USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05204198
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01432
• Publication Date: March 2, 1983

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Use of Toxins and Other Lethal
Chemicals in Southeast Asia
and Afghanistan
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
�Seer-et.
SNIE 11150137-82
2 March 1983
Copy 372
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligenc ources and Methods Involved
(W TEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFb MATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Cri � al Sanctions
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
SNIE 11/50/37-82
USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL
CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND AFGHANISTAN
Information available as of 2 March 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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KEY JUDGMENTS
In the year that has elapsed since the publication of SNIE
11/50/37-82, the use of chemical and toxin agents has continued and
we have found nothing in the evidence acquired since the beginning of
1982 that would contradict our earlier findings on any of the countries
with which we are concerned. The evidence has continued to come
from many different sources and has amplified our understanding of
events of previous years as well as events occurring during 1982.
In Afghanistan, the Soviets have continued to use chemical agents
selectively, through at least January 1983. Analyses of physical samples
have, for the first time, provided evidence of mycotoxins. Chemical
agents other than toxins have also been used, but we have not yet been
able to identify them through sample analysis.
In Laos, Vietnamese and Lao troops, under Soviet supervision,
have continued to use lethal and incapacitating chemicals and toxins
against the H'Mong resistance, through at least December 1982.
In Kampuchea, the Vietnamese forces have continued to use lethal
and incapacitating chemicals and toxins against the DK and KPNLF
resistance forces, through at least February 1983.
In Thailand, in 1982, Thai villages near the Kampuchean border
for the first time became targets of Vietnamese chemical attacks.
Samples from these attacks have been analyzed and trichothecene
mycotoxins have been identified
Physical samples from both Laos and Kampuchea provide further
confirmation that trichothecene mycotoxins are among the agents used.
Our earlier conclusions on this have been reinforced by much better
medical data and additional chemical analyses and
Toxins have been found in urine, blood, and tissues of victims of -yellow
rain- attacks and in samples of material collected from attack sites
Soviet implication in the provision and use of these weapons
continues to be supported by and by reporting from
defectors, resistance groups, and refugees.
In 1982, independent investigations conducted by other govern-
ments�notably those of Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and
West Germany�as well as by private groups, yielded evidence and
analysis broadly supportive of US conclusions
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DISCUSSION
US Evidence of Chemical Warfare
In Laos
1. Throughout 1982 the Vietnamese and Lao con-
tinued their policy of using lethal agents and toxins
against villagers and resistance forces in Laos. While
the pattern of attacks remained consistent with that of
previous years, the number of fatalities reported per
attack decreased. The decrease suggests that less lethal
chemical agents or lower concentrations of the same
agents have been used. The decrease could, however,
also be attributed to other factors:
� The H'Mong population had already been deci-
mated by the high fatalities and refugee exodus
caused by earlier attacks dating back at least to
1976.
� Surviving H'Mong people remaining in Laos
were more wary and quick to take cover at the
first indication of an attack.
� The H'Mong survivors were not taking time to
count victims. This is supported by the very few
reports that cite precise numbers for casualties in
specific chemical attacks.
2. Descriptions of the attacks have not changed
significantly. The H'Mong typically describe aircraft
or helicopters as spraying a yellow rainlike material on
villages and crops, causing in the human targets the
familiar hemorrhaging symptoms characteristic of tri-
cothecene toxin poisoning, as set forth in detail in the
SNIE. In a number of cases, however, only abdominal
pain and prolonged illness, and no bleeding, were
reported. The divergence of symptoms, also observed
in earlier years, suggests that other agents or combina-
tions of agents are also being used. One likely explana-
tion is that different solvents or carriers, exposure
levels, and routes of absorption for the same agents
alter their efficacy in individual attacks. The situation
is further complicated by the fact that different
groups�men, women, children, and animals�often
exhibit different symptoms.
3. The trichothecene toxins that have been identi-
fied by the United States are only one of the compo-
nents of "yellow rain." There is much that we do not
know about the total composition of the material
sprayed or dropped from aircraft, or about other
chemicals that may be in use. For example, the
H'Mong consider the red smoke they have observed in
rocket/artillery munitions as more toxic than the
"yellow rain." They have also reported the use of a
green gas and described a white sticky substance that
dried to a powder and produced smallpox-like rash
and necrosis of the skin. These reports indicate that
several different types of agents have been used both
to inflict casualties on the resistance forces directly,
and to drive the H'Mong from their villages by
contaminating the environment.
4. acquired during 1982 ex-
tends and supports our earlier judgment that the
Soviets are directly involved in chemical warfare
support in Laos. This involvement includes training,
storage and inspection, and supervision of use of
chemical agents. Conclusive proof of Soviet supply of
the chemical agents is still lacking. Indeed, given the
limited collection possibilities and opportunities avail-
able to us, such proof is unlikely to be acquired.
In Kampuchea
5. In 1982 the Vietnamese demonstrated their in-
difference to the international concern over the use of
chemical warfare by conducting a number of attacks
near the Thai border (at least six occurred on Thai
territory) and by continuing the attacks even while the
UN investigating team was in Thailand. Proximity and
visibility of the attacks made collection of fresh sam-
ples for analysis much easier than was the case in Laos
and Afghanistan. That proximity also allowed other
governments and international organizations to exam-
ine recent victims and collect evidence.
6. In 1982, Kampuchea provided a wider range of
sources and kinds of information than in previous
years. The earlier chemical attacks were conducted
primarily against the Democratic Kampuchea (DK)
troops, who served as the main source of information.
At present, information is also obtained from the
Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF),
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Thai and other government representatives, Vietnam-
ese defectors, and international organizations
7. The number of deaths reported per attack also
decreased in Kampuchea. As in Laos, the decrease
may be explained by Vietnamese use of less toxic
chemicals or less effective methods of dissemination or
by improved countermeasures taken by DK forces and
other intended victims. As in previous years, both
Vietnamese and resistance forces claimed deaths and
casualties from poisoned food and water.
8. The combat situation in Kampuchea is much
different from that in Laos. There is a greater fre-
quency of direct engagement of field combat forces,
frequently involving exchanges of artillery fire. Chem-
ical shells are often fired on opposing forces or their
sanctuaries. A Western intelligence service has verified
at least one such chemical attack in late 1982. Accord-
ing to Thai reports, the Vietnamese also spread chemi-
cals along trails and the border. As in Laos, there are
also confirmed reports of aircraft spraying "yellow
rain."
9. Our first positive identification of trichothecene
mycotoxins came in 1981 from a sample collected in
Kampuchea. Since that time, samples of vegetation,
residue, soil, and water, as well as human blood, urine,
and autopsy tissue, have been collected and analyzed.
These analyses have been positive, showing that the
Vietnamese have continued to use toxins. Background
control samples have continued to be negative. Other
chemical agents or combinations are also being used,
able to identify them
but we have not yet been
through sample analysis.
In Afghanistan
10. The Soviets have continued selective use of
chemical agents throughout the past year against
resistance forces and against villages that did not
cooperate with the Afghan authorities. Reports during
1982 have amplified and added credibility to our
earlier findings. In Afghanistan there is no question
that the Soviets themselves are using chemical agents
and possibly toxins. In addition, we continue to receive
reports that the Soviets have provided chemical agents
to the Afghan forces for use against the Mujahedin
11. For the first time we have evidence of the
presence of trichothecene mycotoxins in Afghanistan,
through the discovery of toxin contamination of a
piece of Soviet protective equipment. Laboratory
4
analysis of a Soviet protective mask has revealed the
presence of T-2 toxin (sample 7, annex D, table D-3),
in a quantity of approximately 1 microgram on the
area examined (one-fourth of the mask). This finding
was confirmed independently by three different lab-
oratories.
12. Also for the first time, the United States ac-
quired a large quantity (34 sets) of new (unused) Soviet
gas masks, canisters, and complete protective suits
captured from a Soviet convoy by Mujahedin forces in
August 1982. No information on the location of the
attack or intended destination of the convoy is avail-
able. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the Soviets
would not provide such protective gear to their forces
in Afghanistan unless they anticipated a need for it�
that is, for use in connection with employment of CW
agents and weapons. Comprehensive protective gear
of this sort would not be required as protection against
the kinds of nonlethal riot control chemicals that the
Mujahedin have been accused of using.
13. Reporting from Afghanistan had long included
descriptions of events similar to the "yellow rain"
attacks reported from Southeast Asia. However, be-
cause of the remoteness of attack sites and difficulties
in sample collection, we have been unable to obtain
Physical evidence of the presence of mycotoxins in
Afghanistan until the recent confirmation of the pres-
ence of 1-2 on the Soviet gas mask. This now greatly
strengthens our previous assessment that "toxins prob-
ably have been used since 1980."
14. The biggest mystery remains the identification
of the other agents being used. Some familiar CW
agents can be inferred from descriptions of signs and
symptoms. For example, the medical effects resulting
from some chemical attacks are consistent with the use
of the nerve agent tabun. (Reportedly, tabun is one of
the agents present in the CW stocks maintained by
Soviet forces in Afghanistan.) Other reports indicate
use of an incapacitating agent that causes unconscious-
ness for several hours.
15. As early as 1980 we began receiving reports of
Soviet forces dropping or pumping one or more
chemical agents into tunnels, caves, and underground
waterways where resistance forces and their families
take shelter. Reports of those incidents contain de-
scriptions of symptoms that have puzzled the experts.
Of particular concern are reports of rapid blackening
and decomposition of tissue, a description that fits
none of the CW agents known to us. The frequency
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�StatRE�T�
and consistency of these accounts from many different
tribal groups have led us to conclude that they must be
taken seriously and that we may be dealing with a new
class of chemical or toxin agent or with combinations
not previously known to the West. In one case, US
intelligence officers interviewed eyewitnesses who re-
ported that gasoline and probably diesel fuel were
poured into tunnels and ignited with incendiary pow-
der and shells. The number of deaths and condition of
the bodies were consistent with fire and asphyxiation.
16. There has been no change in the manner of
dissemination of the chemical substances. The pre-
dominant delivery system still appears to be helicop-
ters firing CW rockets, dropping chemical-loaded
bombs or canisters, or spraying chemicals directly.
