TELEGRAM 05637 FROM THE EMBASSY IN ARGENTINA TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AUGUST 27, 1976[SANITIZED] - 1976/08/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 1973-1976
• Keywords: AMERICAN REPUBLICS
• Keywords: FRUS
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05355614
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: August 27, 1976

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[Sanitized copy attached]
Telegram 05637 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, August 27,
1976, 2020Z.
In a full review of the human rights situation in Argentina, the Embassy concluded that
security forces were responsible for most abuses but that their actions did not appear to
reflect official Argentine Government policy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Priority.
Repeated to Asuncion, Brasilia, Montevideo, and Santiago. In telegram 195912 to
Buenos Aires, August 6, the Department requested the Embassy's assessment of the
human rights situation, noting that human rights problems in Argentina had "come under
rapidly escalating scrutiny in last few weeks." (Ibid.) (C) In telegram 04852 from
Buenos Aires, July 23, the Embassy reviewed the junta's performance during its first four
months in power noting that human rights abuses were "likely to continue and perhaps
even increase in Argentina, thus placing senous strains on US-Argentine bilateral
relations." (Ibid.) (declass) In telegram 05521 from Buenos Aires, August 24, the
Embassy reported that elements of security forces had been responsible for the murder of
30 people whose bodies were found in a field near Pilar on August 20. (Ibid.) (S)
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P R 272020Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6880
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
SECRETSECTION 1 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 5637
E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, PINT, SHUN, AR
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA
038176
REF :(A) STATE 195912, (B) BUENOS AIRES 4852, (C) BUENOS AIRES 5521
1. SUMMARY: POLITICAL VIOLENCE, WITH CONSEQUENT VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, HAS BEEN A FEATURE OF ARGENTINE LIFE FOR SEVERAL YEARS.
LEFT-WING TERRORISM BEGAN IN 1969 AND OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN
RESPONSIBLE FOR HUNDREDS OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS, KIDNAPPINGS
AND ATTACKS AGAINST PRIVATE PROPERTY AND MILITARY AND POLICE INSTALLA-
TIONS. COUNTER, OR RIGHT-WING, TERRORISM APPEARED IN 1974 WITH THE.
EMERGENCE OF THE FAMOUS TRIPLE A (COMPRISED OF OFF-DUTY POLICEMEN AND
LABOR GOONS). COUNTERTERROSIM, PRIOR TO THE CHANGE OF GOVT, HOWEVER,
SEEMED TO BE AIMED NOT SO MUCH AT LEFTIST TERRORISTS AS AT PROGRES-
SIVE POLITICAL FIGURES AND OPPONENTS OF MRS. PERON AND LOPEZ REGA.
ITS VICTIMS NUMBERED IN THE HUNDREDS AND IT WAS GUILTY OF SHOCKING
ATROCITIES, THIS, THEN, WAS THE SITUATION THE MILITARY INHERITED
WHEN IT TOOK POWER ON MARCH 24 OF THIS YEAR. PRESIDENT VIDELA
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IMMEDIATELY PROMISED TO DEFEAT LEFT-WING TERRORISM AND AT
THE SAME TIME TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS; THE GOVERNMENT, HE
SAID, WOULD MONOPOLIZE POWER (I.E. VIGILANTE ACTIVITIES
OUTSIDE THE LAW WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED). IN TERMS OF THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST LEFTIST SUBVERSION, VIDELA HAS BEEN AS GOOD
AS HIS WORD. THE GOVT HAS HAD MARKED SUCCESS. THE ERP HAS
BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED IF NOT NEUTRALIZED. THE MONTONEROS HAVE
SUFFERED IMPORTANT LOSSES, THE HOPE THAT COUNTERTERRORISM
WOULD BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL, HOWEVER, HAS NOT BEEN REALIZED.
IF ANYTHING, COUNTERTERRORISM HAS INCRASED. KIDNAPPINGS,
TORTURES AND MURDERS OF REAL OR SUSPECTED "LEFTISTS" ARE COMMON-
PLACE--OFTEN ON THE FLIMSIEST PRETEXTS. FURTHER, IT IS CLEAR
THAT IN MOST CASES THE SECURITY FORCES THEMSELVES, OR AT LEAST
ELEMENTS THEREOF, ARE THE AUTHORS OF THESE ABUSES. PRESIDENT
VIDELA AND THOSE AROUND HIM CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THIS DOES
NOT REPRESENT GOVT POLICY, WHICH REMAINS ONE OF RESPECT FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS. POLICY OR NOT, HOWEVER, POLICE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS REMAIN UNCURBED. THERE IS COUNTRADICTORY EVIDENCE AS
TO WHY. SOME BELIEVE BIDELA IS SIMPLY INSINCERE IN HIS
PROTESTATIONS. THIS CANNOT BE DISPROVED OR REJECTED OUT OF
HAND. WHAT SEEMS MORE LIKELY, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE SECURITY
FORCES ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF DIVISIONS WITHIN THE GOVT,
UNCLEAR POLICY GUIDELINES, FUZZY LINES OF COMMAND AND THE FACT
THAT THE GOVT MUST DEPEND UPON THEM IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST SUBVERSION.
IN SHORT, BECAUSE OF THESE CONDITIONS, THE SECURITY FORCES
ARE OPERATING WITH MISSION-TYPE ORDERS WITHOUT MUCH SUBSEQUENT
REFERENCE TO THE TOP LEVELS OF CONTROL. EVEN IF THIS IS THE
CASE, OF COURSE, THE RESULTS ARE THE SAME. HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS CONTINUE. THE WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY OF THE
PRESENT LEADERS OF THE GOA TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION AND STOP
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ARE NOT YET CLEAR, BUT THERE IS SOME
EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE
POLITICAL AMBIANCE IN WHICH THEY ARE OPERATING IS COMPLEX
IN THE EXTEME AND THE OPTIONS ARE FEW. EVEN THOUGH LEADERS
OF WHAT MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION (THE
UCR, THE PERONISTS, LABOR LEADERS, ETC) ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED
OVER THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THEY REMAIN WILLING TO
GIVE VIDELA THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT AND MORE TIME TO BRING
ABOUT RECTIFICATIONS. THEY HAVE GOOD REASON TO BE PATIENT,
FOR MOST OBSERVERS ARE CONVINCED THAT IF VIDELA IS PUSHED ASIDE,
HE WOULD BE REPLACED BY SOMEONE FAR WORSE--PROBABLY A HARDLINER
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WHO WOULD NOT EVEN GIVE LIP SERVICE TO RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.
IN SUM, AS THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN THE COUNTRY SEE IT,VIDELA
MAY BE A WEAK REED FOR THEM TO LEAN UPON, BUT HE IS THE ONLY
REED THEY HAVE- PRESIDENT OF PERONIST PARTY, DEOLINOD BITTEL,
JUST COMING OUT OF FOUR MONTHS OF HOUSE ARREST, FOR EXAMPLE,
COMMENTED TO EMBOFFS ON AUG 26, "DR. BABBIN OF UCR AND I ARE
IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT ONLY THE MOST IRRESPONSIBLY ARGENTINE
WOULD WISH TO BRING ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE VIDELA GOVT, FOR
WHAT WOULD FOLLOW IT WOULD DOUBTLESS BE WORSE." END SUMMARY.
2. THE ENVIRONMENT OF TERRORISM. IN CONTRAST' TO THE CHILEAN
SITUATION, POLICITAL VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHT SVIOLANTIONS
ARE NOT A NEW FACTOR IN ARGENTINA. ANTI-GOVT TERRORISM
AND REPRESSIVE COUNTERMEASURES ARE FAMILIAR THEMES IN
RECENT ARGENTINE HISTORY. THE CURRENT STATE OF SIEGE WAS
NOT INSTITUTED BY THE PRESENT GOVT; RATHER, IT WAS IMPOSED
BY MRS. PERON'S GOVT (THE LANUSSE GOVT HAD ALSO RULED UNDER
STATES OF SIEGE). POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SIGNIFICANT
NUMBERS WERE HELD BY THE PREVIOUS REGIME, AND BY THE REGIME
BEFORE THAT, AS WELL AS BY THE PRESENT GOVT. TERRORISM AND
COUNTERTERRORISM REGULARLY LEFT BODIES IN THE STREETS WELL
BEFORE THE LATEST MILITARY COUP. THERE HAS BEEN A RELATIVE
RISE IN THE NUMBERS OF VICTIMS ON BOTH SIDES SINCE MARCH 24
OF THIS YEAR, BUT THE MAJOR CHANGE HAS BEEN IN THE DEGREE
OF INTERST SHOWN BY INTERNATIONAL OPINION. PRIOR TO THE
CHANGE OF GOVT THERE WERE FEW EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN FROM
ABROAD CONCERNING COUNTERTERORISM. NOW, SUCH EXPRESSIONS
ARE COMMONPLACE.
