THREE ARTICLES SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL BY ANATOLYI GOLITSYN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05259030
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2021
• Case Number: F-2016-00877
• Publication Date: October 30, 1984

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30 October 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
CI Staff
John F. Pereira
Chief, Information Management Staff
Three Articles Submitted For Approval
by Anatolyi Golitsyn
The three letters as sanitized are approved by the
DO for release.
John F. Pereira
Attachments: 3
1. Letter to Editor of Parade Magazine
2. Letter to Mr. Joseph Douglass Jr.
re "New Lies for Old"
3. Letter to Resistance International
re "Disinformation"
cc: PRB
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23 October 198
Letter to the Editor of Parade bagazine
Dear Sir:
The Edward jay Los tein article which appeared in the October
� 1984 issue of Parade bagazine contains a number of inaccuracies
v,hich not only downgrade but actually misrepresent my contributions
tc the National Security of the United States and its m-7or a
Given your magazine's high regard for truth and accuracy, I trust that
you will publish my letter in order to set the record straight.
First-I did not defect from the KGB in exchange for asylum and safe
passage to the United States. I requested and was granted asylum in
order to become an active participant in the struggle against co=unism
and the KGB. Specifically my intent was to warn the United States govern-
ment about the new communist political and strategic threats resulting
from KGB penetrations in the western governments and further to help
them in counteracting these threats. I have endeavored in this effort
ever since December 1961 � despite serious obstacles and many unfortunate
circumstances.
Second- I resent r. Epstein 's opinion of the impact of my
contribution on the western services. He stated, their reactions to
Colitsyn's disclosures left the secret services of three west rn ant
in a shambles". I also resent the title which he gave to this article,
-When the CIA Was Almost Wrecked". In truth, it is necessary to state
that my disclosures did not damage these three major services. The
damage was effected by the KGB. by disclosures 'should be regarded as
important contributions in revealing and neutralizing the KGB penetrat-
ions in the western services. The circumstances of history and my
personal knowledge of the KGB have put me in the position of a diag-
nostician in discovering the penetrations in these services and in
the position of a doctor in helping to cure the malady. In 1962 I
informed leading officials of both the CIA and the FBI of the pene-
trations and of disinformation problems which they were facing, such
as cancer, intoxication and indigestion respectively. I cave the
',.estern services an early warning at a time when they were treating
these problems aE insinificant and almost non-existent. .o !he s.tme
time the KGB and other communist services were i)repar1H:
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;CI
attacks against them. Subsequent developments confirmed my predictions
and warnings and for the first time penetrations and disinformation
were recognized as serious problems to be confronted.The validity of
my warnings about KGB penetrations was further confirmed by the
numerous indications of KGB successes. As you are aware KGB penetrationE
have now become an almost daily occurrence as evidenced by the recent
KGB recruitment of a FBI Special Agent.I have played a significant role
in eliminating KGB penetrations from the services of three major western
countries and in restoring their effectiveness. The extent of my
contribution cannot be fully judged by outsiders or by retired intell-
igence officers.Only senior officers of the western intelligence
services are in a position to make such a judgment. I am especially
proud of my contributions and my efforts. Without them some western
services would have remained penetrated and would have suffered
irreparable losses including the total compromise of a number of their
officers and secret agents. I am convinced that my efforts would have
been much more effective, viv-a-vis the American Services had it not
been for the Watergate crisis. This crisis almost wrecked both the CIA
and the FBI and also resulted in the stoppage of my actiVe and fruitful
efforts to neutralize KGB penetrations in the western services.
live
long enough,
may
write
a
book
on KGB
penetrations and my
to neutralize them much in the same vein as I did on the subject
Strategic Disinformation in my current book, "New Lies for Old".
Third-1 resent Mr. Epstein blaming me for the estrangement of
relations between the CIA and the FBI. The issue was much more complex.
The major cause for these strained relations at the time was the
calculated KGB desire and effort to bring about an estrangement and
to create tension between the two services using their plants and
s Parr of' -till's rr,
provacateursC_ T-td-aid-and-abet.My arrival
in the United States provided the western sercices with an opport-
unity to deal effectively with these KGB plants. I offered my
assistance to both agencies. Unfortunately Mr, Hooer rejected my
tkece pI3 4 f,S
offer. This explains why EILA-.43+.e.14A-Isj exposureAhad to wait for another
fifteen years.
Sincerely,
A. Golitsyn
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If I
efforts
of
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23 October 1984
Mr. Joseph D. Douglass Jr.
Dir. National Sec. Div. of JAYCOR
205 South Whiting Street
Alexandria, Va. 22304
Dear Mr. Douglass Jr.:
I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation
for your review of my book, "New Lies for Old". Your review
indeed shows a genuine concern for the subject of "Strategic
Disinformation " and the failure of the West to deal witth it.
