USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05184100
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• Document Page Count: 92
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01432
• Publication Date: February 26, 1982

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Use of Toxins and Other Lethal
Chemicals in Southeast Asia
and Afghanistan
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Volume II�Supporting Analysis
SNIE 11/50/37-82JX
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26 February 1982
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SNIE 11/50/37-82
USE OF TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL
CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND AFGHANISTAN
Volume II�Supporting Analysis
The National Foreign Intelligence Board
approved publication of this Estimate
on 2 February 1982.
Information available as of 26 February 1982
was used in the preparation of this second volume.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
I. CHEMICAL WARFARE IN LAOS
Nature of the Evidence
The Evidence
Page
1
1
5
II. CHEMICAL WARFARE IN KAMPUCHEA
14
Nature of the Evidence
14
The Evidence
16
III. THE SOVIET CONNECTION
19
The Soviet Role in Southeast Asia
19
Motivation for Using Chemical Weapons
20
Alternative Explanations
21
IV. CHEMICAL WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN
22
Nature of the Evidence
22
The Evidence
24
V. THE CASE FOR CW USE OF TRICHOTHECENES
40
Sample Analyses for the Trichothecenes
40
Natural Occurrence and Significant Properties
41
VI. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET CHEMICAL
WARFARE PROGRAM
43
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Continued Soviet CW/BW Activities
46
ANNEXES
Page
A. Tabulations of Reported Chemical Warfare Attacks in Laos, Kampuchea,
and Afghanistan
A-1
B. Collection and Analysis of Samples of Chemical Warfare Agents and Toxins
B-1
C. US Army Surgeon General's Investigative Team Report
C-1
D. Analysis and Review of Trichothecene Toxins
D-1
E. Medical Evidence
E-1
F. Report of the Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee, April
1980, on Use of Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea
F-1
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I. CHEMICAL WARFARE IN LAOS
Key Judgment: Lao and Vietnamese forces,
assisted by Soviet logistics and supervision, have
used lethal chemical agents against H'Mong
resistance forces and villages, causing thousands
of deaths since at least 1976. Trichothecene toxins
have been positively identified as one of the
classes of agents used, but medical symptoms
indicate that irritants, incapacitants, and nerve
agents also have been employed. (u)
Nature of the Evidence
1. Since 1976 a total of 261 chemical
attacks against H'Mong villages and guerrilla strong-
holds in Laos have been reported by victims and
witnesses. These attacks reportedly caused the deaths
of at least 6,504 of the H'Mong people.' Most of the
reports were provided by H'Mong refugees, including
village leaders, who were interviewed in Thailand and
the United States. These more than 200 interviews
were carried out variously by US Embassy officials in
Thailand, a Department of Defense team of medical-
toxicological experts,2 US physicians (including a fo-
rensic medicine specialist), Thai officials, journalists,
and representatives of international organizations. Ac-
cording to these interviews, US L-19 and T-41 air-
craft�captured during the US-Vietnamese conflict�
and Soviet AN-2 aircraft were usually employed to
disseminate toxic chemical agents by sprays, rockets,
and bombs. In some cases, Soviet helicopters and jet
aircraft were said to have been used. (u)
2. The medical symptoms reportedly produced by
the chemical agents are varied. According to knowl-
edgeable physicians, the symptoms clearly point to at
least three types of chemical agents: incapacitant/riot
control agents, nerve agent(s), and one or more agents
causing massive hemorrhaging. The last-named were
positively identified as trichothecene toxins in the fall
of 1981. (u)
3. Important testimony was also provided by Lao-
tian and Vietnamese defectors. A number of govern-
'See annex A
See annex C
ments provided information based on their own collec-
tion efforts. Information provided by these sources
includes the following:
� A special Laotian Air Force unit was responsible
for carrying out attacks using chemical warfare
(CW) rockets.
� CW agents were stored at sites in Laos.
� Warheads containing lethal agents were fitted to
US rockets in several small laboratories in Laos.
� A nerve agent was used.
� Laotian and Vietnamese forces exterminated
some H'Mong people by herding them into a
cave, closing the entrance, and filling the cave
with a lethal chemical gas.
� The Soviets were involved in an advisory and
supply role. (u)
4.
confirmed the presence, transportation, and use of
chemical warfare agents in Laos. The existence there
of CW storage facilities was first noted on 14 February
1979, when the LPLA headquarters at Vientiane
made preparations for Soviet personnel to inspect a
chemical facility at Pakxe, where lethal chemical
agents were stored. Other reports indicate that sites
used for this storage of chemical agents or munitions
exist at Savannakhet, Xiangkhoang, Vieng Sai, and
Xeno. Chemical agents and munitions are moved by
truck and aircraft between storage sites and airfields
for loading on aircraft used in mounting chemical
assaults. \
5./
typical conventional ammunition storage facilities,
which are also used to store chemical munitions, are
located near Pakxe, Xiangkhoang, and Vientiane.
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Soviet AN-2
aircraft and captured US L-19, 1-41, and 1-28 air-
craft. These have been the most commonly identified
chemical assault aircraft in Laos
7. Sample Collection and Analysis. In October
1979 a program was initiated to collect and analyze
environmental samples that might contain residue
from a chemical attack and tissue samples from
H'Mong refugees reportedly exposed to toxic chemi-
cals. 3 Environmental samples received from areas of
chemical attack include: a piece of polyethylene plas-
tic believed to have been contaminated with a vesicant
and six samples containing a yellowish powder residue
recovered from rocks, leaves, and roof thatching
8. Analysis failed to reveal the presence of a vesi-
cant or any known CW agent on the plastic sample.
The powder residue samples were analyzed for indica-
tion of any known standard CW agents. None were
detected in these samples. Two of the samples, howev-
er, contained diacetoxyscirpenol (DAS), a potent toxin
of the trichothecene group, which causes massive
hemorrhaging and death. One of these also contained
1-2 toxin.'
9. Medical Examinations. A continuing problem
has been the compilation of medical records and
clinical histories on victims exposed to chemical at-
tacks. This has been especially true in the camps
through which H'Mong refugees are staged before
resettlement to other countries. At least three, prob-
ably more, physicians who have been camp medical
directors report that numerous refugees did show signs
of continued gastrointestinal hemorrhaging, small blis-
ters, and respiratory signs not associated with known
3 See annex B table B-1, for a tabulation of samples collected and
analyzed
See annex D
s See annex E.
TCS-30t549--i92744.1�
pulmonary diseases even after exhaustive diagn05ti(b)(1)c
tests. All these individuals reported involvement in at ( u)k
least one direct chemical attack of "yellow rain," and
several of them were near death. These reports cover
primarily the period 1978 through mid-1980.
(b)(3)
10. Since the relief organizations in the camps do (b)(1 )
not routinely maintain medical records on patients, (b)(3)
preferring to run simple outpatient centers, the medi-
cal data were collected by the camp medical directors
or nurses and maintained separately in clinic files. In
all cases, the files mysteriously vanished shortly before (b)(1)
visits by official interviewers, most recently prior to (b)(3)
the visits of the UN group of experts investigating CW (b)(3)
(b)(3)
use.
The Evidence
11. Vietnamese and Laotian chemical attacks
against the H'Mong villages in northern Laos date
back at least to 1976, when refugees first reported such
attacks to officials in the Thai camps. (See figure 5.)
Other than refugee reports, however, very little evi-
dence on chemical attacks appears to have been
compiled between 1976 and early 1979. From 1979
on, a much wider range of information broadly sup-
porting the H'Mong allegations was obtained.
12. Lao Pilot's Testimony. The most complete
description of the period 1976-78 came from a Lao
pilot who was directly involved in chemical warfare.
The pilot, a former LPLA officer who defected in
1979, reported that he flew L-19 and T-41 aircraft
equipped to dispense toxic chemical agents on H'Mong
villagers in the Phou Bia area of northern Laos. He
said that the LPLA, in cooperation with the PAVN,
had conducted CW operations in Laos since April or
early May 1976. At that time, two LPLA H-34
helicopters were flown between Long Tieng and the
Phongsavan airfield (near Xiangkhoang), both in
Xiangkhoang Province, on a series of flights to trans-
port rockets to Phongsavan for storage
13. Between June and August 1976 the LPLA
launched attacks in the area of Bouamlong�in
Xiangkhoang Province�that was a stronghold for
remnants of the forces of former H'Mong General
Vang Pao. The LPLA used L-19 aircraft for CW
rocket attacks aimed at eliminating the H'Mong resist-
ance in that area. LPLA crews responsible for loading
5
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rockets on the attack aircraft noted, however, that
they were not allowed to use the rockets that had been
moved from Long Tieng to Phongsavan, even though
Phongsavan was much closer to the Bouamlong target
area than Long Tieng, where LPLA aircraft had to
rearm. The pilot said that during nearly three months
of flying missions against the Bouamlong area, he flew
his L-19 aircraft to Long Tieng to be armed with
rockets.
14. In late 1976 the pilot's L-19 aircraft was re-
armed with rockets stored at Phongsavan. Initially,
H-34 helicopters were used to transport the rockets
from Phongsavan to a depot near the Ban Xon airfield,
Vientiane Province, where they were fitted onto racks
of the L-19 aircraft for missions in the Phou Bia area.
Later, the rockets from Phongsavan were transported
to Ban Xon by trucks. All US-manufactured rockets
were stored with the tip and canister kept apart; in
other words, the two parts had to be joined before
being fitted to the racks on the aircraft. The pilot
observed, however, that all the rockets transported
from Phongsavan to Ban Xon were already assembled.
15. As part of his routine flight activities, the pilot
would check over his aircraft and, in doing so, exam-
ine the tip portion of new smoke rockets that had been
transported from Phongsavan. He said that most of
them appeared -loose- in the portion where the tip
and canister joined, whereas the tip and canister of the
ordinary explosive-type rockets at Long Tieng were
noticeably more tightly connected.
16. In late 1976, in preparation for airstrikes on
Kasy (Louangpbrabang Province) and in new areas of
Phou Bia, the pilot said he began carrying two or three
PAVN staff officers, sometimes accompanied by an
LPLA staff officer, in T-41 aircraft for reconnaissance
over the target areas. When these airstrikes were
launched, the defector pilot initially flew his L-19
aircraft on missions with another pilot and an LPLA
staff officer sitting in the rear seat. After two or three
weeks, however, PAVN staff officers, who spoke excel-
lent Lao, began alternating in the rear-seat role with
the LPLA officers. Before each mission, the PAVN or
LPLA staff officer would go over target areas outlined
on situation maps which then were taken along�
and would point out the targets to be attacked. The
-T-eS-4040-424.1.1�
source noted that at no time did the PAVN staff
officer sitting in the back seat of his aircraft communi-
cate with LPLA officers on the ground, as did the
LPLA staff officers. A new PAVN officer was used on
each mission of the T-41 reconnaissance and L-19
airstrike missions in the H'Mong areas. The average
age of these PAVN staff officers was in the middle
forties.
17. The source related that before flying L-19
airstrike missions with a full load of rockets he was
often warned by an LPLA commander to fly at above-
normal altitudes when firing rockets to preclude haz-
ard to the occupants of the aircraft. For this reason the
pilot surmised that the -smoke- rockets fired at the
H'Mong people were unusual. He was able to observe
that the -smoke- rockets detonated in the air and that
some produced white smoke with a mixture of blue,
while others produced red smoke with a mixture of
yellow. The ordinary, explosive-type rockets detonated
on impact. The commander or his designated repre-
sentative told the pilot before every mission that the
operations�called Extinct Destruction Operations�
were intended to -wipe out- the reactionary H'Mong
people.
18. Before a mission involving -smoke rockets,- the
commander warned the pilots to keep the operation
secret. The source said that, during the nearly two
years in which he flew rocket missions, he learned
from the LPLA staff officers accompanying him that
there were two types of rockets. The first, mostly
-smoke- rockets, were to be fired at targets far away
from LPLA and PAVN troops to avoid exposing them
to the poison smoke. The second was of the ordinary
explosive type, considered a -close support- rocket
that could be fired near LPLA and/or PAVN troop
positions. Initially, the L-19 aircraft carried eight
rockets�five -close support- and three "smoke" rock-
ets. Later, only four rockets, mainly of the "smoke"
type, were carried.
19. After each mission in which chemical warfare
rockets were used, the pilot was returned to a -rest
house- at Phongsavan, where an LPLA doctor and
nurse would examine him. He said that after his
missions, especially in 1978, he was particularly well
treated by the examining doctor and watched very
closely by the LPLA nurse. Those L-19 aircraft pilots
6
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Figure 5
Laos: Chemical Warfare Operational Areas
China
Burma
Nam Yao
-Mae Charim
Xaigna-
bouri
Ban Vinai
Louangphrabang
Xam Nua
Houaphan
---Bouamlon
Piaine+.4.
des �
Jarres Xiangkhoin
Long Tie g. Phou aia
mountain' area
V i tiane
VIE IAN
Thailan
Nong Kai
Paksane
Area of concentrated chemical attacks
Houaphan Province where chemical attacks have occurred
Military region headquarters containing chemical sections
Refugee camp
Sampling area�trichothecene toxins
Airfield
200
Kilometers
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
ietna
Kham ou n
Na Phan.
