US EFFORTS GRINDING DOWN AL-QA'IDA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05428602
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Case Number: F-2009-01030
• Publication Date: February 21, 2004

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21 February 2004
US Efforts Grinding Down
al-Qa'ida
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Because of US and allied efforts, the al-Qa`ida
organization we faced two years ago does not exist
today. Successive blows to its central leadership
have severely restricted its capabilities and
cohesiveness, transforming it into a loose collection
of regional networks that operate more autonomously
and have been forced to rely largely on their own
resources. This forced decentralization has
decreased the threat al-Qa`ida poses to the United
States at home and abroad, but only to a point.
� Al-Qa`ida's regional components and affiliated
groups have nonetheless demonstrated their
operational prowess with successful attacks over the
past year, and those capabilities will increase if
al-Qa`ida leaders in Pakistan succeed in their efforts
to reconnect the chain of command.
� In addition, the steady growth of Bin Ladin's anti-
US sentiment throughout the wider Sunni extremist
jihad movement�especially in response to US
intervention in Iraq and the broad dissemination
of al-Qa`ida's destructive expertise ensure that a
serious threat will remain for the foreseeable future,
with or without al-Qa`ida.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
2/ February 2004
Central Leadership Breaking Down...
The war in Afghanistan, detention of the
Management Council in Iran, and capture of Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) and his subordinates
have gutted nearly three-quarters of the upper
echelons of al-Qa`ida's central leadership. This
virtual decapitation of the group limits its ability to
provide overarching operational inspiration and
direction, manage its international infrastructure,
route money from fundraisers to operatives and their
families, articulate its message to sympathizers
abroad, and provide long-term organizational
continuity in the event of the death or capture of
Usama Bin Ladin
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� The capture of KSM and other major operational
planners disrupted or set back several large-scale
terrorist plots, including plans for 11 September-
style attacks on the US West Coast and against
Heathrow Airport as well as an effort to conduct an
operation similar to Richard Reid's failed shoe-
bomb plot, which could have killed hundreds of US
citizens.
At the same time, al-Qa` da's finances are being
steadily soueezed esneciallv in Saudi Arabia
This undercut the
group's legitimacy and led many of its traditional
This report was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief
OTA, on
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donors to shift their support to other causes, sapping
the morale of fighters and their families.
...But Struggling to Regain It's Footing
Bin Ladin and the remnants of al-Qa`ida's central
leadership have responded by withdrawing deeper
into remote areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border, where they are attempting to replicate the
coordinating functions previously performed by the
Management Council and KSM. Detained al-Qa`ida
facilitator Hasan Ghul
place al-Qa`ida finance chief Shaykh Sa`id and top
paramilitary commander `Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi in
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The concentration of most of the remaining central
leadership in and around Waziristan has not stopped
the inefficiency in communications and bickering
among Bin Ladin's lieutenants, however, that has
plagued the group for much of the past two years.
Hasan Ghul has described bitter strategic disputes and
personality clashes between `Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi and
several other senior al-Qa`ida leaders and associates
in the area suggesting that Bin Ladin and Zawahiri (b)(1)
remain unwilling or unable to step in and exercise
their authority decisively, even in their immediate
vicinity.
Waziristan
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� From its base along the border, the central
leadership is opening new lines of contact to
operatives and allies abroad. Ghul was captured
in Iraq.
Bin Ladin would initiate contact by
sending a courier to his subordinates
As we increase our attacks against the remaining
leadership, we must be prepared for al-Qa`ida to try
to violently undermine our efforts.
� Ghul also reports that Hamza Rabi` a�a former
Egyptian Islamic Jihad operative whom he sees as
al-Qa`ida's new chief of terrorist operations�is
based in the area and overseeing attack planning
Other operatives in
this area have been linked to KSM's plot against
Heathrow AirpotH
Regional Networks Seize the Initiative
Despite substantial progress against the upper
echelon, the remaining fighters in al-Qa`ida's
regional networks�estimated to number in the
low thousands�and affiliated groups remain a
significant threat. These terrorist nodes have their
own targeting priorities and can independently muster
the resources necessary to mount successful attacks.
Most of the attacks over the past year have used
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several-hundred-pound vehicle bombs, highlighting
the networks' ability to obtain and fashion highly
destructive explosive devices.
� Operatives associated
al-Qa`ida
conducted the
bombings in November 2003 in Istanbul, Turkey,
�
he Casablanca
bombings in May points to a loose network of local
extremists assisted by groups affiliated with
al-Qa`ida, such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group and Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group.
These networks have demonstrated their ability to
remain viable and potent without the central
leadership's assistance, but they will be even more
capable if reliable lines of contact are reopened.
Hasan Ghul
reports that al-Zarqawi has requested that
al-Qa`ida send skilled operatives from Afghanistan to
assist him in Iraq.
The devolution of targeting decisions to regional
networks has contributed to a broadening of
al-Qa`ida's priorities for attack. This shift in strategy
has led to strategic blunders over the past year, such
as the Riyadh bombings in May and November,
which endangered al-Qa`ida's traditional fundraising
and recruiting base.
