THE INSURGENT SUPPLY NETWORK IN AFGHANISTAN: BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05405052
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• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2020
• Case Number: F-2020-00148
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985

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Directorate of
Intelligence
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The Insurgent Supply Network
in Afghanistan: Building an
Effective System
An Intelligence Assessment
Seer-et
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NESA-10156
August 1985
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Directorate of
Intelligence
'Secret
The Insurgent Supply Network
in Afghanistan: Building an
Effective System
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,
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NESA 85-10156
August 1985
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Key Judgments
Information available
as al 17 July 1985
was used in this report.
The Insurgent Supply Network
in Afghanistan:
Effective Syste
Increases in military supplies delivered via Pakistan and Iran to insurgent
groups fighting in Afghanistan have gradually improved the resistance's
ability to attack Soviet targets. Despite numerous problems, the guerrillas
are establishing a fairly effective system of resupplying their forces, and
they appear better armed than at any time since the Soviet invasion in
1979.
In addition to the danger of attacks by Soviet and Afghan troops,
insurgents must overcome many other obstacles in trying to supply their
forces:
� Transportation problems will continue to be a major hindrance to
resupply efforts.
� The cost of transporting goods rises substantially with the distance and
difficulty of the route, and insurgent groups in remote locations are
poorly armed compared to their counterparts in the border provinces.
� Confrontations between rival guerrilla groups sometimes cause delays
and supply losses.
� Corruption and theft prevent a small quantity of weapons and ammuni-
tion from reaching the insurgent groups for which they were intended.
Concern about losses to Soviet and Afghan forces has prompted many
resistance groups to take extensive precautions to ensure the safety of their
supply lines. Soviet efforts to reduce insurgent infiltration�enhanced by
tactical changes, equipment improvements, and small force augmenta-
tions�are making insurgent movement more dangerous but are unlikely to
prevent the resistance from resupplying their forces in Afghanistan. The
guerrillas most likely will be able to adjust their tactics to counter the
recent improvements in Soviet capabilities in the border areas, and
Moscow's reluctance to increase its forces sufficiently to seal the border
will continue to limit Soviet success.
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NESA 85-10156
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
111
Arms Supplies
1
Transporting the Supplies
2
Resupply Problems
4
Corruption and Theft
Soviet Efforts To Reduce Insurgent Infiltration
8
Countermeasures to Soviet Interdiction Efforts
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Prospects
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The Insurgent Supply Network
in Afghanistan: Building an
Effective System
We estimate that the number of armed Afghan
insurgents has risen dramatically from 50,000 to
100,000 at the time of the Soviet invasion to at least
150,000 full- or part-time fighters.' An improving
resistance logistic systen has abetted the growth of
insurgent arms holdings.
Arms Supplies
The insurgents are better armed than at any time
since the invasion.
Insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan obtain
their arms in several ways. Most insurgents are
supplied by the Peshawar-based-resistance organiza-
tions; some capture them from Soviet and Afghan
forces; others steal arms from rival groups; and some
guerrillas purchase their supplies directly from arms
bazaars in Pakistan and sources inside Afghanistan.
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Alliance of Afghan Resistance Parties
Based in Pakistan
Group
Leader
Ethnic
Compo-
sition
Islamic Fundamentalist
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party)
(Gulbuddin)
Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar
Pushtun
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party)
(Khalis)
Mohammad
Yunus Khalis
Pushtun
Islamic Union for the
Liberation of Afghanistan
Abdul Rasul
Sayyaf
Pushtun
Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society)
Burhanuddin Tajik
Rabbani
Moderate Islamic
Harakat-Inqilab-i-Islami (Islamic
Revolutionary Movement)
Mohammad Nabi Pushtun
Mohammadi
Jabna-i-Najat-i-Milli
Afghanistan (Afghanistan
National Liberation Front)
Sibghatullah
Mojadedi
Pushtun
Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami (National
Islamic Front)
Sayed Ahmad
Gailani
Pushtun
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Some insurgent groups in Afghanistan apparently
bypass the Peshawar resistance organizations and
receive their supplies directly from
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Criteria for Supply Distribution
General criteria used by Pakistan-based resistance
parties for determining the distribution of supplies to
commanders in Afghanistan:
� Strategic importance of the group's area of
operations.