Findings From Other Countries
17. There is a growing body of international evi-
dence that supports the US findings of chemical
weapons use. Non-US private experts and governments
have collected and independently analyzed samples
and have obtained testimony from witnesses of attacks
and from medical personnel. A few examples follow.
18. Non-American physicians with good credentials
in tropical medicine have testified that they have
treated chemical warfare victims. For example, a
French physician has provided testimony on his treat-
ment of victims at a Kampuchean hospital. Similar
testimony came from a Swedish International Red
Cross worker in Kampuchea. A New Zealand doctor
and his British associate at the World Vision Hospital
at Ban Vinai refugee camp are convinced that H'Mong
villagers are victims of repeated chemical warfare
attacks in Laos. An increasing number of these physi-
cians have made strong public statements and, to date,
not one doctor who has examined victims claiming
CW injury has publicly or privately disputed his
claims after examination.
19. Two French physicians who worked in Afghan-
istan described the unusual wounds caused by what
they believe were poisoned bullets. French scientists
have found trichothecene toxins in samples from
Southeast Asia. Thai scientists have reported finding
mycotoxins in their samples.
20. acquired
portions of gas masks from attack sites in Afghanistan.
5
The tests conducted on them are as yet incomplete,
but early indications and some signs and symptoms of
persons handling the contaminated masks suggest that
chemical agents were used in the attacks
21. Several carefully done epidemiological studies
have been prepared by Canadian governmental and
academic institutions. Their findings are consistent
with ours on all but technically minor points.
22. The December 1982 report of the UN Experts
Group provided as much support as the United States
could reasonably expect from such a multilateral
entity. The document supported individual US claims
in more than a dozen specific technical areas, faulted
the Soviet "scientific explanation" in strong language,
and declared other hypotheses (other than use of CW)
to be remote and inconsistent with the human testi-
mony and the laboratory data at hand. Its failure to
support the US charges fully was attributed by most of
the world press to the political�not scientific�inhibi-
tions of the Experts Group.
Implications for Intelligence
23. The fact that chemical and toxin agents con-
tinue to be used in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan
despite a highly publicized UN investigation, diplo-
matic pressure on the Soviet, Vietnamese, and Lao
Governments, and growing international acceptance
of the evidence suggests that the perpetrating govern-
ments do not believe that their activities are as yet
sufficiently damaging politically to warrant their ter-
mination. This is not to say that Moscow, Hanoi, and
Vientiane have ignored the charges being levied
against them. But rather than stopping the illegal use
of chemical and toxin agents, they have launched a
major propaganda counteroffensive
24. In May 1982 the Soviets submitted a "scien-
tific" study to the UN blaming the toxin poisoning in
Laos and Kampuchea on US use of herbicides during
the Vietnam war. The Soviet study claims that wide-
spread use of herbicides allowed toxin-producing fungi
to flourish in Vietnam. Winds then allegedly blew the
spores into Laos and Kampuchea, contaminating the
environment. It is surprising that the Soviet Academy
of Sciences would lend its name to the production of
such a scientifically indefensible paper. Nevertheless,
the overall Soviet counterpropaganda effort has not
been without effect in diverting public attention away
from the Soviet actions and focusing them on the
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proposed US chemical warfare modernization pro-
gram and on past US use of herbicides in Vietnam. An
international scientific conference was held in Ho Chi
Minh City (Saigon) in January 1983 to call attention to
the long-term effects of herbicide use on nature and
man.
25. The comprehensive assessment of the CW evi-
dence that the United States has published and briefed
worldwide in classified and unclassified form has
helped to persuade many governments that lethal
agents, including toxins, are being used and that the
Soviet Union is implicated. There is a reluctance on
the part of most governments, however, to levy such
charges publicly. Governments are loath to take a
public position on the issue because to acknowledge
that the USSR has violated its international commit-
ments is to call into question the trustworthiness of the
USSR as a party to arms limitation agreements. Even
the most conclusive and incontrovertible intelligence
evidence is unlikely to galvanize other governments
into forceful public positions on an issue that has such
politically unpleasant implications.
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"StERZ1:
ANNEX A
INCREMENTAL EVIDENCE
Laos
1. H'Mong refugees entered the camps in Thailand
every month from January through December 1982,
telling stories of chemical attacks and exhibiting severe
medical symptoms from exposure to agents. They also
brought more samples of material contaminated with
the sticky yellow substance described as "yellow rain,"
dropped by aircraft and helicopters on their villages
and crops. More stories of families, animals, and
vegetation being killed by Vietnamese and Lao chemi-
cal weapons have been added to a list dating back to
1976. We know that the "yellow rain" contains tri-
chothecene toxins and perhaps other substances which
cause vomiting, bleeding, and blistering. Doctors at the
Ban Vinai refugee camp observed victims in 1982 with
far worse skin lesions than the small blisters noted in
previous years. Moreover, many more survivors com-
plain of latent illness long after the exposure. Annex C
tabulates the attacks for this period.
2. Medical personnel in Thai refugee camps were
much better organized to screen for victims than in
past years. This is particularly true for the World
Vision hospital in the Ban Vinai refugee camp, where
doctors now routinely use comprehensive question-
naires and conduct medical examinations, including
some on-site preliminary blood analysis. Skilled medi-
cal personnel also oversee preparation of blood and
serum samples for chemical analysis in the United
States or other countries. Therefore, the US Embassy
reports now include far more detail than before. The
Canadian Government has widely disseminated photo-
graphs of victims with severe skin lesions. Some
patients with active and continuing symptoms are
being treated in Thai hospitals.
3. We have noted differences in the symptoms
described in reporting during the past year as com-
pared with preceding years. Severe and prolonged
vomiting, bloody diarrhea, and blistering are still
commonly reported, while the dramatic descriptions
of massive bleeding and rapid death have almost
disappeared. Another set of symptoms, characterized
by incapacitation and unconsciousness, but no blisters
or bleeding and no deaths, has been noted in the past
year. Both general categories of injury can also be
accompanied by long-term physical damage.
4. A number of biological samples have been col-
lected from Laos for analysis in the United States.
Samples include, for example, blood specimens from
10 victims exposed to six different CW attacks during
the period January through May of 1982. All speci-
mens were drawn by medical personnel. Samples were
refrigerated until analyzed in the United States. Anal-
ysis of these blood samples shows that trichothecene
mycotoxins continue to be used against H'Mong vil-
lages. (See annex D, table D-1, for details.)
5. In addition to biological specimens from victims
exposed to CW, six environmental and miscellaneous
collections that included 14 individual samples were
obtained. These included residue from a "yellow rain"
attack, some vials of chemicals allegedly taken from a
military warehouse in Vientiane and reportedly used
to poison wells and small streams, and containers of
environmental materials (such as leaves and pebbles)
allegedly contaminated by CW agents. Analyses have
indicated the presence of one or more trichothecenes
in several powders and vegetation samples. In none of
the samples thus far analyzed have we seen evidence
of traditional chemical warfare agents.
6. In some "yellow rain" samples, pollen of a
definite and discrete size range was found. The pollen
grains ranged from 10 to 20 microns in diameter, a
size that poses a significant inhalation hazard. Al-
though 2 to 10 microns has traditionally been recog-
nized as optimum for lung saturation and retention,
10- to 20-micron particles have a greater total reten-
tion in the upper respiratory tract (80 to 90 percent, as
compared with 40 to 80 percent). The plant sources of
most of the pollens were identified as flowers, and the
pollens were of types that are not windborne. The
limited size range, concentration, and dissemination of
this pollen led to the suggestion that pollen may be a
component of "yellow rain," serving as a carrier
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structure to introduce the trichothecenes to the respi-
ratory tract. Very few samples have been of sufficient
quantity to check for the presence of pollens.
Kampuchea
7. To date the most persuasive scientific evidence
of mycotoxin use has come from Kampuchea. Blood
and other tissue taken from CW attack victims have
been found to contain tricothecene toxins. For exam-
ple, analysis of blood and urine taken from two victims
within 24 hours of a CW attack showed traces of T-2
and HT-2. For details of this and other analyses, see
annex D, table D-2. Autopsy data now available also
support the conclusion that mycotoxins have been
employed offensively (see annex E).
8. In February and March 1982, several attacks
occurred just across the Kampuchean border in Thai-
land. Analysis of samples collected from the attacks
was performed in Canada, Thailand, and the United
States. Although differing sampling techniques give
rise to significant sampling error and lead to slightly
different analytical results, both the US and Thai
analysts, using different analytical techniques, found
trichothecene mycotoxins in their samples.' The Cana-
dian team investigating these attacks has published a
detailed medical assessment of the victims' symptoms;
it concluded that illness had in fact occurred and was
caused by a toxic agent, although preliminary tests for
trichothecenes proved inconclusive in the Canadian
sample.
9. Several Vietnamese military defectors have pro-
vided information on the use of chemical weapons and
the Vietnamese chemical warfare program. They state
that the Vietnamese have used Soviet chemical weap-
ons in Kampuchea and Laos. They have also stated
that Soviet-supplied chemical munitions were avail-
able to Vietnamese forces to use against the Chinese in
1979.
10. CW attacks were also conducted in 1982 against
the Khmer People's National Liberation Front. On
several occasions that year, in the March-May period
'It was thought initially that a harmless yellow powder had been
dropped on Thai villages as part of a disinformation campaign
attempting to discredit US sample analysis results. Within days of
such an attack, the Thai Ministry of Health announced that only
ground-up flowers had been found. However, Thai officials later
stated that further analysis showed traces of toxin and that the
earlier Health Ministry announcement was based on incomplete
investigation.
and again in October, their camp at Sokh Sann was hit
with chemical artillery shells and bombs. Samples of
contaminated vegetation and yellow residue from the
March 1982 attack have been partially analyzed and
several special analyses will be done on them when
they have been fully examined.
