MONTHLY WARNING AND FORECAST MEETINGS FOR JANUARY

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05241973
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-00701
• Publication Date: February 3, 1984

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #00847-84
3 February 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings
for January
The highlights of the NIO Warning and Forecast meeting
subjects and comments on the warning situation follow:
a. Yugoslavia
The political leadership appears to be
unable to come to grips with the country's
Problems.
some military leaders favor
stronger action for the good of the country
leading to speculation about the imposition of
martial law. Most analysts agree with the
U.S. Embassy's judgment that the military are
not likely to act on their own and that it is
not likely that politicians would join with
the military to stage a coup in the near
future.
Although most analysts believe Yugoslavia
will not impose martial law any time soon, if
at all, the P410/Warning has reservations about
that judgment because it downplays the
attitudes of senior civilian security and
military leaders who are very concerned about
internal conditions and are determined t
prevent economic and social collapse
jdescri e
the economy as collapsed; crime, corruption,
and anti-regime activity as increasing; and
Slovenian nationalism as resurgent.
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Yugoslav economic assessments are
.essentially in agreement with IMF analysts.
The sectarian and short-sighted views of
politicians and the workings of the federal
system itself are responsible for the crisis.
Civilian internal security officials and
the military judge themselves the overseers of
political and economic stability. They have
publicly aired grievances against politicians.
The Soviets have indicated that martial
law in Yugoslaviia would be viewed favorably,
shoring la) efforts to strengthen the socialist
camp. Hence, they will be cautiously
attempting to nudge the situation their way.
IMF loan requirements for sterner
economic measures require a degree of central
control that may only be achievable with
martial law or constitutional change.
Although the security leaders resent the IMF
terms as internal meddling under an economic
guise, they have not rejected the underlying
premises.
Martial law is an option
We believe one or
more of the following conditions might force
exercise of the option:
SE Ti
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-- widespread disorder in a republic or
pationwide;
-- a major corruption scandal;
-- a spectacular terrorist incident, as at
the Sarajevo games;
-- a strong political or social reaction
to austerity, especially in one of the poorer
republics;
-- a threat by a republic to increase its
autonomy more than allowed under the federal
structure.
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b. Europe and the MNF
European MNF participants are looking for
ways to end their involvement in Lebanon.
Although the French and Italians have made
only limited withdrawals so far, the French
are trying to convince the Soviets and Syrians
to agree to a UN force to replace the MNF.
Europeans will view any U.S. redeployment that
reduces American risks as a step toward U.S.
withdrawal and could precipitate European
withdrawal.
c. Terrorism in Lebanon
Analysts see a trend toward terrorist
attacks using small arms and hit-and-run
tactics on individuals, including foreign
nationals, diplomats, and MNF soldiers,
exemplified by the murder of AU8 President
Kerr. Kerr's murder may also indicate a
disagreement over tactics between Syria and
the radical Shiites, since Syria worked for
the release of AUB President Dodge after he
was kidnapped in 1982.
d. Iran-Iraq Missiles
Analysts do not believe that the Soviets
have sent or will send SS-12 Scaleboard
missiles to Iraq. However, they do believe
that Iran is trying to procure Exocet missiles
from third country suppliers.
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e. Angola-USSR
UNITA's successes have clearly warned the
Soviets and Cubans and motivated them to
increase their military assistance to
Luanda. South Africa's activity in Angola
complicates Soviet concern as Pretoria
continues to maintain a force of as many as
1,000 men and South Africa continues to
improve the roads leading from Northern
Namibia to the Angolan border. The recent
economic agreements concluded between Moscow
and Luanda probably indicate that the Angolan
economy is as bad as we had thought.
