MONTHLY WARNING AND FORECAST MEETINGS FOR DECEMBER

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05241740
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-00701
• Publication Date: January 3, 1984

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
3 January 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA � ^ Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM � � David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT � � Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings
for December
1. The reports on the NIO Warning and Forecast meetings are
attached.
2. Warning highlights follow:
a. INF Watch
(1) The Soviet walkout in Geneva probably
will not provoke near-term pressure by West
European allies to alter U.S. negotiating
strategy. Analysts disagree over whether this
situation will prevail should talks not be
resumed by spring. The Conference on
Disarmament in Europe may be the arena where
West European pressure emerges. The Soviets
will not want to do anything in 1984 in the
arms control area that will enable President
Reagan to claim that his Soviet policies are
paying dividends. In Soviet eyes arms control
and the peace issue are their major tools in
both West Europe and U.S. domestic politics
for causing problems for the Reagan
administration.
(2) There is little evidence of new
Soviet "countermeasures," but their oceans and
seas "countermeasure" probably require more
time for operational implementation. They
have acknowledged publicly that their East
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European allies are causing problems over
counter-deployments, although such opposition
will not count heavily in Soviet calculations
over INF strategy.
b. Iran/Iraq
The bombings in Kuwait may be the
beginning of an Iranian campaign to use terror
in the Persian Gulf to warn the Gulf states
about siding with Iraq. Nonetheless, the Gulf
states have been stiffening their resistance
to Iranian pressure and will probably draw
closer to the U.S. should this pressure
increase. The Kuwaiti bombings may also have
had a Syrian-Lebanese connection.
c. Syria
Syria is unlikely to escalate
significantly its direct military response to
U.S. actions in Lebanon. It will, however,
step up the use of surrogates, including
terrorists, in response to a U.S.
escalation. Short of being driven out of
Lebanon, Syria will not alter its strategy or
goals and believes that it can outlast the
U.S. in Lebanon.
d. India/Pakistan
Tensions between the two countries are
high. Large-scale military exercises on both
sides make conflict a possibility. Prime
Minister Gandhi may be using the possible
external threat as an election-year issue, but
India does have genuine fears about growing
U.S.-Pakistani ties. If India concludes that
Pakistan has achieved sustained production of
fissile materials at its nuclear fuel
reprocessing facilities, India may launch a
surgical airstrike or even full-scale war.
e. Angola/South Africa
The ultimate objective of the new South
African military operation in southern Angola
is unclear. The gradual and successful
movement of the UNITA insurgency into new
areas of Angola is proceeding despite
Angolan/Cuban efforts to halt it. A growing
Cuban presence in the country raises the
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possibility of Cuban involvement in fighting
with South Africa.
f. The African Economy
Like Latin America, Africa will seek
increased foreign assistance in order to
weather the worsening economic situation. In
Africa, food will be a major concern, followed
by energy and debts. Although European banks
have been the principal backers of African
economies, the U.S. may be subject to growing
demands for funds either directly or through
the IMF. (Most African nations see the IMF as
a U.S. surrogate.)
g. Sudan
If President Nimeiri proceeds with his
Islamization campaign, the unsettled situation
in Sudan will worsen. Dissident activity in
the south will intensify in 1984 and may
provoke the military to turn against
Nimeiri. If the Sudanese military is unable
to counter dissident operations, the Sudanese
government will ask for greater U.S. military
assistance, particularly helicopters.
h. Central American Refugees
Over 400,000 refugees have left their
homelands for other parts of Central
America. Most of the bills for the care of
these refugees is paid by the United Nations
Commission for Refugees. Mexico and Guatemala
are forcing the refugees to stay close to the
borders while Costa Rica is trying to
integrate them into the population. Nicaragua
is actively encouraging emigration while at
the same time playing host to Salvadoran
refugees. Continued economic depression and
heightened political tension will generate
more emigration and, thus, deplete scarce
resources for the care of refugees.
i. El Salvador
Insurgents will try to sabotage the March
elections. Despite a lack of widespread
popular support and logistical problems, they
are more experienced and appear more adaptable
to guerrilla warfare than the Salvadoran army
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is to counterinsurgency. The army is better
armed than before, but its officer corps is
less favorable to the doctrines of
counterinsurgency and it also lacks the air
mobility it needs. The elections may reveal a
dangerous politicization within the army
towards right-wing extremism that may harm the
outcome of the elections.
j. Japanese Trade
Nakasone's election losses may reduce his
ability to lower trade barriers with the
U.S. Many trade issues fall under the control
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries, the least international in outlook
in the Japanese government. The merchandise
trade imbalance with the U.S. is likely to
increase in 1984 while the undervalued yen
exchange rate will remain essentially
unchanged.
k. The Philippines
The Marcos regime faces growing political
problems that are heightened by financial
problems. The Philippine debt is higher than
previously thought and has raised serious
questions about accounting procedures at the
Philippine Central Bank. IMF has returned to
Manila to reassess the financing gap and debt
rescheduling cannot begin until IMF reports
are complete.
Attachments:
As stated (h/w)
David Y Wc anis
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3 January 1984
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Report for December
Distribution:
1. DCI (w/att)
2. DDCI (w/att)
3. Executive Director (w/att)
4. SA/DCl/IS (w/o att)
5. Executive Registry (w/att)
6. DDI (w/att)
7. DDO/C/EPDS (w/att)
8. DDO/C/PCS (w/att)
9. VC/NIC (Mr. Meyer) (w/att)
10. VC/NIC (Mr. Waterman) (w/att)
11. DDI Rep/SAC Omaha (w/o att)
12. DDI Rep/OLL (w/o att)
13. D/AG (w/o att)
14. NIO/AF (w/o att)
15. NIO/AL (Low) (w/o att)
16. NIO/EA (w/o att)
17. NIO/GPF (w/o att)
18. NIO/LA (w/o att)
19. NIO/NESA (w/o att)
20. NIO/E (w/o att)
21. t410/SP (w/o att)
22. NIO/USSR-EE (w/o att)
23. NIO/WE (w/o att)
24. NIO/S&T (w/o att)
25. D/CPAS (w/o att)
26. D/OCR (w/o att)
27. D/SOVA (w/o att)
28. D/EURA (w/o att)
29. D/ALA (w/o att)
30. D/OIA (w/o att)
31. D/NESA (w/o att)
32. D/OEA (w/o att)
33. D/OGI (w/o att)
34. D/OSWR (w/o att)
35. C/COMIREX (w/o att)
36. COMIREX (w/o att)
37. COMIREX (w/o att)
38. C/HRC (w/o att)
39. Richard Beal, WHCMF (w/o att)
40. NWS (w/o att)
41. DDI/IPC (w/o att)
42. C/SIGINT Corn. (w/o att)
43. SRP (w/o att)
44. A/NIO/W (w/o att)
45. SA/W (w/o att)
46. NIO/W Chron (w/o att)
47. NIO/W Subject File (w/o att)
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