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11. Before the October-November dry season there
was evidence that the Vietnamese had chemical muni-
tions and were equipping their troops with more
protective equipment. It appeared that the Vietnam-
ese were prepared to increase their use of lethal
chemical/toxin agents and other relatively nonlethal
agents during the dry season. Subsequent reporting
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Afghanistan
12. The evidence from Afghanistan is different
from that from Southeast Asia. It has been impossible
to obtain fresh samples of any type. However, report-
ing on chemical attacks comes from a wider variety of
sources, and sensitive collection throughout the coun-
try provides evidence to corroborate HUMINT report-
ing.
13. According to a former Afghan Army officer, in
September 1981 a Soviet helicopter sprayed a yellow
mist in Paktia Province (Sheik Amir, 3315N 6949E)
that caused 16 deaths. The survivors had bloody tears
and noses; extensive bleeding was reported in those
who died. The Afghan officer described a similar
attack in Nangarhar Province in the same month, in
which four persons were killed.
14. Since early 1980 we have had numerous reports
of Soviet use of chemical agents on resistance forces
and their families who were hiding in caves, tunnels,
and underground waterways. A HUMINT source who
has reported reliably in the past says that, on 20
September 1982, Soviet soldiers poisoned underground
waterways in Lowgar Province south of Kabul where
the Mujahedin were hiding. A Mujahedin commander
in Pakistan reported a similar event in the same
province on 13 September, which resulted in the
deaths of 60 men and 13 children. Both sources
described a chemical substance being pumped through
a hose from an armored vehicle into the waterways.
Furthermore, villagers who have witnessed Soviet
operations against underground waterways have pro-
vided testimony at international meetings describing
in detail how the Soviets have used chemical agents
and explosives in this way. Moreover, a Cuban emigre
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trained in the use of Soviet chemical weapons has
previously described a dissemination technique that
involves pumping lethal gas through a hose.
15. In both of these September attacks, the victims'
bodies reportedly decomposed rapidly, and the flesh
peeled away when attempts were made to move
them.2 Since 1979 Mujahedin resistance leaders, refu-
gees, journalists, and Afghan defectors have described
chemical attacks that caused almost identical symp-
toms. Most reports have portrayed the skin as being
blue-black after death. Such symptoms seem bizarre,
but the large number of reports from a variety of
sources suggests they cannot be dismissed as mere
propaganda. For example, an Afghan physician work-
ing at a hospital in Kabul in 1981 observed a victim of
what he believes was a chemical attack. The patient
had blackened skin, which was very shiny except for a
large number of spots all over the body. He and other
doctors were told they could not attend the patient.
More recently, a Soviet soldier who defected to the
Mujahedin said in a press interview that a Soviet CW
agent called "smersh," which is "100 percent lethal,"
causes the flesh to become very soft.
16. The defector also said that the Soviets had stores
of "picric acid," "smersh," and an incapacitating
agent in Qonduz and Kabul. In a subsequent interview
it was determined that the "picric acid" referred to
was chloropicrin, an extremely strong irritating agent
with an inhalation lethality nine times greater than
that of chlorine. The defector said that "smersh" was
delivered by rockets fired from a helicopter and that
chloropicrin and the incapacitating agent were con-
tained in cylinders and released through a vent in the
aircraft. Several Mujahedin have described tanks or
cylinders outside helicopters from which chemicals are
sprayed.
17. Further, the defector reported that chemical
agents had been used in June 1982 on a highway
between Termez and the Salang Pass north of Kabul.
He stated that the Soviets have been preoccupied with
protecting the roads and that chemicals were sprayed
by planes along the areas adjacent to highways. Chem-
ical grenades reportedly have been used. We suggest
that the grenades contain toxic smokes, but the data
2 In the late 1960s, the Soviets reportedly tested a chemical agent
that killed dogs immediately and decomposed their flesh within a
half hour.
are inadequate to allow us to hypothesize about the
contents beyond that.
18. The British journalist who interviewed the So-
viet defector cited above also reported on two attacks
he had heard about from other sources. One was an
attack in the spring of 1982 on Kaiba, where Soviet
soldiers shot victims rendered unconscious by a gas.
The other was near Herat in the summer of 1982
when Soviets reportedly loaded the bodies of victims
of a gas attack on a truck and took them away,
possibly for autopsy.
19. An Afghan physician based in Quetta, Pakistan,
told US officials on 5 October 1982 that he had treated
15 Mujahedin for red skin lesions which he said were
caused by Soviet CW attacks in Qandahar Province in
May or June 1982. The Mujahedin claimed that Soviet
helicopters fired rockets which emitted gases on im-
pact�black, yellow, and white in color. Three Muja-
hedin died within 12 hours of one attack, in the
general area of Maharijat south of Qandahar. The
physician said that the victims did not respond to
antibiotics or topical treatment and his blood analysis
was inconclusive.
20. In early December 1981 a group of 15 refugees
attempting escape to Pakistan were attacked by a
helicopter using gas that killed four or five of them
(youngest and oldest) and rendered the rest uncon-
scious for five or six hours. The attack occurred about
60 kilometers northwest of Jalalabad.
21. An Afghan airport official saw 200 to 300 gas
containers at Qandahar Airport that were painted in
greens and browns. The containers generally were 35
to 40 inches high and about 26 to 30 inches in
diameter. (This size generally matches that of contain-
ers known to be used by the Soviets to store CW agents
in their chemical depots.) A friend of the official at the
airport said that the containers held chemicals used
against the Afghan resistance. He described three
types. One caused burning in the throat and suffoca-
tion, one caused what looked like smallpox and blister-
ing, and the third made victims tired and sleepy so
that they could not run or fight. Further, the friend
stated that the containers are put into special casings
that are dropped from aircraft and explode on impact,
emitting a large cloud of smoke, usually yellow, but
sometimes other colors.
A-3
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22. Muiahedin sources described tanks firing gre-
nades in August 1981 in the Arghandab Valley which
produced a foggy mist that rendered 10 members of
the resistance force unconscious. The Soviets carried
their lifeless-appearing bodies away in armored vehi-
cles.
23. Information received this year revealed that a
Soviet adviser who, in March 1979, was inspecting sites
for quartering Soviet contingency troops, before the
invasion, indicated that Soviet chemical defense forces
entering the country would bring stores of toxic
materials. The adviser indicated that a proposed garri-
son near Kabul would be inappropriate for the Soviet
chemical unit because the materials it transported
would devastate the city if an accident occurred.
a chemical defense unit possesses decon-
taminants that require care in handling, they are not
toxic enough to cause a great number of casualties.
The statement therefore suggests that chemical de-
fense units, at least during contingency or wartime
conditions, are responsible for offensive chemical war-
fare materials. This is supported by a former Soviet
soldier stationed in the Baltic Military District in the
mid-1970s. He said that the chemical defense battalion
of his division was responsible for maintaining the
chemical warheads for the division's FROG-7s.
A-4
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ANNEX B
COMPOSITION OF "YELLOW RAIN"
1. The exact composition of the material known as
yellow rain" has not been determined. We are
certain that one or more trichothecene toxins are
included. These may be responsible in whole or in part
for the symptoms reported by victims of the attacks.
These victims experience severe and prolonged vomit-
ing, nausea, and bleeding and often die (sometimes
hours, sometimes days, later). In a few cases the
victims have survived with only skin lesions. Those
who have entered an area after an attack and contact-
ed the dry, fine powder developed skin rashes. If they
inhaled the powder, they developed abdominal pain,
and various degrees of nausea, vomiting, disorienta-
tion, and other minor symptoms. Still others develop
medical problems (and sometimes die) from ingesting
contaminated food and/or water.
2. The descriptions of "yellow rain- as a wet, sticky
substance when disseminated and as leaving a pow-
dery residue afterward suggests that some type of
liquid is present. If present, it may serve to facilitate
dissemination, as from the spray tanks of airplanes. It
may also serve to facilitate skin penetration of the
toxins. There is also the possibility that such a chemi-
cal, if used, is itself toxic, and is responsible for some of
the central nervous system effects which have been
reported and which cannot be explained by the pres-
ence of trichothecenes alone. Preliminary identifica-
tion of such material has been made through sample
analysis.
3. Pollen of a definite size range has been found in
a few "yellow rain" samples by US, British, and
Australian personnel. The pollen grains were 10 to 20
microns in diameter, a size range that poses a signifi-
cant inhalation hazard and which is significantly
narrower than would be expected in a random sample.
Plant sources of most of the pollens were identified as
common flowers. The pollens were of a type that is not
generally windborne, but rather is collected by insects.
This type of pollen can be commercially collected.
The limited size range, concentration, and dissemina-
tion of this pollen have led us to suspect that pollen
may be a component of the "yellow rain- mixture,
possibly serving as a carrier to introduce trichothe-
cenes into the respiratory tract. In only one sample
thus far have pollens and trichothecenes been linked.
B- 1
Too few samples have been analyzed for the presence
of pollen to conclude with certainty that it is a usual
constituent of "yellow rain." We continue to investi-
gate the possibility.
4. The final, tantalizing possibility is that aflatoxin
is a part of the mixture. The evidence for this is
tenuous at best, but still worth considering. As noted in
annex E, aflatoxin B1 was found in autopsy tissues of a
-yellow rain" attack victim. This certainly could be
the result of ingestion of naturally contaminated food
sources; it also could have been acquired at the time of
the attack. The second piece of relevant data is the
finding in one residue sample of a component of
purified aflatoxin from laboratory cultures of aflatoxin
B1. The presence of this component suggests strongly
that not all of the material in the residue was present
naturally. Note, however, that no aflatoxin B1 has yet
been identified in residue samples, but the number of
analyses for that particular toxin have been few. We
know that aflatoxin research has been conducted in
the USSR and that the toxin is listed in the East
German military manuals as a warfare agent. We also
have (limited) intelligence reporting that the Soviets
have conducted research on toxic extracts of mixed
fungal cultures, although the strains of fungi were not
specified. Finally, we know that the trichothecenes
and aflatoxin act synergistically. That aflatoxin may
be a component of -yellow rain- is at present only a
hypothesis, but the bits of data are suggestive of this
and we continue to look for evidence to prove or
disprove the hypothesis.
5. Certainly the variation in symptoms reported
after "yellow rain- attacks can be explained in part by
the differences in physical condition, age, sex, and
degree of exposure of victims. Some of the differences
in severity of symptoms could also perhaps be ex-
plained by the possible admixture in -yellow rain- of
other substances acting synergistically with the toxins.
