized CW-capable states to slow CW proliferation will further be
diminished. Western interference with CW acquisition by developing
nations is likely to be viewed by those countries as an effort to restrict
their increasing military prowess.
Although we have sufficient information to assess the state of CW
program development in a number of nations, we lack confidence that
we know the full extent of the CW threat worldwide. Of ten there are
few indicators that signal chemical weapons production or possession
before their actual use. Latent capabilities may yet exist in some areas
of the world
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DISCUSSION
Trends in Proliferation
Expansion of Capabilities
1. Never before have so many nations possessed
offen ive chemical weapons capabilities.
Burma, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea,
ina, Syria, Taiwan, Vietnam, and possibly Libya
and South Africa have acquired chemical weapons
stockpiles and thus are capable of conducting chemical
warfare (CW). In the absence of international con-
straints on possession of chemical weapons, these
countries have all either recently acquired CW capa-
bilities or demonstrated an active interest in maintain-
ing their capabilities. The turbulent
Middle East and East Asia have become the focuses of
chemical weapons proliferation activity as is displayed
on the map. In addition, a number of
including Nicaragua
Indonesia, Jordan, and others are taking steps to
increase their CW protective posture and may seek in
the future to acquire chemical weapons.
We cannot be certain that there are not other coun-
tries with CW capabilities, because any nation with a
developed industrial base and mature defense industry
could establish the capabilit to field chemical weap-
ons if it so chooses.
2. The scale and maturity of the Iraqi program
have brought chemical weapons into the Middle East-
ern political-military equation to stay. Through sus-
tained and systematic effort, Iraq has developed a
state-of-the-art capability to manufacture chemical
weapons with foreign, particularly West European,
assistance. Predictably, Iran and Syria are making
major efforts to develop chemical weapons in re-
sponse. Other nations will be influenced by the extent
to which Iraq's security is perceived to have been
enhanced by its chemical weapons acquisition
3. There are several explanations for the rapid
increase in the number of developing nations that have
acquired chemical weapons capabilities:
� The technology is readily available.
� Chemical weapons are relatively inexpensive.
� There is a perception of increasing CW threat
from adversaries.
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� Chemical weapons increasingly are seen as a
militarily useful adjunct to conventional weap-
onry.
� The political costs of chemical weapons posses-
sion or use are judged to be acceptable.
4. The accelerating growth in the Third World of
petrochemical, fertilizer, pesticide, and pharmaceuti-
cal industries has created an essential precondition for
spread of CW capabilities, that is, the knowledge and
technical expertise to produce chemical agents. Be-
cause the high cost of modern conventional or nuclear
weapons places a significant burden on their econo-
mies, low-cost, low-technology chemical weapons may
prove to be an attractive, viable alternative. The
growing, but largely unregulated, international market
in CW materiel places the requisite items within both
the reach and the financial means of the military
forces of developing nations
5. Proliferation begets proliferation. Acquisition of
chemical weapons by a nation causes its neighbors to
reassess their military requirements. In regions of
imbalance of strategic forces, possession of a CW
capability may enhance a nation's force posture and
offer a degree of national self-sufficiency and self-
assurance not otherwise available. Compared to devel-
opment of nuclear weapons, whose production re-
quires development of a highly specialized technical
base and acquisition of unique materials, chemical
weapons can be produced from readily accessible
materials using less sophisticated technology. There-
fore, proliferation is more likely to occur in response to
recognition of a new regional CW threat than is the
case with nuclear weapons. The subdued international
response to the use of CW in Southeast Asia, Afghani-
stan, and the Iran/Iraq war is likely to cause other
nations to judge that use of CW will not incur
unacceptable international censure or sanctions.
Role of External Support
6. Technology transfer has played an important
role in the spread of chemical weapons capabilities.
Most frequently, technology is transferred through
direct sales of precursor chemicals, processing equip-
ment, and shell casings and through contractual agree-
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ments for technical expertise. In some cases the sup-
plying firm is witting of the end use of its material or
assistance
use of intermediaries hides
user.
