LETTER TO EDITOR, NY TRIBUNE, FROM ANATOLYI GOLITSYN RE "NEW LIES FOR OLD"

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05259029
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2021
• Case Number: F-2016-00877
• Publication Date: November 2, 1984

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Letter to Editor, NY Tribune, from Anatolyi Golitsyn re "New Lies for Old"
FROM: ,
iJohn F. Pereira
Chief, Information Management Staff
EXTENSION
NO
DATE
2 November 1984
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column offer each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
The attached letter to the
Editor of the New York Tribune
CI Staff
from Golitsyn re "New Lies For
Old" is approved by the DO for
release.
3.
4.
John F. Pereira
C/IMS
Attachment
As Stated Above
cc: PRB .
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS
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! November 1984
A Letter to the Editor of the New York Tribune
Sirs:
Lev Navrozov, in his articles published in the August 23rd
and October 1, 1984 issues of the New York Tribune, made a
number of malicious attacks and insinuations against me and my
recent book, "New Lies For Old." In his articles, he questions'
the historic evidence which I produced and also my access to
the KGB and its secrets. He stated that this evidence consti-
tuted my personal inventions and fantasies. I wish to assure
you and your readers that my knowledge about the Central
Committee's and KGB's preparations for the adoption of the new
long range policy and the active role of the KGB in it, was
available to me because I had witnessed these preparations while
I was both a student at the KGB Institute and a senior officer
of Soviet Intelligence at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. During
the period 1957 - 1959, the KGB Institute was directed, by the
Central Committee, to prepare numerous studies regarding the
use of intelligence and security assets for inclusion in the
strategies against the West. These studies were made available
to the Institute students and were discussed at the conferences
of the Institute. At that time, I read the secret report of
Shelepin regarding the new political tasks of the KGB. The KGB
Institute played a major role in the re-assessment of Stalin's
political practices and the shift to a Leninist approach. While
at KGB Headquarters during 1959 and 1960, I personally witnessed
the KGB reorganization, its political reorientation, its practical
preparation for strategic disinformation and its active role in
the realization of the new strategies. During this same period,
overt political consultations between party leaders occurred as
well as many secret consultations between KGB officials and
security chiefs of the bloc countries. I personally witnessed
the formation of the Disinformation Department and monitored
its beginning.
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Given this evidence, the substance of my book is not
groundless fantasy as intimated by Mr. Navrozov, but instead
an expose and a realistic description of the Communise'
Strategic Disinformation Program in action. This program,
which was launched in 1958, has seriously damaged Western
interests and greatly benefitted our Communist adversaries.
It has further generated a great deal of confusion regarding
Communist developments in the minds of Western analysts and how
to deal with them. It has created a crisis in the West which
is being successfully exploited by the Communist strategists.
Mr. Navrozov has misinformed your readers by stating that my
'book is Soviet agitprop, i.e., propaganda. My book is con-
cerned with Communist strategies and strategic disinformation,
and is definitely not about propaganda. The book demonstrates
that the Communists are presently determined to win the political
struggle with the West, utilizing their strategies and strategic
disinformation and not through Communist propaganda. Their
strategic disinformation program has helped them in the success-
ful realization of some of the Communist strategies and has
created a critical situation because the West, albeit unwittingly,
has helped in the realization of the Communist strategies. For
example, it was Communist strategic disinformation which in the
1960's was responsible for the unilateral United States reduc-
tion in arms which resulted in the Soviet military superiority
and the decline of the U.S. from its military superiority posi-
tion.
I would like to point out yet other gross inaccuracies made
by Mr. Navrozov in his articles. He equates Stalin and Shelepin
practices in the use of Communist priests, writers and scientists.
However, the practices cannot be equated. Stalin, as it is well
known, imprisoned, exiled or shot scientists, writers and priests
who failed to do his bidding, as evidenced by the death sentences
for twenty Jewish writers during the period 1948 - 1952.
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Shelepin, in contrast, resorted to an active use of scientists,
writers and priests in the Strategic Disinformation Program.