3. THE TERRORIST THREAT FROM THE LEFT CERTAINLY DID NOT END
ON MARCH 24. ON THE CONTRARY,SINCE THEN AN ESTIMATED 200
MILITARY AND POLICE HAVE BEEN KILLED BY TERROISTS AND AN
UNKNOWN BUT SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF CIVILIANS HAVE DIED AT
THEIR HANDS. AN AVERAGE OF AT LEAST ONE ACTIVE OR RETIRED
MEMBER OF THE MILITARY OR POLICE IS BEING KILLED EVERY DAY,
AND BOMBINGS OF SPECIFIC TARGETS ARE COMMON. THERE HAVE BEEN
SEVERAL "SPECTACULARS" SUCH AS THE KILLING OF THE FEDERAL
POLICE CHIEF IN HIS OWN BED AND THE JULY BOMBING OF POLICE
HEADQUARTERS. LEFT-WING TERRORISM HAS BEEN THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
FACTOR IN ARGENTINA'S INABILITY TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTMENT.
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4. GOA DRIVE TO CONTROL LEFTIST SUBVERSION. IN ITS DRIVE TO
DEFEAT THE TERRORISTS, THE GOA HAS ACKNOWLEDGED KILLING SOME
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450 CLAIMED TERRORISTS SINCE MARCH 24, AND AN UNKNOWN BUT
UNDOUBTEDLY LARGE NUMBER OF REAL OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AND
"SUBVERSIVE" HAVE BEEN DETAINED. THE GOA HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE
SUCCESS IN REDUCING THE ERP, BUT IT IS GENRALLY CONCEDED THAT
THE MONTONEPOS, DESPITE LOSSES, REMAIN A DANGEROUS AND INTACT
ORGANIZATION OF AN ESTIMATED 7,000 MILITANTS. THIS BASIC
STRUGGLE BETWEEN SECURITY FORCES AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER YEAR OR SO WITH
A CLEAR CUT VICTORY FOR THE GOA NOT YET ASSURED.
5. THE VISIBLE BATTLEFIED . IT IS A GRIM FIGHT AND AS IN MOST
SUCH STRUGGLES OF BLOOD AND PASSION THERE ARE VIOLATIONS OF
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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
SECRETSECTION 2 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 5637
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HUMAN RIGHTS ON BOTH SIDES. ON THE GOVT SIDE, FOR EXAMPLE
IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT THE POLICE AND MILITARY ARE
USING TORTURE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM CAPTURED TERRORISTS.
THIS TYPE OF ABUSE IS UNFORTUNATELY ALL TOO COMMON IN FORCES
AROUND THE WORLD ENGAGED IN COMBAT WHEN IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE OF DIRECT AND URGENT CONCERN AND MEMBERS OF
THE ENGAGED FORCES FEEL THAT THE "ENEMY" HAS FORFEITED ANY
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RIGHTS BY TAKING UP ARMS. AS IN MOST SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, IT
IS USUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO PINPOINT THE DEGREE OF ABUSE OR
SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITY.
6. LEGAL DETENTIONS. ALSO AS PART OF THEIR VISIBLE EFFORTS
AGAINST TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION, THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE
DETAINED NUMBEROUS PERSONS FOR INVESTIGATION AND QUESTIONING
UNDER EITHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATE OF SIEGE, THE ARMS
CONTROL LAWS, ETC. TREATMENT OF THOSE WHO ARE ACTUALLY "BOOKED"
TENDS TO BE RELATIVELY "PROPER". THEIR HOMES MAY BE RANSACKED
AND VALUABLES STOLEN DURING THE ARREST, BUT ONCE IN CUSTODY
TORTURE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE ROUTINE, SOME ARE HELD INDEFINITELY,
AS THEY LEGALLY CAN BE UNDER THE STATE OF SIEGE (SEE PARA 7), BUT
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OTHERS ARE FREED AFTER A SHORT TIME AND STILL OTHERS PASSED
ON TO THE PROCEDURES OF THE REGULAR COURTS OR TO MILITARY
COURTS MARTIAL WHEN THIS IS PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
7. STATE OF SIEGE. THE STATE OF SIEGE CURRENTLY IN EFFECT
IN ARGENTINA WAS IMPOSED BY MRS. PERON'S GOVT ON NOV 6, 1974.
THE CURRENT MILITARY GOVT HAS NOT CHANGED ITS STATUS. AS WITH
STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS IN MOST LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
WHICH HAVE BEEN REGULARLY INOVKED THROUGHOUT THEIR HISTORY,
MANY INDIVIDUAL GUARANTEES ARE SUSPENDED, THE GOVT IS AUTHORIZED
TO HOLD SUSPECTS INDEFINITELY AND TO MOVE THEM FROM PLACE TO
PLACE WITHIN THE COUNTRY. HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED, AS ARE
MANY OTHER RIGHTS, BUT JUDICIAL RECOURSE IS NOT ALTOGETHER
ABSENT. SOONER OR LATER THOSE HELD UNDER THE STATE OF SIEGE
MUST BE RELEASED. AND THE COURTS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION. THE STATE
OF SIEGE IS NOT AN EXCEPTIONAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN COUNTRIES
SUCH AS ARGENTINA, AND A REASONALBE UTILIZATION OF SUCH POWERS
BY THE GOVT IS ONOT CONSIDERED BY MOST ARGENTINES AS CINSTITUTI G
A VILATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IT DOES BECOME QUESTIONABLE TO PUBLIC
OPINION WHEN ABUSED, AS WITH THE MASS ROUNDUPS OF SUSPECTS IN
SPORTS STADIUMS IN CHILE. SOME ARGENTINES ARE CONCERNED THAT
THE GOVT HERE MAY BE VERGING ON ABUSE. AN ESTIMATED 3,000 TO
5,000 PERSONS ARE NOW DETAINED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATE
OF SIEGE. THE GOA HAS RELEASED NO TOTAL OR LIST OF THOSE
DETAINED, AND AS VARIOUS INDIVUDUALS ARE RELEASED OTHERS ARE
DETAINED; HENCE, IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE HOW MANY
PRISONERS ARE BEING HELD FOR A "REASONABLE" FEW WEEKS OR A
MONTH AND HOW MANY FOR AN "UNREASONABLE" FEW MONTHS. WHATEVER
THE LENGTH OF TIME, ENOUGH PEOPLE ARE AFFECTED BY THE DETENTIONS
SO THAT THERE IS WIDENING CONCERN.
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8. OTHER JURIDICAL MEASURES. IN ADDITION TO THE STATE OF
SIEGE, THE GOA, SINCE TAKING POWER, HAS PROMULGATED A NUMBER
OF NEW LAWS AND MODIFICATIONS TO OLD ONES. THEPENAL CODE
HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO INCLUDE NEW OFFENSES AND TO INCREASE
PENALTIES FOR TOERHS. CERTAIN LAWS, SUCH AS THE "ACT OF
INSTITUTUIONAL RESPONSIBILITY", DESCRIBED EVEN BY THE CAUTIOUS
ARGENTINE PRESS AS "REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE", CLEARLY APPEAR TO BE
VIOLATIONS OF POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS BY ANY OBJECTIVE
STANDARD, BUT THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO CONSTITUTE VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHT IN THE GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD SENSE. MOREOVER,
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THE REGULAR CIVIL COURTS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION. THEY ARE.
FOR EXAMPLE, DEALING WITH CHARGES OF CORRUPTION AND OTHER ABUSES
AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE DEPOSED GOVT. THE COURTS HAVE EVEN
CHALLENGED THE GOA'S FAILURE TO OBSERVE A PROVISION OF
THE CONSTITUTION WHICH PERMITS A PERSON HELD UNDER STATE OF
SIEGE TO ELECT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, AND THE GOA HAS COMMITTED
ITSELF TO RESOLVE THE LEGAL CONFLICT EXPLICIT IN THIS CASE.