In other cases, effective
the ultimate purpose or
7. An example of state-provided assistance in acqui-
sition of CW capabilities is provision of CW training
and protective and decontamination material. Such
assistance is regularly provided by the armed forces of
the United States, Soviet Union, and others to their
allies. More insidious, however, is direct military
assistance in chemical weapons production,
8. The full spectrum of technology transfer mecha-
nisms has abetted CW proliferation. In past years, the
Soviets directly transferred chemical weapons to
Egypt, Vietnam, and Laos but maintained varying
degrees of control. Likewise, Egypt transferred weap-
ons to Syria. Today, however, most nations are seeking
to acquire indigenous production capabilities with the
result of diminished foreign control. Not only are
chemical weapons and the raw materials transferred,
but also the essential technologies through sales of
turnkey factories, manufacturing and processing tech-
nology and equipment, material development and
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Political and Economic Impact:
Problems and Prospects
9. Proliferation of CW programs has created a
growing international market in sales of CW-related
equipment as well as technical expertise. We estimate,
for example, that Iraq has spent about $200 million on
its CW program over the past decade and makes use
of numerous suppliers, both to avoid dependence on a
single supplier and to circumvent controls on particu-
lar items of equipment and materials. Although a
number of West European firms
have
been major suppliers.
are also becoming competitive in the marketplace.
Should access to these suppliers be restricted, we
anticipate that other rapidly industrializing and East
European nations will eagerly fill the void.
10. We expect that sales of protective masks and
garments, detection and decontamination equipment,
antidotes, and other CW-related materiel will increase
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significantly. Most nations, especially the developing
countries, will be reluctant to prohibit their industries
from competing in this lucrative market. Further-
more, most nations have legal strictures against imped-
ing fair trade. The momentum for foreign sales is
caused by the pressure to exploit export markets
brought about by limited domestic economic growth
in Europe. In many cases, but certainly not all, the
acquiring military organization deals directly with
private industry without the knowledge of the sup-
plier's government
11. Because many of the precursor chemicals and
most of the processing equipment required for chemi-
cal agent production have numerous legitimate indus-
trial applications, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
implement blanket export constraints on them. To the
extent that they do exist, trade controls on CW-related
chemicals have not been effective in preventing Third
World nations from developing CW capabilities. A
nation can circumvent efforts to constrain its CW
program development through a number of mecha-
nisms:
� Disguising the end user in material acquisitions.
� Using different chemical agent production
methodologies.
� Developing indigenous production capabilities
for precursor chemicals and equipment.
� Seeking alternative suppliers
12. Thus far, the prospects for sufficient interna-
tional cooperation to develop and enforce more effec-
tive controls seem poor. Once chemical agent produc-
tion has begun, the international ability to cause a
slowing or cessation of a burgeoning CW program
through imposition of restrictions on trade may exist
for only a short period of time. For example, embar-
goes on chemical exports have made it more difficult
for Iran and Iraq to obtain the chemicals needed to
synthesize warfare agents but have not completely cut
off supplies.
13. Iraq provides an excellent example of the diffi-
culties of attempting to halt a CW program. Initially,
we had limited information on the Iraqi sources of
precursor chemicals. Following Iraq's use of nerve
agent and mustard in the spring of 1984, the United
States and a number of European countries placed
embargoes on sales of specific chemicals. However,
Iraq was able to find other sources of supply and
began to disguise the end user in its purchase orders.
When the embargo began to affect its chemical agent
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Problems for Export Control:
Chemical Precursors Often Dual Use
There are very few CW agent precursor chemicals
that have no legitimate industrial use. One such chemi-
cal is methylphosphonyl difluoride (referred to as di-
fluor or DF), which produces the G-type nerve agents,
such as sarin, when mixed with an alcohol. This chemi-
cal is under foreign policy export control by the United
States, United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Euro-
pean Economic Community. However, there are no
known producers of this chemical in the United States
or Western Europe
The majority of CW agent precursor chemicals also
have important industrial applications. An example of
such a dual-use chemical is phosphorus oxychloride,
which can be used to produce the nerve agent tabun.