It is in this context that one should examine the actiVist role
of the academician SAKHAROV or the writer TWARDOUSKIY. Such an
examination would explain why the omnipotent KGB tolerated the
activist role of SAKHAROV up until 1980 and his long and unin-
terrupted contacts with prominent Western correspondents in
Moscow, and why the KGB overlooked the mailing of letters and
manuscripts by SAKHAROV to persons in the United States since
1968 and again recently from his place of exile. What was the
purpose of injecting the letters of SAKHAROV in the American
debate on the arms race and what effect did they have on the
debate? An effective examination of SAKHAROV's pronouncements
can be made only in terms of the Soviet military strategy, the
SALT negotiations and strategic disinformation. It may be that
such an examination would reveal that his pronouncements were
actually designed by the Communist strategists to influence
American policies, the SALT negotiations and the arms race debate.
One should also ask the question whether SAKHAROV's pronouncements
contributed to the emergence of the nuclear freeze. debate in the
United States. SAKHAROV, in his 1968 treatise, predicted that
there would be an attack against the U.S. militarism at the
beginning of the 1980's. I can understand why SAKHAROV was
correct. Such an attack on U.S. militarism was attempted in
recent times in Western Europe.
Another example of Mr. Navrozov's complete disregard for
the facts can be cited. In my book, "New Lies For Old," I
described how the KGB, under Shelepin, drawing on its experience
in successfully manipulating its controlled political opposition
against the West, as in the well known operation "Trust", decided
to again use the KGB controlled opposition in the framework of
their long range strategy. Such KGB designs provide an oppor-
tunity to analyze the dissident movement in the U.S.S.R. as a
new "Trust". Mr. Navrozov tries to defend the dissident move-
ment, completely ignoring past experiences and the new KGB design
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to manipulate the political opposition. I find this kind of
attitude in a dissident as rather strange. Further, his boast-
ful references in his articles concerning Soviet defectse spend-
ing and his
in the last
My response
denigration of my views on Soviet military efforts
twenty years can only be characterized as ridiculous.
to all of his criticisms is that "he does not know
what he is talking about." In the 1960's, I warned the proper .
authorities that the U.S.S.R. was going to try to achieve mili-
tary superiority, and also warned about the dangers of detente
and the provision of U.S. credit and technology to the Communist
countries. My warnings were meaningful because they were given
ahead of time. Mr. Navrozov's articles, however, are all mean-
ingless since they were given postfactum when the United States
had already made erroneous decisions which led to the loss of
their military superiority.
Mr. Navrozov's attacks on Mr. Angleton, Mr. Hackett, Mr.
Arnaud de Borchgrave, Mr. Robert Moss, the British S.I.S., this
author and many other experts on disinformation are not only
irresponsible, but rather pretentious. I characterize this
overall attack as grossly irresponsible because 'such persons as
Messrs. Angleton, de Borchgrave and Moss have raised and brought
concern for the Communist disinformation issue and its impact
on the United States to the attention of the nation and to the
Western world. I find Mr. Navrozov's assertion that my book is
useful to the KGB, as most shocking and malicious. I am firmly
convinced that my book is the only realistic and timely presenta-
tion which not only exposes the success of the Communist Strate-
gic Disinformation Program, but also permits one to view the
Communist strategies in a new light. Further, the exposure in
the book creates serious obstacles for further Communist
strategic successes. My book has caught the Communist strate-
gists, the KGB and their secret helpers red handed in mid stream
of their preparation for a new strategic offensive in Europe.
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I would like to make a summation of my impressions re-
garding Mr. Navrozov's articles. First, I seriously doubt that
he has an in-depth knowledge about the KGB, and whether he is
at all qualified when he categorically dismisses the potential
of the Bloc Intelligence System, and particularly, the Strate-
gic Disinformation Program as it is directed against the West.