9. COUNTERTERRORISM. WHILE THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED SPIN-OFF EFFECTS
OF THE GOVT'S VISIBLE AND "LEGAL" DRIVE AGAINST LEFT-WING
TERRORISM-E.G. A PROPENSITY NOT TO TAKEPRISONERS IN COMBAT,
HARSH INTERROGATION OF CAPTURED TERRORISTS, LEGAL DETENTION
OF THOSE SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST CONNECTIONS, AND EMERGENCY
LEGISLATION WHICH SUSPENDS CERTAIN RIGHTS--MAY HAVE NEGATIVE
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION, THEY DO NOT BY
ANY MEANS REPRESENT THE MAIN PROBLEM. THE AREA
WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF GREATEST CONCERN IS THE MUCH MORE COMPLEX
AND OBSCURE MATTER OF COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICED BY ELEMENTS
OF THE SECURITY FORCES WHOSE AUTHORITY (IN TERMS OF THE ORIGIN
OF THE ORDERS UPON WHICH THEY ACT) IS UNCLEAR. SINCE 1974,
ELEMENTS COMMONLY DESCRIBED AS REPRESENTING THE "EXTREME
RIGHT" OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM HAVE CONDUCTED THEIR OWN
TERRORIST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE LEFTIST GUERRILLAS AND, ALMOST
INDISCRIMINATELY,AGAINST PERSONS AND GROUPS IDENTIFIED--
SOMETIMES ONLY VERY VAGUELY SO--WITH THE LEFT. DURING MRS. PERON'S
GOVT, THE BEST KNOWN OF THE RIGHTTIST COUNTERTERRORIST GROUPS
WAS THE TRIPLE A, MADE UP LARGELY OF POLICE PERSONNEL OPERATING
UNOFFICIALLY AND SOME LABOR UNION GOON SQUADS. WITHOUT DOUBT,
THE TRIPLE A COUNTED WITH SUPPORT AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF
MRS. PERON'S REGIME. WITH THE ADVENT OF THE MILITARY GOVT,
THE TRIPLE A FADED FROM THE FOREFRONT (PROBABLY BECAUSE OF ITS
IDENTIFICATION WITH THE PERON REGIME), BUT COUNTERTERRORISM, IF
ANYTHING, INCREASED. OUR BEST ESTIMATE IS THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES
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ARE NOW CARRIED OUT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY BY ACTIVE-DUTY AND
RETIRED MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL WHO ARE PURSUING THE ANTI-
LEFTIST CAMPAIGN IN SOMETHING OF THE MANNER OF A CRUSADE. THE
WORST OF THESE UNITS SEEMS TO SPRING FROM THE FEDERAL POLICE,
RATHER THAN FROM THE MILITARY. THEIR METHOD OF OPERATION IS
WELL KNOWN: CIVILIAN CLOTHES, MOVEMENT IN THE NIGHT IN UNMARKED
CARS, KIDNAPPING (AS DISTINCT FROM THE LEGAL ARREST DESCRIBED
IN PARA 6), TORTURE AND EVEN MURDER. THEIR VICTIMS HAVE SOMETIMES
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BEEN TARGETED ON THE FLIMIEST OF PRETEXTS. THE FIVE
PRIESTS WHO WERE MURDERED IN JULY, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD NOTHING
TO DO WITH TERRORISM, NOR DID THE BISHOP OF LA RIOJA, WHO
OSTENSIBLY WAS KILLED LAST MONTH IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
BUT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN MURDERED BY RIGHTIST "DEATH SQUADS"
A PARTICULAR TARGET HAS BEEN THE FOREIGN REFUGEE COMMUNITY
LIVING IN ARGENTINA, PARTICULARLY URUGUAYANS AND CHILEANS,
WITH THE MICHELINI-GUTIERREZ RUIZ MURDERS AND THE RECRNT DISA-
PPEARANCE OF 17 URUGUAYAN REFUGEES THE MOST NOTORIOUS CASES
SO FAR. THERE ARE NO STATISTICS CONCERNING THE NUMBERS OF
KIDNAPPINGS, SESSIONS OF TORTURE AND BODIES LEFT SCATTERED
ABOUT, BUT THE TOTAL SINCE MARCH MUST BE IN THE HUNDREDS,
10. WEEKS' CASE. TOBE SURE, THE LINE BETWEEN "LEGAL ARREST"
AND "KIDNAPPING" IS SOMETIMES BLURRED. THE CASE OF FATHER JAMES
MARTINE WEEKS IS PERHAPS ILLUSTRATIVE. WEEKS WAS TAKEN INTO
CUSTODY BY AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE AGENTS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES
ON AUG 3. THE SEMINARY IN WHICH HE LIVED WAS RANSACKED AND MANY
VALUABLES STOLEN. TO THE EX-NUN HOUSEKEEPER, THE INTRUDERS
PRETENDED THEY WERE MONTONEROS, BUT THEY MADE NO SUCH PRETENSE
TO WEEKS; TO HIM, THEY FREELY ADMITTED THEY WERE INTELLIGENCE
AGENTS (SUGGESTING THEY MAY ORIGINALLY HAVE PLANNED TO KILL WEEKS
AND THE OTHERS AND BLAME IT ON THE LEFT), WEEKS WAS NOT INVOLVED
WITH SUBVERSION AND THE ONLY "EVIDENCE" FOUND AGAINST HIM WERE A
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FEW "MARXIST" BOOKS AND A "REVOLUTIONARY" RECORD.EVEN SO, WEEKS
MIGHT NEVER HAVE BEEN SEEN AGAIN HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE EMBASSY'S
URGENT INQUIRIES ON HIS BEHALF. ONCE THE EMBASSY'S INTEREST
BECAME KNOWN, WEEKS AND THOSE ARRESTED WITH HIM APPARENTLY WERE
SWITCHED FROM THE CATEGORY OF "CLANDESTINE DETAINEES" TO "LEGALLY
ARRESTED". EVEN AT THAT, HOWEVER, THE GOA DENIED CONSULAR ACCESS
FOR ALMOST TEN DAYS AND NEVER REPLIED TO US PROTEST NOTES ON THE
SUBJECT.
11. OFFICIAL POSITION OF GOA: THE MODUS OPERANDI OF SECURITY
FORECES ENGAGED IN THESE EXTRA-LEGAL ACTIVITIES MAKES IT CLEAR
CLEAR THAT THEY ENJOY SUPPORT FROM ABOVE. THE QUESTION IS:
HOW HIGH DOES THAT TOLERANCE REACH? ONE THEORY IS THAT THE
TOP LEVELS OF THE GOA, INCLUDING PRESIDENT VIDELA, ARE FULLY
AWARE AND APPROVE OF THESE SUB ROSA OPERATIONS. IN ORDER TO
MUTE CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO THE GOVT'S IMAGE AT HOME AND ABROAD,
HOWEVER, THIS THEORY RUNS, VIDELA FEIGNS INNOCENCE AND PROMISES
RECTIFICATIONS WHICH HE IN FACT HAS NO INTENTION OF MAKING.
SUCH A THEORY CANNOT BE REJECTED OUT OF HAND, BUT SOME AVAILABLE
EVIDENCE-SEE PARA 12--TENDS TO REFUTE IT, AND IT IMPUTES
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TO VIDELA A MORE MACHIAVELLIAN TURN OF MIND--AND A GREATER
ABILITY TO DISSEMBLE-THAN HE APPEARS TO MERIT.
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12. GOA MUST DEPEND UPON SECURITY FORCES. VIDELA MUST BE AWARE
OF THE MAYRIAD HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, BUT THE FACTORS BEHIND
HIS FAILURE TO CURB THOSE ABUSES ARE PROBABLY FAR MORE COMPLEX
THAN THOSE SUGGESTED IN THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE. FIRST, UNLIKE
THE PRESENT CHILEAN OR URUGUAYAN GOVTS, THE GOA FACES A DANGEROUD
TERRORIST THREAT FROM THE LEFT, ONE WHICH IF NOT BROUGHT UNDER
CONTROL COULD PARALYZE THE ECONOMY AND THREATEN THE VERY EXISTENCE
OF THE GOVT. TO DEFEAT THAT THREAT, THE VIDELA GOVT MUST RELY
ON THE EXISTING SECURITY FORCES. SO LONG AS THE THREAT FROM
THE LEFT IS THERE, THEREFORE, THE GOVT WILL HESITATE TO TAKE
STEPS TO CURB THE EXCESSESS OF THE SECURITY FORCES IF THERE IS A
HIGH RISK THAT IN SO DOING IT MIGHT DEMORALIZE, DIVIDE OR ALIENATE
THEM. EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVT WOULD LIKE TO CONTROL THEM, HOWEVER,
WAS SEEN IN THE APPOINTMENT IN EARLY JULY OF GEN CORBETTA AS
CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE. CORBETTA STATED PUBLICLY THAT HE
WOULD NOT TOLERATE ILLEGAL METHODS AND HE MADE GENUINE EFFORTS
TO STOP THEM. HIS EFFORTS UNFORTUNATELY COINCIDED WITH THE
BOMBING OF POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN EARLY JULY.