Considering past Soviet failures to follow
through on economic commitments, their
economic support is not assured.
f. The President's Trip to China
With the success of the Zhao visit to
Washington, relations have grown in tone and
substance. It would take a major unforeseen
event to disrupt the President's planned trio.
g. Tunisia
The government, with President Bourguiba
playing a key role, was able to quell rioting
sparked by economic grievances, but only by
backing down on austerity measures. If
Bourguiba were to die in the near future,
Prime Minister Mzali, his successor, would be
considerably weakened and unlikely to appear
as pro-Western as Bourguiba. Further
outbreaks of rioting might lead the military
to seek to replace Mzali as their price for
assuming a greater role in internal security.
h. Nigeria
Apparently senior military officers seized
power in order to prevent a coup by lesser-
ranking officers. Therefore, the new
government might be under some pressure in
handling the economy and the corruption
issue. Because the country seems to be headed
for prolonged economic and political
instability, a second coup by more radical
middle-level officers may be in the offing.
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i. Ghana
Rumors of coup plotting persist as Lt.
Rawlings and his supporters chart a moderate
course and appeal for Western aid. Special
advisor Kojo Tsikata is the leading Marxist
radical
Tsikata lacks any
other support because Rawlings is popular,
although the government is not. A successful
coup by Tsikata will certainly bring Cuban and
Libyan support. However, present evidence
suggests that Tsikata prefers his role as an
advisor where for the present he still holds
considerable influence.
j. Nicaragua
Anti-Sandinista activity is on the rise
with the FDN continuing to make deep
incursions in northern Nicaragua. Insurgent
activity has had an impact on the coffee
harvest with some 75 percent of the producers
reporting manual labor shortages. However,
there is little evidence that harassment
activity at Corinto or Puerto Sandino had a
significant effect on trade.
k. Hawkins-Gilman Amendment
The intelligence community will have to
provide adequate support for the State
Department's annual report to Congress on the
narcotics situation in forty-one producing and
transiting countries as prescribed by the
Hawkins-Gilman Amendment to Foreign Assistance
Act HR 2915. Congress plans to pass
the report to the concerned countries,
Attachments:
As stated (h/w)
c an is
avid .
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NIC #00847-84
3 February 1984
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Report for January
Distribution:
1. ADCI (w/att)
2. ADDCI (w/att)
3. Executive Director (w/att)
4. SA/DCl/IS (w/o att)
5. Executive Registry (w/att)
6. DDI (w/att)
7. DDO/C/EPDS (w/att)
8. DDO/C/PCS (w/att)
9. VC/NIC (Mr. Meyer) (w/att)
10. VC/NIC (Mr. Waterman) (w/att)
11. ODI Rep/SAC Omaha (w/o att)
12. DOT Rep/OLL (w/o att)
13. 0/AG (w/o att)
14. NIO/AF (w/o att)
15. NIO/AL (Low) (w/o att)
16. NIO/EA (w/o att)
17. NIO/GPF (w/o att)
18. NIO/LA (w/o att)
19. NIO/NESA (w/o att)
20. NIO/E (w/o att)
21. NIO/SP (w/o att)
22. NIO/USSR-EE (w/o att)
23. NIO/WE (w/o att)
24. NIO/S&T (w/o att)
25. NIO/CT (w/o att)
26. D/CPAS (w/o att)
27. 0/OCR (w/o att)
28. D/SOVA (w/o att)
29. D/EURA (w/o att)
30. 0/ALA (w/o att)
31. D/OIA (w/o att)
32. 0/MESA (w/o att)
33. D/OEA (w/o att)
34. D/OGI (w/o att)
35. D/OSWR (w/o att)
36. C/COMIREX (w/o att)
37. COMIREX (w/o att)
38. COMIREX (w/o att)
39. C/HRC (w/o att)
40. Richard Beal, WHCMF (w/o att)
41. NWS (w/o att)
42. DDI/IPC (w/o att)
43. C/SIGINT Corn. (w/o att)
44. SRP (w/o att)
45. A/NIO/W (w/o att)
46. SA/W (w/o att)
47. NIO/W Chron (w/o att)
48. NIO/W Subject File (w/o att)
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