.Xeno
Savannakhet
Savanna het
puchea
�Palme
China
Gulf
of
Tonkin
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assigned to missions utilizing chemical warfare rockets
had special privileges, including additional flight pay
and free meals at the Phongsavan cafeteria. In Octo-
ber 1978 the LPLA stopped using L-19 aircraft on
combat missions and began using Soviet MIG-21s for
chemical attacks on the Phou Bia areas
20. Corroborating Evidence. Several H'Mong re-
ports provide significant substantiation of the testimo-
ny of the Lao pilot. The chief of eight villages, for
example, described attacks covering all seven days of
the week of 5 June 1976 in the Bouamlong area,
Xiangkhoang Province. He described L-19 aircraft
firing rockets that produced red and green smoke. Ten
villagers were killed by gas and 30 by shrapnel. Most
of the H'Mong reports documented by a US foreign
service officer in June 1979 and a Department of
Defense medical team in October 1979 are consistent
with the Lao pilot's testimony. H'Mong observers
familiar with military aircraft reported L-19s until
late 1978. After that time, reports described jets or
-MIGs- and some accurately described Soviet AN-2s.
21
As is discussed in chapter III, the Soviets supervise the
chemical warfare activities in Laos; we assume, there-
fore, that chemical munitions are handled in about the
same manner as in the USSR. No protective clothing or
special decontamination equipment is required for
loading chemical bombs on aircraft and helicopters at
chemical munitions test ranges, according to former
Soviet chemical warfare personnel
22. The Lao pilot's description of the rockets used
on the L-19 was corroborated by other sources. A
H'Mong refugee, a former commmander of a 500-man
resistance force, reported that in 1977 he found a
rocket canister and a separated warhead that he
believed were the kinds used by the Vietnamese and
Lao. The canister, he said, had authentic US markings
identifying it as a US-manufactured 2.75-inch rocket,
as well as three lines of Russian writing (which he
-TC-S-31/6171-fIL
could not translate). Another H'Mong resistance force
officer, who reportedly had been trained as a liaison
officer and ordnance expert before the Communist
takeover of Laos, stated that he too believed the rocket
canister was of US manufacture and that the Soviet
technicians in Laos had modified the upper stage to
contain a poisonous (lethal) chemical
23. The diameter of the warhead was reported to
be 12.5 centimeters (5 inches), probably a measure-
ment taken on a modified warhead because the
United States does not have a 5-inch warhead for the
2.75-inch -rocket motor.- During the Vietnam con-
flict, about 35 million US-manufactured 2.75-inch
rockets were sent to the war zone, and many tens of
thousands of these no doubt fell into North Vietnam-
ese hands when South Vietnamese forces collapsed.
The usual US fills for these rockets were white phos-
phorus, high explosives, flechettes, and some CS (riot
control agent). The Vietnamese may be using some of
these rockets with existing loads, but modified war-
heads for the 2.75-inch rocket motor could easily be
fabricated in Vietnam and filled with a lethal or
nonlethal agent in Laos, especially with Soviet assist-
ance. According to US experts, fabrication of a war-
head 5 inches in diameter, necked down to fit the
2.75-inch rocket, could be accomplished by trained
technicians in a small, well-equipped machine shop
and laboratory. (u)
24. Other Evidence.
learned that a special Laotian Air Force unit is
responsible for chemical rockets. This unit is com-
manded by a Soviet-trained Lao and has a Soviet
rocket expert attached as an adviser. Modification of
captured US-manufactured 2.75-inch rockets to con-
tain lethal CW agents reportedly is done routinely in
Laos, with chemical agents supplied by the Soviets
under the direction of Soviet and Vietnamese experts.
Small, but adequately equipped three- and four-man
facilities for this activity reportedly are located in
Vientiane, at Phongsavan in Xiangkhoang Province,
and in Savannakhet Province. (S NF REI, UK CAN AUS NZ
NC)
25. information provides a
picture of the Laotian chemical warfare organization
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and the direct involvement of the Vietnamese and the
Soviets in supporting that effort. The Supreme Head-
quarters Command in Vientiane controls the Regional
Military Chemical Sections.
26. In the fall of 1981 the United States discovered
trichothecene toxins on a vegetation sample collected
from Kampuchea. This led to a reanalysis of samples
taken from Laos since 1979. Two samples of a yellow
substance collected from different areas showed high
levels of trichothecene toxins. New samples were
received in late 1981 and are currently being ana-
lyzed
27. The discovery of trichothecene toxin as the
mysterious lethal agent that eluded US analysts for
many years has somewhat overshadowed a significant
body of earlier evidence that several different types of
agents�lethal and incapacitating�have been used
over the years.
28. There is even some evidence to suggest that in
the early years the Laotian and Vietnamese forces
were experimenting with different agents and delivery
systems in search of an effective way to exter
the H'Mong or drive them out of Laos.
29. A Pathet Lao soldier is reported to have told
H'Mong villagers in early 1978 that an agent sprayed
over their villages as a test had not been effective but
that he could provide them an antidote if they were
affected by the agent. Dispersal of this particular
agent was associated with a "black rain." When it was
effective, the symptoms were quite different from
what has been described after -yellow rain" attacks.
Drops on bare skin caused severe necrosis, rotting skin,
and high fever that sometimes resulted in death.
30. In a number of the refugee reports, the eyewit-
ness accounts describe the "red gas" as being more
lethal than the "yellow cloud." A former Lao Army
captain stated that the "red gas" caused the H'Mong to
die within 12 hours. An employee of an international
organization interviewed victims of a 15 September
1979 attack where nonlethal rounds preceded an
attack by five or six "red gas" bombs that covered a
500-meter area. Persons within 30 to 100 rr_2,ters of the
circle died in 10 minutes after severe convulsions.
Others had headaches, chest pains, and vomiting but
did not die.
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31. While it has been difficult to associate specific
symptoms with the colors, it is apparent in reviewing
reports back to 1976 that several different agents have
been used. The different colors cannot be dismissed as
only smokes used to mark target areas. In many cases
it appears that irritants or incapacitants have been
used on H'Mong villages before use of a lethal or
heavy-casualt -producing agent like nerve gas or tox-
in.
32. The method of dispersing agents also varies.
Several types of aircraft and helicopters have been
used. There have been questions raised about the
effectiveness of agent delivery at the high altitudes
reported (7,000 to 10,000 feet). Airburst rockets could
be fired from high altitudes effectively. Many reports,
however, including those from H'Mong soldiers, de-
scribed attacks made at 1,000 to 3,000 feet. The Lao (b)(3)
pilot described firing the chemical rockets from alti-
tudes higher than would be normal for conventional
rockets. A number of reports, especially from 1977
and 1978, describe chemical attacks by 105-mm artil-
lery and 122-mm rockets. One report from a H'Mong
officer described 122-mm chemical rocket attacks
from Louangphraban Airfield on a village 8 to 9
kilometers away.
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33.
\ a Lao military report
confirmed that poison chemicals had been dispersed
by the Lao Government in an effort to kill Lao hill
tribesmen, con-
firmed that toxic chemicals had been spread and
described small yellow grains. \ /a hospital at
Paksane requested assistance in treating a large num-
ber of villagers suffering from nausea and bloody
diarrhea./
Lao military units were setting up classes in the use of
chemical weapons and protection from their use by
the "enemy." One report stated that "enemy forces"
entered Laos from Thailand with liquid toxic chemi-
cals to poison Lao units' food and water. (Ts u)
/ reports revealed that
34. reports suggest the not surprising
fact that the chemical warfare program is compart-
mented within the Lao military, and that field units
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are now acquiring knowledge about chemical warfare
activities previously restricted to specialized units and
individuals. This accords with the secretive nature of
the Vietnamese-directed chemical activity reported by
the Lao pilot. Lao troops probably started receiving a
heavy dose of propaganda about an enemy chemical
threat in order to offset spreadin knowledge of the
government's use of lethal agents
35. In a 15 December 1981 press conference in
Beijing, a former Lao Health Ministry Bureau Direc-
tor, Khamsengkeo Sengsthith, said that the Vietnamese
were using chemical weapons -in the air and on the
ground- in Laos, killing -thousands.- He said the
Vietnamese alone were using chemical weapons, keep-
ing the affairs secret from the Laotians. Furthermore,
he stated that 3,000 Soviet advisers are in Laos and
they -have taken control- of the Lao Air Force while
40,000 to 50,000 Vietnamese troops have reduced Laos
to colony status. We believe that few people in the
Laotian military and government are aware of the
Vietnamese/Soviet-directed chemical warfare activi-
ties
II. CHEMICAL WARFARE IN KAMPUCHEA
Key judgment: Vietnamese forces have used
lethal trichothecene toxins on Democratic Kam-
puchean troops and Khmer villages since at least
1978. Again, medical symptoms indicate that
irritants, incapacitants, nerve agents, and a highly
effective hemorrhagic agent or mixture of agents
also have been used.
Nature of the Evidence
36/ /Since October 1978, radiobroadcasts,
press releases, and official protests to the United
Nations by the leadership of the Democratic Kampu-
chea (DK) dissident group have accused the Vietnam-
ese and the Hanoi-backed People's Republic of Kam-
puchea (PRK) regime of using Soviet-made lethal
chemical agents and weapons against DK guerrilla
forces and civilians.
In November 1979,
however, the guerrilla forces of the Khmer People's
National Liberation Front reported that the Vietnam-
ese had attacked them with a tear gas which, from
"rt-S-31106)-4444L�_
then- description, resembled CS. Subsequently, Thai
officials, DK informants and refugees, defectors from
the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), US and Thai
medical personnel, officials of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Canadian and
West European officials also have implicated the
Vietnamese in the offensive use of lethal and incapaci-
tating chemical agents in Kampuchea.
37. The conflict in Kampuchea differs from that in
Laos in that the UN-recognized government of Kam-
puchea, Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea group, is
operating as an organized guerrilla force. DK reports
cannot be taken at face value. Pol Pot's forces are
engaged in a propaganda effort against the Vietnam-
ese, and many of their reports must be assumed to be
false or grossly exaggerated
According to DK officials, chemical attacks have
occurred in 11 Kampuchean provinces and were
concentrated in the provinces of Battambang and
Pursat, along the Thai-Kampuchean border. (See fig-
ure 6.) The DK also accused the Vietnamese of
poisoning food and medicines given to Kampuchean
civilians. The Vietnamese have counterclaimed that
the DK is poisoning Vietnamese food and water
supplies with toxic plant extracts, including strych-
nine.
38. Official DK radiobroadcasts and press releases
have stated that the PAVN-PRK chemical attacks
produce symptoms ranging from mild, temporary
incapacitation to severe incapacitation and death.
Initially, in October 1978, the DK description indicat-
ed that a riot control chemical was used. The DK did
not publicize symptomatic effects ascribed to lethal
agents (as did reports from Laos) until the plight of the
H'Mong refugees had been published in the Thai press
and other news media.
39. The DK also reported that the Vietnamese were
spreading a ground contaminant that produced severe
swelling of the feet, tissue destruction, pus formation,
and gangrene, with death occurring in one to three
days. Because some Pol Pot forces do not wear shoes or
sandals, a persistent vesicant or mixture of vesicants
similar to the arsine and mustard class of compounds
when used in this way could produce these effects
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Figure 6
Kampuchea: Chemical Warfare Operational Areas
Thalland
Siem Reap-
'PApet
attamba
Battamban
.Pailin
Thum Treng
'
0
.S
7hEifEi7C
Tonle
Sap
Kompong
1 Chhnang
Area of concentrated chemical attacks
Takeo Province where chemical attacks have occurred
� Sampling area�trichothecene toxins
100
630977 7-82
--TCS-8,96.61-8.24L.
Kilometers
15
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�Ratanakiri
Mi
Nantes and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative. rued
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Tap-sera.4
40. As early as August 1979, there were reports of
the use in Kampuchea of lethal chemicals that caused
vomiting, internal hemorrhaging, and death. Report-
ing by various sources, not directly connected with the
DK, claimed that the PAVN and the PRK were
attacking DK guerrillas with lethal and incapacitating
chemicals delivered by artillery (60-mm and 120-mm),
107-mm rockets, M-79 grenade launchers, aerial
sprays, rockets, and bombs. A total of 124 separate
chemical attacks in which 981 individuals died have
been reported since 1978.6
41. Aerial attacks reportedly were made with fixed-
wing aircraft and helicopters spraying yellow and
white aerosols that were usually lethal. Artillery
chemical shells produced white and black smokes that
were usually incapacitating. Liquid-type toxic chemi-
cals reportedly were used in boobytraps. Lethal com-
pounds allegedly were introduced into water supplies
used by DK forces and refugees and into food and
medicine given to Kampuchean civilians. PAVN de-
serters have reported Soviet involvement in transport-
ing PAVN troops to forward areas and in firing
chemical weapons, probably rockets, which exploded
and emitted a deadly smoke.
42
/reports that the Vietnamese have employed
toxic chemicals against DK troops and civilians. Ac-
cording td, reports, lethal and nonlethal
chemicals were disseminated as a spray or smoke
directly against DK forces and also were used to poison
water supplies, food, and terrain along roads such as
route 10 from Phum Treng to Pailin and along the
Thai-Kampuchean border. Reporting indicates that
anyone coming in contact with the apparently persist-
ent chemical used on terrain bleeds through the skin,
suffers congestion, vomits blood, and eventually dies
from the effects. These symptoms are associated with
trichothecene toxins. (Ts U NF EEL UK CAN AUS NZ OC)
43.