WITHIN DAYS, POLICE EXTREMEISTS HAD REACTED BY KILLING FIVE
CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DOZENS OF OTHER VICTIMS. CORBETTA WAS SOON
FORCED OUT BY A NEAR MUTINY OF THE POLICE AND REPLACED BY AN
OFFICER WHO, WHILE DESCRIBED AS HAVING THE SAME INCLINATIONS
AS COEBETTA,TOOK COMMAND WITH A PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT
FOR THE POLICE AND ANY MEASURES THEY DEEMED NECESSARY TO DEFEAT
SUBVERSION. THE GOVT HAD TRIED AND FAILED TO CONTROL THE POLICE
(SEE BUENOS AIRES 4852).
13. DIVISIONS WITHIN GOVT. SECONDLY, VIDELA MUST CONCERN HIMSELF
NOT ONLY WITH THE REACTION OF THE SECURITY FORCES, BUT MUST
ALSO GUARD HIS FLANKS WITHIN HIS OWN INSTITUTUION. THERE
ARE MANY OFFICERS WHO REGARD HIM AS TOO SOFT, OTHERS WHO OPPOSE
HIS GOVT'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM, AND STILL OTHERS WHO ARE BITTERLY
OPPOSED TO THE OPENING TO THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL SECTORS WHICH
VIDELA AND VIOLA HOPE AT SOME POINT TO BRING ABOUT. SOME OBERVERS
HOLD THAT SHOULD VIDELA MOVE TO FORCE THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE BEFORE
HE HAS CONSOLIDATED HIS POLITICAL POSITION, THE RESULT MIGHT HE
THAT IN THE ENSUING TURMOIL HE AND HIS MODERATE FOLLOWERS
WOULD BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE AND BE REPLACED BY HARDLINERS WHO
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WOULD NOT EVEN WISH TO RESTRAIN COUNTERTERRORISM.
14. LACK OF COORDINATION. FINALLY, THE JUNTA SYSTEM ITSELF
IS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. COLLEGIATE RULE AND DIVISION OF
RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG THE THREE SERVICES MILITATE AGAINST
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A STRONG CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND CLEAR LINES OF COMMAND. THIS
RESULTS IN A SITUATION IN WHICH EACH CORPS COMMANDER, EACH
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, EACH MUNICIPAL INTERVENTOR AND SO ON DOWN THE
LINE, TENDS TO OPERATE WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE.
IF A COMMANDER, OR GOVERNOR, IS ANTI-SEMITIC, THEN JEWS IN HIS
DISTRICT ARE LIKELY TO HAVE A HARD TIME. IF HE IS ANTI-RAPICAL,
UCR HEADQUARTERS MAY BE CLOSED, ETC. THIS IS FURTHER COMPLICATED
BY AN ABSENCE OF COORDINATION AMONG THE SERVICES OR AMONG
INDIVDUAL UNITS. CONFUSION OFTEN SEEMS TO REIGN. PEOPLE WORKING
FOR THE ARMY ARE ARRESTED BY THE NAVY. PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN
GIVEN A CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH AND RELEASED FROM DETENTION
IN ONE ZONE ARE ARRESTED THE NEXT DAY IN ANOTHER. UNTIL THIS
SITUATION IS CORRECTED, UNTIL THERE ARE CLEAR GUIDELINES AND
CLEAR LINES OF COMMAND FROM A STRONG CENTRAL AUTHORITY CAPABLE
OF ENFORCING ITS ORDERS, EXCESSES ON THE PART OF THE SECURITY
FORCES ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED.
15. CONCLUSIONS IN SUM, WHILE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ARE CERTAINLY
OCCURING IN ARGENTINA, THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO RESULT FROM A
POLICY ON THE PART OF THE TOP LEVELS OF THE GOA; RATHER, THEY
REPRESENT ACTS ON THE PART OF ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES
WHICH THE PRESENT LEADERS OF THE GOVT, BECAUSE OF THE
CONDITIONS MENTIONED ABOVE, ARE HAMPERED OR PREVENTED FROM
CONTROLLING. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THE GOA DOES NOT, IN THE END,
BEAR RESPONSIBILITY. AND IF THE PRESENT LEADERS CANNOT IN DUE
TIME BRING THEIR SUBORDINATES UNDER CONTROL, THEY CANNOT EXPECT
TO CONTINUE TO CONVINCE OTHER GOVTS OR PRIVATE INVESTORS THAT
THE GOA IS WORTHY OF CONFIDENCE. HENCE, WHAT IS IN QUESTION
MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE ARE THE INTENTIONS--AND THE ABILITY--OF
THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP TO CLEAR UP LINES OF COMMAND, BRING THE
SECURITY FORCES FIRMLY UNDER CONTROL, AND CURB HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE MOVING IN THAT
DIRECTION. SANCTIONS HAVE BEEN PROMISED AGAINST THOSE (POLICE)
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASS MURDER ON AUG 20 (SEE BUENOS AIRES 5521)
I CORPS COMMANDER, MOREOVER, HAS INSTRUCTED MILITARY FORCES
IN HIS AREA TO APPREHEND "UNAUTHORIZED" PERSONS OR GROUPS OPERATING
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AGAINST LEFTISTS (SEE IR 6804 0212). FURTHER, PROJECTED CHANGES
IN THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE MAY REPRESENT A FIRST STEP ON
VIDELA'S PART TOWARD CONSOLIDATING HIS POSITION. CERTAINLY MOST
ARGENTINE POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS AND LABOR LEADERS WITH WHOM
WE ARE IN CONTACT, WHILE VERY DISTURBED OVER THE EXCESSES
AT THIS POINT, REMAIN WILLING TO GIVE VIDELA THE BENEFIT OF
THE DOUBT AND HOPE THAT HE WILL YET RIGHT THESE WRONGS, INDEED,
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THEY HAVE FEW OTHER OPTIONS, FOR THE CONSENSUS OF OPINION IS
THAT IF VIDELA AND THE MODERATES ARE REPLACED, THEY WILL BE
REPLACED BY HARDLINERS, EVEN LESS ACCEPTABLE TO THOSE CONCERNED
OVER HUMAN RIGHTS. A HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENCY RECENTLY STATED TO EMBOFF: "WE KNOW WE MUST GET
HUMAN RIGHTS MATTER UNDER CONTROL AND WE WANT TO DO SO, BUT
IF WE MOVE PRECIPITATELY THE ONLY RESULT MAY BE THE OVERTHROW
OF VIDELA, AND WHAT GOOD WILL THAT DO THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN ARGENTINA?" THE PRESIDENT OF THE PERONIST PARTY,
DEOLINDO BITTEL, VIRTUALLY ECHOED THESE WORDS IN A REMARK TO
EMBOFFS ON AUG 26 CONCERNING POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN
RIGHTS SITUATION. "TO BE SURE, THERE MUST BE RECTIFICATIONS","
HE SAID, "BUT IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO PUSH VIDELA SO HARD THAT
WE PUSH HIS GOVT TO FAILURE."
CHAPLIN
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Case Number: 200000044
PAGE 01 BUENOS 05637 01 OF 03 301158Z
65
ACTION ARA-10
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ARAE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 DHA-02 ORM-02 AID-05 SCCT-01 SY-05 SIL-01
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LAB-04 TRSE-00 /077 W
P R 272020Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6880
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILLA,
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
SECTION 1 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 5637
038176
AWENTINAMIOJECT(
U.S.DEPT.OFSTATE,AAPVIPS
MaxplecP. Grafeld, Director
( )Release ( )Deny
Exempdon(s): -/
DeciassifY: (1-4V Pan ( 1 In Full
( ) ap 00 as ( ) Onsvn:.4 ,1
Date (ti, VD/ ReasonV-5/
A41111-,
E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, PINT, SHUM, AR
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA
REF :(A) STATE 195912, (B) BUENOS AIRES 4852, (C) BUENOS AIRES 5521
1. SUMMARY: POLITICAL VIOLENCE, WITH CONSEQUENT VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, HAS BEEN A FEATURE OF ARGENTINE LIFE FOR SEVERAL YEARS.
