TERRORISM REVIEW 16 FEBRUARY 1984[SANITIZED] - 1984/02/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05360588
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: February 16, 1984

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Terrorism �
Review
16 February 1984
3.5(c)
Gi TR 84-004
16 February 1984
Copy 481
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3.5(c)
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Terrorism
Review
16 February 1984
3.5(c)
_Sect'Et
1 Perspective�South American Terrorism
3.5(c)
NR
5 Argentina: The Montoneros and the New Government
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Pffice of Global Issues, 3.5(c)
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Terrorism
Review
16 February 1984
3.5(c)
Perspective South American Terrorism
NR
3.5(c)
�Seri.,Er
3.5(c)
Terrorism in South America has changed�gone are the days of the Tupamaros
and Montoneros who terrorized their countries and threatened their governments
through repeated acts of violence. Most of the countries in which terrorism
flourished during the 1960s and 1970s�Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil�are quiet
now, thanks to the sweeping and brutal government crackdowns on leftist
extremism that took place throughout most of South America during the 1970s.
3.5(c)
The South American terrorists of today are different from their predecessors.
Although there are remnants of the urban guerrilla groups that operated in the
past, some�for example, the Brazilian MR-8 and the Argentine Montoneros�
appear to have opted for political means to achieve their revolutionary ends. Apart
from the urban guerrillas currently operating in Chile, the most active South
American terrorists today are those who form part of larger rural insurgencies.
Only a few South American countries are currently experiencing a significant
terrorism problem:
1
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,Seerre't-.
GI TR 84-004
16 February 1984
3.5(c)
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� In recent months Chile has experienced an escalation in urban terrorist violence
characterized by bombings of public utilities and an assassination campaign
directed against the national police. Most of the attacks go unclaimed but local
services suspect that members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
and elements of the Communist Party (PCCH) are to blame. The aim of the
terrorist violence appears to be to keep the atmosphere in Chile charged so that
the situation is not defused by negotiations between moderate opposition groups
and the government. In the past, Cuba has provided training to PCCH and MIR
members and currently provides safehaven to exiled leaders.
In those countries in South America where terrorism is not currently a significant
threat, local governments nevertheless take the possibility of its reappearance
seriously:
3.5(c)
� Argentina's President Alfonsin has announced that the government will propose
tough antisubversion legislation that will hold both the military and former
terrorists accountable for crimes committed during the 1970s. As evidence of
Alfonsin's resolve to prevent the return of terrorism to Argentina, in December
when two exiled Montonero leaders reentered the country to announce the
group's renunciation of violence, they were promptly arrested.
It is unlikely that the scope of terrorism in South America will broaden
significantly in the immediate future. Renewed countersubversive campaigns in
Colombia, Peru; and Chile together with the enhanced effectiveness of local
security services elsewhere on the continent should keep terrorism from posing a
threat to government stability in the region. 3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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Argentina: The Montoneros
and the New Government
The Montoneros, the Peronist leftwing terrorist
organization that was decimated by security forces in
the late 1970s, are trying to make a political
comeback. In the wake of President Alfonsin's
stunning defeat of the Peronist party and the overall
poor showing of the left in the 30 October general
elections, Montonero leaders have apparently decided
against the use of violence�at least for now. The
Montoneros reportedly intend to focus on more
conventional tactics, such as infiltrating labor and
political organizations and strengthening their
position within the Peronist party. Their goals are to
move the Peronist party leftward and to splinter
Alfonsin's electoral coalition, but we see little
prospect for significant gains on either front any time
soon.
3.5(c)
The Montoneros, who first emerged in 1970, were
used by party chief Juan Peron against the incumbent
military regime. They split with Peron over tactics
and ideology after he became President in 1973,
however, and were banished from party ranks in 1975
by his widow and successor, Isabel. Although they
became one of Argentina's most notorious terrorist
groups, they were soundly defeated after the military
took over in 1976; those not captured or killed were
forced into exile. Claiming to represent the true voice
of Peronism, they dubbed their group the Peronist
Montonero Party and embarked on a propaganda
campaign against the military. Argentine intelligence
officials recently estimated there were 500 abroad and
300 in country, but we believe this count is
considerably exaggerated.
3.5(c)
The Election Impact
The Montoneros apparently saw the presidential
election campaign last year as an opportunity to
reassert themselves within the Peronist party.
exiled terrorist
leader Mario Firmenich contacted then Army
5
3.5(c)
Montonero Governor Oscar Bide ain meeting the
press upon return to Argentin
3.5(c)
Clarin
commander Nicolaides in an effort to negotiate a
return to legitimate political activity. On several
occasions, he and his colleagues reentered Argentina
clandestinely for brief visits,
Meanwhile, Montoneros inside the
country interrupted television broadcasts a number of
times with political messages backing leftist Peronist
candidates. Sympathizers also distributed pamphlets
criticizing the military.
