MONTHLY WARNING AND FORECAST MEETINGS FOR SEPTEMBER

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05241632
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-00701
• Publication Date: October 3, 1983

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC #7101-83
3 October 1983
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
SUBJECT
David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings
for September
1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. The warning highlights of the meetings conducted by
NIO's during September follow.
a. INF
(1) There is no new evidence to indicate
steps underway by the Soviets to put the U.S.
in an "analogous position."
Unless the
Soviets contemplate reducing their SS-20 force
drastically, they probably are resigned that
NATO will deploy its INF. Thus, one of their
principal objectives is to make the deployment
as politically costly to West Europeans and
the U.S. as possible. The general
effectiveness of the U.S. response to the KAL
shootdown may well make the Soviets more
intent on targeting the Reagan Administration
and thus toughen whatever countermeasures they
plan against INF.
(2) West Germany remains the focus for
the largest demonstrations in October as INF
deployment nears. Red Army faction and other
fringe groups plan disruptive actions. Some
Green elements promise a more active
interpretation of "civil disobedience." Large
demonstrations are also likely in the U.K.
during October but the public seems resigned
to deployment. In Italy, "autonomous groups"
are urging provocative actions at Comiso and
violence is possible.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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b. Lebanon
(1) The ceasefire continues to hold, but
inconclusive political negotiations will
probably be followed by more fighting. Over
the next six months, a de facto partition will
continue as the Amin government's support will
diminish and narrow. If there is no
meaningful progress toward forming a
government of national unity, the Lebanese
Army will become more dependent on the U.S.,
and we will encounter growing problems with
our regional allies in securing transit rights
to resupply the Army. There is risk of a
deterioration into a direct U.S.-Syrian
military confrontation. If that occurs, Syria
will look to the USSR for support. There is
little prospect of Arab support for the U.S.
position in such a confrontation.
c. Iran-Iraq War
(1) Iran's strategy of attrition is
increasing Iraq's desperation and raising the
possibility of Iraqi escalation of the
conflict. Some escalation--most likely Iraqi
attacks on tankers transiting to and from
Iranian ports--seems inevitable, with or
without the use of Super Entendard aircraft.
d. Pakistan
(1) The unrest in Sind Province continues
but it has not spread to the politically
critical Punjab Province. Analysts generally
agree that Zia will remain in power for the
next six months, although his position may be
eroded.
e. El Salvador
(1) Talks between Ambassador Stone's
mission and guerrilla factions emphasized
several points. First, the guerrillas said
that they are not interested in participating
in elections. They displayed confidence in
winning the war on the ground despite recent
successful government operations. The motives
of the guerrillas seem to be to deal with the
El Salvador Peace Commission to make it appear
as if they are dealing with the government and
to appeal directly to the U.S. Congress in a
context of reasonableness. The talks also
make differences among the guerrilla factions
apparent and an argument can be made that
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force has caused negotiations to be
possible. Human rights continues to be a
problem affecting U.S. Congressional
attitudes.
f. Sudan
(1) Growing shortages, a decline in the
standard of living, and discontent in the
military force present Nimeiri with new
challenges. Nimeiri has reaffirmed the
primacy of Islamic law; he has probably
further antagonized the non-Muslim south.
Problems will be compounded by Ethiopian and
Libyan supported dissidents and the weakened
Nimeiri regime should be watched closely in
the coming months.
g. Chad
(1) Habre can retain control over the
southern part of Chad with French support.
Prospects are for a long-term French presence
before an accommodation can be arranged.
h. Angola
(1) Much of the Soviet equipment
delivered during recent months is beyond
Angola's abilities to operate effectively.
The Community is looking for evidence of
increased Soviet, Cuban, or East European
personnel strengths to maintain and operate
the equipment.
i. Philippines
(1) The Marcos government has made no
serious attempt to diffuse the political
situation. The financial situation is
precarious and concern also centers on the
reaction of U.S. and Japanese banks.
President Reagan's visit could be the focus of
further violent demonstrations.
j. Greece
(1) Pressures from the left are likely to
cause Papandreou to move left on foreign
policy issues further complicating relations
with the U.S. Withdrawing permission to use
Greek facilities for resupply of the Lebanese
armed forces is but one example. U.S. bases
in Greece, after the initial five-year term,
will be an issue in the 1985 elections and a
destabilizing element in U.S.-Greek relations.
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Attachments:
SA/W
NIO/AF
NIO/EA
NIO/LA
NIO/NESA
NIO/NP
NIO/USSR-EE
NIO/WE
.44
avid . cManis
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NIC it101-83
3 October 1983
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meetings for September
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI (w/atts)
2 - DDCI (w/atts)
3 - Executive Director (w/atts)
4 - SA/IS/DCI (w/o atts)
5 - Executive Registry (w/atts)
6 - DOT (w/atts)
7 - DDO/C/EPDS (w/atts)
8 - DDO/C/PCS (w/atts)
9 - /DDI Rep/SAC/ADCOM (w/o atts) (b)(3)
10 - DOT Rep/OLL (w/o atts)
11 - C/NIC (w/atts)
12 - VC/NIC (Mr. Meyer) (w/atts)
13 - VC/NIC (Mr. Waterman) (w/atts)
14 - 0/AG w/o atts
15 - NIO/AF
16 - NIO/AL H
17 - NIO/EA
18 - NIO/GPF n
19 - NIO/LA
20 - NIO/NESA u H
21 - NIO/E
22 - NIO/SP
23 - NIO/USSR-EE is Is
24 - NIO/WE u H
25 - NIO/S&T
26 - NIO/PPT H H
27 - NIO/AG
28 - D/CPAS
29 - D/OCR
30 - D/SOVA H
31 - D/EURA
32 - 0/ALA H H
33 - D/OIA
34 - 0/MESA u H
35 - D/OEA H H
36 - D/OGI
37 - D/OSWR ss
38 - C/COMIREX H
39 - C/SIGINT Corn. H
40 - C/HRC is
41 - SRP n H
42 - SA/DDI/CS H
43 - DOT Registry (w/atts)
44 - NIO/W
45 - A/NIO/W u
46 - NWS n
47 - SAW H
48 - NIO/W Subject File (w/atts)
49 - NIO/W Chron UH
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