Legitimately, phosphorus oxychloride is used in the
manufacture of pesticides, plastic and elastomer addi-
tives, hydraulic fluids, and surfactants.
Currently, there are five known plants in the United
States and six known plants in Western Europe that
produce phosphorus oxychloride. They export thou-
sands of tons of this chemical each year. This chemical
also is under foreign policy export control by the United
States, United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Euro-
pean Economic Community.
But phosphorus oxychloride is easily manufactured
by oxidizing phosphorus trichloride. Therefore, the
export controls on phosphorus oxychloride can be cir-
cumvented by purchasing phosphorus trichloride,
which is not under any export controls. Phosphorus
trichloride is produced in much larger quantities than
phosphorus oxychloride and is used for commercially
important products such as pesticides, flame retardants,
and solvents, as well as phosphorus oxychloride. There
are at least five known US plants and seven known West
European firms that produce phosphorus trichloride.
In addition to chemical agent precursors, there are
some ubiquitous chemicals that can be used as CW
agents directly but which also have legitimate industrial
uses. One such chemical is phosgene, a choking agent
first used in World War I. Commercially, phosgene is
used in the production of polyurethanes, polycarbon-
ates, and in the synthesis of chloroformates and carbon-
ates, which are used as intermediates in the synthesis of
pharmaceuticals and pesticides. The majority of phos-
gene produced is used to manufacture plastics, an
important global industry. Phosgene is under no foreign
policy export controls because it has so many important
industrial uses. Other such chemicals include hydrogen
cyanide, cyanogen chloride, diphosgene, arsine, and
adamsite. Even sulfur mustard has some legitimate
industrial uses.
production capability, Iraq turned to different manu-
facturing processes and began to seek the capability to
produce domestically all the necessary production
equipment and chemicals.
14. Additional difficulties were encountered in
dealing with suppliers.
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Lack of export-
monitoring apparatuses and uneven application of
export controls have enabled Iraq to continue to
acquire all the requisite materials for chemical weap-
ons production. The United States is encountering
similar problems with other suppliers of nations that
are developing chemical weapons capabilities
15. The United States is the only nation that public-
ly discusses its CW program. Most other nations
consider CW issues to be such sensitive subjects that
they refuse to engage in open discussion concerning
them. Many friendly European and Third World
nations resist publicly accusing others of using CW,
particularly the Soviet Union and its allies, because
they both fear reprisals and question the efficacy of
such accusations. Most US allies would rather maintain
silence or work quietly through diplomatic channels.
16. West European governments, which would
seem to be natural allies on efforts to stop CW use and
proliferation, have their own reasons for preferring to
keep CW out of the public spotlight:
17. Other friendly nations deny possessing a CW
program. For example, when the United States ap-
pealed to a Middle Eastern government to stop supply-
ing CW materiel and expertise to Iraq, implying the
possibility of Congressional delay or disapproval of US
foreign aid, the Defense Minister flatly denied that his
government had a CW program and the subject was
closed to further discussion
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18. We expect to see a decline in the ability of
industrial states to use their political and economic
influence to halt chemical weapons proliferation. As
Third World chemical weapons programs and CW-
materiel industries mature, CW training, logistic, and
production assistance increasingly will be sought from
countries such as Iraq, Egypt, and Israel, which have
developed strong domestic programs.
Cambodian populations as a terror and area denial
weapon, with the objective of driving resistance forces
from their homelands. There also has been an opportu-
nity to field test agents and delivery systems, and
possibly to perform some medical assessments of the
effects of chemical agents. Vietnam is also reported to
have used CW in border conflicts with the People's
Republic of China.
Fur-
thermore, because chemical weapons are but one part
of defense modernization packages, Western interfer-
ence with acquisition of CW capabilities is likely to be
viewed by developing countries as an effort to restrict
their increasing military prowess. Nations seeking to
become CW capable are likely to charge discrimina-
tion, as they do regarding the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Act.
19. Although not directly aiding chemical weapons
proliferation, acquisition of a protective capability is
an essential element of CW program development.
