TERRORISM REVIEW 12 NOVEMBER 1982[SANITIZED] - 1982/11/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05360493
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: November 12, 1982

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Intelligence
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Seerer
3.5(c)
Terrorism
Review
12 November 1982
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GI TR 82-003
12 November 1982
Copy 336
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3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
Terrorism
Review
3.5(c)
12 November 1982
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3.5(c)
Group Study: The Montoneros of Argentina
3.5(c)
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
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Group Study:
The Montoneros of Argentina
The Montoneros, among Latin America's most effec-
tive terrorists before being violently suppressed in the
late 1970s, are preparing to become more active.
Background
The Montoneros emerged in 1970 as the militant left
wing of the umbrella Peronist movement under the
leadership of then-exiled dictator Juan Peron. At
Peron's bidding, they sought to undermine the incum-
bent military regime by raiding military barracks,
robbing banks, and kidnaping both wealthy Argen-
tines and foreigners in and around Buenos Aires. By
1973, however, the Montoneros were growing increas-
ingly radical, calling for a "popular war" against the
upper classes, and expanding operations into rural
areas.
they numbered some 2,500 combatants and 11,000
sympathizers. After Peron assumed the presidency in
late 1973, he attempted to negotiate a halt to the
terrorism, but the Montoneros refused to come to
terms. By 1974 the split was complete, and the
Peronist regime became the guerrilla's target. The
Peronist government outlawed the Montoneros in
mid-1975, and security forces moved against them.
After ousting the PFronist regime in 1976, the armed
forces had free rein against the Montoneros. Within
three years the Army and intelligence services�
employing torture, illegal detentions, and widespread
dragnets�succeeded in forcing most of its members
into inactivity or exile.
by early 1977 combatants had already been
reduced to about 300, and most of the leaders were
captured, killed, or had fled the country. Any serious
threat to the regime was eliminated, although sporad-
ic attacks�including several sensational kidnapings
and bombings�continued until 1979. By the end of
that year, Montonero activists in Argentina were
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Set�t
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estimated at 200 Their
activities were confined to distributing leaflets, paint-
ing slogans on buildings in downtown Buenos Aires,
and interrupting normal radio and television broad-
casting with propaganda speeches. 3.5(c)
Current Status
3.3(b)(1)
Montoneros in
Argentina have maintained close contact with thei3.3(b)(1 )
network abroad, estimated in 1979
to number some
200. The exiles sought refuge in Latin America and3.3(b)(1 )
Western Europe.
the Mexican Government and leftist parties
in Western Europe have backed the Montonero prop-
aganda campaigns, providing Mario Firmenich�a
founder and leader of the Montoneros
with forums for antiregime speec es
funds for printing and travel.\
3.3(b)(1)
in the case of Mexico, it fits the pattern
of support for leftist groups. The favorable operational
climate presumably accounts for the decision�
to base the Montoneros'
political arm in Mexico City
By 1980, the Montoneros, under Firmenich, divided
into two groups�the clandestine operation in Ar en-
tina and the more open movement abroad.
Firmenich's decision
to separate militant from political action reflects
ideological rifts within the movement. Veterans of the
struggle, including Firmenich, were uncertain wheth-
er to continue armed confrontation, to build a popular
base to support a potential political party, or to move
forward on both fronts. In an effort to identify the
organization with a legitimate party, Firmenich has
renamed the Montoneros the Peronist Montonero
Movement.
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3 3(b)(1)
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Cuban Support
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Cuba has provid-
ed training for recruits and a safehaven for Firmen-
ich.
the Castro regime also provided financial sup-
port, at least until September 1982, and safeguarded
funds acquired by the Montoneros through their
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criminal activities.
3.3(b)(1)
Moreover, Havana has served as a staging area for
Montoneros moving into Central America.
Montoneros have worked with the Sandinistas
in various operations, including the training of Costa
Rican leftists and the assassinations of former Nica-
raguan dictator Somoza in Paraguay. During the
same period,
Montoneros helped to train assassination teams
3.
for attacks on officials in El Salvador.
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Montoneros and the Transition
3.5(c)
The uncertain political and economic situation in
Argentina following the Falkland Islands defeat has
improved the potential operational climate for the
terrorists, who retain a capability to carry out attacks,
should they decide to do so.
as of late 1981 about 60 members
were inside Argentina and an additional 300 were
abroad. the
organization has been revamped to facilitate political
and military action. Four separate components deal
with weapons and logistics; intelligence; counterintel-
ligence; and political action, which includes propagan-
da activities and liaison with foreign terrorist and
leftist political movements. All components are based
outside Argentina; exiles in Havana take the lead in
weapons and logistics, intelligence, and counterintelli-
gence, while those in Mexico focus on political action.
3.5(c) 3.3(b)(1)
Inside Argentina, the Montoneros apparently are
preparing to resume operations, anticipating the re-
turn of some overseas cadre. Caches of arms, includ-
ing automatic weapons, grenades, and other explo-
sives, have been uncovered as recently as January
1982, according to press and US Embassy reporting.
In April, Montoneros may have been involved in
Sei�
several bombings in downtown Buenos Aires, accord-
ing to US officials there.
The Montoneros also appear to be stepping up their
political activity. During the Falklands crisis, Firmen-
ich publicly appealed to regime leaders to allow him
to return to Argentina to join the struggle against the
British and form a legitimate political party. The
ruling junta refused.
3.5(c)
Prospects
The ability of the Montoneros over the next six to 18
months to capitalize on current conditions in Argenti-
na and their enhanced military training and experi-
ence will be constrained by:
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Lack of public support. We judge that labor and
political leaders currently believe their interests lay
in assisting the regime through the transition proc-
ess and not in backing or condoning violence that
might delay elections. Potential student support is
also uncertain.
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Ideological rifts within the Montonero movement.
We believe the lack of consensus on renewing
violence could force Firmenich to focus on political
action, at least until the effects of economic deterio-
ration and the struggle within the military become
more apparent.
The willingness of outsiders to back a renewed
insurgency./
We judge that Cuba is
withholding support to avoid alienating Buenos
Aires at a time when diplomatic relations are
improving as a result of Havana's aid during the
Falklands. Moreover, the Cubans probably want the
Montoneros to continue to concentrate on assisting
insurgents in Central America rather than in Ar-
gentina. We believe Castro is unlikely to change his
position any time soon.
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We believe that, if the security forces are impaired
significantly by continuing divisions within the mili-
tary and if economic deterioration sparks serious
social unrest, militants could be emboldened to renew
terrorist activities. Without significant external sup-
port, however, we judge they would be unlikely to
mount more than sporadic attacks against the govern-
ment
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ret
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