AL-QA'IDA'S TIES TO OTHER KEY TERROR GROUPS: TERRORIST LINKS IN A CHAIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05428213
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Case Number: F-2009-01030
• Publication Date: August 28, 2003

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Al-Qa'ida's Ties to
Other Key Terror
Al-Qa�ida's Ties to Other Key Terror
Groups:
Terrorist Links in a Chain
Longstanding ties to numerous like-minded Sunni extremist groups
worldwide, cultivated long before al-Qa`ida was ousted from Afghanistan,
are serving increasingly as the weakened organization's lifeline, sustaining
its goals of inciting worldwide jihad and anti-US and anti-Western terrorist
operations. The personal, logistic, and operational ties between al-Qa`ida
and associated groups are blurring the lines that hitherto had set them
apart.
� Findings to date into the mid-May suicide bombings in Casablanca reveal
that they were part of a highly intricate plot
overseen by two established North African extremist groups the
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group and Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group�with the knowledge of at least some members of al-Qa`ida, and
carried out by a loose grouping of young Moroccan militants known as
the Salem Jihadiya.
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The Casablanca plot is part of a growing pattern in which Sunni extremist
groups in other regions show a similar willingness to put on al-Qa`ida's
mantle and plot against the US and its allies in the war on terrorism.
� Al-Qa`ida�linked plots targeting US interests are on the rise in East
Africa and the Horn from affiliates such as the Somali-based al-Ittihad
al-Islami; in Southeast Asia the Jemaah Islamiya; the Iraq-based Ansar
al-Islam, whose members are returning to postwar Iraq; in Central Asia
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; and in Lebanon 'Asbat
al-Ansar, a predominantly Palestinian Sunni extremist group based in
refugee camps there.
� Meanwhile, al-Qa`ida associate Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi�who was
behind the murder in October 2002 of a US Embassy official in Jordan
is relying on a decentralized pool of semiautonomous North African and
Middle Eastern operatives to plan attacks against US and Israeli interests
in Europe and elsewhere.
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Shared ideological commitment coupled with a strong sense of obligation
for al-Qa`ida's past support also is prompting many affiliated groups to
rally to al-Qa`ida's side, enhancing the odds that operatives from some
groups will become involved in future al-Qa`ida plots while others will
carry out their own plots against the US and pro-Western governments
they seek to replace with strict Islamic states.
Even if al-Qa`ida disassembles, remnants could migrate to indigenous
Sunni extremist groups already primed to carry on the cause. Although the
groups vary in terrorist skills, assimilated al-Qa`ida members could expand
their capabilities and confidence, encourage networking, and increase
cooperation between groups that previously have not worked together.
� Just as al-Qa`ida's involvement in the late 1990s with competing Kurdish
Islamic factions in northern Iraq solidified them and led to the creation of
today's Ansar al-Islam, al-Qa`ida could spark similar alliances among
rival Islamic factions elsewhere, unifying them and further straining
weak governments trying to suppress violence from local Islamic
extremists.
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Al-Qatida's Ties to Other Key
Terror Groups: Terrorist Links
in a Chain
The suicide bombings in Casablanca on 16 May 2003
by members of the Salafia Jihadiya, a loose grouping
of young Moroccan Islamic militants who acted as
the martyr footsoldiers in the plot, are one of the
latest signs of the spread of al-Qa`ida's goals and
ideology among Sunni extremist supporters
worldwide, and indicate growing emphasis on
attacking US and pro-Western targets and
establishing strict Islamic regimes.
� Like Saudi Arabia, Morocco was one of several
countries Usama Bin Ladin in an audiotape in
February 2003 asserted was ripe for Islamic
revolution
hatched
Islamic Combatant Group
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The plot,
by the Moroccan
members of the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
is
indicative of a trend in which the operational
distinctions between al-Qa`ida and affiliated Sunni
extremist groups are increasingly blurred.
Building a Legacy Through Other Sunni
Extremist Groups
The North African Casablanca plotters are part of a
broad spectrum of like-minded Sunni extremists
worldwide who were courted by al-Qa`ida long
before the group was ousted from Afghanistan and
who are now rallying to its side against the United
States and its allies in the war on terrorism. Long-
established ties to such groups are sustaining the
weakened organization's program that promotes
worldwide jihad and anti-US and anti-Western
agendas. Trained at al-Qa`ida's terrorist camps in
Afghanistan, extremists belonging to a variety of
Sunni groups and loose networks, like that of
al-Qa`ida associate Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, are
building on Bin Ladin's "base" as he envisioned it
This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief
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and so named his organization, while adapting his
legacy to their own objectives!
For al-Qa`ida, the ties are paying off as radical Sunni
groups once focused predominantly on local terrorist
agendas take up a broader anti-US and anti-Western
terrorist program. Several threats posed by such links
are of priority concern.