Therefore, we believe that nations seeking to halt
chemical weapons proliferation may be forced to
reevaluate their policies regarding sales to developing
nations of CW protective, detection, and decontami-
nation equipment. Efforts to stem proliferation of CW
capabilities and yet meet the legitimate defense needs
of one's allies will pose a wrenching conflict for
governments.
Security Aspects of Proliferation
Role of CW in Recent Conflicts
20. Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Chemical
and toxin warfare agents have been used in the late
1970s and early 1980s by Soviet forces in Afghanistan
and Soviet-supported regimes in Laos and Cambodia.'
We believe that the factors precipitating use of these
weapons include a lack of a protective or retaliatory
capability by the resistance, tactical utility for guerril-
la warfare, a low risk of exposure, and opportunity for
plausible denial. We do not know what utility the
Soviets and their surrogates may have ascribed to
chemical warfare as used in these regions.
21. In Southeast Asia, Vietnam, with Soviet assis-
tance, has used CW against unprotected Lao and
Detailed assessments of this topic are found in SNIE 11/50/37-
82JX, 2 February 1982, and SNIE 11/50/37-82JX, 26 February
1982, both entitled Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and
in a Memorandum to Holders of the same title, SNIE 11/50/37-83
(Secret), 2 March 1983.
22. In Afghanistan, the Soviets have used CW
against mujahedin resistance forces. The use of chemi-
cal weapons has contributed to depopulation of some
contested areas, thereby reducing the bases of support
for resistance forces. We judge that the Soviets have
also taken advantage of the war in Afghanistan to test
both chemical agents and delivery systems. Unlike the
situation in Southeast Asia, we believe that the Soviets
maintain control over the movement storage, and use
of chemical weapons in Afghanistan
23. To date, the Soviets have been moderately
successful at orchestrating a propaganda campaign
that discounts their use of CW. This, combined with
the difficulty of obtaining persuasive evidence from
remote and denied areas, has led many to doubt
whether any chemical agents have been used and if
so, whether the agents were lethal.
There is no evidence since early 1983
of use of CW in Afghanistan.
24. Reasons postulated for the decline in reports of
CW use in these regions include:
� Objectives were achieved.
� Sufficient success with conventional weapons ob-
viated need for further CW use.
� Operational difficulties were encountered.
� Completion of a testing program.
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� Public pressure.
� Inadequate intelligence collection or lack of con-
firming evidence.
Although we cannot judge which of these reasons most
accurately reflects reality, we believe a combination of
the first five factors has led to a real decline in CW use
in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.
25. Iran-Iraq. The combat use of mustard and
tabun has enabled Iraqi troops to drive back the
Iranians more rapidly and with fewer Iraqi casualties
than might otherwise have been the case. Despite
Iranian charges that Iraq has been using chemical
weapons throughout the war, we assess that Iraq has
used lethal chemical weapons in only four battles since
August 1983. Earlier press reports that Iraq was using
lethal chemical weapons appear to have been based on
sporadic use of the riot-control agent CS (tear gas),
white phosphorus artillery rounds, and smoke rounds.
Iran has not yet used lethal chemical weapons during
the war, but has used CS in isolated instances.
26. We assess that the Iraqis are not insensitive to
the adverse publicity to their use of CW.
the Iraqis feel that it is only part of a
larger propaganda effort against Iraq, and therefore
they have decided to deny the use of chemical agents.
If in the future they are forced to acknowledge the use
of CW, they will most likely claim it was only used in
self defense and only against enemy forces on Iraqi
territory. The decision to use CW was made recogniz-
ing and in spite of possible repercussions
27. the Iraqis be-
lieve their use of CW against the Iranians has been
successful. They believe that, while the tactical bene-
fits have been good, there is room for improvement
that could be obtained by use of larger quantities of
agent and use of other (more toxic) agents. They also
believe CW has had a negative impact on Iranian
morale. On the other hand, two side effects were
noted among Iraqi soldiers: chemical weapons use
gave some soldiers increased confidence, while in
others it created a fear of retaliation-in-kind by Iran.