These are not minor issues since they involve the surviva:1 of
the United States. I believe that Mr. Navrozov has the duty
to inform the public what his qualifications are that make him
an authority on the KGB and on strategic disinformation. His
articles contain so many inaccuracies and a complete disregard
for factual reporting that it appears that he does not compre-
hend the high responsibility that accompanies reporting in the
Western world. His style is reminiscent of that of a fanatical
reporter of a Communist provincial newspaper during the Stalin
years. His insinuations and assertions indicate that he, him-
self, is under the spell of "Communist Disinformation," and
that he is utterly confused by it. I feel that it would be
useless to argue the issues with Mr. Navrozov since he is
obviously hopelessly confused and has closed his mind to reason
Based on this, it appears that Mr. Navrozov is not a solution,
but a part of the problem.
I am, however, concerned about the confusion which his
articles may have generated in your readers and thus, would
like to share with them some of my views on the interaction
between Communist strategies and strategic _disinformation. In
my opinion, if one understands the Communist strategies, one
will have an opportunity to detect, to understand, and to
analyze conciftte strategic disinformation operations, and to
see how they serve the strategies. Let me dwell for a few
moments on these concrete strategies and try to explain them,
not in academic terms as I did in my book, but in simple prag-
matic terms. There cannot be strategic disinformation in
general. One must first grasp the concrete strategy and then
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determine what specific disinformation activities serve and con-
tribute to the success of the strategy. First, for example,
there is the long range Communist policy for developinrmature
socialist societies and for achieving world domination. This
policy includes the military strategy of achieving the Communist
Bloc's military superiority through political-diplomatic negotia-
tions with the United States and through the receipt of Western
military technology by the U.S.S.R. in the first phase, and by
China in the second phase. If one grasps this strategy, one
can better understand how its ultimate success is served by the
disinformation regarding the Sino-Soviet split. Second, another
"Communist strategy is its economic strategy whereby they strive
to develop their economic-technical foundation so that it is
superior to that of the West. This is to be accomplished with
the help of Western technology and with Western credit. It does
not require much wisdom to see that the success of the second
strategy is well served by the "Rumanian Independence Disinforma-
tion" and again by the Sino-Soviet Split Disinformation.
Third, the European strategy is aimed at breaking up the
NATO alliance and at the withdrawal of the United States forces
from Europe through the German reunification and European securi-
ty. Taking this strategy into account, one can realize how well
it may be served by Ceasescu's Independence Disinformation, by
Honneker's raprochment with Western Germany and by the coming
introduction of false liberalization and the use of controlled
opposition in Eastern Europe and in the U.S.S.R.
Fourth, another Communistf4(thi d world strategy)is aimed at
the elimination of Western influence in this area and the achieve-
ment of a United Front with the developing countries through the
support of Wars of Liberation, by active diplomacy and by the use
of a variety of tactics on the part of individual Communist
states instead of one tactic of a Communist monolith. If one
takes this strategy into account, one can see that the Sino-Soviet
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Spilt Disinformation, in fact the duality of actions, and par-
ticularly, the disinformation of Tito 's independence, served
this strategy quite well. The late Tito almost succeeded in
taking these countries away from the West through the so-called
"Non-Aligned Movement."
A few words regarding the solution of the problem are
required. Since Communist Strategic Disinformation Operations
are a product of the Communist strategists, i.e., man made, the
clinical analysis of their technology should be man made as well.
In my view, this is a major task for Western governments and
their intelligence and counter-intelligence services. Without a
solution of this task, one cannot expect either an understanding
of Communist strategic disinformation in the West or a viable
Western policy toward the Communist world.
The conduct of Communist strategic disinformation operations
and the confusion it generates are great obstacles for the success-
ful functioning of genuine political opposition in the Communist
countries and abroad. I have come to the conclusiQn that unless
the political opposition to the Communist regimes realizes the
true essence of strategic disinformation and its connection with
their strategies, they will make grave mistakes since they may be
exploited skillfully by the Communist strategists and they, un-
wittingly, may even serve the Communist strategists in achieving
their goals.
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