6 See annex A.
44
operations regiments of the 4th Infantry Division
would receive protective equipment and training in its
use. CW training exercises have been confirmed\
45. a 17-vehicle convoy
was transporting lethal and incapacitating chemicals to
forward areas in Battambang and Siem Reap Prov-
inces. (Ts U NF EEL UK CAN AUS NZ OC)
46.
47. Sample Collection and Analysis. A program
to collect and analyze environmental samples possibly
contaminated with CW agents was initiated in late
1979. Samples, reportedly from areas of chemical
attack, include clothing reportedly taken from DK
victims of a gas attack, an artillery shell casing, food
(corn) samples, water samples, leaf samples, and hu-
man tissue. Background vegetation and water samples
were also collected for baseline data.
48. These samples were analyzed for standard
known chemical warfare agents and the results were
negative. Special analysis of water and vegetation
samples showed the presence of mycotoxins of the
trichothecene group.'
49. Medical Examinations. DK victims of gas
attacks have been interviewed by qualified medical
personnel, including doctors, registered nurses, and
trained medics from the United States, Thailand, and
international organizations. Autopsies reportedly were
performed on DK soldiers killed in the area attacked
with trichothecene toxins.'
The Evidence
50. Indications Before 1980. There is no doubt
that in 1978 and 1979 the Vietnamese and PRK forces
made at least limited use of riot-control chemicals and
possibly of incapacitating agents against both Commu-
nist and non-Communist guerrilla forces in Kampu-
chea. The chemicals used probably included screening
' See annex B.
See annex D
See annex E
1 6
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3))(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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smokes, riot-control agents such as CS, and an uniden-
tified incapacitating agent that causes vertigo and
nausea and ultimately renders victims unconscious
51. DK officials attempted to provide the ICRC
and international newsmen with substantive evidence
that joint PAVN-PRK forces were using CW against
DK forces. DK troops delivered to the ICRC blood
specimens from alleged poison-gas victims. An inde-
pendent laboratory under the direction of the ICRC
reported the results of the analysis of the samples as
being either indeterminate or negative. The ICRC also
reported receiving a 60-mm shell containing a CW
agent, but they have not released any analytical
results. According to an ICRC representative in Bang-
kok, all physical evidence received by the ICRC on the
use of CW in Kampuchea was sent to Geneva for
analysis by independent laboratories. We have no
reports of analysis of samples other than that of blood
specimens.
52. Several canisters have been discovered near the
Thai-Kampuchean border which apparently contain
nonlethal military chemicals. Smoke billowing from
one of the canisters reportedly "numbed- one of the
soldiers, who recovered after a brief hospitalization.
DK troops found a gas grenade in an area that had
been attacked by the PAVN. The reported description
of and markings on this grenade fit those of a US CS
grenade (ABC M-25A2), a weapon probably among US
supplies captured by the Vietnamese. Vietnamese
defectors have described chemical attacks using riot-
control agents and incapacitants, and in some cases it
appears that captured US stocks of CS riot-control
agents were used. However, as previously stated, the
United States did not have any type of lethal or
incapacitating agents in Vietnam.
53. New Evidence in 1980 and 1981. In February
1980 the DK accused the Vietnamese of spraying
poison gas in northwestern Battambang Province. Re-
porting indicated that the Vietnamese were using 60-
mm mortars, 120-mm shells, 107-mm rockets, and M-
79 grenade launchers filled with chemical agents as
well as munitions delivered by T-28 aircraft.
54.
information in February 1980
on 60-mm shells filled with agents that affected the
blood and nerves. In late February the DK planned to
exhibit poison victims to the ICRC in Bangkok and
provide samples of blood and clothing, which in fact
were sent to Geneva for analysis.
55. According to the DK, the chemicals used were
green and yellow, and powderlike in appearance. In
some instances the gas was described as yellow or
white. The symptoms described were tightening of the
chest, disorientation, vomiting, bleeding from the nose
and gums, discoloration of the body, and "stiffening of
the teeth." In July 1980 the DK described artillery
attacks that produced a black smoke causing itchy
skin, weakness, skin lesions, and in some cases decay-
ing skin and blisters. (u)
56. In mid-July,
\ Vietnamese troops had stat-
ed that rocket propulsion systems were inside two
large aluminum tanks being taken to the Phnom Var
Mountains to be assembled with as warheads or use
on DK forces.
57. In December 1980, reporting revealed that the
Vietnamese were once again firing chemical artillery
shells, and it was believed that poison chemicals were
being brought into the Thai border area. By March
1981 the DK had reported numerous attacks with
lethal chemical agents and the poisoning of food and
water. The DK reported planes that dropped a white
or yellow powder, artillery fire that produced a white
or black smoke, and a viscous material with the
consistency of toothpaste that was put into cigarette
packs left along trails and that emitted a lethal "gas."
This "gas" caused instant death, whereas the "gas"
from the planes caused a sequence of symptoms,
including massive bleeding, rapid deterioration of the
internal organs, and seepage of blood from the skin
(b)(3)
(b)((b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1
(b)(3
(b)(3)
(b)(1
(b)(3
58. In March 1981 a team trained to collect samples
with special containers went into an area within hours
after an attack and collected samples of vegetation and
water. The team performed its own analysis on the
samples, some of which, however, were turned over to
US officials and eventually analyzed by the Army's
Chemical Systems Laboratory. Later, one of the sam-
ples, a leaf and stem, was found to contain high levels
of trichothecene toxins in an analysis performed at the
17
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University of Minnesota." The symptoms described by
the DK are consistent with those caused by the toxins
found on the leaf sample. Furthermore, a US Govern-
ment doctor was shown autopsy reports performed by
paramedics on victims in the attack area where the
vegetation and water samples were collected.
59. The Thai have become increasingly worried
about chemical attacks against their own forces and
civilian population. In March 1981 at least one Thai
died from a toxic agent placed by Vietnamese troops
and others became ill after suffering bleeding from the
nose and mouth; it is not clear how the Thai came in
contact with the poison(s). Thai officials have issued
strict orders concerning buying food and drink in
Kampuchea and the Thai border area. In May 1981,
two Vietnamese were captured in a Thai relocation
camp for the Kampucheans as they were attempting to
poison the water supply. The poison was analyzed and
found to contain lethal quantities of cyanide and an
unidentified hydrocarbon. (u)
60. In May 1981 the DK was prepared to send two
gas victims to Tokyo to be interviewed. In 1980 the
Japanese refused to accept a contaminated sample
because of Japanese laws governing the import of such
material. We do not know what became of the DK
victims.
61. An unexploded -B-40- rocket was obtained by
the Thai in June after an attack in which two other
rockets released poison gas. In July, analysis
revealed the movement of trucks oa e
with blue sacks filled with white powder. Sources
stated that the chemicals caused blindness, hemorrhag-
ing, and vomiting. The chemicals were being moved
into the Pursat, Battambang, and Siem Reap areas.
62. The DK began reporting chemical attacks again
throughout the period from September to November
'� See annexes B and D.
7"c-,e09-4,2,,ca
1981. These included reports of deaths from aerial and
artillery attacks as well as more reporting on water
poisoning. In September and October a US doctor and
a nurse, affiliated with an international volunteer
organization, treated DK victims of a chemical attack
in a DK hospital. Blood samples were rushed to the
United States for analysis on two occasions." The
nurse related the DK version of the attack, which
differs from descriptions of other attacks. While re-
treating from combat with the Vietnamese, DK sol-
diers hit tripwires that set off some type of chemical
smoke pots, killing some 20 soldiers and making many
others ill for more than a month. Another report, on 13
November, described a similar incident early that
month when a DK unit, withdrawing from a clash
with Vietnamese forces, activated devices -hanging in
the trees- which disseminated toxic chemicals.
63. In March 1979, during PAVN operations
against Khmer Rouge forces in the Phnom Melai area,
a PAVN private observed the following related to
chemical warfare activity. At a point in the fighting,
all regiment (740th) troops were issued gas masks.
However, the 2nd Battalion, a -border defense unit,"
was not issued masks (reason unknown). This unit was
in the Phnom Melai area and was virtually surrounded
by Khmer Rouge forces. At a point in the fighting, the
regiment's troops were ordered to fix masks. The
source allegedly saw two Soviets (Caucasians) fire a
-DI1-10- (the weapon was so identified by the source's
comrades). The source was approximately 50 meters
from the firing point. The weapon at impact (which
the source apparently was able to observe from his
position) gave off clouds of white, gray, and green
gas/smoke. His signal unit subsequently passed a
message which reported that there were 300 dead,
including Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese of the border
defense 2nd Battalion. The source claimed to have
seen the dead. The corpses had traces of white and
green powder on their faces and clothes. The faces
were contorted, with eyes wide open. No blood was
seen. We note that a H'Mong resistance leader de-
scribed an incident in 1981 where two Soviet soldiers
fired a hand-held weapon that dispersed a lethal
agent.
" See annexes B and D
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III. THE SOVIET CONNECTION
Key Judgment: The one hypothesis that best
fits all the evidence is that the trichothecene
toxins were developed in the Soviet Union, pro-
vided to the Lao and Vietnamese either directly
or through transfer of technical know-how, and
weaponized with Soviet assistance in Laos, Viet-
nam, and Kampuchea. There is no intelligence at
hand to support alternative explanations, such as
completely independent manufacture and use by
the Vietnamese. It is highly probable that the
USSR also provided other chemical warfare
agents. While the evidence on the Soviet role does
not constitute proof in the scientific sense, the
Intelligence Community finds the case to be
thoroughly convincing.
The Soviet Role in Southeast Asia
64. The Soviets have had advisers and technicians
working in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea for many
years, but it was not until early 1979 that evidence
surfaced on their direct involvement in chemical
warfare activities.
ordered the
Southern Region command in Pakxe to prepare its
chemical storage facilities for inspection by unidenti-
fied Soviet military personnel.
the chemi-
cals to be inspected were those that cause "stomach
sickness and death."'
65.
66. A separate source stated that the chemical
section in Xiangkhoang prepared Soviet-manufactured
chemical items for inspection by a Soviet military
team on 7 February 1979. A seven-man Soviet team of
chemical artillery experts, accompanied by Laotian
chemical officers, inspected chemical supplies and
artillery rounds at the Xeno storage facility on 1 June
1979. One report stated that the Soviets would be
inspecting the same chemical explosives used to sup-
press the H'Mong resistance in the Phou Bia area/
TCS'3,5110v8-9744
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
67. In addition to the intelligence information cited
above, which we believe to be reliable, there have
been a number of eyewitness accounts of Soviet
advisers and technicians participating in the prepara-
tion of the chemical weapons for the attacks on the
H'Mong villages. Several Laotian defectors have re-
ported seeing Soviet advisers present when aircraft
were loaded with chemical-agent rockets. We have not
been able to confirm a report that the Soviets have a
factory in Vientiane where they mix agents and
prepare them for shipment to the regional storage
facilities. H'Mong eyewitnesses claim to have seen
"Caucasian pilots" in aircraft, and one H'Mong report (b) 3)
states that a Soviet aircraft was found in the jungle
with a dead Soviet pilot. In November 1981 a H'Mong
resistance leader described how Soviet soldiers fighting
with the Lao used hand-held weapons that fired
chemical munitions a distance of 200 to 300 meters.
The lethal chemical dispersed from the munition had
a killing radius of 15 meters. This type of report
remains suspect, but is not dismissed because of the
known Soviet involvement with the Laotian chemical
warfare program.
68. In February 1982, information was received
that supports the contention that the Soviets supply
chemical weapons to the Vietnamese. A Soviet ship-
ment of wooden crates filled with canisters of -deadly
toxic chemicals" was unloaded at the Ho Chi Minh
City port in July 1981, according to a former official
of the Public Security Office of the Vietnamese
Ministry of Interior; this office is responsible for
special port security. Through personal observation
and debriefings of security personnel, he was able to
describe the July incident, in which Vietnemese sol-
diers were caught pilfering the wooden crates contain-
ing the chemical canisters. Special security personnel,
who were always present when sensitive military
shipments from the USSR were offloaded, immediate-
ly isolated the area and told soldiers that the round
canisters, which were individually sealed in nylon,
contained "deadly toxic substances." The wooden
crates, each weighing 100 kilograms, were loaded on
military trucks and taken to the Long Binh Storage
Depot under special guard.
19
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69. The Soviets have most likely been shipping
chemical munitions to Vietnam for many years. In
1975 a source who participated in an operation in the
Black Sea to salvage the sunken wreckage of a ship
that had been carrying supplies to Vietnam described
how the divers were affected when they attempted to
remove toxic chemicals. A special Soviet salvage unit
took over the operation after the divers became ill.