� In Southeast Asia, the capture in August 2003 of
Jemaah Islamiya OH leader and senior al-Qa`ida
operative Riduan bin Isomuddin, better known as
Hambali, weakens al-Qa`ida's ability to advance
joint large-scale anti-US and anti-Western plots in
the region. The groups' increased operational
collaboration has posed a serious threat to US
interests there over the past year. Before Hambali's
arrest, Indonesian authorities had already cited him
as the key plotter behind the bombing in October
2002 of a Western tourist nightclub in Bali that
killed more than 200 persons, including several US
citizens. Investigations into the bombing of the
Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on 5 August continue;
Indonesian authorities have already linked the JI to
that attack and are arresting suspects
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� In the Horn and East Africa, the Somalia-based (b)(3)
al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) bolsters al-Qa`ida
operatives by providing safehaven and operational
support for plots against Western interests there
Ties
between al-Qalida and AIAI date back to the early
1990s
� Hambali's arrest represents a major blow for
al-Qa`ida's network in the region given his
operational stature but will not stamp out the
ou 's ideology among some JI orononents.
the JI was preparing several terrorist
options in Southeast Asia, suggesting other JI
figures holding anti-US views may continue
pursuing plots and retaliatory attacks.
1A1-Qalida in Arabic means "The Base" and is a term
that underscores Bin Ladin's longtime goal of building a
lasting foundation that, with or without him, will inspire,
continue spreading his extremist ideology, and provide
resources to future supporters.
More Sunni Affiliates Waiting in Wings.
There are growing numbers of Sunni extremist groups
in other regions showing a similar willingness to put
on al-Qa`ida's mantle and plot against US and pro-
Western targets.
� In Iraq, al-Qa`ida is looki
ous Ansar al-Islam (Al
o enmesh US
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and Coalition forces.
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With AT members now returning
to postwar Iraq, the group has reemerged as one of
the best funded and organized Sunni extremist
groups in Iraq and is intent on forcing the US out,
echoing al-Qa`ida's goal in its propaganda.
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� Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network of
semiautonomous terrorist operatives from North
Africa and the Middle East us
safehaven in northeastern Iraq
Al-Qa`ida's ties with the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Lebanon-based 'Asbat
al-Ansar are growing. Although skewed, the IMU's
rationale for considering US nationals "legitimate
targets" ma � arallel anti-US views of other Sunni
extremists.
� In Lebanon, al-Qa`ida's ties with `Asbat al-Ansar,
a Palestinian-Lebanese Sunni extremist group based
in refugee camps there, have grown, with some
al-Qa`ida members having relocated to Lebanon
from Afghanistan
but `Asbat al-Ansar has shown only a limited
operational ability. It probably was behind the
bombings of seven US franchise restaurants since
April 2002, with the most recent in April 2003,
possibly at al-Qa`ida's urgings. Further al-Qa`ida
pressure and support could give `Asbat al-Ansar the
incentive and skills to conduct more sophisticated
attacks in Lebanon or abroad
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al Palestinian Groups Still Leend�
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Al-Qa`ida's message has not resonated with major (b)(3)
radical Palestinian o s in the West Bank and Gaza
Stri
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Lebanese Hizballah Keeping al-Qa`ida at Arms
Length
al-Qa`ida
does not appear to have established strong ties to
Hizballah, despite some contact over many years
fueled by relationships with mutual associates, enmity
toward common enemies, and geographic proximity.
The EH, for example, which merged with al-Qalida
in 2001, had previous ties with Hizballah in the mid-
1990s when some EIJ members trained at Hizballah
camps in Lebanon. Several former NJ, now
al-Qa`ida, members have remained in Lebanon
through 2003.
Although HAMAS and al-Qa`ida use the term "jihad"
in their rhetoric, they differ on goals, strategy, and
attitude toward the US and Arab states. Both believe
the use of violence against non-Muslims perceived as
aggressors is justified and prescribed by Islamic law.
The groups differ, however, in defining the scope and
priorities of jihad. HAMAS has publicly shunned Bin
Ladin's call for a worldwide jihad and taken pains in
the aftermath of the 11 September attacks to distance
its perceived "legitimate resistance activities" against
Israel from al-Qa`ida's global holy war.
Closer cooperation between Hizballah and al-Qa`ida
has been hampered by differences in the two groups'
primary agendas, as well as al-Qa`ida's general
reluctance to work extensively with Shia Muslims.
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appears to be motivating some groups involved in
operations that were conceived after al-Qa`ida and its
associates fled Afghanistan.
Motives and Implications of Increased
Cooperation
Al-Qa`ida's vision is proving a strong magnet for
pulling other Sunni extremist groups closer to help
replace waning operational resources and become
willing partners in future attacks against the US and
pro-US governments. Longstanding ties, shared
ideological commitment, and a strong sense of
obligation for past al-Qa`ida support are prompting
many affiliated groups to step forward. Moreover,
the desire to retaliate against the United States and
undermine our allies in the war on terrorism also
Even if al-Qa`ida disassembles, its remnants are
likely to migrate to indigenous Sunni extremist
groups already primed to continue Bin Ladin's goals
and anti-US agenda. Assimilating al-Qa`ida members
into their ranks could strengthen the capabilities of
individual groups, further encourage networking, and
increase cooperation among groups not previously
known to do so, similar to the Casablanca plotters.
Dispersed al-Qa`ida members also could help unify
fractious groups elsewhere similar to competing
Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, further straining
weak governments struggling to suppress indigenous
extremists.
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I %Mina Jihadiya. lot previously considered a formal
USG listings as an FM or Terrorist Exclusion List.
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