6. Clearly we are not yet certain of the composition
of -yellow rain" beyond knowing that trichothecenes
are present. As indicated above, however, the accumu-
lated evidence allows us some working hypotheses that
may help us define the materials in the mixture more
precisely.
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ANNEX C
DETAILS OF CHEMICAL ATTACKS
This annex comprises four tables (C-1, C-2, C-3, and
C-4) providing detailed information on CW attacks in
Laos, Kampuchea, Thailand, and Afghanistan�loca-
tion of attack, source of information, method of
delivery, form of chemical, and number of casualties.
C- 1
--5.C.C.ELLI ......
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�--
Table C-1
Laos: Summary of Chemical Warfare Attacks, 1982-83
Date of
Attack
Location
Source of
Information
Delivery Method
Form of
Chemical
Persons Killed
Persons Taken Ill
3, 6, 11 Jan
1982
Phou Bia
H'Mong refugee
medical exam,
Ban Vinai refu-
gee camp
Helicopter spray
Yellow rain
0
?
4 Jan
Phou Bia
Refugee, Ban
Vinai
Aircraft
Green chemical
?
9 Jan
Ban Dan Trung,
Phou Bia
Refugee, Ban
Vinai
Artillery
White/yellow
cloud
13 Feb
Phou Bia
Refugee, Ban
Vinai
Aircraft spray
-Yellow rain"
0
21-22 Feb
Phou Bia
Refugee, Ban
Vinai
Helicopter
White powder
0
28 Feb
Phou Bia
Medical exam,
Ban Vinai
Helicopter
Yellow powder
20
10 Mar
Phou Bia
Refugee, Ban
Vinai
Helicopter, other
aircraft
Red, yellow,
white clouds
Many
Many
17 Mar
Phou Bia
Medical exam,
Ban Vinai
Helicopter spray
-Yellow rain"
25 Mar
Phou Bia
Medical exam,
Ban Vinai
Helicopter spray
"Yellow rain-
1
40 families
30 Mar
Phou Bia, Pha
Ngune, Nam Yao
Medical exam,
Ban Vinai
MI-8 helicopter,
MIG-17
Red, yellow/
white
Many
Many
Late Mar or
early Apr
Phou Bia
Medical exam,
Ban Vinai, 214
refugees
Aircraft
"Yellow rain"
27
Many
1 Apr
Phou Bia (three
villages)
Refugee
"Yellow rain"
Many
4
8, 10 Apr
20 km NE of Phou
Khao airfield in
central Laos
Refugee
Helicopter
Yellow powder
P
7
17, 18, 30
Apr
Phou Bia (three
areas)
EI'Mong refugees
Aircraft
"Yellow rain"
10
27 Apr
Samsen area
Thai official to US
defense attache
Helicopter
"Yellow rain-
113
Many
Apr/May
Phou Bia
Medical exam,
Ban Vinai
Aircraft, includ-
ing helicopters
-Yellow rain"
0
Many
20 May
Phou Bia, Ban
Pha Ngune
Medical exam,
Ban Vinai
Jet aircraft
"Yellow rain"
4
100
24 May
Phou Bia
Medical exam,
Ban Vinai
Aircraft
"Yellow rain-
9
Many
May
Phou Bia
Lao refugee
Poisoned river
0
Many
17 June
Phou Bia
Medical exam,
Ban Vinai
Helicopter
"Yellow rain-
4
Many
17 Oct
Hills around vil-
lage of Phu Me
Medical exam,
Ban Vinai
Jet aircraft
Orange/yellow
mist
2
Many
11 Dec
Champassak Prov-
ince
Thai intelligence
Poisoned water
?
Many
23 Dec
SE Savannakhet
Province
Thai intelligence
Aircraft spray
Yellowish liquid
P
Many
C-2
--SEEREZ.
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-3-ets-RELs
Table C-2
Kampuchea: Summary of Chemical Warfare Attacks, 1982-83
Date of
Attack
Location
Source of
Information
Delivery Method
Form of
Chemical
Persons Killed
Persons Taken Ill
13 Feb
1982
Khao Din, Thai
border
DK/Thai
Artillery shells
?
1
100 (17
hospitalized)
23 Feb
Border near Pai-
lin
Thai
Aircraft (powder
blown over bor-
der)
Yellow powder
0
Many
3 Mar
Battambang
Province
DK/Thai
Artillery
0
5, 7 Mar
Pailin area
DK/Thai
Aircraft spray,
artillery
White powder
0
10
7-11 Mar
Sokh Sann
KPNLF
Aircraft spray,
artillery
Yellow substance
0
Many
10 Mar
Battambang
Province
DK
Aircraft
25
12
10-13 Mar
Battambang
Province
DK/Thai
Aircraft, artillery
30
7
17 Mar
Sokh Sann
KPNLF
Artillery
Yellow/white
powder
0
Many
24 Mar
Battambang
Province
DK
Poisoned water
Yellow powder
4
24 Apr
Nong Chan (near
Thai border)
KPNLF
60-mm mortar
Yellow cloud
0
4
29 Apr
Battambang
Thai
Aircraft spray
Yellow powder
3
7
25, 26
May
Sokh Sann
DK official
Aircraft spray
Chemical
0
June
Preah Vihear
Province
DK commander
Poison food and
water
?
2
Many
24 June
Border near Nong
Chan
Thai intelligence
Mortar rounds
Yellow cloud
0
4
? Sep 82
Along Thai bor-
der
Physican near
Kampuchean
border
Chemicals spread
on ground
Sep 82
Along Thai bor-
der
Physican near
Kampuchea bor-
der
Ground spray
24 Sep
Nong Chan
KPNLF
60-mm mortar
Chemicals
0
4
29-31 Oct
Sokh Sann
KPNLF
P
Yellow droplets
31 Oct
Yaeng Dangkum
Correspondent
Artillery shells
Gas
6
60
1, 2 Nov
Phum Tuman
Thai
Howitzer shells
?
4
Many
1 Nov
Koh Kong City
DK/Thai
105-mm artillery
?
0
6
2 Nov
Ta Sanh
DK/Thai
Heavy weapons
3 Nov
Sokh Sann
KPNLF
P
White droplets
8 Nov
Anlong Reap
DK/Thai
P
P
0
7
25 Nov
Samrong
DK
Poison gas
6 families
(civilians)
26 Nov
Battambang
Province
DK
Spread around
civilian homes
0
(continued)
C-3
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Table C-2 (continued)
Kampuchea: Summary of Chemical Warfare Attacks, 1982-83
Date of Source of Form of
Attack Location Information Delivery Method Chemical Persons Killed Persons Taken III
3 Dec Thai-Kampu- DK Artillery rounds ? 0 15
chean border and release of
chemicals into
the Stoeng Me-
toek River
5 Dec
Stung Treng
River
DK
Poison spread
along river
Civilians died
after eating fish
11 Dec Northeastern DK Poisoned water ? Many
Preah Vihear
Province
16 Dec Ban Hiang, Ban DK Vietnamese
(date of Pakxangholong, sprayed two types
report) Ban Non Gnang of poison gas on
edge of jungle
and around wells
Poison gas
23 at first loca- ?
tion, 7 at second
(after eating ani-
mals or plants ex-
posed to the
spray), 8 at third
23 Dec
Kampot Province Khmer Rouge Helicopter spray
1 Jan 1983 Nong Chan Singaporean in-
telligence
10 Jan Koh Kong DK/Thai intelli- Artillery
gence
6
12 Jan Nong Chong DK/Thai intelli-
gence
18 Jan
Kompong Speu Voice of DK in Ground spray
Province Kampuchea
10
17 Feb Sokh Sann, 0 KPNLF -Rain-
Totiek
C-4
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Table C-3
Thailand: Summary of Chemical Warfare Attacks, 1982-83
Date of
Attack
Location
Source of
Information
Delivery Method
Form of
Chemical
Persons Killed
Persons Taken Ill
19 Feb
Pong Nam Ron
District
Thai, Canadian
Aircraft spray
Yellow powder
0
Many
3 Mar
Southeast of Pong
Nam Ron District
near border
Thai
Aircraft (powder
windblown over
border)
Powder
0
Many
5 Mar
Pong Nam Ron
District
Thai
Mortars
Gray/black
smoke
0
18 (Thai civilians)
6, 8 Mar
Southeast of Pong
Nam Ron District
near border
Thai
Aircraft spray
Yellow powder
0
Many
12 Jan 1983
Camp at Nong
Ehan
KPNLF
Artillery
Poison gas
C-5
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�sesgEz.
Table C-4
Afghanistan: Summary of Chemical Warfare Attacks, 1982-83
Date of Source of
Attack Location Information
Jan Lowgar Province Mujahedin
Form of
Delivery Method Chemical
Helicopter
Persons Killed Persons Taken Ill
Early Feb
North of
Shindand
Mujahedin
commander
Aircraft
Yellow substance 4
4, 5 Feb
South of
Shindand
Mujahedin
commander
Helicopter
Yellow substance 0 0
19 Feb Badakhshan British Aircraft Yellow substance 0
Province
2nd week of Vardak Province Afghan exile
Apr
Helicopters with Blue smoke 300
bombs
May
Badakhshan
Province
Mujahedin Helicopters Smoke-producing
bombs (blue-
green)
May-Jun Qandahar
Province
Mujahedin
Helicopter Black, yellow,
rockets white gases
5-9 Jun Lowgar Province Afghan exile
After military
attacks, Soviets
used unknown
chemicals on
bodies killed in
action
11 June
Qandahar
Province
Mujahedin Aircraft bombs Poisonous gas 15 30
Jun Northern Faryab Pakistani press
Province
Helicopters,
bombs
Red, white, black ? Many
gases
Jun
Road between MI-24 pilot Helicopter ? ?