28. We judge that Iran has a limited supply of
chemical weapons and is likely to use them in retalia-
tion to Iraqi use. Iranian spokesmen have repeatedly
threatened in public forums to retaliate in kind for
Iraqi use of chemical weapons.
Iran planned to initiate a new offensive early
in 1985 with a chemical airstrike against Iraqi troops
near areas north of Al Basrah; however, the offensive
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Chronology of Iraqi CW Use
We assess that Iraq had only small Quantities of
mustard and nerve agents available for research and
testing when the war with Iran began. The fighting,
however, spurred Iraq to speed up production, and by
1982 Iraq began producing significant quantities of
mustard agent. Approximately 1,000 artillery shells
filled with mustard agent had been accumulated when
the Ir nians mounted their first invasion of Iraq in July
1982. at least some of
these shells were moved to a depot near the fighting,
but they were not needed. Instead, mortar shells filled
with nonlethal CS gas were used successfully to break
up Iranian infantry assaults. This was the first large-
scale use by Iraq of riot-control agents in the war.
In August 1983, Iraq used a limited quantity of
mustard agent against Iranian troops near Haj Umran in
northern Iraq. The Iraqi attacks were very limited,
however, and only a few Iranians were seriously in-
jured.
On 19 November 1983, Iraq used mustard agent for a
second time during a major battle near Panjwin in
northern Iraq. This time the Iraqis conducted a much
larger attack with chemical weapons, firing several
hundred shells filled with mustard agent at Iranian
forces threatening to overrun Iraqi frontline positions.
Several hundred Iranian troops reportedly were killed
or severely wounded by the mustard agent.
On 28 February, Iraq
made heavy use ot mustard agent to support a counter-
attack against an estimated 15,000 Iranians. According
to press reports, the Iranians claim some 2,500 of their
troops were killed or severely wounded by mustard
agent in this battle. On 17 March, Iraq became the first
country to use nerve agents against conventional mili-
tary forces.
In early 1985, during a second major battle in the
marshes north of Al Basrah, Iraq again used mustard
and nerve agents against attacking frontline Iranian
forces and rear area troop concentrations. Press reports
indicate that at least several hundred Iranian soldiers
were killed or wounded by chemical agents.
was never launched,, and chemicals were thus not
used. Moreover, the Iraqis have not used chemical
weapons on a large scale since early 1985, depriving
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the Iranians of an opportunity to retaliate in kind.
Reported dissension between the Iranian military and
religious leaders over CW employment may also
explain the decision to abstain.
29. Iran's mounting frustration with the muted
international response to Iraq's use of CW may prove
sufficient for a decision to retaliate in kind. Because of
the political costs, such a decision would not be made
lightly, and CW would most likely be employed
against limited selective targets. However, the recent
use of conventional missiles against major population
centers by both Iran and Iraq raises the concern of
CW against civilian targets. Although we judge such
use unlikely, the barriers of restraint are eroding. The
Iranian stockpile and delivery capabilities are not
believed to be sufficient for extensive tactical use
Impact on Balance of Power
30. Middle East. Shifting political alliances in the
Middle East and the attendant changes in perception
of external threats have stimulated nations to under-
take major defense modernization programs. Their
military forces have acquired some of the most mod-
ern conventional, weapons available. We have seen
development of chemical weapons programs as a small
part of the weapons acquisition programs in Israel,
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and possibly Libya.
32. The Iran-Iraq war has seen new tactics in
Middle Eastern warfare with the use of chemical
weapons and human wave assaults. However, even
given the possession of CW capabilities by most of the
Middle Eastern major Dowers
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
34. We cannot
tries such as Iran
have shown little
discount the possibility that coun-
and Libya, whose current leaders
inhibition in defying international
norms to achieve political objectives, would use CW in
a surprise attack on foreign forces or, more likely,
against US interests.
35. Asia. For the most part, the military forces in
Asia possess technologically less advanced weapons,
and the imbalance of both conventional and chemical
force postures is greater than in the Middle East.
Sporadic guerrilla actions prevail, rather than the
opposed forces warfare seen in the Middle East. The
imbalance of power among regional actors could allow
CW to play an increasingly significant role in achiev-
ing military or political objectives.