More recently, al-Qa`ida associate Abu Mus'ab
al-Zarqawi has argued for making Iraqi Shia his and
al-Qa`ida's principal target in Iraq. According to
Hasan Ghul, `Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi
oppose this strategy,
but reporting from him
to kidnap Iranian officials to bargain for the release
of the Management Council.
Iraq: The Emerging Rallying Point
Al-Qa`ida and other jihadist groups see the US-led
action in Iraq as proof of the United States' intention
to occupy Muslim lands and de-Islamicize them. The
presence of US military forces in Iraq has united
jihadists and terrorist groups in their desire to expel
the United States through any means necessary.
� Many jihadists participating in anti-Coalition
operations in Iraq hope to inspire an Islamic
extremist movement among Iraqi Sunnis that would
bring about a fundamentalist Sunni government.
� Others are more focused on attacking the United
States and undermining US goals of creating a
secular Iraqi democracy by targeting the developing
Iraqi government and its citizens.
While our understanding of and pressure against this
jihadist network is growing, should al-Qa`ida succeed
in developing effective relationships with new Iraqi
Sunni extremist groups or in creating its own network
in Iraq, it may be able to remain there for the long
term. Safehaven networks in Iraq�although far
more limited than bases and camps once held in
Afghanistan�could provide jihadists with enough of
an infrastructure to threaten the transitional Iraqi
authority, serve as a base to recruit and train
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operatives for international operations, and to
perpetuate their image of success globally. fl
The Threat: Less Coordination More Anti-US
Foot Soldiers
If we capture or kill Bin Ladin and the other remnants
of al-Qa`ida's central leadership, the organization and
its wider jihadist allies' ability to plan complex
operations on the scale of 11 September will be
further diminished.
� A jihad movement facing communications
breakdowns, an unforgiving security environment,
and lacking a unified al-Qa`ida at its center is less
likely to achieve the kind of synergy that produced
11 September. The 11 September attack was
conceived collaboratively by several senior
al-Qa`ida leaders co-located in Afghanistan, cost
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and involved
handpicked operatives recruited from both Western
Europe and the Arabian Peninsula.
lhadists look forward to another major strike on US
soil and eagerly exchange rumors and speculation on
the timing of the attack
The steady growth of anti-US sentiment
throughout the jihad movement, however, offsets
this advantage,. Unlike several years ago, when
al-Qa`ida was the movement's principal force
advocating anti-US attacks, anti-US sentiment now
dominates jihadist Internet discussions, and new
recruits to other Sunni extremist groups-
re being taught that attacking
the United States and its interests worldwide often
must take priority over local struggles. Even if Bin
Ladin soon dies and his organization crumbles, he
will have succeeded in realigning the larger jihad
movement's goals and priorities behind a unifying
anti-US vision.
Major Attacks in the US Will Remain a Focus
For the growing number of jihadists interested in
fighting the United States, a spectacular attack on the
US Homeland is the "brass ring" that many will strive
for�with or without encouragement by al-Qa`ida's
central leadership. Internet discussions indicate that
Operatives will attempt to achieve glory by staging
another innovative attack in the United States, and
they appear eager to inflict large-scale casualties by
using chemical or biological agents�such as anthrax
or the mubtakar CW devices�or conducting another
attack involving commercial aircraft. Creative
operatives are refining their
tactics to take advantage of US vulnerabilities to
produce spectacular results.
� Jihadists who lack the wide-ranging contacts or
technical skill necessary to pull together a complex,
resource-intensive plan might instead focus on
attacks that will attract worldwide media attention
out of proportion to the casualties they cause, such
as the assassination of a high-ranking official, an
attack involving a radiological dispersal device, or a
prolonged hostage situation.
� We have not extinguished al-Qa`ida's funding,
however, and the group remains capable of
financing terrorist operations. Improvised
explosive devices such as the ammonium nitrate
bomb that killed 17 persons in Riyadh in November
2003 cost little, and even the 11 September
operation cost less then $400,000.
Keys to Future Success
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To complete the job of eliminating al-Qa`ida and
diminishing the broader extremist threat will require
continued aggressive US and allied action. Al-Qa`ida
and its allies will take advantage of any lessening of
our efforts to attempt to resuscitate their organization
and capabilities.
� Capturing or killing Bin Ladin will greatly
accelerate the development of splits in al-Qa`ida.
Intelligence shows that he is the only figure whose
authority is universally accepted in the group
few trusted couriers and family
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members who likely know the location of Bin Ladin
� We must continue to detain other key al-Qa`ida
leaders and operatives.
The Coalition's
political, economic, and military efforts will
hopefully compel regional leaders and affiliated
tenor groups in South Asia and the Middle East to
see the personal risks of harboring and working
with bickering and ineffective al-Qa`ida leaders.
� Increasing stability and indigenous capacity in
Afghanistan and Iraq is adding new strength to the
alliance fighting al-Qa`ida and extremism.
Combined with allied efforts, we are dismantling
terror networks in these two countries.
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