The source was told that the substance was a deadly
-dust--like material
70. Two Vietnamese corporals from the 337th and
the 347th PAVN divisions stated in recent debriefings
that Soviet-supplied chemical weapons were stored in
caves near Lang Son at the time of the February 1979
Chinese incursion into Vietnam. Division units were
issued gas masks, but were told that the Soviet-
supplied chemical weapons would not be used unless
the Chinese initiated chemical warfare. Both sides
later charged that the other used chemical weapons,
but there is insufficient evidence to substantiate any of
the claims.
71. Since the first reports of chemical attacks in
Southeast Asia in 1976, we have tended to interpret
the Soviet role as strictly advisory. There is consider-
able evidence now, however, to suggest that the Soviets
may be far more involved in the Laotian and Viet-
namese chemical warfare program than we assumed
in earlier assessments. While more evidence will be
needed to make a firm judgment, analysis of the
available intelligence leads to the hypothesis that the
Soviet military not only aids the effort, but benefits
from the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia.
Motivation for Using Chemical Weapons
72. The Soviets have made a large investment in
ensuring that Vietnam and its puppets succeed in
extending their control over Indochina. Much of the
Soviets' interest in this region is dictated by their
power rivalry with China. Regional Communist forces
have been strengthened to contain Chinese influence
and deter military incursions. The area of northern
Laos where the H'Mong have stubbornly resisted and
harassed Vietnamese forces is strategically significant
to the Vietnamese because it adjoins a hostile China. In
the last few years the Vietnamese have expanded their
military construction and strengthened their forces
there For Vietnam, the H'Mong resistance is a major
irritant to be removed as quickly and cheaply as
possible. To that end, much of the H'Mong population
that lived in the Phou Bia mountain region has been
driven into Thailand, killed, or resettled. About 50,000
of an original 300,000 (in 1975) remain. The use of
chemical agents has played a major role in driving the
H'Mong from their mountain strongholds, relieving
the P AVN /LPLA ground forces of the need for costly
combat in difficult terrain
73 The Soviets and their allies were no doubt
confident that chemical warfare against the H'Mong
in re tnote regions of Laos could be conducted without
detection or at least without effective international
opposition or condemnation. They have denied such
charges as have been made to date, and have made
counterclaims that the United States used chemical
warfare in Vietnam. In Kampuchea they may also
have calculated that, in view of the lack of interna-
tional support for Pol Pot's regime, chemical weapons
could be used on his troops and troops of lesser known
resistance forces without any significant international
outcry.
74. There remains the question of the choice of
chemical agents and particularly of toxins that cause
such bizarre and horrifying symptoms. Chemical
weapons offer some real advantages over conventional
bombing and artillery strikes, napalm, white phospho-
rus, and infantry operations. Caves and rugged terrain
in Laos and thick jungles in Kampuchea have frus-
trated attempts to locate and destroy the resistance
forces. Chemical clouds can penetrate the heavy for-
ests and jungle canopy and seep into the mountain
caves. Persistent agents linger in the area and cause
casualties days and sometimes weeks after the attack.
Unprotected forces and civilians have little defense
against lethal agents including toxins, nerve agents,
and blister agents.
75. Trichothecene toxins have the added advantage
of being an effective terror weapon. Severe bleeding,
in addition to blisters and vomiting, instilled fear in
the resistance villages. Not only are the villagers and
their animals being killed in a gruesome manner, but
the vegetation and water also are contaminated. Survi-
vors are loath to return to their inhospitable homes and
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instead make the long and dangerous trek to camps in
Thailand.
76. There is no clear-cut explanation of why tri-
chothecene toxins have been used in addition to
irritants, incapacitants, and other traditional chemical
warfare agents. We can only speculate that they are
probably cheaper to make and are readily available
from Soviet stocks; they are probably safer and more
stable to store, transport, and handle in a Southeast
Asian environment, and may require less protective
equipment when being prepared for munitions. It is
clear that they have caused high casualty rates and
have been effective as a terror weapon. Moreover,
they are difficult to trace as the causative agent after
an attack�as demonstrated by the long-delayed US
detection. Very few laboratories in the world have the
analytical capability to identify precisely the type and
amount of trichothecene toxin in a sample of vegeta-
tion, soil, or water.
77. Several of the H'Mong reports suggest that
Southeast Asia is being used as a laboratory to test
chemical weapons. In one case, Vietnamese and Lao-
tian troops entered a village after an attack and took
about 20 survivors to a hospital for examination.
Victims were treated with different antidotes. The
detailed description provided by a H'Mong, who was
one of the survivors taken to the hospital, is one of the
few cases available on poststrike medical analysis
78. We suspect that the Soviets, Vietnamese, and
Laotians have gained significant information on
chemical agent effects on humans, although informa-
tion on poststrike analysis is very limited. Years of
aerial and artillery chemical dispersion has undoubt-
edly provided the Soviets with valuable testing data.
Southeast Asia offered the Soviets an opportunity to
test old agents that had been stockpiled for many years
as well as more recently developed agents or combina-
tions of agents. A common feature in the descriptions
of chemical attacks is the delivery of several types of
agents on a single target, sometimes simultaneously,
more often sequentially. In some cases, irritants or
incapacitants were used first, followed by a second
attack with a lethal agent.
Alternative Explanations
79. As a further check on our inference of a crucial
Soviet role in the chemical warfare activities in Indo-
TC5*-81369-42,11.1___
china, we have hypothesized and considered the plau-
sibility of several alternative explanations of the phe-
nomena observed. These hypotheses are described in
the following paragraphs. It is our opinion, however,
that none of these alternatives fit the data as well as
the hypothesis of a direct Soviet connection
80. Are the Vietnamese and Laotians using cap-
tured US chemical stocks? The Vietnamese are
known to be using captured US aircraft, artillery,
munitions, and chemicals such as smoke flares, and the
riot-control agent CS. However, the United States did
not have lethal agents in Vietnam, and stocks of
defoliant were removed long before the Vietnamese
Communists took over. The United States had no
chemical agents in Vietnam or in the US stockpile that
would cause symptoms of the sort associated with
"yellow rain" or other lethal chemical attacks ob-
served in Indochina. Agent Orange or any other
defoliant would not cause the types of visible physical
symptoms and death reported from Laos and Kampu-
chea.
81. Are the allegations made by the H'Mong
and Democratic Kampuchean forces part of a
systematic propaganda or misinformation cam-
paign designed to discredit their enemies? The
evidence, especially after early 1979, is not based
solely on refugee reports. However, the H'Mong ref u-
gees have been interviewed by doctors, journalists,
international refugee groups, congressmen, governors,
and officials from several governments. Every quali-
fied observer reported that he believed the H'Mong
were describing a tragic event that happened to them,
their families, and friends. It is highly unlikely that
men, women, and children for over five years have
engaged in a sophisticated propaganda campaign that
would require considerable medical knowledge of
what we now know was toxin poisoning. Furthermore,
the H'Mong have not had a well-organized propagan-
da effort concerning their plight and their story has
been championed mainly by interested private citizens
and a few governments. Pol Pot, on the other hand,
does have a well-established propaganda apparatus
that caused analysts to distrust the early reports of
chemical weapon use against his Democratic Kampu-
chean forces. By the summer of 1981, evidence from
non-DK sources had fully substantiated the earlier
charges.
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82. Have the Vietnamese and Laotians pro-
duced their own chemical agents or purchased
them from countries other than the USSR? It
cannot be ruled out that the Vietnamese, and perhaps
even the Laotians, have produced some chemical
warfare agents on their own or purchased chemical
weapons or the materials to make agents arid delivery
systems. Some of the traditional agents like mustard or
chlorine could certainly have been prepared in an
indigenous chemical laboratory, and the Vietnamese
have sufficient capability to manufacture crude deliv-
ery systems. Thus far we have positively identified
only one class of the agents used�trichothecene tox-
ins�on the basis of analyses of samples from Laos and
Kampuchea. These analyses 12 reveal that these par-
ticular trichothecenes would not occur naturally in
Southeast Asia in the observed combinations and
concentrations. It is possible that the Vietnamese could
purchase the cultures to make the agent, but that
seems most implausible. Rather, it is much more likely
that the Soviet Union has produced the toxins for the
Vietnamese and supplied the technology to weaponize
the toxin. The Soviets have more experience than any
other country with these particular trichothecene tox-
ins and have an extensive chemical warfare program
in which they could produce and test them. They also
have extensive biological facilities in which they could
produce the toxin in the large quantities required
83. Did the reported deaths occur as a result of
the poor physical condition of a population ex-
posed merely to riot control agents? Several univer-
sity studies and US Government investigations show
that the H'Mong and the Democratic Kampuchean
forces are generally in good health and would not have
been killed by riot-control agents. Conjectures that
many refugees suffered from diseases like tuberculosis
and would therefore be vulnerable to nonlethal chok-
ing agents are unfounded. It is possible for victims
trapped in caves or tunnels to die from a heavy dose of
riot-control agent, especially a vomiting agent like
adamsite. Few reports, however, describe deaths in
caves or tunnels. Most attacks occurred in open air
over villages. Credible alternate explanations for the
blisters and other symptoms observed on survivors by
doctors in Thailand have not been forthcoming. These
" See annexes B and D.
symptoms are not of the type associated with any
known diseases, nor do they resemble those caused by
mustard gas.
IV. CHEMICAL WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN
Key Judgment: Soviet forces in Afghanistan
have used lethal and casualty-producing agents
on Mujahedin resistance forces and Afghan vil-
lages since the December 1979 invasion. There is
some evidence that Afghan Government forces
may have used chemical weapons provided by
the USSR against the Mujahedin even before the
invasion. No agents have been identified through
sample analysis, but we conclude from analysis of
all the evidence that attacks have been conducted
with irritants, incapacitants, nerve agents, phos-
gene oxime, and perhaps trichothecene toxins,
mustard, lewisite, and unidentified toxic smokes.
Nature of the Evidence
84.
Since 1979 a total of 47 separate
chemical attacks against Mujahedin guerrillas and
villages have been reported by human sources, includ-
ing Mujahedin resistance fighters, Afghan Army offi-
cers, journalists, and medical experts from the United
States, Afghanistan, Germany, and France. In the
chemical assaults as a whole, a minimum of 3,042 of
the Mujahedin reportedly were killed."
85. The reports of chemical warfare attacks indicat-
ed that fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters were usual-
ly employed to disseminate CW agents by rockets,
bombs, and sprays. Chemical-filled landmines were
also reportedly used by the Soviets. The chemical
clouds were usually gray (or blue-black), yellow, or a
combination of the two colors
86. Medical symptoms reported by victims and
witnesses of attacks indicate that nonlethal incapaci-
tating chemicals and lethal chemicals�including
nerve agents, phosgene or phosgene oxime, possibly
trichothecene or other toxins, and mustard�were
used. Several descriptions of the physiological action of
'3 See annex A.
--"rCS-1�6614.8.24
22
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-fria-Seczati
Figure 7
Mujahedin Guerrilla Killed During an
Attack on Charbagh Safar
Summer 1980
ret
586177 3-82
a chemical agent or of the condition of the corpses of
victims were particularly unusual. In one, victims
were rapidly rendered unconscious for two to six hours
and had no aftereffects. In another, the condition of
the bodies included abnormal bloating and blackened
skin with a dark reddish tinge, and the flesh appeared
decayed. (See figure 7.) In a third incident�which
defies explanation�three dead Mujahedin guerrillas
were found with hands on rifles and lying in a firing
position, indicating that the attacker had used an
extremely rapid-acting lethal chemical that is not
detectable by normal senses and apparently causes no
external physiological responses before death.
87. We have reliable information from several
sources that the Soviets had a variety of CW agents
available in Afghanistan. Agents included nerve gases,
vesicants, and several other casualty-producing agents.
88. A former Afghan Army ordnance officer re-
ported that the Soviet army has stockpiled large
amounts of artillery shells and handgrenades contain-
ing phosgene, diphosgene, sarin, and soman. Stockpiles
are in storage sites located in Kabul; in Bala Hissar, at
the airport site referred to as Khafaramanag in an
underground storage depot; in the Khair Khana dis-
trict military storage depot near Qandahar City; near
Herat; and at the provincial airports of Shindand and
Jalalabad.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
89. (b)(1)
indicated the use of (b)(3)
chemical warfare agents in Afghanistan as early as 31
May 1979, seven months before the Soviet invasion. It
is not known whether Soviet or Afghan pilots conduct-
ed the attacks. The chemical munitions were referred
to as "microbe bombs- or "chemical bombs" and were
to be used to "destroy the Muslims," suggesting a
lethal agent.
90.
the location of chemical bombs, train-
ing in CW, and training of Afghan troops in the use of
gas masks and the use of lethal chemicals. For in-
stance, on two occasions on 21 August 1980, Soviet
aircraft reportedly dropped chemical bombs on a
village near Herat, killing 300 insurgents and their
sympathizers.
91.\
23
/confirmed the use
of chemical munitions by the Soviets against the
Mujahedin. These reports neither confirm nor refute
the use of lethal chemical agents. One report
indicated that Afghan and Soviet
units used helicopters to disseminate "poisonous gas
causing many deaths." Other intelligence shows that:
� Toxic smokes, possibly organic arsenical corn-
.pounds, were brought into Afghanistan and later
withdrawn by the Soviets.
� Chemicals were used to drive insurgents from
caves, after which they were attacked conven-
tionally by helicopters.