LEFT-WING TERRORISM BEGAN IN 1969 AND OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN
RESPONSIBLE FOR HUNDREDS OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS, KIDNAPPINGS
AND ATTACKS AGAINST PRIVATE PROPERTY AND MILITARY AND POLICE INSTALLA-
TIONS. COUNTER, OR RIGHT-WING, TERRORISM APPEARED IN 1974 WITH THE
EMERGENCE OF THE FAMOUS TRIPLE A (COMPRISED OF OFF-DUTY POLICEMEN AND
LABOR GOONS). COUNTERTERROSIM, PRIOR TO THE CHANGE OF GOVT, HOWEVER,
SEEMED TO BE AIMED NOT SO MUCH AT LEFTIST TERRORISTS AS AT PROGRES-
SIVE POLITICAL FIGURES AND OPPONENTS OF MRS. PERON AND LOPEZ REGA.
ITS VICTIMS NUMBERED IN THE HUNDREDS AND IT WAS GUILTY OF SHOCKING
ATROCITIES. THIS, THEN, WAS THE SITUATION THE MILITARY INHERITED
WHEN IT 40K POWER ON MARCH 24 OF THIS YEAR. PRESIDENT VIDELA
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IMMEDIATELY PROMISED TO DEFEAT LEFT-WING TERRORISM AND AT
THE SAME TIME TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS; THE GOVERNMENT, HE
SAID, WOULD MONOPOLIZE POWER (I.E. VIGILANTE ACTIVITI8S
OUTSIDE THE LAW WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED). IN TERMS OF THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST LEFTIST SUBVERSION, VIDELA HAS BEEN AS GOOD
AS HIS WORD. THE GOVT HAS HAD MARKED SUCCESS. THE ERP HAS
BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED IF NOT NEUTRALIZED. THE MONTONEROS HAVE
SUFFERED IMPORTANT LOSSES. THE HOPE THAT COUNTERTERRORISM
WOULD BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL, HOWEVER, HAS NOT BEEN REALIZED.
IF ANYTHING, COUNTERTERRORISM HAS INCRASED. KIDNAPPINGS,
TORTURES AND MURDERS OF REAL OR SUSPECTED "LEFTISTS" ARE COMMON-
PLACE--OFTEN ON THE FLIMSIEST PRETEXTS. FURTHER, IT IS CLEAR
THAT IN MOST CASES THE SECURITY FORCES THEMSELVES, OR AT LEAST
ELEMENTS THEREOF, ARE THE AUTHORS OF THESE ABUSES. PRESIDENT
VIDELA AND THOSE AROUND HIM CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THIS DOES
NOT REPRESENT GOVT POLICY, WHICH REMAINS ONE OF RESPECT FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS. POLICY OR NOT, HOWEVER, POLICE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS REMAIN UNCURBED. THERE IS COUNTRADICTORY EVIDENCE AS
TO WHY. SOME BELIEVE BIDELA IS SIMPLY INSINCERE IN HIS
PROTESTATIONS. THIS CANNOT BE DISPROVED OR REJECTED OUT OF
HAND. WHAT SEEMS MORE LIKELY, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE SECURITY
FORCES ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF DIVISIONS WITHIN THE GOVT,
UNCLEAR POLICY GUIDELINES, FUZZY LINES OF COMMAND AND THE FACT
THAT THE GOVT MUST DEPEND UPON THEM IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST SUBVERSION.
IN SHORT, BECAUSE OF THESE CONDITIONS, THE SECURITY FORCES
ARE OPERATING WITH MISSION-TYPE ORDERS WITHOUT MUCH SUBSEQUENT
REFERENCE TO THE TOP LEVELS OF CONTROL. EVEN IF THIS IS THE
CASE, OF COURSE, THE RESULTS ARE THE SAME. HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS CONTINUE. THE WILLINGNESS AND-ABILITY OP THE
PRESENT LEADERS OF THE GOA TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION AND STOP
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ARE NOT YET CLEAR, BUT THERE IS SOME
EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE
POLITICAL AMBIANCE IN WHICH THEY ARE OPERATING IS COMPLEX
IN THE EXTEME AND THE OPTIONS ARE FEW, EVEN THOUGH LEADERS
OF WHAT MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION (THE
UCR, THE PERONISTS, LABOR LEADERS, OTC) ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED
OVER THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THEY REMAIN WILLING TO
GIVE VIDELA THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT AND MORE TIME TO BRING
ABOUT RECTIFICATIONS. THEY HAVE GOOD REASON TO BE PATIENT,
FOR MOST OBSERVERS ARE CONVINCED THAT IF VIDELA IS PUSHED ASIDE,
HE WO D BE REPLACED BY SOMEONE FAR WORSE�PROBABLY A HARDLINER
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WHO WOULD NOT EVEN GrvB LIP SERVICE TO RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.
IN SUM, AS THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN THE COUNTRY SEE IT,VTDELA
MAY BE A WEAK REED FOR THEM TO LEAN UPON BUT H -
REED THEY HA U. PRESIDENT OF PERON1ST PARTY, D:011..INCIZEBC1:!1'143L,
JUST COMING OUT OF FOUR MONTHS OF HOUSE ARREST, FOR EXAMPLE,
COMMENTED TO EMBOFFS ON AUG 26, "DR. BABBIN OF UCH AND I ARE
IN -FULL AGREEMENT THAT ONLY THE MOST IRRESPONSIBLY ARGENTINE
WOULD WISH TO BRING ABOUT THE FAILURE OP THE VIDELA GOVT, FOR
WHAT WOULD FOLLOW IT WOULD DOUBTLESS BE WORSE." END SUMMARY.
2. THE ENVIRONMENT OF TERRORISM. IN CONTRAST TO THE CHILEAN
SITUATION, POLICITAL VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHT SVIOLANTIONS
ARE NOT A NEW FACTOR IN ARGENTINA. ANTI-GOVT TERRORISM
AND REPRESSIVE COUNTERMEASURES ARE FAMILIAR THEMES IN
RECENT ARGENTINE HISTORY. THE CURRENT STATE OF SIEGE WAS
NOT INSTITUTED BY THE PRESENT GOVT; RATHER, IT WAS IMPOSED
BY MRS. PERON'S GOVT (THE LANUSSE GOVT HAD ALSO RULED UNDER
STATES OF SIEGE). POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SIGNIFICANT
NUMBERS WERE HELD BY THE PREVIOUS REGIME, AND BY THE REGIME
BEFORE THAT, AS WELL AS BY THE PRESENT GOVT. TERRORISM AND
COUNTERTERRORISM REGULARLY LEFT BODIES IN THE STREETS WELL
BEFORE THE LATEST MILITARY COUP. THERE HAS BEEN A RELATIVE
RISE IN THE NUMBERS OF VICTIMS ON BOTH SIDES SINCE MARCH 24
OF THIS YEAR, BUT THE MAJOR CHANGE HAS BEEN IN THE DEGREE
OF INTERST SHOWN BY INTERNATIONAL OPINION. PRIOR TO THE
CHANGE OF GOVT THERE WERE FEW EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN FROM
ABROAD CONCERNING COUNTERTERORISM. NOW, SUCH EXPRESSIONS
ARE COMMONPLACE.
3. THE TERRORIST THREAT FROM THE LEFT CERTAINLY DID NOT END
ON MARCH 24. ON THE CONTRARYisINCE THEN AN ESTIMATED 200
MILITARY AND POLICE HAVE BEEN KILLED BY TERROISTS AND AN
UNKNOWN BUT SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF CIVILIANS HAVE DIED AT
THEIR HANDS. AN AVERAGE OF AT LEAST ONE ACTIVE OR RETIRED
MEMBER OF THE MILITARY OR POLICE IS BEING KILLED EVERY DAY,
AND BOMBINGS OF SPECIFIC TARGETS ARE COMMON. THERE HAVE BEEN
SEVERAL "SPECTACULARS" SUCH AS THE KILLING OF THE FEDERAL
POLICE CHIEF IN HIS OWN BED AND THE JULY BOMBING OF POLICE
HEADQUARTERS. LEFT-WING TERRORISM HAS BEEN THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
FACTOR IN ARGENTINA'S INABILITY TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INVESTMENT.
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itiLiAdoil
ieeitiEn
r
1976BUEN0S05617
Case Number: 200000044
BUENOS 05637 01 OF 03 301158Z
DEFE.T.A DRIVE To
CLAimvn ERRORIe, ROL LP
OU#roi-' --,-RTIET
ususvgitiEDLy TjA0RIETE TME co SUBVERS
450 THE T CONT
4.