� Size of the insurgent group.
� Political and military influence of the commander
and his personal contacts in Pakistan.
� Extent of losses suffered by group in operations.
� Level of activity of the group.
(b)(3) � Nature of the group's mission or missions.
� Amount of supplies available to the Pakistan-based
party
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Transporting the Supplies
The insurgent commander to whom the supplies are
issued in Peshawar is responsible for arranging for
their transportation from the border storage areas to
his groun in Afghanistan
most
supply caravans consist of insurgents' and privately
owned trucks and animals. We believe the mode of
transport depends mainly on the funds available to the
insurgent group, transportation costs, and the route
the insurgents will use to reach their destination. In
the eastern provinces, most supplies are transported
on mules, horses, or half-ton trucks. Insurgents resup-
plying their forces in southwestern and western Af-
ghanistan tend to use mostly trucks and camels.
most weapons and ammunition are hidden in buses
and trucks and moved in by road from Pakistan rather
than through remote regions on the backs of animals
The generally rugged geography of Afghanistan's
borders is a major advantage for the resistance. Over
the past five years, the insurgents have used hundreds
of routes from Pakistan and Iran to deliver militar
goods to their growls fighting in Afghanistan.______
Soviets believe
that the insurgents can use approximately 300 moun-
tain passes between Pakistan and Afghanistan to
move arms and other equipment, but we believe that
the number is higher. If the Soviets succeeded in
closing all of the main passes to Pakistan, guerrilla
forces probably would switch to alternative�albeit
less convenient and more time-consuming�routes.
Resistance movements across the long Iranian frontier
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are difficult for the Soviets to monitor because they
have too few aircraft and troops to conduct frequent
patrols.
Insurgent supply routes range from major roads to
tracks that can be traversed only on foot.
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The need to move supplies over long distances, besides
making them more expensive, results in shortages of
some types of weapons and ammunition in remote
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Figure 1
Areas of Afghanistan Unsuited to Cross-Country Movement by Wheeled and Tracked Vehicles
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locations. Heavy items are difficult to transport in
large quantities and slow the progress of a caravan,
making it more vulnerable to attacks by Soviet,
regime, or hostile insurgent forces.
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Corruption and Theft
We believe a small quantity of the insurgents' mili-
tary supplies is lost through corruption and theft.
Most field commanders for large guerrilla groups in
Afghanistan report few significant problems with
corruption, and some, like Panjsher Valley command-
er Masood, authorize harsh punishment for insurgents
involved in arms thefts. Nonetheless, arms smuggling
and black-market dealing are traditional in Afghani-
stan, and there are some insurgent leaders who hoard
the arms and ammunition they receive from Pakistan,
trade them for other weapons, or sell them for private
gain. We question the claims of some insurgent
sources, most of whom have ties to groups that receive
few arms from resistance organizations in Pakistan,
that as much as 60 percent of the military supplies
provided to the insurgents are diverted. Based on
reporting from fairly reliable sources, we believe that
the amount lost because of corruption or theft is
probably only 10 to 30 percent of supplies
Desire for personal profit or political gain motivates
some insurgents to divert arms intended for groups in
Afghanistan. a few
insurgent staff members in Pakistan who are responsi-
ble for distributing arms sell them to noninsurgent
buyers or to groups other than those to which the
supplies are authorized. At least one arms distributor
7
in late 1983 and early 1984 sold for personal profit all
of the arms and ammunition consigned to him fom )
routing to western Afghanistan.