Kabul and
Termez
(Soviet defector)
Jul Panisher Valley
20 Jul Syed Karom
District
13 Sep Lowgar
Afghan defector
Mujahedin
Aircraft
Tabun nerve gas
-Chemical gas- 3
-Chemical gas- -Chemical gas- 73
pumped from
armored vehicle
18 Sep Kote Sangi
Mujahedin Rockets
20 Sep Lowgar
Afghan observer Chemicals
pumped from
armored vehicle
Gas
Late Sep- Baghlan Province Mujahedin Aircraft bombs
early Oct
5 Nov Near Kabul
Grenades thrown ?
by Soviet soldiers
16 Nov Dewaghal, in Afghan observer Chemical bombs ?
Konar Valley dropped on rebel
stronghold
3 Feb 1983
Kandar Province Afghan military
officer
25
Secret
C-6
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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--Sreciu
ANNEX D
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND TOXINS
1. Identification of the specific chemical agents
being used in conflict areas (such as Laos, Kampuchea,
and Afghanistan) depends on collection and analysis of
at least one of the following: environmental samples
contaminated with agent, the munitions used to de-
liver agents, or biological specimens from attack
victims
2. Obtaining contaminated samples that will yield
positive traces of specific chemical agents is dependent
on a number of factors. These include the persistency
of the chemical; the ambient temperature, rainfall,
and wind conditions; the media on which the chemical
was deposited; and the time, care, and packaging of
the sample from collection to analysis in a laboratory.
Many standard chemical warfare agents are nonper-
sistent and disappear from the environment within a
few minutes to several hours after being dispersed.
These include, for example, the nerve agents sarin and
tabun, the blood agents hydrogen cyanide and cyano-
gen chloride, the choking agents phosgene and diphos-
gene, and the blistering agent (urticant) phosgene
oxime. Other standard CW agents�such as the nerve
agents V X and thickened soman, and the blistering
agents sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and lewis-
ite�may persist for several days to weeks depending
on weather conditions. The trichothecene toxins are
persistent but may be diluted to below detectable
concentrations by adverse weather conditions. Al-
though the trichothecenes are quite stable under con-
trolled laboratory conditions, in the field they may be
subject to microbial degradation_______
3. To maximize the chances of identification and
detection, sample collections should be made as rapid-
ly as possible after a chemical assault, and with many
agents this means minutes to hours. Under the circum-
stances of Southeast Asia and Afghanistan this has
simply not been possible; nor has there been hardware
specifically developed and disseminated to these areas
to aid collection of perishable samples. While numer-
ous samples have been collected, few of them held any
D-1
realistic prospect for yielding positive results. When-
ever random samples are collected, even under ideal
conditions, there is a wide variability in the concentra-
tion of agents detected in the samples. This is not
surprising when one considers the many factors that
can affect sampling.
4. Samples have been collected from Southeast Asia
since mid-1979 and from Afghanistan since May 1980.
To date, about 350 individual samples�of greatly
varying types and usefulness for analytical purposes�
have been collected and analyzed for the presence of
traditional CW agents, none of which have been
detected. On the basis of recommendations by medical
and toxicological experts and of findings by the US
Army Chemical Systems Laboratory (USACSL), many
of the samples have been analyzed for the trichothe-
cene group of mycotoxins. Details concerning the
samples, including the circumstances of their collec-
tion and results of their analysis, are provided in tables
D-1, D-2, and D-3.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
5. All environmental and nonbiological samples are
submitted to USACSL for comprehensive analysis for
unknowns, to include traditionally recognized chemi-
cal warfare agents and other possibly toxic materials.
Tissue specimens and body fluids from victims of CW
attacks are submitted to the Armed Forces Medical
Intelligence Center (AFMIC). Before 1982, AFMIC
was known as the US Army Medical Intelligence and
Information Agency (USAMIIA).' Analyses of biologi-
cal samples for trichothecene and other mycotoxins
are conducted under the sponsorship of AFMIC by Dr. (b)(3)
Chester Mirocha, University of Minnesota; Dr. Joseph
Rosen, Rutgers University; and Dr. Tim Phillips, Texas
A &M University. The US Food and Drug Administra-
tion has also assisted in analysis, as has a pollen expert
from the Smithsonian Institute.
' Unless otherwise indicated, all human tissue and urine speci-
mens listed in the sample set tables were refrigerated (5-8 degrees C)
from the time of collection until they were received by the
analytical laboratories
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Table D-1
Laos: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No. Sample Description
1 Polyethylene plastic sheet,
square inches.
History of Sample
4 Collected in early 1979 after a chemi-
cal attack on H'Mong village. H'Mong
refugee gave to Thai personnel, who in
turn passed a small piece to US officials
for analysis.
Analytical Results
Thai preliminary analysis indicated the
presence of a vesicant (blistering agent).
Analysis by an independent US laborato-
ry found no evidence of vesicant or any
other CW agent.
2
Yellow powder residue on
bambo thatching from roof of
hut.
Chemical was sprayed from L-19 air-
craft in Pha Mai Village in March
1979. All animals in village died. At
least 28 people died after vomiting
blood, coughing up blood, and suffer-
ing massive nosebleed, blurred vision,
and difficult breathing. Dried yellow
spots on bamboo thatching were about
2.0 millimeters in diameter. Sample
given to US Army medical team in
October 1979. Analyzed by US Army
Chemical Systems Laboratory
(USACSL).
Total sample of yellow material on bark
was 2 milligrams. No evidence of known
chemical warfare agents was present.
Lauryl alcohol derivatives, primarily sul-
fate, indicating a possible surfactant or
wetting agent for spreading other chemi-
cals, was detected.
3
Human tissue samples from 20
H'Mong reportedly exposed to a
CW attack and hospitalized in
Bangkok. Twenty urine, 19
blood, and 20 sputum samples
and 16 chest X-rays were re-
ceived. Samples from H'Mong
refugees not attacked with
chemical agents were used as
controls.
Samples were taken in July 1980 from
H'Mong who had been exposed to a
CW attack. Analyzed for cholinester-
ase. Control samples from H'Mong ref-
ugees not exposed to a CW agent were
also analyzed. Samples being retained
at USACSL for possible additional anal-
ysis.
Cholinesterase activity determinations in
the blood of exposed individuals were not
significantly different from normal/un-
exposed persons. Cholinesterase activity
was very low in both test and control
subjects. No evidence of known CW
agents in any of the samples.
4
Yellow/orange powder from
chemical attack in vicinity of
Phou Bia.
Collected by H'Mong resistance fight-
er on day of attack, 25
October 1980. Thirty of 100 people
became ill; none died. Given on 21
April 1981 to medical officer of inter-
national organization, who transferred
it to US custody. Sample sent to United
States 30 April 1981. Container was not
opened until received at USACSL.
No evidence of any known CW agent.
(Sample contained only 1 to 2 milligrams
of powder.) Not analyzed for trichothe-
cene toxins. Tentatively identified as ses-
quiterpene, which has a structure similar
to that of the trichothecenes. Also found
were a quinone and aromatic hydrocar-
bons and carbonyls.
5
Yellow powder residue scraped
from a banana leaf in vicinity of
Ban Don.
Collected by H'Mong refugee
after a 1 April 1981 attack on
north side of mountain near Ban Don.
Sample received by a medical doctor
from international organization 21
April 1981 and by US personnel on 30
April 1981. Container was not opened
until received at USACSL.
No evidence of any known CW agent.
Sample contained only 1 to 2 milligrams
of powder. Not analyzed for trichothe-
cene toxins. Analysis did detect sesquiter-
pene and carbonyl groups, which could
be indicative of a trichothecene.
(continued)
D-2
.."-SECVLL
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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--S-eeRzis
Table D-1 (continued)
Laos: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
6
Sample Description
Yellow powder (about 550 milli-
grams) from village of Muong
Cha in the Phou Bia region.
History of Sample
H'Mong refugee collected sample in
scraping from rocks and leaves after a
15 March 1981 attack in the village of
Muong Cha. Refugee arrived in Thai-
land on 28 April 1981 and gave sample
to Thai police authorities, who turned
it over to US Embassy officer. Sample
forwarded to US on 21 May 1981.
Analyzed for known CW agents at
USACSL, then transferred to inde-
pendent laboratory for trichothecene
analysis.
Analytical Results
No evidence of known CW agent. Aro-
matic hydrocarbons and carbonyls were
present indicating possible trichothecene.
Portion of sample analyzed for mycotox-
ins of the trichothecene group. T-2 toxin
and diacetoxyscirpenol (DAS) were found
at levels of 150 and 25 parts per million
respectively. Nivalenol and deoxyniva-
lent were not detected. Second analysis
of sample showed a T-2 toxin level of 148
ppm and DAS at 27 ppm. No nivalenol
or deoxynivalenol was detected. Analysis
for aflatoxin was negative. Pollen was
also identified.
7
Very small amount, less than
milligram of solid in 5 milliliters
of solution.
First sample taken by a H'Mong from
site of a CW attack that occurred on 2
April 1981 at Ban Thong Hak. Twenty-
four victims died. Sample was given to
a journalist, who transferred it to a
Congressman. It was given subsequent-
ly to USACSL on 11 June 1981. Sample
transferred to US Army Medical Infor-
mation and Intelligence Agency (USA-
MBA) for analysis for trichothecene
toxins.
Second similar sample from same chan-
nel received on 30 June 1981.
Sample 1: No evidence of any traditional
CW agents. Solvent was methanol. No T-
2, nivalenol, or deoxynivalenol was pres-
ent. Ten nanograms of diacetoxyscir-
penol (DAS), a toxic trichothecene, were
present in the sample. The small sample
size precluded adequate analysis for
other trichothecene toxins, and it cannot
be determined if they were present or
not.
Sample 2: Indications of a steroid which
could be indicative of a trichothecene.
No evidence of known CW agents.
8
Five blood samples.
Samples were clotted. Sent to USA-
MIIA on 17 November 1981. No analy-
sis for trichothecene toxins planned.
Symptoms described by victims indi-
cate that the chemical agent was CS or
other riot control material.
No exploitation at this time.
9
Two samples:
� Natural vegetation, stem and
leaves.
� Plastic bottle containing five
samples, three of leaves and
two of powder.
Sample of residue collected after a 6
December 1981 CW attack at Muong
Phon, 20 kilometers west of Phou Bia.