THk SS /N. R VE Bt8 ER OF R ' -CH 2 N ITS D
MONT EDuc N DE EAL 4, AND ED xi RIvR
ORG ONRR INC TH TA/N OR su AN LL/N To
SuccE SIVEft /1,16,GE Nure SINCE mA:A;S AcKu ION,
AN/ zA Os 13 E 4 ED S pEc IATICNO Som
STRu TIoN ' ESP/ RP ' THE TED T 1911. a E
GGLE OF AN TE 1,0 ' BUT IT GOA HA ERR0 BUT
is LIKEL,DETwEEm EsTimA SSgs, Is S E1STs
RE GSNHAL HAD 0, AND
A cLEAR-A. To c ,XcuR TED 7 --A/N Ly C NS/D
cuT ONT/Npv ITY FO �C3 M: A DANG CONCE SRABLE
V ICTORy FOR ATRCES ANDI!;;ITANTs SROUS A g.ED THAT
FOR
THE GoA ANOTg IET EAR CT
LEAsT A.ERR0R TH/s INTA
- NOT --ER y
YET A EARCtGANIZA"
SSURE R So N �NS
D, ITH
5 THE VISIBLE BATTLEFIED IT IS A GRIM FIGHT AND AS IN MOST
SUCH STRUGGLES OF BLOOD AND PASSION THERE ARE VIOLATIONS OF
NNN
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ACTION ARA-10
BUENOS 05637 02 OF 03 3012I3Z
INFO OCT-01 I50-00 ARAE-00
INR-07 L-03
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02
NSAE-00 1'TSC-05 PA.,01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 DHA-02
LAB-04 TRsE_00
ORM-02
/077
AID-OS
SCCT-01 SY-05 SIL-01
P R 272020Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
6881
SECTION 2 OF 3 BUENOS
Current Class:
AIRES 5637
038408
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� HUMAN RIGHTS ON BOTH SIDES. ON THE GOVT SIDE.
FOR EXAMPLE
IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT THE POLICE AND MILITARY
THIS TYPE :::i:Joisall1=4:= ArTgnggtNTRFSTS'
JROUND THE G IN COMBAT WHEN IMMEDIATE OPERA=L
/NTEtLIGENCERECTELID URGENT CO
THE ENGAGED FORCES PEEL THAT THE "EN=NHTE1=1:4D�1;NY --
RIGHTS BY TAKING UP ARMS. AS IN MOST SUCH RCUMSTANCES IT
SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITY. �i
IS USUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO PINPOINT THE DEGREE OF ABUSE
6. LEGAL DETENTIONS. ALSO AS PART OF THEIR VISIBLE EFFORTS
AGAINST TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION, THE SECURITY FORCES HAVE
DETAINED NUMBEROUS PERSONS FOR INVESTIGATION AND QUESTIONING
UNDER EITHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATE OF SIEGE, THE ARMS
CONTROL LAWS, ETC. TREATMENT OF THOSE WHO ARE ACTUALLY "BOOKED"
TENDS TO BE RELATIVELY "PROPER". THEIR HOMES MAY BE RANSACKED
AND VALUABLES STOLEN DURING THE ARREST, BUT ONCE IN CUSTODY
TORTURE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE ROUTINE. SOME ARE HELD INDEFINITELY,
AS� Nv EGALLY CAN BE UNDER THE STATE OF SIEGE (SEE PARA 7), BUT
PAGE 02 BUENOS 05637 02 OF 03 301213Z
OTHERS ARE FREED AFTER A SHORT TIME AND STILL OTHERS PASSED
ON TO THE PROCEDURES OF THE REGULAR COURTS OR TO MILITARY
COURTS MARTIAL WHEN THIS IS PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
7. STATE OF SIEGE. THE STATE OF SIEGE CURRENTLY IN EFFECT
IN ARGENTINA WAS IMPOSED BY MRS. PERON'S GOVT ON NOV 6, 1974
THE CURRENT MILITARY GOVT HAS NOT CHANGED ITS STATUS AS WITH
STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS IN MOST LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
WHICH HAVE BEEN REGULARLY INOVXED THROUGHOUT THEIR HISTOR ,
MANY INDIVIDUAL GUARANTEES ARE SUSPENDED, THE GOVT IS AUTHORIZED
TO HOLD SUSPECTS INDEFINITELY AND TO MOVE THEM FROM PLACE TO
PLACE WITHIN THE COUNTRY. HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED, AS ARE
MANY OTHER RIGHTS, BUT JUDICIAL R IS NOT ALTOGETHER
ABSENT. SOONER OR LATER THOSE HELD UNDER THE STATE OF SIEGE
MUST BE RELEASED. AND THE COURTS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION. THE STATE
OF SIEGE IS NOT AN EXCEPTIONAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN COUNTRIES
SUCH AS ARGENTINA, AND A REASONALBE UTILIZATION OF SUCH POWERS
BY THE GOVT IS ONOT CONSIDERED BY MOST ARGENTINES AS CINSTITUTI G
A VILATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IT DOES BECOME QUESTIONABLE TO PUBLIC
OPINION WHEN ABUSED, AS WITH THE MASS ROUNDUPS OF SUSPECTS IN
'SPORTS STADIUMS IN CHILE. SOME ARGENTINES ARE CONCERNED THAT
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5,000 HERE MAY Case Number.,
$IEGE S ARE NOW DETAINED
200000
DETAINED, THE GOA, -�W DETA-' �N ADT -044
DETAINED; '-', AND - HAS 'INED 'SE AN
NED. AS VAR RELEASE UNDER
MONTH - ARE Is r--IVuip TOTAL - 3 � An
uAL OR -IONS - -0 T
OF PERSON Y EE v
PRISONERS HENCE IT VARIOUS Imo D NO Tn THE PROVISIONS
THE AND Ho BEING ALMOST S ARE LIST n OF
THE GOVT
LENGTH OF
mAlly .LD RRT. LnE STATE
OF
F THOSE-AT
SO THAT-TT:I �F TIME FOR AN-T.1.� "REi:IELE To D SED E
ERE Is TA' ENOUGH uL4E.EAsomwABLg. DETERMINE OTHERS ARE
WIDENING PEOPLE LEt, FEW E How
G coNc, E ARE A FEW MONTHS. WHATEVER 0 MANY
ERN. AFFECTED NTHs R A
By THE
waATE
E DETEVER
NTIONS
(L-OTHER JURIDICAL MEASURES. IN ADDITION TO THE STATE OF
SIEGE, THE GOA, SINCE TAKING POWER, HAS PROMULGATED A NUMBER
OF NEW LAWS AND MODIFICATIONS TO OLD ONES. THEPENAL CODE
HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO INCLUDE NEW OFFENSES AND TO INCREASE
PENALTIES FOR TOERHS. CERTAIN LAWS, SUCH AS THE "ACT OF
INSTITUTUIONAL RESPONSIBILITY" DESCRIBED EVEN BY THE CAUTIOUS
ARGENTINE PRESS AS "REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE", CLEARLY APPEAR TO BE
VIOLATIONS OF POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS BY ANY OBJECTIVE
STANDARD, BUT THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO CONSTITUTE VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHT IN THE GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD SENSE. MOREOVER,
PAGE 03
BUENOS 05637 02 OF 03 301213Z
THE REGULAR CIVIL COURTS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION. THEY ARE.
FOR EXAMPLE, DEALING WITH CHARGES OF CORRUPTION AND OTHER ABUSES
AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE DEPOSED GOVT. THE COURTS HAVE EVEN
CHALLENGED THE GOA'S FAILURE TO OBSERVE A PROVISION OF
THE CONSTITUTION WHICH PERMITS A PERSON HELD UNDER STATE OF
SIEGE TO ELECT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, AND THE GOA HAS COMMITTED
ITSELF TO RESOLVE THE LEGAL CONFLICT EXPLICIT IN THIS CASE.