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some arms caravans heading into A.-
ghanistan turn around at the border and bring the
arms to secret caches from which they are sold on the
open or black market
some arms and ammunition
that were authorized for distribution to the resistance
were sold to Pakistani dissidents or smuggled into
India. Some Afghans are also selling Pakistani-
supplied weapons in Iran to the Tudeh (Communis,
Party
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Some insurgent groups in Afghanistan�mainly those
with no or only poor connections to the seven major
Peshawar resistance groups�steal arms and ammuni-
tion from other groups, probably because they are
disgruntled with the supply network and their inabil-
ity to obtain sufficient arms in Pakistan
insurgent commander from the small Fedayed-i-
Islami organization, has waylaid caravans entering
Qandahar Province near Spin Buldak and stolen their
weapons because he is not receiving weapons from the
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(b)(1) Pakistani Corruption
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Most of the allegations against Islamabad are by
leaders of the moderate resistance organizations�
especially Sayed Ahmad Gailani�whose groups re-
ceive fewer arms from Pakistan than the rival funda-
mentalist organizations. Gailani probably receives
smaller quantities of weapons than other groups
because his insurgents are neither very active nor
effective. Islamabad
decided in January 1980 to provide arms mostly to
groups that would use them effectively. We believe -
that the accusations by Gailani are aimed at discred-
iting the fundamentalists and the Pakistani Govern-
ment.
Accusations of Pakistani diversion in the media
are based
on rumors and contacts with insurgent leaders like
Gailani. These reports are not, in our view, reliable
evidence against Pakistan.
Pakistanis. He recently defected to the Kabul govern-
ment. Small groups like Ismatullah's are strong candi-
dates for recruitment by the regime because they tend
to switch loyalties often to obtain military supplies,
other goods, or money.
Soviet Efforts To Reduce Insurgent Infiltration
The Soviets and Afghans are implementing tactical
changes to try to stem infiltration in the border
regions. They continue to rely mainly on large block-
and-sweep operations, which they are conducting
frequently. The Soviets also are increasing their use of
small-unit tactics and heliborne assaults to trap insur-
gent caravans:
� Unlike in the past when Soviet and Afghan attacks
dropped sharply in the winter, fighting in border
areas has continued with little interruption since last
summer. The Soviets launched one of their largest
operations of the war in the Konar Valley in late
May, concentrating on blocking resistance infiltra-
tion and escape routes and sweeping the area.
Soviet heliborne as-
saults and ambushes of insurgent caravans have
increased over the past year.
-.Saczet.
�
�
the Soviets
began using mobile ambush teams in southwestern
Afghanistan in late 1983. Helicopter-supplied teams
of some 30 troops operate for two to 20 days to
monitor insurgent movements and conduct am-
bushes in a given area.
the Soviets have
increased their air patrols of passes from Pakistan
into the eastern provinces and are trying to respond
more quickly to aerial reconnaissance confirmation
of caravan movements.
� Late last year Afghan regime units renewed their
efforts to halt guerrilla traffic on roads into Afghan-
istan by garrisoning a series of posts and temporary
camps in the eastern provinces.
Recent increases in Soviet manpower in the border
provinces are improving their capabilities against
insurgent infiltration, but their numbers are still far
too few to seal the border
over the past 18 months the Soviets
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In some areas of Afghanistan terrain offers few
places for concealment and leaves the insurgents
open to -poo-uo- attacks by Soviet or Afghan
helicopters
more than doubled the number of special-purpose
forces�Spetsnaz�in the country and sent an addi-
tional motorized rifle regiment from the USSR to
Herat. The regiment will enhance pipeline security
and probably conduct sweep operations close to the
Iranian border.