� Col. Gen. V. K. Pikalov, chief of Soviet chemical
troops, and other officials visited a site that had
(b)(1)
fo'D(3
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3))
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
TCS-88661-42,1-11
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
been attacked with a CW agent, designated
-IF.
14
� Soviet units in Mazar-e Sharif
supplies of sodium hydroxide,
decontamination chemical, and
that more be sent immediately.\
had depleted
a potent CW
had requested
92.
93.
the presence of Soviet
CIA" reconnaissance and decontamination units at Ka-
bul, Shindand, and Chaghasaray airfields.
94. Sample Collection and Analysis. Efforts to
collect contaminated environmental samples, Soviet
equipment, and materials from Afghan victims of CW
were initiated in early 1980. The first sample of rocket
tube and warhead fragments was collected in Konarha
Province. Since then, 13 additional samples, including
Soviet gas masks and clothing from gas victims have
been collected for analysis. The last of these, a grain
sample, was received in mid-February 1982.
" A Soviet designation for several pathogenic Fusarium products
or systems is -IIF,- which stands for -artificial infection back-
ground- (iskusstevnnyy infektsianny Jon). IlFs involve deliberate
contamination of soil in test areas with spores of disease-producing
fungi. We do not know if these IIF systems include compounds
which are trichothecenes, or even if the IIF and IF designators have
a common origin in language. But elsewhere in the Soviet agricultur-
al research program it is known with certainty that there is
widespread use of certain trichothecenes involving systems of spray
dissemination from light aircrft. A capability exists for multiton
production at several Soviet facilities, and such production is known
to exist for other spray-delivered microbial products as well
"TeS-6614
95. Analysis to date has not revealed any standard,
know'n CW agent or trichothecene but analysis is not
cornplete.'5
96. Medical Examinations. Muiahedin refugees,
who claimed to have been victims of gas attacks, were
examined by medical doctors from the United States,
Pakistan, and France. Photographs, descriptions of the
symptomatic effects, and descriptions of the corpses of
some victims clearly indicate that lethal and casualty-
causing agents were used in Afghanistan."
The Evidence
97. The Soviets appear to have used a wide variety
of chemical agents in Afghanistan. There are a num-
ber of reports that indicate the Afghan military, and
possibly the Soviets, used chemical weapons in 1979
before the Soviet invasion. Several Afghan officers
have stated that the Soviets supplied both lethal and
nonlethal agents to the Afghan forces, in addition to
chemical warfare training in the USSR. A substantial
body of evidence from all areas of Afghanistan was
collected on Soviet chemical attacks throughout 1980.
Most of the reports describing large numbers of deaths
are from the first three months of 1980 in northeastern
Afghanistan. In 1981 more evidence on chemical
attacks became available and there are indications that
chemical agents will continue to be used. The follow-
ing paragraphs covering chemical attacks from the
summer of 1979 to the fall of 1981 summarize a large
body of information. (See figure 10 on page 28.)
98. Attacks Before the Invasion.
99. A former Afghan Army officer who joined the
insurgency claimed that Soviet aircraft dropped canis-
's Descriptions of samples and analytical results are in annex B.
'6 See annex E.
24
�
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3))(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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1.-73ro Secr.gi
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
ters containing toxic gas on insurgents in Bamian
Province during June and July 1979. He also reported
that rumors circulating in the Afghan refugee commu-
nity claimed that, in August and September 1979,
chemical agents were used to dislodge insurgents
attempting to interdict a road in the Salang Pass area
northeast of Kabul.
100. An Afghan civil engineer described attacks in
August 1979 by possibly MIG-19 or SU-17 aircraft
followed by reconnaissance by MIG-25s on a position
where a large resistance force was being assembled.
He heard that about 2,000 died and personally saw a
large number of dead bodies with exposed bones and
open wounds that appeared to have been caused by
acid. Survivors described an acidlike agent. He was
told that the aircraft came from Tashkent in the USSR.
He had heard similar reports from Jalalabad and
Qandahar.
101.
102.
/six "chemical bombs"
were expended, along with conventional air munitions,
27
"Tap-eeepa.t_
(b)(3)
(b)(1 )1(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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--rop-,sec4e6.
Figure 10
Afghanistan: Chemical Warfare Operational Areas
Iran
Herat
KavarzanHer�
Shindand
.�6
Farah ,
//
Badghisat
r -
Alg ha nrista
OrCr4gan
GharT
iDeh Raved
Gandahar.4:
Qandahar
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative. n 'tied
t 420 kilometers
to Aiys'
Soviet Union
clon(luz
Gonduz
Badakhshin
Mazar-e Sharif Takhar
S-3-lang
Tunnel
Bagrame
B Train
KABUL+ \
KabOl
Vardak
Lowgar Nang&
Feyzahad
�
Paktia
Konarha
sadahad
haghasaray)
ISLAMABAK
�
�
Pakistan
China
India
Area of concentrated chemical attacks
Parvan Province where chemical attacks have occurred
Soviet chemical defense battalion
� Airfield
390
Kilometers
n 10Y 78 1.8?
in a strike by Afghan IL-28 bombers from Shindand
on targets in Farah, Herat, and Badghisat Provinces on
16 November 1979. Afghan IL-28s were based at
Shindand/
103. On 27 December 1979, Soviet jet aircraft
reportedly had dropped chemical bombs. The location
of this particular attack was riot given, but the same
report mentioned other chemical attacks in Badakh-
shan Province.
104. Chemical Attacks Following Invasion.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 17 Decem-
ber 1979, reports were received from many types of
sources that both Soviet and Afghan forces were using
various types of chemical agents.
105. One report speaks of chemical bomb attacks
during the week of 13-19 January 1980 against insur-
gent forces near Feyzabad and Jalalabad, in the
Hazarajet area of Bamian Province, and in Takhar
Province, all in eastern Afghanistan. The bombs re-
portedly exploded in midair, dispersing a -vapor- that
felt damp on the skin. Inhalation of the vapor is said to
have caused difficulty in breathing, nasal excretions,
vomiting, blindness, paralysis, and death. These symp-
toms are associated with nerve agent poisoning.
106. In mid-January there were other reports alleg-
ing that Soviet aircraft and helicopters had attacked
remote areas in northeastern Afghanistan, particularly
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28
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�1710-5eefe
Badakhshan Province, dropping bombs that exploded
and dispersed gas that caused blindness, paralysis, and
death. We know that the Soviets Nunched their first
offensive operation in northeastern Afghanistan using
air and helicopter strikes from a base inside the Soviet
Union and that these air attacks� occurred during
heavy snowfall against insurgent positions high in the
mountain area.
107. In February 1980 a respected Australian jour-
nalist and a US official spoke with Afghan refugees
from different ethnic tribal areas who described
chemical agent attacks that allegedly occurred in
several Afghan provinces. One tribal group reported
that attackers dropped canisters dispersing a gas but
that no casualties occurred. A reported chemical agent
attack in another area allegedly caused some people to
become ill but did not cause any deaths. Reports from
some refugees from Badakhshan Province have alleged
that an unspecified number of deaths occurred as a
result of exposure to chemical agents used in attacks in
that area.
108. Another set of reports that iecently became
available, concerning the period from mid-January to
February 1980, described helicopter attacks in north-
eastern Afghanistan in which a grayish-blue smoke
resulted in symptoms similar to those described by the
H'Mong refugees from Laos (heavy tearing or water-
ing of eyes; extensive blistering and discoloration of
the skin, later resulting in large sheetlike peeling;
swelling in the areas affected by the blister; and finally
numbness, paralysis, and death).
109. In early March, following the Soviet offensive
in Konarha Province on the Pakistani border, Afghan
refugees arriving in Pakistan provided new reports of
chemical agent attacks. But, unlike earlier reports
describing attacks in which deaths allegedly occurred,
these reports describe attacks with an incapacitating
agent. In addition to these reports, there are several
reliable ones which state that the Soviets used inca-
pacitating agents during the Konarha offensive to
allow Soviet forces to overrun resistance forces and
capture prisoners.
110. Medical examinations in Pakistan of refugees
from a large attack in the upper Konar Valley in
February 1980 described red skin and blisters contain-
ing fluid described as dirty water. Refugees reported
that about 2,000 people were affected after contact
with a dirty yellow cloud.
111. An Afghan doctor
reported the same type of
agents as those being used
Badakhshan Provinces.
112.
who worked in Qonduz
incapacitants and blister
in Konarha, Paktia, and
114.
115. The Soviet 108th Motorized Rifle Division \
Troops
to wear gas masks when using the grenades and
their eyes if exposed. By August, more than 2,700
were
wash
toxic
smoke grenades were received
Other divisions also had toxic smoke grenades, which
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
complicated the withdrawal to the USSR. \ j(b)( 1 )
(b)(3)
29
116. A Japanese academic in March 1980 at a
training camp in Peshawar saw an 8-mm film that
showed Soviet helicopters dropping several objects,
which caused no explosion and produced a bluish-
purple smoke mixed with gray and white, probably in
an area northwest of Jalalabad. He was told the attacks
caused numerous deaths, but the Hezbi-Islami Party,
which operates in that area, refused to make the film
available to any international organizations. They
believed they were fighting a holy war and did not
need to prove that international law was being violat-
ed.
Testrfierze
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To-p�Jec44
117. An Afghan officer trained in chemical warfare
in the USSR described the use of incapacitants and
blister agents in Afghanistan and remembered their
characteristics as described in Soviet manuals. He said
the incapacitant munition is effective in a 50-meter
radius and causes unconsciousness for varying periods.
118. Col. Gen. V. K. Pikalov, chief of the USSR's
chemical troops, brought 20 Soviet officials to tour
Afghanistan in April 1980. They were specifically
interested in investigating the use of toxic agents in the
Herat area. -IF" was the only identification of the
agent used
March the Afghan
capture of -lethal
resistance. In fact,
On 25
Government had publicized the
US grenades- provided to the
it was a US riot-control grenade
readily available commercially for police forces. Ac-
cording to a reliable source, however, the Soviets used
lethal agents near Herat in March and placed the
blame for the incident on US-provided chemical
weapons used by the insurgents.
119. A Dutch journalist published his eyewitness
account of two chemical attacks in the Jalalabad area
on 15 and 21 June 1980. He filmed the MI-24
helicopter dropping canisters that produced a gray-
white cloud. A victim with blackened skin was photo-
graphed (figure 7 on page 23) in the village five hours
after the attack. The journalist evidently was exposed
because he developed blisters on his hands and a
swollen and itchy face. He was exposed in the second
attack and it took about 10 days for him to recover
from skin lesions, nausea, diarrhea, arid stomach
cramps. This is one of the best firsthand accounts
available from Afghanistan. The agent has not been
identified, but it could be a mixture containing phos-
gene oxime or hydrogen sulfide along with other
components
120. A US journalist described seeing a yellow-
green gas that appeared to him to be a highly concen-
trated CS-type gas with a blister agent associated with
-TeS-344444.21.11__
it. He said the canisters containing the incapacitating
gas were -18 inches long and 8 inches in diameter,-
whic h corresponds with many other reports from
Afghans. We had heard reports about a lethal gas that
causes unconsciousness and then death.
121. In August 1980
Soviet attack with chemical bombs on the village of
Sya Wusan, 30 kilometers southeast of Herat, leaving
300 dead. Afghan military authorities told doctors in
Herat they could not treat the victims and doctors'
offices were closed. It was in this time frame that the
chemical battalion at Shindand set up an operational
decontamination station. (See figure 12.)
122. Chemical Attacks in 1981. Soviet helicopter
units participated in chemical attacks from 20 to 29
April 1981, in areas east and west of Kabul and in the
Konar Valley. These attacks were intended to drive
personnel from sanctuaries such as caves in order to
engage them with conventional fire./
Similar
operations by helicopters occurred north of Qandahar
on 24 and 26 April.
123. An Afghan MI-8 helicopter pilot who defected
to the Pakistanis said Soviet forces had used chemical
weapons in Badakhshan, Qonduz, and Konarha Prov-
inces. Chemicals in canisters that contained toxic gas,
tear gas, and antirespiratory gas, which has an inca-
pacitating effect by causing choking and difficulty in
breathing, were manually pushed from the cargo
compartments of helicopters. He said there was also a
specific gas that is absorbed by the body and leaves the
skin so soft that one can pierce it with a finger. In one
case, there was a wind shift, and Soviet and Afghan
forces were seriously affected. Other sources also have
described an incident where Soviet and Afghan forces
were victims of their own gas attack
124. A US doctor of Afghan origin examined vic-
tims of a July 1981 attack. His report is detailed in the
annex on medical evidence."
30
Tsr.r-Seemt.
See annex E.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
1
3
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(b)(3)
125. Before a Soviet sweep operation in the Konar
Valley in September 1981, resistance leaders were told
by an Afghan officer that the Soviets had four agents
available, but would use only the incapacitant which
they could defend against with wet rags over the face.
During the operation, Soviet helicopters conducted gas
attacks in 25 different areas, using cylinders about 1.5
meters long and 60 centimeters in diameter that
exploded 4 to 5 meters above the ground, releasing the
incapacitating gas. Some victims lost consciousness,
were paralyzed, and recovered; others died, and un-
protected areas of their skin turned dark green to blue-
green
126. CW Agents Used. A recent report from a
wounded Mujahedin fighter in a Karachi hospital
reinforces our suspicion that previously unidentified
toxins or nontraditional CW agents have been used.