9. COUNTERTERRORISM, WHILE THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED SPIN-OFF EFFECTS
OF THE GOVT'S VISIBLE AND "LEGAL" DRIVE AGAINST LEFT-WING
TERRORISM-E.G. A PROPENSITY NOT TO TAXEPRISONERS IN COMBAT,
HARSH INTERROGATION OF CAPTURED TERRORISTS, LEGAL DETENTION
OF THOSE SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST CONNECTIONS, AND EMERGENCY
LEGISLATION WHICH SUSPENDS CERTAIN RIGHTS�MAY HAVE NEGATIVE
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION, THEY DO NOT BY
ANY MEANS REPRESENT THE MAIN PROBLEM. THE AREA
WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF GREATEST CONCERN IS THE MUCH MORE COMPLEX
AND OBSCURE MATTER OF COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICED BY ELEMENTS
OF THE SECURITY FORCES WHOSE AUTHORITY (IN TERMS OF THE ORIGIN
OF THE ORDERS UPON WHICH THEY ACT) IS UNCLEAR. SINCE 1974,
ELEMENTS COMMONLY DESCRIBED AS REPRESENTING THE "EXTREME
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Current Handli 1,17)1
464 1HE
Current Classng:: n ;
/a g
Document Number: 1976BUEN0S05617
Case Number: 200000044
RIGHT" OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM HAVE CONDUCTED THEIR OWN
TERRORIST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE LEFTIST GUERRILLAS AND, ALMOST
INDISCRIMINATELY,AGAINST PERSONS AND GROUPS IDENTIFIED--
SOMETIMES ONLY VERY VAGUELY SO - -WITH THE LEFT ON S
WAS THE TRIPLE A, MADE LARGELY GELY �IF POUNICT:I4RTE'llERO:TaRIENLG MORS
GOVT, THE BEET KNOWN OF THE RIGHTT ST CO '1ST GROUPS
WAS
TRIPLE A COUNTED WITH SUPPORT ii'iHi"ciAig:isYfggss,:i;TNG
UNOFFICIALLY AND SOME OR UNION coGnm :gnu.
MRS. PERON'S REGIME:. WITH THE ADVENT OF Tan MILITARY Gorr
THE TRIPLE A FADED FROM THE FRONT ROBABLY FORE (PBECAUSE OF ITS
ANYTHING, INCREASED. OUR BEST ::T411:14TillE IS THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES
IDENTIFICATION WITH THE PERO , BUT COUNTERTERRORISM, IF
NOW CARRIED OUT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY BY ACTIVE-DUTY AND
RETIRED MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL WHO ARE PURSUING THE ANTI-
LEFTIST CAMPAIGN IN SOMETHING OF THE MANNER OF A CRUSADE. THE
WORST OF THESE UNITS SEEMS TO SPRING FROM THE FEDERAL POLICE,
RATHER THAN FROM THE MILITARY. THEIR METHOD OF OPERATION IS
WELL KNOWN: CIVILIAN CLOTHES, MOVEMENT IN THE NIGHT IN UNMARKED
CARS, KIDNAPPING (AS DISTINCT FROM THE LEGAL ARREST DESCRIBED
IN P1 6), TORTURE AND EVEN MURDER. THEIR VICTIMS HAVE SOMETIMES
''
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BUENOS 05637 02 OF 03 301213Z
BEEN TARGETED ON THE FLIMIEST OF PRETEXTS. THE FIVE
PRIESTS WHO WERE MURDERED IN JULY, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD NOTHING
TO DO WITH TERRORISM, NOR DID THE BISHOP OF LA RIOJA, WHO
OSTENSIBLY WAS KILLED LAST MONTH IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
BUT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN MURDERED BY RIGHTIST "DEATH SQUADS"
A PARTICULAR TARGET HAS BEEN THE FOREIGN REFUGEE COMMUNITY
LIVING IN ARGENTINA, PARTICULARLY URUGUAYANS AND CHILEANS,
WITH THE MICHELINI-GUTIERREZ RUIZ MURDERS AND THE REORNT DISA-
PPEARANCE OF 17 URUGUAYAN REFUGEES THE MOST NOTORIOUS CASES
SO FAR. THERE ARE NO STATISTICS CONCEHNIVO THE HUMORS OF
KIDNAPPINGS, SESSIONS OF TORTURE AND BODIES LEFT SCATTERED
ABOUT, BUT THE TOTAL SINCE MARCH MUST BE IN THE HUNDREDS,
10. WEEKS' CASE, TOBE SURE, THE LINE BETWEEN "LEGAL ARREST"
AND "KIDNAPPING" IS SOMETIMES BLURRED. THE CASE OF FATHER JAMES
MARTINE WEEKS IS PERHAPS ILLUSTRATIVE. WEEKS WAS TAKEN INTO
CUSTODY BY AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE AGENTS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES
ON AUG 3. THE SEMINARY IN WHICH RE LIVED WAS RANSACKED AND MANY
VALUABLES STOLEN L TO THE RK-NUN HOUSEKEEPER, THE INTRUDERS
PRETENDED THEY WERE MONTONEROS, BUT THEY MADE NO SUCH PRETENSE
Current Class:
LISSIREO
Paget 7
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Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1976BUEN0S05637
Case Number: 200000044
TO WEEKS; TO HIM, THEY FREELY ADMITTED THEY WERE INTELLIGENCE
AGENTS (SUGGESTING THEY MAY ORIGINALLY HAVE PLANNED TO KILL WEEKS
AND THE OTHERS AND BLAME IT ON THE LEFT). WEEKS WAS NOT INVOLVED
WITH SUBVERSION AND THE ONLY "EVIDENCE" FOUND AGAINST HIM WERE A
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ACTION ARA-I0
BUENOS 05637 03 OF 03 301250Z
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ARAE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 DHA-02 ORM-02 AID-05 SCCT-01 SY-05 SIL-01
LAB-04 TRSE-00 /077 W
P R 272020Z AUG 76
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6882
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
SECTION 3 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 5-637
038792
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FEW "MARXIST" BOOKS AND A "REVOLUTIONARY" RECORD EVENSO, WEEKS
MIGHT NEVER HAVE BEEN SEEN AGAIN HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE EMBASSY'S
URGENT INQUIRIES ON HIS BEHALF.. ONCE THE EMBASSY'S INTEREST
BECAME KNOWN, WEEKS AND THOSE ARRESTED WITH HIM APPARENTLY WERE
SWITCHED FROM THE CATEGORY OF "CLANDESTINE DETAINEES" TO "LEGALLY
ARRESTED". EVEN AT THAT, HOWEVER, THE GOA DENIED CONSULAR ACCESS
FOR ALMOST TEN DAYS AND NEVER REPLIED TO US PROTEST NOTES ON THE
SUBJECT
11. OFFICIAL POSITION OF GOA: THE MODUS OPERANDI OF SECURITY
FORECES ENGAGED IN THESE EXTRA-LEGAL ACTIVITIES MAKES IT CLEAR
CLEAR THAT THEY ENJOY SUPPORT FROM ABOVE. THE QUESTION IS:
HOW HIGH DOES THAT TOLERANCE REACH? ONE THEORY IS THAT THE
Current Class:
NOS% IN
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illossiFIE0
Case Number: 200000044
TOP LEVELS OF THE GOA, INCLUDING PRESIDENT VIDELA, ARE FULLY
AWARE AND APPROVE OF THESE SUB ROSA OPERATIONS. LN ORDER TO
MUTE CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO THE GOVT'S IMAGE AT HOME AND ABROAD,
HOWEVER, THIS THEORY RUNS, VIDELA FEIGNS INNOCENCE AND PROMISES
RECTIFICATIONS WHICH HE IN FACT HAS NO INTENTION OF MAKING.
SUCH A THEORY CANNOT BE REJECTED OUT OF HAND, BUT SOME AVAILABLE
EVID -SEE PARA 12--TENDS TO REFUTE IT, AND IT IMPUTES
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BUENOS 05637 03 OF 03 3012502
TO VIDELA A MORE MACHIAVELLIAN TURN OF MIND--AND A GREATER
ABILITY TO DISSEMBLE-THAN HE APPEARS TO MERIT.
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12, GOA MUST DEPEND UPON SECURITY FORCES. VIDELA MUST BE AWARE
OF THE MAYRIAD HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, BUT THE FACTORS BEHIND
HIS FAILURE TO CURB THOSE ABUSES ARE PROBABLY FAR MORE COMPLEX
THAN THOSE SUGGESTED IN THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE. FIRST, UNLIKE
THE PRESENT CHILEAN OR URUGUAYAN GOVTS, THE GOA FACES A DANGEROUD
TERRORIST THREAT FROM THE LEFT, ONE WHICH IF NOT BROUGHT UNDER
CONTROL COULD PARALYZE THE ECONOMY AND THREATEN THE VERY EXISTENCE
OF THE GOVT. TO DEFEAT THAT THREAT, THE VIDELA GOVT MUST RELY
ON THE EXISTING SECURITY FORCES. SO LONG AS THE THREAT FROM
THE LEFT IS THERE, THEREFORE, THE GOVT WILL HESITATE TO TAKE
STEPS TO CURB THE EXCESSESS OF THE SECURITY FORCES IF THERE IS A
HIGH RISK THAT IN SO DOING IT MIGHT DEMORALIZE, DIVIDE OR ALIENATE
THEM. EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVT WOULD LIKE TO CONTROL THEM, HOWEVER,
WAS SEEN IN THE APPOINTMENT IN EARLY JULY OF GEN CORBETTA AS
CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE. CORBETTA STATED PUBLICLY THAT HE
WOULD NOT TOLERATE ILLEGAL METHODS AND HE MADE GENUINE EFFORTS
TO STOP THEM. HIS EFFORTS UNFORTUNATELY COINCIDED WITH THE
BOMBING OF POLICE HEADQUARTERS IN EARLY JULY.