The Soviets probably hope new equipment will also
improve their capabilities. The use of BM-27 multiple
rocket launchers, which reliable sources report are
now in Afghanistan, in addition to helicopters will
greatly enhance their ability to quickly sow antiper-
sonnel mines in areas of suspected insurgent infiltra-
tion from long range. The Soviets, however, will be
unable to mine all insurgent trails, and the guerrillas
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defuse the mines
Besides increasing air and ground reconnaissance and
continuing to rely heavily on informants, the Soviets
apparently are trying other methods to improve their
abilities to detect supply efforts.
insurgents from Lowgar
Province found a small device�probably a tracking
and locating transmitter�hidden between blankets
on a camel in a convoy from Pakistan.
9
Rough terrain often complicates insurgent resup-
ply efforts, making vehicular traffic impossible
and straining humans and animals. It also con-
ceals convoy movements and rpdurpc leir vul-
nerability to attack.
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Countermeasures to Soviet Interdiction Efforts (b)(1)
Many insurgent groups take extensive precaution;(b)(3)
whil traveling to ensure the safety of their supply
i
lines guer-
rilla groups usually split their caravans into units of
no more than 10 animals to avoid detection by Soviet
and Afghan forces; trucks resupply some insurgent
groups in Afghanistan, but they rarely travel in
convoys. When a caravan is attacked by Soviet or
Afghan troops, the guerrillas usually scatter, take
defensive positions, and hold their fire to avoid coun-
terfire. The caravan then reforms at a predetermined
location where its greater strength will protect it
against attacks by rival groups. In regions where
terrain provides little natural cover, guerrillas travel
at night so their movement will not be detected by
aircraft. Travel during the day is usually restricted to
rough terrain, away from main roads, where the
groups run less risk of being spotted.
The insurgent information network often allows cara-
vans to alter their routes to avoid Soviet and Afghan
operations or patrols. Villagers, contacts in the Af-
ghan military, and other resistance groups provide
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intelligence on Soviet and Afghan regime activities
along supply lines
Because Moscow realizes that resistance activity in-
side Afghanistan depends on arms flows across the
borders, it is likely to continue intensifying political
and military pressure on Pakistan and Iran to stop
their support to the insurgents
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Prospects
The Afghan insurgents will have to overcome numer-
ous problems if they are to maintain their resupply
routes. The availability and high cost of transporta-
tion will continue to be significant hindrances. Resis-
tance forces also are likely to find travel more hazard-
ous and lose more military supplies over the coming
months as Soviet forces conduct large and more
frequent operations near the borders and become
more adept at locating supply routes and confiscating
weapons
**tiet.ek
Soviet political and military efforts to stop the flow of
arms to the resistance, however, are unlikely to
prevent the insurgents from resupplying their forces.
The number of insurgent counterambushes of Soviet
and Afghan heliborne assault teams is likely to in-
crease over the coming months. According to a fairly
reliable source, insurgent leaders in Qandahar Prov-
ince have instructed their forces to aggressively patrol
areas known or suspected to be landing zones for
Soviet heliborne forces attempting to ambush resis-
tance supply columns. Panjsher Valley guerrillas al-
ready have practiced counterambush tactics during
several Soviet and Afghan regime campaigns into the
valley and could use them to protect their supply lines.
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Figure 2
Insurgent Counterambush of a Soviet
Heliborne Assault Team
Insurgent councerambush
mrf,
I. Insurgent caravan moves along scheduled route.
1. Local insurgent group patrols sections of the caravan route and
sets up counterambush teams ahead of the caravan.
3. Soviet ambush team (heliborne assault force) attempts to ambush
caravan.
4. Pre-positioned insurgents open fire on Soviet ambush team,
warning caravan in the process.
5. Caravan scatters and regroups at predetermined point.
SC %.1
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Moreover, the guerrillas quickly adapt to Soviet and
Afghan regime tactical changes, and they probably
will try to offset their losses by bringing in larger
quantities of military goods and switching to less
convenient routes. Moscow's reluctance to increase its
forces sufficiently to seal the border also will continue
to limit Soviet success in reducing the flow of insur-
gent supplies into Afghanistan
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