3
3.5(c)
The impressive size of Alfonsin's mandate, coupled
with the poor showing by the left, seems to have
convinced most Montonero leaders that political
action now provides the best means for achieving their
goals, although some undisciplined factions may still
resort to violence on occasion. A secret Montonero
.3(b)(1)
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3.3(b)(1)
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>efr;
3.3(b)(1)
assessment,
concluded that the new
President's program had effectively co-opted potential
leftist supporters. The document further revealed the
Montoneros' fear that terrorism might prompt a
military backlash, thus threatening the civilians'
tenure in office. According to another document, the
Montoneros planned to speed up infiltration of leftist
political and labor organizations and hoped to make
inroads into rural and agricultural unions as well.
They intend to mobilize support for job actions should
the new government, as expected, turn down demands
for large wage hikes. Furthermore, they are seeking
ways to split Alfonsin's diverse electoral coalition
3.3(b)(1)
Since Alfonsin's inauguration in early December, the
Montoneros' effort to increase their influence
reportedly has intensified. Their main target,
is the radical
left wing of the Peronist movement�the Peronist
Intransigent Mobilization Party�led by well-known
Montonero sympathizer Vicente Saadi.
his leftwing newspaper, La
Voz, is funded by the Montoneros and, as of at least
mid-1983, his personal income was subsidized by the
group. The leftists therefore apparently believe he will
use his newly won Senate seat and his post as head of
the Peronist bloc in the Senate to further their
interests 3.5(c)
Similarly, the Montoneros have stepped up their
public criticism of the Peronist party's rightwing
leadership, blaming it for the party's defeat.
the
Montoneros intend to try to unseat them and to
challenge moderates for control of the party.
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
To further their objectives, exiled Montonero leaders
prepared to return to Argentina soon after the
election. The US defense attache in La Paz reported
that 20 to 30 members met overtly there to discuss
reentry. In December, following an open letter to
Alfonsin announcing the organization's intention to
pursue peaceful political objectives, two Montonero
leaders�former governors Ricardo Obregon Cano
and Oscar Bidegain�arrived in Buenos Aires.
3.5(c)
The government, however, has already taken a tough
stand against the Montoneros. Obregon Cano and
Bidegain were arrested soon after returning, making
good Alfonsin's public pledge to hold the former
terrorists�like the military�accountable for crimes
committed during the 1970s. The President,
reiterating his campaign promise to prevent a
resurgence of terrorism, plans to press for stringent
countersubversive legislation. Moreover, recent
statements by government officials suggest that
Alfonsin intends to preserve�at least for now�the
military's ability to gather intelligence on terrorist
capabilities 3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Prospects Dim
We believe the Montoneros have little prospect of
achieving significant political gains in the near term
and that any violence will be swiftly contained.
Alfonsin's antisubversive measures deprive them of
the opportunity to organize effectively within the
country, and several key leaders have already put off
their return. Moreover, the Peronist party leadership
appears determined to isolate the radical left,
especially Saadi, although the odds on success are
uncertain. Isabel Peron, who for years did not exercise
her powers as nominal president of the movement, has
recently reasserted her authority and reaffirmed her
ri htwin su orters as the party's leaders.
she intends to contain Saadi, as
we as ot er e ected leftists, by helping to shape anti-
left legislation 3.5(c)
The Montoneros probably will also receive less aid
and support from foreign benefactors than they did
during the military regime, thereby further cutting
their potential capabilities:
� The Palestine Liberation Organization, which in the
past provided the Montoneros with training and
funds, refused appeals for aid in mid-1983,
3.3(b)(1)
� Mexican officials, who had supported exiled
Montoneros with safehaven and government jobs,
are removing many from their posts and forcing
them to leave Mexico,
6
3.3(b)(1)
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� The Cubans, perhaps the Montoneros' most
important allies, are likely to maintain contacts but
probably will hesitate to provide much more than
low-level support for renewed terrorism, given
Havana's interests in strengthening ties with the
new civilian government.
� Bolivia's leftist President Siles probably will
continue providing safehaven and moral support�
the top two Montonero leaders were spotted moving
freely in La Paz as recently as late December�but
he is unlikely to permit use of his country as a base
for guerrilla operations 3.5(c)
3.5(c)
�,e4
7 .eKt
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