Victims suffered from bloody vomiting
and diarrhea. Many deaths. H'Mong
carried the sample out of Laos 8 De-
cember 1981.
received it 9 December 1981 and
provided sample to Embassy. Received
by USACSL on 5 January 1982. One-
fourth of sample given to UK for analy-
sis. One-fourth sample to USAMIIA for
trichothecene analysis.
Sam12121Sample 1: No evidence of
known CW agents. Analysis incomplete.
Sample 2: No evidence of known CW
agents. Identified 2 methylfuran cyclooc-
tatetraene, which could be indicative of a
trichothecene. Analysis for trichothe-
cenes were negative. Analysis in UK
found pollens from plant indigenous to
Southeast Asia. No trichothecene toxins
were found.
10
Residue.
Sample collected by a H'Mong resist-
ance leader immediately after a 12
December 1981 CW attack. Villagers
suffered bloody diarrhea, some deaths.
Sample given to Embassy official on 8
January 1982 and transferred to UK
officials on that date. Sent to London
on 19 January for analysis.
Pollen, flower parts, and Fusaria mold.
No trichothecene toxins were detected.
Toxogenic fungi�some trichothecene
toxin species were found.
(continued)
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R
Table D-1 (continued)
Laos: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No. Sample Description
11 Residue of gray fuzz.
History of Sample
On 3 March 1982 this residue sample
from Laos was provided to a Thai
national who had been given the
sample by a Lao in the Lao resistance
force. Residue was obtained after a
CW attack at the end of February
1982. Chemical was dropped from a
small, unidentified aircraft. Four or
five individuals in the area suffered
fever on the first day, followed by
vomiting of blood on second and third
days before death. Cattle allegedly
died within seven days after the attack.
Received on 8 March 1982 by
USACSL.
Analytical Results
Sample had appearance of fuzz. No evi-
dence of traditional CW agents. Analysis
incomplete.
12 Two vials of white powder:
�Vial A
�Vial B
Vials allegedly taken from a military
warehouse in Vientiane used to store
CW equipment, including munitions.
Powders reportedly were used to poi-
son wells and small streams. Samples
taken by a Lao who had access and
given to Thai contact, who turned it
over to a US citizen. Samples pouched
to US on 15 April 1982. Analyzed by
USACSL.
Vial A - penicillin-G
Vial B - procain penicillin.
13 Four tubes of blood: two hepa-
rinized (h) and two nonheparin-
ized (nh) specimens from:
A-man
B-woman
Samples drawn from H'Mong refugees,
man and wife on 21 March 1982. They
and their six-month-old baby were ex-
posed to CW attacks on 11 November
1981 and 4 January 1982. All were ill
on 21 March 1982. In November attack
an airplane dispersed yellow chemical.
Wife coughed yellow sputum and had
bloody diarrhea for five days. In Janu-
ary attack a green chemical was dis-
seminated from an airplane. All were
ill, but wife suffered most�blurred
vision, swollen eyes, bloody cough, se-
vere back pain. Sample to AFMIC and
Dr. Mirocha on 24 March 1982.
14 Three blood specimens, hepa-
rinized, unrefrigerated for eight
hours, refrigerated remainder of
time, from:
A-Bloc Her, 8-year-old boy
B-Tong Her, 6-year-old boy
C-Xia Sue Xiong, young girl
Samples
on 17 April 1982 from three H'Mong
refugees who were exposed to a CW
agent (variously described as yellow-
red-brown) in late March 1982. A total
of 124 H'Mong reportedly were
exposed. Three blood samples were
taken�(A) 8-year-old boy who had
been severely ill with bloody diarrhea
and coughing of blood, (B) 6-year-old
boy grossly anemic and splenomegally,
and (C) a girl suffering from bloody
diarrhea and abdominal pain. Arrived
in US on 23 April 1982. Sent to AFMIC
for analysis by Dr. Mirocha.
Specimen
DAS
T-2
HT-2
A-h
Negl
14 ppb
Negl
-nh
Negl
Negl
Negl
B-h
Negl
Negl
Negl
-nh
Negl
Negl
Negl
(Note: Lag of two and a half months
between exposure and drawing of blood.)
Subject
A
Trichothecene Toxins
(b)(1)
DAS T-2 HT-2 (b)(3)
Negl Negl Negl
Negl 110 ppb 296 ppb
Negl 46 ppb Negl
(continued)
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Table D-1 (continued)
Laos: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
15
Sample Description
Blood specimens, one heparin-
ized, one nonheparinized, from
25-year-old H'Mong who died
following a GI hemorrhage.
History of Sample
Victim was admitted to Loei Hospital
just before death. Blood drawn at hos-
pital on 17 April. Victim claimed to
have been exposed to a CW attack.
Samples arrived in US on 23 April. Sent
to AFMIC for analysis.
Analytical Results
Trichothecene Toxins
Specimen DAS T-2 HT-2
Heparanized Negl 14 ppb 19 ppb
Nonheparinized Negl Negl Negl
16 Two tubes of blood samples, one
heparinized, one nonheparin-
ized.
Blood drawn 26 April 1982 from
H'Mong refugee, Neng Xiong, suffer-
ing the effects of CW exposure 25
March 1982 after an attack on Na
Phong Village in Laos. Helicopter
dropped a yellow chemical. All of pop-
ulation (40 families) reportedly suffered
from vomiting, fever, backaches, head-
ache, and chest pain. None suffered
bleeding. Many developed swollen
eyes. One woman died. Pigs, chickens,
and buffalo also died. Blood, refrigerat-
ed since drawn, arrived in US on 30
April 1982. Sent to AFMIC for analysis
by Dr. Mirocha.
Trichothecene Toxins
Specimen
Heparinized
Non-
heparinized
DAS
Negl
Negl
T-2
100 ppb
32 ppb
HT-2
8 ppb
34 ppb
17 A. Residue samples from areas
of attack near Na Khouang:
A-1�soil
A-2�vegetation
and pebbles
B. Two air-monitoring badges,
of the type included in sam-
pling kits. Contain activated
charcoal absorbent.
A. Residue samples were taken from
three different areas in Laos that were
separately attacked on 17, 18, and 30
April 1982. Sources of samples did not
witness attacks, nor did they observe
any victims. Ten persons reputedly
died after suffering vomiting, bloody
diarrhea, and headaches. Attacks were
conducted by single jet planes. Sent to
USACSL 11 May 1982.
B. Charcoal from badges was reportedly
exposed to environment and placed in
the Na Khouang area in January 1982.
They were retrieved in March after a
CW attack. Sent to USACSL in May.
A. Analysis incomplete. A component of
purified aflatoxin from culture was iden-
tified in one vegetation sample. This
component is indicative of the presence
of aflatoxin purified from artificially cul-
tivated Asperguillus flavus. Aflatoxin acts
synergistically with trichothecene toxins
and may be a component of -yellow
rain.- However, no trichothecene toxin
was found in the sample containing
aflatoxin.
B. Analysis incomplete.
18 Sealed glass ampule containing
tan crystals.
Sample acquired in Laos and sent to
USACSL 12 July 1982.
Vapor analysis - trace of dichloroben-
zene. No evidence of known CW agents.
Crystalline material is penicillin-G, iden-
tical to sample 12, vial A.
19 Tan granular solid, approxi-
mately 300 mg.
Sample acquired in Laos and sent to
USACSL 15 June 1982.
25% 0-hexachlorocyclohexane, 75% dia-
tomaceous earth. Probably used as an
insecticide, although hexachlorocyclo-
hexane has been used as a smoke. Lin-
dame�O-hexachlorocyclohexane�is an
insecticide. No evidence of traditional
CW agents or toxins.
(continued)
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Table D-1 (continued)
Laos: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
20
Sample Description
Two tubes of whole blood, one
heparinized (h), one nonhepar-
inized (nh).
History of Sample
H'Mong refugee who was exposed to
CW on 17 March 1982 in Laos. Blood
drawn on 31 March 1982 and kept
chilled from that time except for about
four hours in transit. Blood drawn by
Ban Vinai hospital physician and trans-
ported to Bangkok Embassy officer by
Victim had
symptoms similar to those associated
with mycotoxicosis�bloody vomiting,
bloody diarrhea. Arrived in USA at
1730 hours, 1 April. Sample sent to
AFMIC for analysis by Dr. Mirocha.
Analytical Results
Trichothecene Toxins
Specimen
nh
DAS T-2 HT-2
Negl 19 ppb Negl
Negl 3 ppb 2 ppb
21 Eight tubes of blood specimen,
two heparinized (h), two nonhe-
parinized (nh), from each of two
H'Mong victims and from each
of two control individuals.
Two H'Mong refugees, 22 and 28 years
of age, were victims of a CW attack in
Laos on 20 May 1982. Attack occurred
at about 1700 hours near Ban Pha
Ngum. These two were part of a resist-
ance patrol of six men near the village
of 100 inhabitants. Blood was drawn
from victims and two controls on 19
June 1982. The chemical reportedly
was disseminated from a jet aircraft. It
appeared as a yellow syruplike sub-
stance and had fallen on this patrol and
village. The drops dried quickly. Both
victims suffered chest pain, coughing
with pink mucous, sore throat, dys-
pnea, visual disturbance, vertigo, he-
modiarrhea, weakness, anorexia, and
abdominal pain. The older victim also
suffered lower leg and pedal edema,
facial edema, mild icterus, and dull
mentum, some of which were still evi-
dent one month after exposure. Most of
the villagers were sick and four died.
The attack also killed pigs and chick-
ens. Samples received on 22 June by
AFMIC for analysis.
Lab results
hospital:
from Ban
Vinai camp
Blood
22-yr-old
28-yr-old
WBC
8,300
5,750
HCT
42
18.5
Diff
S-57, L-36,
S-38, L-62
E-10, M-2
Negative malaria smear with adequate
platelets. Smear showed med/severe mi-
crocytic hypochromaic anemia with
moderate poikilocytes and anisocytes.
Analysis: Pending
22 Gravel and cloth in four pack-
ages.