36. The success and publicity of the Ir7i chemical
weapons program will probably stimulate
we do not expect that chemical weapons
will be used indiscriminately because of expectations
of retaliation-in-kind. However, recent experience in-
dicates that, when faced with situations of overwhelm-
ing manpower superiority, or a threat of major inva-
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
countries, to acquire chemical weapons. It is apparent (b)(3)
that these countries, and others in the region, are
actively seeking to strengthen their military postures in
response to perceived regional threats. We expect
them to seek indigenous CW capabilities as part of
their defense modernization efforts. The proliferation
of CW capabilities is likely to have a further destabi-
lizing effect on Asian regional power balances until an
equilibrium is achieved.
37. We believe that, if Vietnam builds a militarily
significant domestic chemical warfighting capability
in coming years, other Asian nations are likely to feel
compelled to develop comparable means to contend
with the threat. Already we see expressions of interest
in acquiring protective capabilities by Malaysia, Indo-
nesia
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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sion, chemical weapons
may be used to turn the tide of
the battle.
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40. Africa. Indigenous CW capabilities on the Afri-
can continent are known to exist only in Egypt and
Possibly in Libya and South Africa.
41. In much of Africa, if the capabilities existed,
the remoteness of many regions and inaccessibility to
Western observers could make the potential for use of
CW somewhat greater, as the likelihood for interna-
tional detection or confirmation would be reduced.
Furthermore, the low level of military sophistication
and lack of CW protective capabilities make the
potential for CW use both inviting and of significant
tactical advantage
42. Financial constraints are likely to be the most
important inhibitor to CW proliferation in this region.
This factor creates opportunities for other nations with
newly acquired CW capabilities or a growing CW-
materials industry to gain some political leverage by
assisting less developed countries in CW program
development. We expect, however, that conventional
weapons acquisition will continue to take priority in
defense modernization programs in most African na-
tions until conventionally armed forces are well estab-
lished.
43. Central and South America and the Carib-
bean. We do not believe that Cuba has an indigenous
offensive CW capability, but it possibly possesses
chemical weapons sufficient for training purposes
transferred from the Soviet Union. However, Cuban
forces are trained to operate in a CW environment
and could probably conduct offensive chemical war-
fare in a number of regions where Cuban expedition-
ary forces are stationed. We do not yet see indications
of chemical weapons proliferation to other Caribbean
nations, probably because those countries have insuffi-
cient military force structures to support a CW pro-
gram. (b)(3)
44. Although we have little evidence to confirm
much interest in acquisition of CW capabilities in
Central and South America, no region should be
(b)(1)
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presumed immune from chemical weapons prolif era-
tion.
45. Nicaragua, with Cuban and Soviet assistance,
has acquired CW protective and decontamination
equipment. We do not know whether Nicaragua
sought this materiel or whether it appeared as a part of
the standard military assistance package. Increased
global attention to CW suggests that most military
forces will, at a minimum, undertake assessments of
the regional CW threat and of their vulnerabilities
and, where appropriate, take actions to rectify any
imbalance. Once the seeds of a CW program have
been planted, we expect slow but steady program
growth.
Implications for US Forces
46. Although most of the concern about -the CW
threat to US forces has been focused on possible Soviet
use in Europe, there are other areas where US forces
are also vulnerable. For example, the Presidential
Chemical Warfare Review Commission noted in June
1985: The possibility exists that North Korea, a
country not noted for restraint, would use chemical
weapons to attack US and Republic of Korea forces
that are in South Korea. . . . The threat of attack in
the Far East has not received adequate attention,
even though Asia is where chemical weapons most
recently have been employed.
47. Likewise, the ready availability of chemical
weapons in the Middle East significantly increases the
potential for US and Allied forces deployed to that
region in either military actions or peacekeeping roles
to be subjected to CW attack. On the basis of our
knowledge of the CW capabilities of Middle Eastern
countries, we would expect traditional agents�for
(b)(3) example, mustard, tabun, or sarin�to be used.