WITHIN DAYS, POLICE EXTREMEISTS HAD REACTED BY KILLING FIVE
CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DOZENS OF OTHER VICTIMS. CORBETTA WAS SOON
FORCED OUT BY A NEAR MUTINY OF THE POLICE AND REPLACED BY AN
OFFICER WHO, WHILE DESCRIBED AS HAVING THE SAME INCLINATIONS
AS CORBETTA,TOOK COMMAND WITH A PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT
FOR THE POLICE AND ANY MEASURES THEY DEEMED NECESSARY TO DEFEAT
SUBVERSION. THE GOVT HAD TRIED AND FAILED TO CONTROL THE POLICE
(SEE BUENOS AIRES 4852).
13. DIVISIONS WITHIN GOVT. SECONDLY, VIDELA MUST CONCERN HIMSELF
NOT ONLY WITH THE REACTION OF THE SECURITY FORCES, BUT MUST
ALSO GUARD HIS FLANKS WITHIN HIS OWN INSTITUTUION. THERE
ARE MANY OFFICERS WHO REGARD HIM AS TOO SOFT, OTHERS WHO OPPOSE
Current Class:
IINCLASSIHED
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Current Class:
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Document Number:
HIS GOVT'S
OPPOSED TO
VIDELA AND
HOLD THAT S
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iNUILRILIJ
n/a
1976BUEN0S05637
Case Number: 200000044
ECONOMIC PROGRAM, AND STILL OTHERS WHO ARE BITTERLY
THE OPENING TO THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL SECTORS WHICH
VIOLA HOPE AT SOME POINT TO BRING ABOUT SOM
HC VIDELA
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E OBERVERS
MOVE TO FORCE THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE BEFORE
THAT DXN THE ENSUING
:: HAS C�78�LIDAT8D 1;g:7.010';;EivRI.LGUT BE
BE EMOVED FROM OFFICE ADD BE REPLACED BY HARDLINERS WHO
PAGE 03 BUENOS 05637 03 OF 03 301250Z
WOULD NOT EVEN WISH TO RESTRAIN COUNTERTERRORISM.
14. LACK OF COORDINATION. FINALLY, THE JUNTA SYSTEM ITSELF
IS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. COLLEGIATE RULE AND DIVISION OF
RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG THE THREE SERVICES MILITATE AGAINST
A STRONG CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND CLEAR LINES OF COMMAND. THIS
RESULTS IN A SITUATION IN WHICH EACH CORPS COMMANDER, EACH
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, EACH MUNICIPAL INTERVENTOR AND SO ON DOWN THE
LINE, TENDS TO OPERATE WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE.
IF A COMMANDER, OR GOVERNOR, IS ANTI-SEMITIC, THEN JEWS IN HIS
DISTRICT ARE LIKELY TO HAVE A HARD TIME. IF HE IS ANTI-RADICAL,
UCR HEADQUARTERS MAY BE CLOSED, ETC. THIS IS FURTHER COMPLICATED
BY AN ABSENCE OF COORDINATION AMONG THE SERVICES OR AMONG
INDIVDUAL UNITS. CONFUSION OFTEN SEEMS TO REIGN. PEOPLE WORKING
FOR THE ARMY ARE ARRESTED BY THE NAVY. PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN
GIVEN A CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH AND RELEASED FROM DETENTION
IN ONE ZONE ARE ARRESTED THE NEXT DAY IN ANOTHER. UNTIL THIS
SITUATION IS CORRECTED, UNTIL THERE ARE CLEAR GUIDELINES AND
CLEAR LINES OF COMMAND FROM A STRONG CENTRAL AUTHORITY CAPABLE
OF ENFORCING ITS ORDERS, EXCESSES ON THE-PART OF THE SECURITY
FORCES ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED.
15. CONCLUSIONS IN SUM, WHILE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ARE CERTAINLY
OCCURING IN ARGENTINA, THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO RESULT FROM A
POLICY ON THE PART OF THE TOP LEVELS OF THE GOA; RATHER, THEY
REPRESENT ACTS ON THE PART OF ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES
WHICH THE PRESENT LEADERS OF THE GOVT, BECAUSE OF THE
CONDITIONS MENTIONED ABOVE, ARE HAMPERED OR PREVENTED FROM
CONTROLLING. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THE GOA DOES NOT, IN THE END,
BEAR RESPONSIBILITY. AND IF THE PRESENT LEADERS CANNOT IN DUE
TIME BRING THEIR SUBORDINATES UNDER CONTROL, THEY CANNOT EXPECT
TO CONTINUE TO CONVINCE OTHER GOVTS OR PRIVATE INVESTORS THAT
THE GOA IS WORTHY OF CONFIDENCE. HENCE, WHAT IS IN QUESTION
MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE ARE THE INTENTIONS--AND THE ABILITY--OF
Current Class:
UNCI.. SSiHEU
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Current Handling:
Document Number: 1976BUEN0S05657
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111\battli
Case Number: 200000044
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Channel: n/a
VIOLAT/ONS THERE IS S M
ES gIRMLy
0T� CLR7bICINI;ROL
UNDE
E EVIDE
-P LINEs oF
SECUR/T
Y FORCEADERSHIP
R AND
SANcT CUICElliMMAND BRIN
THE PRESENT L
RESPONSIBLE IONS RAVE BE NCR THAT THEy HUMAN RIGHTS
THE
L'OR THE MAss muREN PROMISED AG ARE MOVING limS
IN1. ,A.,A.&-o,,7e",111321�tgIMANDT0 AERpp, RreHO:NDEovv., _707.1%, r:BAERsalL,,TA0-........UlltGuc-2,re`BISIESTETTRTH--�-N�0SES PIR�,114-q1THACE)
' MILITARy 5521)
iIS
PgRSONs PORCS$
OR GRoups nnv
-,.RATING
DIRECTION
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BUENOS 05637 03 OF 03 301250Z
AGAINST LEFTISTSL JJFURTHER, PROJECTED CHANGES
IN THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE MAY REPRESENT A FIRST STEP ON
VIDELA'S PART TOWARD CONSOLIDATING HIS POSITION. CERTAINLY MOST
ARGENTINE POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS AND LABOR LEADERS WITH WHOM
WE ARE IN CONTACT, WHILE VERY DISTURBED OVER THE EXCESSES
AT THIS POINT, REMAIN WILLING TO GIVE VIDELA THE BENEFIT OF
THE DOUBT AND HOPE THAT HE WILL YET RIGHT THESE WRONGS. INDEED,
THEY HAVE FEW OTHER OPTIONS, FOR THE CONSENSUS OF OPINION IS
THAT IF VIDELA AND THE MODERATES ARE REPLACED, THEY WILL BE
REPLACED BY HARDLINERS, EVEN LESS ACCEPTABLE TO THOSE CONCERNED
OVER HUMAN RIGHTS. A HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENCY RECENTLY STATED TO EMBOFF: "WE KNOW WE MUST GET
HUMAN RIGHTS MATTER UNDER CONTROL AND WE WANT TO DO SO, BUT
IF WE MOVE PRECIPITATELY THE ONLY RESULT MAY BE THE OVERTHROW
OF VIDELA, AND WHAT GOOD WILL THAT DO THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN ARGENTINA?" THE PRESIDENT OF THE PERONIST PARTY,
DEOLINDO BITTEL, VIRTUALLY ECHOED THESE WORDS IN A REMARK TO
EMBOFFS ON AUG 26 CONCERNING POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN
RIGHTS SITUATION. "TO BE SURE, THERE MUST BE RECTIFICATIONS","
HE SAID, "BUT IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO PUSH VIDELA SO HARD THAT
WE PUSH HIS GOVT TO FAILURE."
CHAPLIN
NNN
Current Class:
11 USTI
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