Samples were obtained by US Embassy
officer in Thailand from Lao insurgents
in August 1982. The samples reportedly
were dangerous, poisonous, and related
to CW substances. Samples were alleg-
edly taken from a CW storage area in
Laos. A US Army Technical Escort
Team was dispatched to Thailand and
transported samples to USACSL for
analysis. Received by USACSL on 11
October 1982.
Vapor analysis from all samples con-
tained p-chloronitrobenzene as the major
component.
Analysis incomplete.
Secret
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Table D-2
Kampuchea: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
1
Sample Description
Clothing (two pairs of trousers,
two shirts) from dead Demo-
cratic Kampuchea (DK) soldiers.
History of Sample
On 27 February 1980 a US Embassy
officer obtained clothing sealed in
heavy plastic bags from Thai official.
Clothing reportedly taken from DK
soldiers killed in chemical attack in the
Pailin area. Clothing sample was ob-
tained two weeks before being given to
US officer. Analysis done by an inde-
pendent laboratory.
Analytical Results
No evidence of standard CW agents was
detected. Not analyzed for mycotoxins.
Cytotoxicity tests were negative.
2
Water sample (25 milliliters).
Sample taken in mid-January 1980
from a stream in the Thaphaya area of
the Thai-Kampuchean border by Royal
Thai Army (RTA) troops. It was passed
to station officer by Thai who claimed
that RTA troops and villagers became
ill with swelling limbs and a red rash.
Analyzed by independent laboratory.
No evidence of standard CW agents was
detected. Not analyzed for mycotoxins.
Cytotoxicity tests were negative.
3
Red corn (500 grams). Corn con-
tained cob particles, broken ker-
nels, and insects.
Sample obtained from Kampuchean
refugee who entered Thailand in early
1980. The corn was provided by the
Vietnamese and reportedly originated
in Russia. Eating it caused people to
vomit and cough up blood. Analyzed
by independent US laboratory.
No evidence of known CW agents. Was
not toxic to cell tissue culture. No toxic
effect noted in rat receiving portion of
sample orally. Not analyzed for
trichothecene toxins.
4
Empty artillery shell.
Sample collected by DK refugee in No evidence of presence of CW agents or
early 1980. Received 5 May 1980. Sent their degradation products. Major con-
to independent laboratory for analysis. stituent was TNT.
5
Shirt taken from DK victim of Attack occurred on 29 February 1980
CW attack. about 15 to 20 kilometers southeast of
Nong Pru. Victim reported symptoms
of nausea, vomiting, weakness, and
headache. Some victims reportedly
died from internal bleeding. On 5
March 1980, RTA officer in Aranya-
prathet delivered the garment sealed in
a foil bag to a US Embassy officer.
Sample was pouched to USACSL on 7
March 1980.
No evidence of any standard CW agent
or agent breakdown product was detect-
ed on the sample. Two siloxane lubri-
cants (hexamethylcyclotrisiloxane and oc-
tamethyltetrasiloxane) were identified.
These are of interest because of the
intensive studies of siloxanes by Soviet
scientists.
The presence of a component with a
mass of 100 was detected but not identi-
fied. No unusual effects were noted in
mice confined with the clothing for six
hours. Biocultures proved negative.
6
Yellow corn packaged in plastic
bag.
Obtained from Kampuchean refugee.
Received by USACSL on 19 November
1979.
Arsenic was detected at a level of 43
ppm. Arsenic appears to be organically
bound but is not in a known CW agent
structure. Possibly a fungicide or
rodenticide.
7
Water sample from area of CW
attack (Control samples collect-
ed outside range of chemical
attack did not contain any tri-
chothecene toxins or known CW
agents.)
Sample given to US Embassy officer by
Thai chemical officer who acquired it
on the Thai-Kampuchean border area
near Phnom Mak Hoeum about 15
March 1981. Sample received by
USACSL on 25 March 1981. Sample
given to USAMIIA on 26 August 1981
for trichothecene analysis by independ-
ent laboratory.
Cyanide at 460 ppm. (Note: Control
water sample also contained high cya-
nide levels.) No evidence of standard CW
agents was detected. Analysis for toxins
revealed presence of deoxynivalenol at
level of 66 ppm, of solid material in
water. Trace of another trichothecene
toxin, diacetoxyscirpenol (DAS), also
found.
(continued)
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"Steftzz.
Table D-2 (continued)
Kampuchea: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
8
Sample Description
Leaves and stem samples (Con-
trol samples collected outside
range of chemical attack did not
contain any trichothecene toxins
or known CW agents.)
History of Sample
Sample obtained by Thai chemical of-
ficers about 15 March 1981 on Thai-
Kampuchean border just south of
Phnom Mak Hoeum. Given to US Em-
bassy officer, who sent it to USACSL.
Received on 24 March 1981. Trans-
ferred to USAMIIA on 29 April 1981
for trichothecene analysis by independ-
ent laboratory.
Analytical Results
Sample was positive for cyanide (8.7
mg/leaf) and a trace of fluoride. No
evidence of standard CW agents. Sample
contained three trichothecene toxins: T-2
at 3.15 ppm, nivalenol at 109 ppm, and
deoxynivalenol at 59.1 ppm.
9
Water samples
Six water samples reportedly from area
of chemical attack were given to Em-
bassy personnel by Thai officer who
received them from DK sources. Col-
lected 15 March 1981. Received by
USACSL on 24 March 1981.
No evidence of standard CW agents. Not
yet analyzed for toxins. Cyanide was
found at levels between 210 and 590
ppm. (Note: Cyanide also found in con-
trol water samples.)
10 Negative control samples of Received from field on 20 September Analyzed for toxins. Negative results on
water, soil, vegetation, corn, and 1981. all samples.
rice
11
Blood samples (A14, A15, A16,
and A17)
Four samples were drawn from DK
personnel exposed to CW agent on 19
September 1981. Samples drawn on 7
October 1981. Samples were left unre-
frigerated for 48 hours after collection
and had begun to putrify, a condition
that interferes with many assays. Sent
to USAMIIA for analysis for trichothe-
cenes at an independent laboratory.
Negative results on all samples. Samples
were in poor condition for analysis.
12 Blood samples and blood
smears. Total blood samples: 13
(B-1 through B-13)
Nine blood samples from DK personnel
who had been subjected to a CW attack
in fall 1981. Approximately 50 people
were killed in the attack. Four samples
from unexposed DK personnel. Sam-
ples drawn on 21 October 1981 by
trained medical personnel. Sent to
USAMIIA for analysis on 22 October
1981. Samples properly refrigerated
and in good condition for analysis.
White blood cell count (WBC) was low in
all victims but not significantly lower
than in nonexposed individuals. A me-
tabolite of T-2 toxin (HT-2) was tenta-
tively identified in the blood of two
victims having the lowest WBCs. No
toxins were present in remaining blood
samples from exposed subjects or unex-
posed personnel.
13 Two samples:
� Bottle with leaves reportedly
contaminated with CW pow-
der agent
� Bottle with small piece of
bamboo reportedly contami-
nated with toxic agent
Powder spread by airplane over upper
Koh Kong Province. Exposed individ-
uals vomited blood. Also some deaths.
Attack took place on 10 November
1981. Samples were given to Embassy
contacts by DK escape representative
in Bangkok on 12 November 1981. Sent
16 November 1981 in diplomatic
pouch. Received by USACSL on 19
November. Portion of sample trans-
ferred to USAMIIA for trichothecene
analysis.
Analysis in progress.
14 Glass bottle containing a pow-
der, tinted pink.
Powder was obtained on 20 November
1981 by KPNLF (Khmer People's Na-
tional Liberation Front) forces in Kam-
puchea. Received by USACSL on 8
December 1981. Portion of sample
transferred to USAMIIA on 16 Decem-
ber 1981 for trichothecene analysis.
Sample is 98 percent talc. Other chemi-
cals not identified. Results of analysis for
trichothecenes were negative.
(continued)
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--seeREI
Table D-2 (continued)
Kampuchea: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
Sample Description
History of Sample
Analytical Results
15 Blood and urine samples:
A-1�urine
A-2�blood
A-3�blood
B-1�urine
B-2�blood, syringe
Samples taken from DK victims
was exposed
to CW attack on 19 September 1981
and 13 February 1982. Blood and urine
samples taken on 14 and 15 February
1982, exposed to
CW on 13 February 1982. Blood and
urine specimens taken 14 and 16 Feb-
ruary 1982, respectively. Samples were
kept refrigerated. Received by AFMIC
on 4 March 1982 for analysis.
The 13 February 1982 exposure oc-
curred during a fire fight with Viet-
namese forces in area north of Khao
Din, approximately 300 meters from
the Thai-Kampuchean border. The
Vietnamese disseminated chemical
with artillery bombardment. Approxi-
mately 100 DK soldiers reportedly
were made ill by the CW agent, suffer-
ing from burning eyes, blurred vision,
shortness of breath, chest pains, vomit-
ing (no blood), and vertigo. Some vic-
tims also felt weak and were trembling.
16 Blood: 12 samples, six heparin-
ized, six nonheparinized
Samples
from DK soldiers exposed to CW attack
on 13 February 1982 (see No. 15).
Blood was drawn on 4 March 1982, 19
days after the attack. Victims were still
showing some effects of CW attack and
were being treated in Nong Pru Hospi-
tal. Victims were numbered follows:
Samples received for analysis by AF-
MIC 5 March 1982.
Trichothecene Toxins
Specimen DAS T-2 HT-2
A-1 Negl Negl Negl
A-2 Negl 18 ppb 22 ppb
A-3 Not analyzed
B-1 Negl Trace 18 ppb
B-2 Negl 11 ppb 10 ppb
'Liquid components were extracted
from syringe and analyzed.
Heparinized
1. Negl�
2. Negl
3. Negl
4. Negl
5. Negl
6. Negl
Nonheparinized
Negl
7 ppb of T-2
Negl
Negl
Negl
3 ppb of T-2
� Victim 1 had blood content of T-2 toxin
at 18 ppb and HT-2 toxin at 22 ppb in
blood drawn one day after attack (see
No. 15).
17 One bottle of white substance
White substance was provided by Thai
component of Armed Forces Reserve
Institute of Medical Sciences. Substance
described as a poison which was put
into water to kill fish. Received 12
March 1982. Sent to USACSL on 26
March for analysis.