This man, described as an expert on Soviet ordnance
and use of chemical weapons (but not chemical-
biological aspects), told US Embassy personnel on 10
February 1982 that the Soviets are using irritants, a
hallucinogenic gas, and an apparent nerve gas. The
nerve gas- was described as an off-white powder
generally dispersed from helicopters during artillery or
aerial bombing attacks. He said the substance is hard
to detect. Victims feel faint and dizzy; subsequently
they vomit and began to bleed from the eyes, nose,
and mouth. Death rates approach 70 percent. Dead
bodies are relaxed and the skin peels off when an
effort is made to move the bodies. This sequence of
symptoms is consistent with trichothecene toxin poi-
soning, not nerve agents. This source's cogent and
detailed description of symptoms of survivors, up to six
months after an attack, are similar to numerous
reports from Southeast Asia and supports the growing
body of as yet unevaluated claims that toxins cause
long-term health effects.
127. The Mujahedin regarded gas as simply another
weapon in the Soviet arsenal and had to be urged to
discuss CW use. This is typical of the Mujahedin
attitude toward the US -preoccupation- with chemi-
cal warfare and contributes to the intelligence conclu-
sion that Mujahedin reports of chemical attacks, like
the H'Mong refugee reports on CW use in Laos, are
not part of a fabricated propaganda campaign.
128. To substantiate the descriptions of chemical
attacks in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, details of
reported attacks were checked against
35
military
operations at the specific time and place. In a high
percentage of the cases studied, military operations of
the type described by the victims of chemical attacks
did take place. For example, an Afghan emigre in
Europe recently repeated a description by an Afghan
tribal leader of a Soviet chemical attack with helicop-
ters on a 700-man force that had gathered to conduct a
surprise attack on Qandahar in October 1981.
129. The most persuasive case studies are those
where samples have been collected and analyzed.
Thus far that has been possible only for attacks in
Southeast Asia; but the Afghan emigre stated that
green gas canisters, which emitted a green-yellow
smoke upon bitting the ground, were taken to Pakistan
by some of the 400 survivors of the October attack.
Attempts are being made to acquire the canisters.
130. We have reliable information that the Soviets
have stockpiled lethal and casualty-producing agents
in Afghanistan and information, also reliable, on
where and when some of them have been used. The
agents included nerve agents, phosgene, phosgene
oxime, sulfur mustard, and lewisite. The agents used,
plus the time and location of the attacks, generally
correspond to the refugee reports and recorded mili-
tary operations. Afghan military defectors have also
described the agents being used by the Soviets and
pinpointed where they are stored.
131. Soviet Chemical Defense Equipment and
Units. A number of former Afghan officers have
described their chemical warfare training in the USSR,
and have listed the different types of agents available
to the Afghan military and the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Their reports, which date back to early 1980, are
similar to a recently acquired clandestine report,
except that they described the symptoms caused by
the chemical agents without naming them. A former
ordnance officer described where the agents were
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b),(-3),3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
ku)ko)
(b)(3)
S(960-4241
Trirteer44..._
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-1"6"Trlieetie4
Table 1
Major Soviet Chemical Defense Equipment
at Division Level
Equipment
Units and Number
Chemical
Battalion
Four Chemical
Companies
Other Divison
Units
Total
BRDM-RKh
9
16
4
29
TMS-65 jet engine
2
0
2
ARS-12/14 b
20
12
3
35
DDA-53/66 C
4
4
6
14
a Wheeled reconnaissance vehicle with chemical, biological, and radiological detection equipment.
b Truck-mounted device that uses fluid under pressure to decontaminate terrain and equipment.
Truck-mounted steam chambers for decontamination of clothing.
stored in Kabul,
Jalalabad.
Herat, Shindand, Qandahar, and
132. Chemical defense battalions�standard in all
Soviet divisions�are deployed with the three Soviet
motorized rifle divisions operating in Afghanistan at
Qonduz, Shindand, and Kabul. Also a chemical com-
pany is subordinate to each tank and motorized rifle
regiment.
133. The chemical defense battalion is normally
equipped with the TMS-65 decontamination vehicle
(truck mounted, jet engine), the DDA steam generator,
and the ARS spray-type decontamination equipment.
Such equipment has the primary mission of reducing
the effects of chemical, biological, and nuclear con-
tamination. A secondary mission for the TMS-65 is to
lay smokescreens, and for the DDA device to generate
hot water for showers.
134. The table of organization of these units in-
cludes the major equipment items listed in table 1.
135. Soviet divisional chemical defense forces are
sufficient to decontaminate division equipment but
are capable of only relatively modest-scale terrain-
decontamination operations. If the Soviets were plan-
ning fairly widespread use of persistent chemical
agents and operations in contaminated areas, addition-
-TC1-1(4441.6,21_1.1_
al chemical defense units probably would be required.
Such nondivisional units�subordinate to either army
or military district headquarters�are located in most
military districts in the USSR, but none have been seen
in Afghanistan
136. The nondivisional chemical defense unit clos-
est to the Afghan border is the 126th Chemical
Defense Battalion located in Bukhara, in the Turke-
stan Military District, about 300 kilometers from the
border. This unit appears to be manned at no more
than half strength and probably would need to be
augmented by reserve personnel before deploying
outside the USSR./
137. Chemical defense equipment, apparently a
reserve stockpile, also is stored in Dushanbe and
Kurgan-Tyube in the Central Asian Military District at
installations formerly occupied by elements of the
201st Motorized Rifle Division. This equipment was
not moved out of the two installations however, when
the division moved into Afghanistan
138.
36
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"(6)(3)
(b)(o)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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TOrtversik
I Decon-
tamination vehicles also have been seen in the Kabul
area.
141.
Decon-
tamination and reconnaissance equipment accompa-
nied a 152-mm artillery unit into operations in the
Konar Valley, near Chaghasaray
142. Soviet troops in Kabul have been observed
with what appear to be gas masks in canvas carrying
37
"Tap-64iczea,.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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-rap-seepiA
cases; and,/ Soviet
forces were instructed to don masks when using
-toxic/noxious- grenades. Also, on 24 February 1980
many Soviet troops became ill from carbon monoxide
poisoning when they were caught by a traffic jam in
the Salang tunnel because they did not have special
protective canisters required for carbon monoxide
143. Soviet Offensive CW Capabilities. The So-
viet Union has stocked a variety of toxic chemical
agents and munitions to meet wartime contingencies.
Weapon systems capable of delivering chemical muni-
tions available to Soviet forces in Afghanistan include
TCS-3G,
artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and most tactical
aircraft. (See table 2.)
144. Field artillery can be used to disseminate CW
agents in large concentrations for short ranges. Chemi-
cal artillery munitions (as well as aerial bombs) include
both fragmentation and nonfragmentation varieties.
Dissemination efficiencies (the amount of agent depos-
ited after dissemination) as high as 90 percent appar-
ently have been achieved with Soviet base-ejection
38
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Table 2
Soviet CW Agents and Weapons Systems
Agent
Artillery Munitions
(size in millimeters) a
Free Fall Bombs
(weight in kilograms) a
Rocket Warheads a
Nerve
Thickened Soman
100
FROG
Sarin
122, 152
100, 250
BM-21
BM-24
Vesicant (Blister)
Mustard
122, 152
Thickened Mustard
122, 152
Thickened Lewisite
122, 152
Mustard/Lewisite Mixture
100, 250,
500, 1,000,
1,500
Thickened Mustard/Lewisite Mixture
250, 1,000
Systemic
Hydrogen Cyanide
250, 500
BM-21
BM-24
a Entry indicates availability of delivery system for agent specified.
shells,
145. The lethal agents listed in table 2 are known to
be in the Soviet inventory. It has been confirmed that
a Soviet agent known as VR-55 is the nerve agent
soman (GD) thickened with 3- to 5-percent polymeth-
ylmethacrylate. Unthickened soman (GD) may be
considered by the Soviets as a viable agent fill for
munitions, but the thickened version appears to be
favored. Tabun, VX, toxins, and phosgene oxime, on
the basis of recent information, may have become
standard agents
146. The Soviets have been interested in the US
binary weapons program for over a decade and appar-
ently have conducted research and development in
such weapons and may have even tested a few rounds.
The Soviets issued a patent for a reaction involving an
oxime and an alcohol to yield two CW agents: a nerve
agent and phosgene oxime (an urticant). There is,
however, no evidence that the Soviets have binary
weapons in their inventory.
147. About a dozen major installations in the USSR
are known to store chemical defense equipment and
are suspected of also storing chemical munitions and/
or bulk supplies of agents. One of these�the facility
"I'CS-31,619-8471,11.
near the town of Arys' in the Central Asian Military
District�is located about 500 kilometers from the
Afghan border. Although chemical shells reportedly
were stored near Arys' before World War II, we
cannot confirm that toxic munitions are now being
stored at this installation. Any munitions stored there
today could be moved by rail to Termez�and then
overland across the border�or directly into Afghani-
stan by air
148.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Analysis of information from several sources
convinces us that in Soviet CW exercises the crews
loading CW munitions onto aircraft do not wear
protective clothes, nor is decontamination equipment
present. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
39
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149. Because Afghan insurgent forces have little or
no protection, there are several situations in which the
use of chemical weapons could be an attractive alter-
native to conventional munitions. In mountainous
areas, where rebels are holed up in caves or other
inaccessible areas, conventional artillery, high-explo-
sive bombs, and napalm are not particularly effective.
/an unidentified
agent has been used on this kind of target.
150. Another possible use for lethal agents would be
to deny terrain to rebel forces. Using persistent agents,
the Soviets could contaminate large areas for up to
three to five days, especially by air-delivered muni-
tions. Contamination of terrain also could be used to
force insurgents into areas more accessible to Soviet
troops or into conventional fire zones. Under ideal
temperature and wind conditions, the persistent nerve
agent thickened soman would be the most effective
agent. A KhAB-100 bomb filled with a nerve agent
such as soman could cover 4,000 square meters with a
contamination density of 7.25 grams per cubic meter
and would kill all unprotected individuals
151. Effects of Weather and Terrain. The effec-
tiveness of CW agents is heavily influenced by the
terrain, wind, and temperatures. Much of Afghanistan
is mountainous, and at elevations below 1,200 meters
temperatures rise to more than 38 degrees Celsius
nearly every day from June to September. There are
few trees, and the centuries-long practice of seeking
fuel and forage in this already barren land has denud-
ed the hillside of scrub and bushes. The effectiveness
of chemical agents would be degraded in such a harsh
environment. Strong gusty winds characteristic of
barren mountains would decrease the density of the
contamination, and more agent would be required to
maintain a lethal concentration. Also, the cold tem-
peratures in winter and during fall nights would
reduce the vapor hazard to a minimum. As tempera-
tures rose during the day, however, the agent would
vaporize and the hazard would increase. The best
dissemination periods in Afghanistan probably would
be around sunrise during the spring and fall months.
152. An Afghan officer who defected described
chemical attacks with lethal agents from 13 to 19
January near Bamian, Feyzabad, Jalalabad, and Ta-
TC5-613619-4242.1_
khar. The US Air Force studied the weather over these
areas for that period and concluded that conditions
were favorable for the aerial delivery of nerve agents
on at least two days at each location. The Soviets are
actively engaged in testing methods of disseminating
agents to allow delivery on target with minimum
influence from certain meteorological conditions.
They have tested chemical aerial bomb delivery from
light bombers and helicopters as well as multiple
rocket launchers and artillery at the Shikhany test
range.
V. THE CASE FOR CW USE OF
TRICHOTHECENES
Sample Analyses for the Trichothecenes
153. Many of the reports of chemical attacks in
Southeast Asia were puzzling in that they described
the use of a lethal agent (or agents) that produced
symptoms not easily correlated with those known to be
produced by traditionally recognized chemical war-
fare agents."
154. The symptoms most frequently described in
Laos and Kampuchea correspond most closely with
those produced by a group of mycotoxins, the
trichothecenes. Particularly unusual was the repeated
description by medically unsophisticated victims of
symptoms indicating hemorrhage and degeneration of
the mucosal lining of the gastrointestinal tract, symp-
toms characteristic of trichothecene poisoning.2� A
review of the scientific literature 21 revealed that the
trichothecenes had physical and chemical properties
ideal for chemical agents; that they could easily be
mass-produced; and, also, that they had been the
subjects of intense Soviet scientific investigation since
the 1930s.
155. For these and other reasons, the decision was
made to test for the trichothecenes using the most
sensitive and specific methods of analysis available.
"This chapter summarizes annex D, which is a detailed presenta-
tion of the investigation undertaken to substantiate the case for use
of trichothecene toxins in Southeast Asia
A compilation of the signs and symptoms reported in each
country is found in table D-1, annex D
2" See annex E.
z See annex D, sections IV and V.
40
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(D)(i)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Samples were submitted on a blind basis to Dr.
Chester Mirocha, the leading US expert on detection
of trichothecenes.