I am impressed by your credentials and I agree that we have a
common interest here. However, I am of the opinion that a dis-
cussion, at the present time, would not be very fruitful. I am
presently drafting a new book which, in some ways, is an exten-
sion of "New Lies for Old'. It will deal, inter alia, with the
technology of disinformation. I am using my own methodology and
research which will require clearance by the proper American author-
ities. Therefore, I would like to postpone your proposed discussion
until I finish this new book.
I would like, however, to make a few comments regarding your
review. I concur with your comment that the book is somewhat diff-
icult to read. This is quite natural since the book is an academic
one.In fact most books on this subject, including articles such as
yours, are difficult to read. As for the structure of the book, I
must explain that the original manuscript was very_IongconSiSting
of three volumes. Volume one dealt with the struggle for power after
the death of Stalin and the adoption of the Soviet Bloc's long range
grand policy. (1953-1960.) Volume two dealt with Strategic Disinform-
ation . Volume three discussed the Communist strategies in detail.
Because of its length I compromised with my publisher to publish
only the second volume as "New Lies for Old', since it was the
most important subject and the least known. Since it was taken out
of context, both the logic and the credibility of the book was
weakened: Volume one and volume three are being held in abeyance
by the publisher awaiting their chances. I am convinced, however,
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that they are not only important but that they are absolutely
necessary background reading in order to fully understand the
subject of "Strategic Disinformaion", as described in "New Lies
for Old".
As a gesture of my good will and my trust in you, I wish to state
that, if you are interested in reading the two unprinted volumes, I
can arrange it with the publisher to have them made available to you
for reading. Unfortunately, by agreement, this would have to be
effected only in the New York offices of the publisher. I do believe
that such a reading would be most beneficial and it would keep our ties
alive. Unfortunately, all correspondence on this matter, for security
reasons, must be through the Dodd, Mead Publishing Company.
Sincerely,
A. Golits n
AG/j1
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16 October 1984
Resistance International
102 Avenue Des Champs Elysees
75008, Paris, France
Att. Mr. Vladmir Maximov, Executive President
i. Dear Mr. Maximov:
Thank you very much for your kind invitation. Unfortunately,
I am unable to attend and to participate in your conference.
However, as one who is very concerned with the subject of "Dis-
information", I would like to take this opportunity to give you
my thoughts on the subject,(attached), with a request that you
make them available to the participants of the conference.
I would greatly appreciate it if you would inform me of the
highlights of the conference and particularly the response of the
participants to my statement.
Thanking you in advance for your consideration, I remain
Sincerely,
A. Golitsyn
Att. Statement
Mr. A. Golitsyn
c/o Dodd, Mead & Co.
79 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016
Att. Mr. Allen Klots, Vice President
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16 October 1984
A Statement By A. Golitsyn To The Participants Of The Conference
On "Disinformation In The Modern World".
Gentlemen:
I am indeed grateful for the invitation to participate in the
conference on "Disinformation In The Modern World". Unfortunately
I am unable to attend and personally participate. However, as a
person greatly concerned about this subject, I would like to
offer for your consideration several points on "Disinformation" which
are particularly relevant to your organization and to the political
opposition in general.
1) I am alarmed by the confusion on the subject of "Disinformation"
Many people talk about it and write about it providing their own
definitions of the word. I am of the opinion that these erroneous
definitions and interpretations of communist disinformation are the
principle causes for this wide-spread confusion.Some writers confuse
disinformation with limited covert operations and political action,
discounting its long range strategic connection. Others confuse it
with propaganda and psychological warfare. We often speak about
disinformation in general terms lumping together strategic, political,
military, operational and tactical disinformation. All of this confusion
in my view, can be eliminated or at least reduced, by giving a more
concrete and precise definition of "Communist Strategic Disinformation".
My definition of "Communist Strategic Disinformation", is as follows:
"Those secret operations or activities which are conducted by the
entire Communist Bloc or by a number of its members in accordance
with a consistent design or a strategic plan to create favorable
conditions for long range communist grand policies and strategies and
to contribute to the success of these policies and strategies.
The essence of such operations is an active misrepresentation of
the true communist principle goals and strategies in order to
accomplish them by influencing and inducing their western adversaries
to contribute, albeit unwittingly, to the accomplishment of their
objectives. Such active misrepresentation is performed by the con-
cealment of true information and by the calculated distortion and
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dissemination of false information sometimes detrimental to them-
selves and contradictory to their own propaganda. The communist
components involved include the Party, Assets of its Security and
Intelligence Services, the controlled political opposition, Agents
of influence inside and abroad, the communist press and their agents
in place in the Western Media like in Pathe in France.