48. There exists a good chance that agents, as yet
unknown to us, could be used against US forces by
nations that have been provided with chemical weap-
ons by the Soviet Union or Soviet surrogates. This
judgment is based on our assessment that unidentified
SC 0288/-85
agents have been used by Soviet and Soviet-surrogate
forces in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.
Clearly, planning for CW contin-
gencies must be incorporated in operational plans for
most theaters of potential deployment
49. Although our knowledge is limited, we believe
the CW R&D programs of most nations in the nascent
stages of chemical weapons acquisition concentrate on
traditional chemical agent production methodologies.
There are areas of CW research, however, with the
potential to yield technological breakthroughs that
could alter the nature of the CW threat. These
include: new methods of agent production (including
biotechnology applications); development of new
agents such as mask-breakers or rapid-acting, long-
lasting incapacitants; encapsulation of persistent
agents; and develo ment of eff ctive n n
prophylactics.
Potential for Terrorist Use of CW
50. The spread of chemical weapons capabilities
into Third World states increases the likelihood that
terrorists will acquire these weapons and/or the capa-
bility to produce and weaponize them in the near
future. The publicity given recent incidents of CW
and industrial chemical accidents may also heighten
awareness of the potential for using CW as a method
of drawing attention to a terrorist group's cause.
51. We believe that successful CW use by any
terrorist group would lower the threshold of restraint
on its subsequent application by other terrorists. How-
ever, as long as terrorist objectives are being met
through current techniques, there is little practical
reason to turn to CW. Motivational considerations,
rather than technological constraints, probably ac-
count for the low incidence of terrorist use of CW so
far. The fact remains that, without good intelligence,
governments are unable to predict or counter terrorist
activities, much less prevent the use of CW by them.
The advantage will always belong to the terrorist who
can choose the method, time, and place of attack from
an almost infinite range of opportunities
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52. Our analysis suggests that it is within the capa-
bility of many terrorist groups to fabricate chemical
weapons on a limited scale and use them against
selected targets, causing multiple casualties�dozens to
several hundreds. Production of small quantities of
agents is not much more difficult than clandestine
production of narcotics and well within the means of a
terrorist organization or disaffected
sophisticated
group
53. Many of the chemicals traditionally considered
as warfare agents�phosgene, chlorine, hydrogen cya-
nide, and cyanogen chloride�can be purchased virtu-
ally anywhere in an industrialized, open society. The
details on techniques, safety procedures, and equip-
ment for producing the more toxic nerve agents are in
the open literature. The chemical precursors are also
available or can be produced in small quantities with
relative ease. The risk associated with production of
small quantities (about 2 kg) of nerve agent in a facility
such as an apartment or single family dwelling is
relatively low. With substantially larger quantities, the
(b)(3) risk level increases.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
54. As an alternative to fabricating CW agents or
obtaining them from patron states, terrorist groups
might try to steal them from the civil sector�for
example, from university research laboratories, civil-
ian industrial facilities, or government laboratories�
or to steal them during shipment to these facilities.
Less likely would be an attempted terrorist attack on a
military storage facility.
55. Also, the wide availability of toxic industrial
chemicals, including those also considered traditional
CW agents, makes the potential for hijacking, sabo-
tage, and theft of these substances as they are trans-
ported by tank car and railcar very real. Entire towns
could be held hostage by terrorists with a threat to
vent tank cars of toxic chemicals.
56. The technical obstacles to terrorist use of chemi-
cal weapons for inflicting mass casualties�many hun-
dreds�are generally much more formidable than for
multiple casualties. The obstacles include a higher
relative cost and investment of time, greater complex-
ity of disseminating equipment (for most, though not
all, mass casualty scenarios), increased physical risk to
the terrorists in manufacturing and transporting large
quantities of agent, and greater likelihood of detection
at some phase of the process.
57. Possible objectives for terrorist use of CW in-
clude making a novel, dramatic statement to draw
public attention to their cause, to instill fear, to inflict
casualties, to force withdrawal of unprepared military
SC 02881-85
(b)(3)
forces from foreign deployments, or to cause economic
disruption in a fragile economy with hopes of destabi-
lizing a government. Only small quantities of agent
would be required for such uses.