156. Results. Analyses of four alleged chemical
warfare samples (two from Laos and two from Kam-
puchea) were completed in September 1981. All four
showed the presence of extremely high levels of
trichothecenes." The samples were collected from the
sites of three separate chemical attacks in which
victims reported symptoms consistent with trichothe-
cene poisoning. The extremely high levels of toxins
found in these samples (150 parts per million of 1-2
toxin, 109 ppm of nivalenol, more than 100 ppm of
diacetoxyscirpenol, and 66 ppm of deoxynivalenol)
have not been reported to occur in a natural environ-
ment even under climatic and substrate conditions
favorable for their production. Three of the analyzed
samples were taken from environments�the surface
of rocks or water�that would be extremely unlikely to
support natural growth and toxin production.23
157. Conclusions. When all the factors are consid-
ered it is clear that the appearance of these particular
toxins in these extremely high levels in environments
so hostile to their formation cannot reasonably and
scientifically be attributed to a natural contamination.
This conclusion is supported by the results of the
analyses of controls consisting of vegetation, soil, and
water samples from an area adjacent to the Kampu-
chean attack site. Nivalenol, deoxynivalenol, T-2, and
diacetoxyscirpenol were not present�indicating that
these toxins do not occur naturally in that geographical
area. Even samples of corn and rice from the area�
which would provide an ideal substrate for the toxin-
producing species�were found to be negative for the
trichothecenes.
158. Additional alleged chemical warfare samples,
including blood samples from victims of "yellow rain"
attacks in Kampuchea were analyzed." Preliminary
results on these blood samples are consistent with toxin
22 See annex D, table D-2.
" A detailed analysis of the possibility that the levels of toxins
found in the Laotian and Kampuchean samples could have been the
result of a natural contamination is presented in annex D, section
" See annex D, table D-3.
41
exposure, but are statistically inconclusive because of
the problems encountered in obtaining fresh samples
and because of the lack of sufficient controls. HT-2, a
metabolite of T-2 toxin, was detected in blood speci-
mens from two victims of a "yellow rain" attack."
159. Further Efforts. Collection efforts continue
and additional samples continue to arrive. These will
be tested for the trichothecenes as well as for other
more familiar chemical warfare agents. In addition,
many of the samples previously collected and tested
for the traditional chemical warfare agents will be
reexamined for the presence of trichothecenes.
Natural Occurrence and Significant Properties
160. The trichothecenes are mycotoxins; that is,
they are toxins produced by fungi. There are more
than 40 structural derivatives known to occur natural-
ly.26 Trichothecene toxins, more than any other group
of mycotoxins, have been associated with acute disease
outbreaks in humans; and most of these outbreaks (b)(3)
have occurred in the Soviet Union.27 The Soviets have
traditionally had a strong scientific interest in these
toxins, and research projects concerning them have
been identified with Soviet institutes believed to be
involved in classified research related to chemical and
bacteriological warfare. (b)(3)
161. Literature concerned with the natural occur-
rence of these toxins has been relatively scarce because
of the lack of convenient detection methods and the
complexity of the trichothecene family of compounds.
Methods capable of distinguishing between close struc-
tural derivatives and of accurately quantifying the
levels of toxin present have only recently become
available. We do have reports of natural occurrences
of T-2 toxin, diacetoxyscirpenol, deoxynivalenol, and
nivalenol�reports that were obtained from a litera-
ture search of over 3,000 citations concerned with
trichothecene toxins."
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
162. The extremely high levels of toxins found in
the CW samples from Laos and Kampuchea, as noted
" These results are detailed in table D-2, annex D.
" Some of the most important of these and the fungi that produce
them are listed in table D-4, annex D.
" See annex D, table D-5
"These reports are listed in annex D, section IV.
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in paragraph 156, have not been reported to occur in
nature. Higher levels of toxin production can, of
course, be induced when the mold species is grown in
pure culture under ideal temperature and substrate
conditions in the laboratory. The Soviets, for instance,
have succeeded in producing 4 grams of T-2 per
kilogram of substrate under controlled conditions. In a
natural environment, however, the Fusarium species
cannot compete well with other mold species such as
Aspergillus and Penicillium, and levels of toxin pro-
duced are lower (in most cases, by several orders of
magnitude) than those found in the samples." Several
other lines of evidence�including climatic require-
ments for toxin production, results of surveys of
toxigenic fungi in Southeast Asia, and results of con-
trolled studies�support the conclusion that it is impos-
sible to provide a scientifically sound explanation for
the natural appearance of these particular toxins at
these levels and combinations in an environment so
hostile to their production.
163. When one considers the suitability of tri-
chothecenes as chemical agents, factors such as stabil-
ity, solubility, and ease of production become ex-
tremely important. The trichothecenes are very stable
and can be stored for years at room temperature with
no loss of activity. They are also heat stable, showing
no loss of activity after heating at 100 degrees Celsius
for an hour. The structure of the compounds allows
solubilization of them in a wide range of solvents
without affecting the basic toxicity."' Although some
of the trichothecenes have been synthesized chemical-
ly, biosynthesis employing Fusaria species is the most
effective way to produce large quantities. Almost half
of the Soviet open literature concerning these toxins
deals with defining optimum conditions for biosynthe-
sis of the compounds."
164. Mycotoxins can be produced in excellent
yields employing the same techniques that are used to
produce some antibiotics. Both are products of mold
metabolism, and an antibiotics installation could pro-
vide an excellent cover for agent production facilities.
Heavily guarded industrial microbiology plants under
military control have been identified in the Soviet
Union.
" See annex D, table D-7.
" See annex D
s' See annex D for a representative bibliography.
irs-nt*(9-42.4.11_
165 On the basis of their stability, solubility, and
production characteristics, the trichothecenes would
fit the general requirements for chemical agents. Of
course, the most important properties of chemical
agents are their toxicological effects." Striking among
those for trichothecene toxins are the rapid onset of
vomiting and severe itching and tingling of the skin.
Hemorrhage of the mucous membranes and bloody
diarrhea follow. The correlation between the symp-
toms reported to have been caused by the trichothe-
cenes and those reported by gas victims in Laos,
Kampuchea, and Afghanistan is immediately appar-
ent.
166. Most of the available data concerning the
effects of the trichothecenes are the result of animal
studies in which pure compounds were administered
by oral, subcutaneous, intraperitoneal, or intravenous
routes. There are no reports concerning inhalation of
mixtures of these compounds. It is difficult, therefore,
to speculate concerning the time course and severity of
the effects that would be expected in humans exposed
to aerosolized mixtures of these potent toxins."
167. The most useful data concerning exposure in
humans were obtained in a Phase I clinical evaluation
of anguidine (diacetoxyscirpenol) as an experimental
anticancer drug. The trichothecene was administered
by intravenous infusion, and immediately caused nau-
sea, vomiting, diarrhea, somnolence (and/or mental
confusion), fever, chills, a generalized erythema with a
burning sensation, hypotension, dyspnea, stornatitis,
hives, and ataxia. Another useful body of clinical data
concerning the effects of trichothecenes in humans is
drawn from descriptions of the course of the disease in
the natural outbreaks that occurred in the Soviet
Union."
VI. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE
SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM
168. Indications of current chemical weapons used
by the Soviets or their allies are more credible when
viewed in the context of developments in chemical
00 The most prominent symptoms associated with trichothecene
poisoning are listed in annex D, table D-1.
" See annex D, table D-1.
" These symptoms are described in detail in annex D, section
42
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weaponry generally and of Soviet association with a
given development in particular. The modern history
of toxic chemical agents dates from World War I. Both
the French and the Germans first used lacrimators on
a limited scale in 1914. In an attempt to overcome a
stalemate, the Germans on 22 April 1915 launched a
large-scale chemical warfare attack: chlorine gas was
released from commercial cylinders along the front,
with the wind blowing in the direction of the unpre-
pared enemy. This attack was highly effective, and the
tactic was subsequently repeated.
169. The first chemical shell, developed by the
French and used in early 1916 against the Germans,
was filled with phosgene (CG). It was succeeded a
short time later by shells filled with hydrogen cyanide
(AC). In July 1917 the Germans began using shells
filled with mustard gas (HD). About the same time the
Germans also introduced diphenylchloroarsine (DA), a
particulate irritant that could penetrate the protective
masks then in use by the Allied troops.
170. Throughout this war both the Allies and the
Germans explored the military effectiveness of chemi-
cal munitions of varying sorts. The Russians apparent-
ly suffered particularly heavy casualties. By 1917 they
had produced the Shlem respirator, an effective pro-
tective mask. Even so, Russian soldiers continued to
suffer heavy casualties, in part because of lack of
training. In one particular attack, for example, the
Russian soldiers apparently donned their masks but
had not been told to remove the plug from the filter
canister. The result was that they were either asphyx-
iated or died from exposure to the gas when they
removed the mask.
171. At the close of the war, the Soviet military
establishment examined its experience with chemical
weapons and reached the following conclusions: (1) It
is necessary to be able to retaliate in kind. During the
war the Russian forces failed in this totally; only a
small portion of total CW agent use was Russian. (2) It
is necessary to understand how to use chemical weap-
ons effectively. (3) It is necessary to have protective
equipment available to the troops, and they must
know how to use it correctly.
172. To rectify these deficiencies the Soviets be-
came involved in all aspects of chemical warfare. The
first Soviet military chemical academies were found-
ed, and the Soviets in 1924 negotiated a CW coopera-
tion pact with the Germans. This pact resulted in
establishment of the CW proving grounds at Shikhany.
The Germans continued their assistance into 1929,
when they departed at Soviet request, abandoning all
equipment. In that year the Soviets were field-testing
mustard thickened with various additives for use in
aerial spray tanks.
173. In 1925 the Geneva Protocol was signed by the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the USSR. In
short, this pact prohibited the first use in war of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases; the rights to retaliate
and to use such gases against nonsignatories were
reserved.
174. During the 1930s the Soviets established a
large number of CW production plants and began
stockpiling agents. They carried out many field test
programs, often involving large numbers of animals.
They conducted research into new agents, including
experiments with phosgene oxime and with mixtures
of agents. They built special railcars to transport bulk
agents to sites for filling munition systems. They
developed the first ARS decontamination vehicles,
which could also be used for carrying bulk agents. All
Soviet troops were issued Shlem respirators and protec-
tive capes and buskins. By the start of World War II
the USSR chemical agent stockpile exceeded 140,000
tons: CW agents were the only war supplies the Soviets
did not need from the West.
175. Also during this decade the Germans devel-
oped nerve agents, and in 1939 began production of
the nerve agent tabun (GA). In 1935 and 1936, Italy
successfully employed mustard gas in Ethiopia, claim-
ing that the Geneva Protocol did not prohibit use of
CW in reprisal against other illegal acts of war.
176. At the outbreak of World War II the United
States, like the Soviet Union, had large stockpiles of
mustard and phosgene; and the Germans had stock-
piled sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and tabun.
Toxic chemicals were not used in that war, however,
possibly because of the inhibiting effect of probable
retaliation in kind.
177. In 1945 the Soviets captured the German
nerve agent plant at Dyhernfurth, together with many
43
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ltp-5eer-e4
of its scientists and technicians. The entire plant was
transferred to Volgograd. The Soviets first produced
tabun and then switched to production of the nerve
agents sarin and soman as the agents of choice. A new
agent, VR-55, noted by the early 1950s, was subse-
quently identified as thickened soman, a modification
developed by the British and shared with the Soviets
during World War II. It has been suggested that
chemical warfare was then viewed by the Soviets as a
cheap answer to American possession of nuclear weap-
ons. By the late 1950s good intelligence was available
on the existence of Soviet weapon systems for CW
agents and of plans for their use, as well as details
establishing a commitment to training troops in use of
and protection from chemical weapons. Production
plants were constructed at Shikhany and Dzerzhinsk
during the 1960s
--"MS-3064943.2,(1,1
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191. In recent years HUMINT reporting has re-
flected a continuing Soviet commitment to chemical
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lop Steret
defense training, and intelligence from all sources
shows protective and decontamination equipment in
large amounts and variety. Activity at Soviet CW-
related sites has not been affected by US termination
of CW agent production. The Soviets have condemned
US interest in binary chemical munitions while pursu-
ing similar research. There continues to be evidence
that they are working to produce penetrating agents
that will defeat Western protection systems.
192. The Soviet Union ratified the 1972 convention
banning the production and stockpiling of bacteriolog-
ical and biological agents and toxins and their means of
delivery. They also entered into negotiations with the
United States to draft a similar treaty to ban chemical
weapons. However, Soviet interest in chemical and
biological warfare in all its facets continues unabated, a
conclusion quite consistent with the allegations arising
from Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.
47
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-rairs�4,a
ANNEX A '
TABULATIONS OF REPORTED CHEMICAL WARFARE
ATTACKS IN LAOS, KAMPUCHEA, AND AFGHANISTAN
This annex comprises three tables summarizing
chronologically, by location, number, and associated
deaths, the chemical attacks reported to have occurred
in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan between 1975
and 1981. The tables were compiled from a large
volume of intelligence reports on such attacks. Every
effort was made to correlate individual allegations
with collateral information and to eliminate double
counting. The numbers of fatalities shown almost
certainly fall short of actual totals because our cover-
age is inevitably incomplete and many reports failed
to provide casualty numbers.