Sodium hydroxide with 0.5% CN- and
0.5% Cl-. The size and analysis suggest a
technical-grade caustic pellet. This does
not preclude the possibility of higher
concentrations of cyanide originally in
the sample but lost through hydrolysis in
the presence of moisture from the air or
elsewhere.
(continued)
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"iltfeE,Z
Table D-2 (continued)
Kampuchea: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
18
Sample Description
Three samples each of blood,
urine, and hair from three
Khmer victims exposed to CW.
Blood was in two tubes, one
heparinized (h), one nonhepar-
inized (nh)
History of Sample
Tissue specimens were taken from
three Khmer inhabitants of the Nong
Pru area who allegedly were exposed to
CW agents disseminated by Vietnam-
ese forces in two CW incidents on 6
and 7 March 1982 in the Pailin area.
Blood and urine were taken on 13
March, hair on 18 March. Samples,
kept chilled with ice, were received by
AFM1C on 22 March. Hair sample
given to USACSL on 26 March for
analysis.
The victims were made ill on 6 March
after walking through area known as
Sala Krah, which had been sprayed
with white powder by a jet fighter
plane. Ten of 15 men in one unit were
unable to continue moving to the front
because of illness. Symptoms included
nausea, vomiting, shortness of breath,
blurred vision, diarrhea, bloody dis-
charge from nose, burning sensation in
chest and abdomen. The second expo-
sure occurred on 7 March when Khmer
units were attacked with chemical/
toxin artillery shelling.
Analytical Results
Trichothecene Toxins
DAS T-2 HT-2
Urine Samples
Victim 1 Negl 5 ppb 1 ppb
Victim 2 Negl 4 ppb 1 ppb
Victim 3 Negl 22 ppb 7 ppb
Blood Samples:
Victim 1 h Negl 7 ppb Negl
nh Negl Negl Negl
Victim 2 h Negl Negl 8 ppb
nh Negl
Victim 3 h Negl Negl Negl
nh Negl Negl Negl
Hair Samples: Analysis complete. No ar-
senic or other heavy transition elements
were detected. Hair was not analyzed for
organic compounds.
(continued)
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fiE.1
Table D-2 (continued)
Kampuchea: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
19
Sample Description
Tissue Specimens:
Heart
Lungs
Esophagus/stomach
Liver
Kidney
Large intestine
History of Sample
Autopsy tissue from DK fighter who died
on 15 March 1982 after being exposed to
CW on 13 February (see samples 15, 16,
and 17). Victim was being treated for
exposure and malaria at Nong Pru since
13 March. Victim developed high fever,
became jaundiced, and vomited foul-
smelling blood shortly before death.
Urine was tinged with blood. Death due
to kidney failure. Tissue samples taken
kept refrigerated and arrived at AFMIC
on 22 March. Tissue analyzed for tri-
chothecene toxins and aflatoxin.
Analytical Results
Wgt.
of
Sam-
ple Trichothecene Toxin*
(g)
Tissue DAS "� T-2 HT-2
Heart 7.9
Stomach 13.5
Liver 9.5
Kidney 10.4
Lung 4.5 �
Intestine 5.3 �
� 1.2 ppm
25 ppb 4 ppm
� �
6 ppb �
8 ppb �
88 ppb 9 ppb
�Dashes indicate toxins were not detected.
Concentrations of DAS (diacetoxyscir-
penol) were no greater than the added
internal standard.
� �DAS was used as an internal standard�
that is, it was added to each tissue sample
to check accuracy of analysis. Only the
kidney had a concentration of DAS that
was greater than the amount added.
Aflatoxin
Wgt. of Concen-
Sample tration Adjusted
Tissue (g) ng/g" ng/g"
Stomach
3.0
20
23
Liver
3.0
20
23
Kidney
7.5
15
17
Intestine
3.0
11
13
�Nanograms per gram of sample
� � Values adjusted on basis of 88% recovery
20 Vegetation�leaf samples.
Sample obtained after a 7-11 March
1982 CW attack at Sokh Sann., Received
22 March by AFMIC. Transferred to
USACSL on 26 March for exploitation.
(See sample 22, from same attack area)
Analysis incomplete.
21 Allegedly poisoned rice.
Rice sample was given to the Thai by
Khmer refugees who claimed that the
sample was relief rice distributed by the
Phnom Penh PRK government. The
Thai military stated that the rice is
"pearl grain- and not grown in Kampu-
chea. Refugees did not define symptoms
or the location and date of distribution.
Sample received by USACSL on 22
March for analysis.
Sample contained carbon disulfide, styrene
benzonitrile, and less than 0.41 ppm ar-
senic. No evidence of standard CW agents
or trichothecene toxins. The rice sample
did not contain any poisonous compounds
at effective levels.
(continued)
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Table D-2 (continued)
Kampuchea: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No. Sample Description
22 Yellow residue.
History of Sample Analytical Results
KPNLF and other sources reported
that a moist yellow substance was de-
livered by artillery on four villages at
Sokh Sann. Attacks occurred 7-11
March 1982.
Exposed personnel reported itching
and swelling in areas of the body com-
ing in contact with the substance. Many
also experienced nausea, vomiting, di-
arrhea (no blood). Chickens died or
became feverish when given the sub-
stance orally.
There were no human fatalities as of 11
March. Effect on vegetation included
wilting of younger leaves and stems of
plants. Older leaves showed some
browning and burned spots.
Sample was given to USACSL for ex-
ploitation on 22 March.
Chloroform, d-terpinene, 4 compounds
similar to terpenes were detected. Analy-
sis incomplete.
23 Vegetation sample with yellow
spot.
Sample from area of 19 February 1982
attack in the Pong Nam Ron district
near the Thai-Kampuchean border. A
Vietnamese aircraft sprayed a yellow
powdery substance.
Sample given to US by the Armed
Forces Institute of Thailand. Sent to
USACSL for analysis on 4 March.
Transferred to AFMIC on 2 June. Ana-
lyzed by Dr. Mirocha. French also re-
ceived sample.
No evidence of known CW agents. Tri-
chothecene toxin T-2 and DAS were
present at levels of 86 ppb and trace
amounts, respectively. Analysis for HT-2
was negative. Sample was insufficient to
analyze accurately for nivalenol and
deoxynivalenol. French scientists report-
edly found T-2 at a level of 96 ppb and
DAS at a level of 639 ppb.
24 Gas mask (Chinese).
Democratic Kampuchea forces operat-
ing near Phnom Melai claim they cap-
tured the mask from Vietnamese forces
during fighting on 1 March 1982.
USACSL received mask for exploita-
tion on 4 June.
No standard CW agents or other toxic
compounds were detected.
25 Tail fins from 60-mm mortar
rounds.
Tail fins were from mortar rounds em-
ployed against KPLNF forces at Nong
Chan on 24 September 1982. Received
by USACSL on 1 October.
Analysis incomplete.
Secret
D-12
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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"SeeRzz_
Table D-3
Afghanistan: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
1
Sample Description
Rocket and bomb fragments
with Soviet markings
History of Sample
Fragments were obtained in Konarha
Province, sent to USACSL on 18 April
1980.
Analytical Results
No evidence of standard CW agents.
2
Soviet gas mask and canister
Purchased in Kabul. Sent to
on 18 September 1980.
USACSL No evidence of standard CW agents.
Dioctylphthalate, which probably was
used to test gas mask filter, was
identified.
3
Knit polyester cap, a polyester
knit jacket, badly worn shirt,
which appeared to be recently
washed.
Obtained in Islamabad, Pakistan, from
an Afghan refugee, who claimed he
was subjected to a gas attack. Collected
on 2 November 1980, shipped from
field on 19 November 1980, received
by USACSL on 8 December 1980.
Analysis showed no evidence of any
known CW agent but detected a high
molecular weight ester, which could be
indicative of a trichothecene, and adipic
acid esters. Also detected malathion, an
organic phosphate insecticide.
4
Human tissue (two bottles)
Same as sample 3.
Not analyzed because of deterioration of
sample enroute.
5
7.62-mm cartridges
The cartridges, which reputedly were
coated with a poison, were carried by
special Afghan police and some Soviet
advisers. Samples were collected in No-
vember 1980 and received for analysis
at USACSL on 4 February 1981.
No evidence of standard CW agents was
found on bullet coating or scrapings from
slug. Not analyzed for toxins.
6
Cotton garment and socks
Clothing appeared to be very dirty.
Clothing obtained from Afghan refu-
gee in Islamabad, Pakistan. Refugee
reportedly subjected to CW attack. Re-
ceived by USACSL 12 February 1981.
Transferred to USAMIIA for toxin
analysis.
No evidence of known CW agents. Re-
sults on trichothecene pending comple-
tion of analysis.
7
Soviet Shlem gas masks
Five masks were procured in Kabul at
various times and were sent as received
to USACSL for analysis between 24
August 1981 and 21 December 1981.
No background information is available
with these masks.
No evidence of traditional CW agents.
An analytical sample from the external
surface of one-quarter of a mask, ob-
tained in September 1982, showed the
presence of toxin T-2 (approximately 1
microgram). The result was verified by
two independent laboratories.
8
Expended Soviet 5.45-mm car-
tridge case
Obtained by Mujahedin about 1980.
The bullets had been captured from
the Soviets and used by Afghan Islamic
insurgents. During a firefight, insur-
gents using the bullets became ill, with
severe vomiting and nausea for several
hours. They suspected that the Soviets
had contaminated the powder charge.
Sent to USACSL on 25 August 1981.
No evidence of any generally recognized
agent or toxic compound was found. Was
not analyzed for toxins.
9
Soviet gas mask with canister
Item was reportedly taken from a Sovi-
et after a Soviet gas attack in early
1981. Item was collected by an Afghan,
who is associated with the Mujahedin
and who loaned the item to US person-
nel for analysis. USACSL received the
mask on 18 December 1981.
Preliminary analysis by thin-layer chro-
matography (TLC) of material from hose
connection of the mask indicated the
presence of T-2. This could not be con-
firmed. No evidence of traditional CW
agents.
(continued)
D-13
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sttcb