2) Communist leaders including diplomats like Minister Gromyko
and Ambassador Dobrynin, prominent scientists and writers all play
an active role in this operation. Often the KGB and the Defense
Ministries of Communist Countries, such as the USSR and China, conduct
special supportive actions like faked border hostilities or public
protests in front of their respective embassies.
3) The more exact definition of Strategic Disinformation, if
understood, provides an opportunity to detedt, to understand and to
analyze concrete strategic disinformation operations and to see
how they serve the strategies. Let me dwell for a few moments on these
concrete stategies and try to explain them, not in academic terms
as I did in my book, "New Lies For Old", but in simple pragmatic terms
There cannot be strategic disinformation in general. One must first
grasp the concrete strategy and then determine what specific dis-
information activities serve and contribute to the success of the
strategy.For example there is thelong range communist policy for
developing mature socialist societies and for achieving world dominatior
This policy includes the military strategy of achieving the Communists
Bloc's military superiority through political-diplomatic negotiations
with the United States and through the receipt of western military
technology by the USSR in the first phase and by China in the second
phase. If one grasps this strategy one can better understand how its
ultimate success is served by the disinformation regarding the
Sino-Soviet split.
4) Another communist strategy is its economic strategy whereby
they strive to develop their ecomonic-technical foundation so that
it is superior to that of the west .This to be accomplished with
the help of western
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require much wisdom to see that the success of the second strategy is
well served by the "Romanian Independence Disinformation" and again
by the Sino-Soviet Split Disinformation.
5) The European strategy is aimed at breaking up the NNTO
alliance and at the withdrawal of United States forces from Europe
through the German reunification and European security. Taking this
strategy into account one can realize how well it may be served by
Ceasescu's Independence Disinformation, by Honneker's raprochment
with Western Germany and by the coming introduction of the false
liberalization and the use of controlled opposition in Eastern
Europe.
6) Another Communist third world strategy is aimed at the
elimination of western influence in this area and the achievement
of a United Front with the developing countries through the support
of Wars of Liberation, by active diplomacy and by the use of a
variety of tactics on the part of individual communist states instead
of one tactic of a communist monolith.If one takes this strategy into
account one can see that the Sino-Soviet Split Disinformation, in
fact the duality of actions, and particularly the Disinformation of
Tito's independence, served this strategy quite well. The late Tito
almost succeeded in taking these countries away from the west through
the so called "Non-alligned Movement".
7) Since Communist Strategic Disinformation Operations are a
product of the communist strategists ie man made, the clinical
analysis of their technology should be man made as well. In my view
this is a major task for western governments and their intelligence
and counter-intelligence services. Without a solution of this task
one cannot expect either an understanding of communist strategic
disinformation in the west or a viable western policy toward the
communist world.
8) The conduct of communist strategic disinformation operations
and the confusion it generates are big obstacles for the successful
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functioning of genuine political opposition in the communist countries
and abroad. I have come to the conclusion that unless the political
opposition to the communist regimes realize the true essence of
strategic disinformation and its connection with their stategies, they
will make grave mistakes since they may be exploited skillfully by the
communist strategists and they ,unwittingly, may even serve the
communist strategists in achieving their goals.
I have to be frank with you. I am concerned by your stated plans.
After reading your, Statement of Principle, I have reached the con-
clusion that your organization is moving in the wrong direction and
that you already may have made a big mistake. In your statement you stat
that you are trying to create and function as a United Front to fight
against the Soviet totalitarianisms and against the military regimes
implying in the non-communist world as well. I fund this not only
erroneous but also confusing and contrdictory. Why is it necessary
for you to combine two struggles? Why not limit your efforts to an
effective struggle against the Soviet, Chinese, Polish, Cuban,
Czechoslovakian, Romanian, North Korean and the rest of the communist
totalitarianisms as the main threats to the non-communist world
and leave the other military dictatorships or regimes to the oppor-
tunities of the democratic processes there and to the influence of
other western governments and particularly to the quiet diplomacy of
the United States as verbalized by the American representative to
the United Nations, Ms. Jean Kirkpatrick. It appears that your plan to
fight the military regimes, if applied to Latin America and Central
America, might put your organization in conflict with United States
policy in these areas. You may also find yhat your efforts to fight the
military dictatorships in these areas might be exploited by the Soviets
who support the struggle for liberation. Thus you may find that un-
wittingly you are serving Soviet strategic plans.
I sincerely hope that the foregoing on the threat of communist
strategic disinformation will assist you in understanding the danger
involved in your United Front of two struggles and in making the
necessary corrections. Thank you for your attention and consideration.
Sincerely,
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