58. The Middle East is a particularly ripe target for
terrorist use of chemical weapons. Most of the major
powers in this region now possess some CW capability.
The possibility exists that the Governments of Iran or
Libya, which have supported terrorist activities in the
past, might willfully supply chemical agents to terror-
ists. The drilling rigs and refineries of Persian Gulf
oilfields are potential high-value CW targets. Access
could easily be denied by attack with a persistent
agent, although substantial quantities of agent would
be required.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
59. Chemical and toxin agents have been used in
the past as assassination weapons and may become
increasingly popular as terror weapons against limited
targeted populations. The subdued public response to
use of chemical weapons in recent conflicts may well
lower inhibitions to their use by terrorists as well.
Previous assessments have considered that fear of
causing an adverse public response rather than garner-
ing sympathy or support to their cause may have
served as an inhibitor to terrorist use of CW. This
consideration may no longer be valid.
(b)(3)
Implications for Arms Control
60. Perhaps the greatest threat to an effective
chemical weapons treaty posed by proliferation is the
possibility that states will elect not to become parties.
As more nations acquire CW capabilities, the likeli-
hood of ratification of or accession to a treaty may be
questionable in regions of perpetual conflict (for exam-
ple, Southeast Asia and the Middle East). States with
recently acquired CW capabilities may be unwilling to
forgo the perceived military advantage that these
weapons confer if they doubt accession or compliance
by hostile neighbors
61. Although the 1925 Geneva Protocol bans use of
chemical weapons in war, there are no global legal
constraints on the production or possession of chemical
weapons. The efficacy of the Protocol is further
eroded by the fact that many parties ratified with
several reservations, so that it is often said to have been
reduced to a ban on first use, in war, against other
parties only. While efforts are under way at the
Geneva Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a
comprehensive ban on the development, production,
stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of these weap-
ons, proliferation of chemical warfare capabilities
(b)(3)
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exacerbates negotiating problems and imperils the
(b)(3) prospects for consummation of any global treaty
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
62. The US draft treaty under discussion in Geneva
would require each party to declare whether it has
under its control anywhere any chemical weapons,
chemical weapons production facilities, supertoxic
lethal chemicals, or key precursors or production
facilities thereof. Likewise, detailed declarations of
past transfers of chemical agents would h narmirpri
64. We believe that the relative lack of internation-
al recrimination or sanctions against those countries
using CW in recent conflicts will lower the threshold
SC 02881-85
15
for CW use in the future. Although most Third World
countries do not subscribe to the US position that
herbicides and riot-control agents do not fall under the
purview of chemical weapons constraints, we may see
countries with newly acquired CW capabilities use
such chemicals with impunity, adopting the US posi-
tion of exclusion when convenient for them. These
agents possess toxic properties that may be lethal in
certain conditions. Escalation from use of herbicides
and riot-control agents to more lethal agents is likely�
as seen in Iraq�thus exacerbating the present prob-
lems of ascertaining whether prohibited chemical
agents are being used.
(b)(3)
65. We also question the existence of the presumed
international moral constraints against use of chemical
weapons. Western abhorrence of these weapons stems
from their use in World War I and subsequent
publicity intended to create popular opinion against
CW. To a large extent, the countries addressed in this
Estimate lack such previous exposure. National atti-
tudes toward chemical warfare may be swayed either
positively or negatively by chemical accidents (such as
in Bhopal), which have demonstrated the devastating
potential of chemicals
(b)(3)
66. The perceived utility of chemical weapons as
demonstrated in recent conflicts may cause another
historical barrier to crumble. Military planners have
traditionally exhibited resistance to use of CW because
of the uncertainties of its effectiveness based on such
variables as weather, delivery concentration, and pro-
tective capabilities of opposing forces. Because the
standards of successful employment may be different
than US expectations, military effectiveness may in
fact be judged higher by Third World nations than by
ourselves. If CW acquires the reputation of having
particular effectiveness in certain tactical scenarios,
resistance to its use is certain to be lowered.
Tz>rs,
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DISSEMINATION NOTICE
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4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
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