' This anr------irr-is-41,1acj
fiCS-71611t8271t
Table A-1
Laos: Summary of Reported Chemical
Attacks and Associated Deaths, 1975-81
Time Period
Area
Attacks a
Deaths b
Summer 1975
Vientiane
2
25+
Fall 1976
Phou Bia
8
10
Savannakhet
1
10
Winter 1976-77
Phou Bia
2
16
Spring 1977
Phou Bia
6
66+
Khammouan
2
1
Summer 1977
Phou Bia
6
95
Fall 1977
Phou Bia
1
25
Winter 1977-78
Phou Bia
10
1,328+
Savannakhet
6
224
Spring 1978
Phou Bia
34
969+
Summer 1978
Phou Bia
22
664+
Fall 1978
Phou Bia
19
572
Winter 1978-79
Phou Bia
5
15+
Spring 1979
Phou Bia
36
257+
Summer 1979
Phou Bia
5
239+
Fall 1979
Phou Bia
10
56
Xaignabouri
2
24+
Winter 1979-80
Phou Bia
4
10+
Spring 1980
Phou Bia
3
24
Summer 1980
Phou Bia
6
187+
Fall 1980
Xaignabouri
1
12
Phou Bia
7
88+
Savannakhet
3
1+
Winter 1980-81
Xaignabouri
2
57
Phou Bia
4
82
Vientiane
1
1+
Spring 1981
Houaphan
2
?
Phou Bia
7
218
Vientiane
1
�
Summer 1981
Phou Bia
1
?
Fall 1981
Phou Bia
4
500+
Khammouan
3
534+
226
6,310+
a This tabulation omits 35 attacks, accounting for 194 deaths, that
were not located in the reports. The totals overall were 261 attacks
and more than 6,504 deaths.
b A plus sign indicates that the report(s) of deaths gave a minimum
figure. In some cases (shown with a question mark) deaths were
reported but no number was given. Other reports (signified with a
dash) gave no information on fatalities.
A-1
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Table A-2
Kampuchea: Summary of Reported Chemical
Attacks and Associated Deaths, 1978-81
Time Period
Area Attacks Deaths a
1978
Summer 1979
Fall 1979
Winter 1979-80
Spring 1980
Summer 1980
Ratanakiri
Kampong Speu
Siem Reap
Battambang
Pursat
Koh Kong
Kampot
Kampong Chhnang
Battambang
Pursat
Koh Kong
Battambang
Pursat
Koh Kong
Stem Reap
Battambang
Pursat
Koh Kong
Winter 1980-81 Battambang
Pursat
Spring 1981 Preah Vihear
Battambang
Pursat
Koh Kong
Kampot
Summer 1981 Battambang
Kampong Thom/Cham
Fall 1981 Siem Reap
Battambang
Pursat
Koh Kong
Kampot
5
4 37
1
4 22+
2 1+
2 6+
1 3
2
12
5
2
3
8
5
1
3
2
3
8
2
1
118
64+
21+
4
20+
24+
13
82+
23+
7
3
12 163+
3 42+
1
1
3
1
16 305
6 16
3
1
1
7+
124 981
a A plus sign indicates that the report(s) of deaths gave a minimum
figure. In some cases (shown with a question mark) deaths were
reported but no number was given. Other reports (signified with a
dash) gave no information on fatalities.
Table A-3
Afghanistan: Summary of Reported Chemical
Attacks and Associated Deaths, 1979-81
Time Period
Province Attacks a Deaths b
Summer 1979 Badakhshan
Parvan
Bamian
Fall 1979 Konarha
Farah
Herat
Badghisat
Winter 1979-80 Badakhshan
Takhar
Konarha
Nangarhar
Bamian
Spring 1980 Badakshan
Konarha
Oruzgan
Qandahar
Summer 1980 Nangarhar
Vardak
Herat
Kabul
Fall 1980 Konarha
Lowgar
Ghazni
Winter 1980-81 Lowgar
Spring 1981 Parvan
Lowgar
Ghazni
Qandahar
Summer 1981 Nangarhar
Qandahar
Herat
1 2,000c
1 8
1
1 350
1
1
1
5 130+
1
2 10+
1
1
1 1+
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
3
2
1
3
300+
4
100
2
2 16
1 119
47 3,042
This tabulation omits some attacks described in the text because
they could not be dated or located with high confidence.
), A plus sign indicates that the report(s) of deaths gave a minimum
figure. In some cases (shown with a question mark) deaths were
reported but no number was given. Other reports (signified with a
dash) gave no information on fatalities.
The reported figure of 2,000 deaths in Badakhshan after a single
attack in the summer of 1979 is unusually high. We are concerned
that the figure may reflect an unverifiable reporting error. In all
other respects, however, the report met the criteria established for
inclusion in this table.
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ANNEX B '
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND TOXINS
The specific chemical agents being used in Laos,
Kampuchea, and Afghanistan cannot be determined
without collection and analysis of at least one of the
following: environmental samples contaminated with
agent, the munitions used to deliver agents, or biologi-
cal specimens from attack victims.
Obtaining contaminated samples that will yield
positive traces of specific chemical agents is dependent
on a number of factors. These include the persistency
of the chemical, the ambient temperature, rainfall,
wind conditions, the media on which the chemical was
deposited, and the time, care, and packaging of the
sample from collection to analysis in a laboratory.
Many standard chemical warfare agents are nonper-
sistent and disappear from the environment within a
few minutes to several hours after being dispersed.
These include, for example, the nerve agents sarin and
tabun, the blood agents hydrogen cyanide and cyano-
gen chloride, the choking agents phosgene and diphos-
gene, and the urticant phosgene oxime. Other standard
CW agents�such as the nerve agents VX and thick-
ened soman and the blistering agents sulfur mustard,
nitrogen mustard, and lewisite�may persist for sever-
al days to weeks depending on weather conditions.
The trichothecene toxins have good persistency but
may be diluted to below detectable concentrations by
adverse weather conditions. To maximize the chances
of detection, sample collections should be made as
rapidly after a chemical assault as possible, and with
many agents this means minutes to hours. Under the
circumstances of Southeast Asia and Afghanistan this
has simply not been possible. While numerous samples
were collected, few of them held any realistic prospect
TeS-8136944444
for yielding positive results. It is fortunate that
trichothecenes are sufficiently persistent to allow de-
tection several months after the attack.
Samples have been collected from Southeast Asia
since mid-1979 and from Afghanistan since May 1980.
To date about 50 individual samples�of greatly vary-
ing types and usefulness for analytical purposes�have
been collected and analyzed for the presence of
traditional CW agents, none of which have been
detected. On the basis of recommendations by medical
and toxicological experts and of findings by the US
Army Chemical Systems Laboratory (USACSL), many
of the samples have been analyzed for the trichothe-
cene group of mycotoxins. Four samples, two from
Kampuchea and two from Laos, were found to contain
high levels of trichothecene toxins. Preliminary results
of several additional samples indicate the presence of a
trichothecene metabolite in blood samples drawn from
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) troops. Quantification
of. their levels is pending. Details concerning the
samples, including the circumstances of their collec-
tion, analysis, and the results, are provided in this
annex.2
All samples were sent to USACSL for analysis,
unless otherwise stated. USACSL analyzed all samples
for the presence of traditionally recognized chemical
warfare agents. Analyses for tricothecenes were con-
ducted by Dr. Chester Mirocha, University of Minne-
sota, under the sponsorship of the US Army Medical
Information and Intelligence Agency (USAMIIA). An
independent laboratory in the United States analyzed
a few samples for presence of chemical warfare
agents.
z See the tables on the ensuing pages.
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Table B-1
Laos: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No. Sample Description
1 Polyethylene plastic sheet, 4
square inches
History of Sample
Collected in early 1979 after a chemical
attack on H'Mong village. H'Mong refu-
gee gave to Thai personnel, who in turn
passed a small piece to US officials for
analysis.
Analytical Results
Thai preliminary analysis indicated the
presence of a vesicant (blistering agent).
Analysis by an independent US laborato-
ry found no evidence of vesicant or any
other CW agent.
2
Yellow powder residue on bam-
boo thatching from roof of hut.
Chemical was sprayed from L-19 aircraft
in Pha Mai village in March 1979. All
animals in village died. At least 28 people
died after vomiting blood, coughing up
blood, and suffering massive nosebleed,
blurred vision, and difficult breathing.
Dried yellow spots on bamboo thatching
were about 2.0 millimeters in diameter.
Sample given to US Army medical team
in October 1979. Analyzed by US Army
Chemical Systems Laboratory (USACSL).
Total sample of yellow material on bark
was 2 milligrams. No evidence of known
chemical warfare agents was present.
Lauryl alcohol derivatives, primarily sul-
fate, indicating a possible surfactant or
wetting agent for spreading other chemi-
cals was detected.
3
Human tissue samples from 20
H'Mong reportedly exposed to a
CW attack and hospitalized in
Bangkok. Twenty urine, 19
blood, and 20 sputum samples
and 16 chest X-rays were re-
ceived. Samples from H'Mong
refugees not attacked with
chemical agents were used as
controls.
Samples were taken in July 1980 from
H'Mong who had been exposed to a CW
attack. Analyzed for cholinesterase. Con-
trol samples from H'Mong refugees not
exposed to a CW agent were also ana-
lyzed. Samples being retained at
USACSL for possible additional analysis.
Cholinesterase activity determinations in
the blood of exposed individuals were not
significantly different from normal/un-
exposed persons. Cholinesterase activity
was very low in both test and control
subjects. No evidence of known CW
agents in any of the samples.
4
Yellow/orange powder from
chemical attack in vicinity of
Phou Bia.
Collected by H'Mong resistance fighter,
on day of attack, 25
October 1980. Thirty of 100 people be-
came ill; none died. Given on 21 April
1981 to medical officer of an internation-
al organization, who transferred it to US
custody. Sample sent to United States 30
April 1981. Container was not opened
until received at USACSL.
No evidence of any known CW agent.
(Sample contained only 1 to 2 milligrams
of powder.) Not analyzed for trichothe-
cene toxins. Tentatively identified a ses-
quiterpene, which may be indicative of
trichothecenes. Also found were a Quin-
one and aromatic hydrocarbons and
carbonyls.
5
Yellow powder residue scraped
from a banana leaf in vicinity of
Ban Don.
Collected by H'Mong refugee,
after a 1 April 1981 attack on nort
side of mountain near Ban Don. Sample
received by medical doctor from interna-
tional organization on 21 April 1981 and
by US personnel on 30 April 1981. Con-
tainer was not opened until received at
USACSL.
No evidence of any known CW agent.
Sample contained only 1 to 2 milligrams
of powder. Not analyzed for trichothe-
cene toxins. Analysis did detect sesquiter-
pene and carbonyl groups which could
be indicative of a trichothecene.
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Table B-1 (Continued)
Laos: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Yellow powder (about 350 milli-
grams) from village of Muong
Cha in the Phou Bia region.
H'Mong refugee collected sample by
scraping from rocks and leaves after a 13
March 1981 attack in the village of
Muong Cha. Refugee arrived in Thailand
on 28 April 1981 and gave sample to
Thai police authorities, who turned it
over to US Embassy officer. Sample for-
warded to US on 21 May 1981. Analyzed
for known CW agents at USACSL, then
transferred to independent laboratory for
trichothecene analysis.
No evidence of known CW agent. Aro-
matic hydrocarbons and carbonyls were
present, indicating possible trichothe-
cene. Portion of sample analyzed for
mycotoxins of the trichothecene group.
T-2 toxin and diacetoxyscirpenol (DAS)
were found at levels of 150 and 25 parts
per million, respectively. Nivalenol and
deoxynivalenol were not detected. Sec-
ond analysis of sample showed a T-2
toxin level of 143 ppm and DAS at 27
ppm. No nivalenol or deoxynivalenol was
detected.
Very small amount, less than
milligram of solid in 5 milliliters
of solution.
First sample taken by a H'Mong from
site of a CW attack that occurred on 2
April 1981 at Ban Thong Hak. Twenty-
four victims died. Sample was given to a
journalist who transferred it to a Con-
gressman. It was given subsequently to
USACSL on 11 June 1981. Sample trans-
ferred to USAMIIA for analysis for tri-
chothecene toxins.
Second sample from same channel re-
ceived on 30 June 1981.
Sample 1: No evidence of any traditional
CW agents. Solvent was methanol. No T-
2, nivalenol, or deoxynivalenol was pres-
ent. Ten nanograms of diacetoxyscir-
penol (DAS), a toxic trichothecene, were
present in the sample. The small sample
size precluded adequate analysis for oth-
er trichothecene toxins, and it cannot be
determined if they were present or not.
Sample 2: Indications of a steroid which
could be indicative of a trichothecene.
No evidence of known CW agents.
Five blood samples
Samples were clotted. Sent to USAMIIA
on 17 November 1981. No analysis for
trichothecene toxins planned. Symptoms
described by victims indicate that the
chemical agent was CS or other riot
control material.
No exploitation at this time.
Two samples:
� Natural vegetation, stem
and leaves.
� Plastic bottle containing
five samples, three of
leaves and two of powder.
Sample of residue collected after a 6
December 1981 CW attack at Muong
Phon, 20 kilometers west of Phou Bia.
Victims suffered from bloody vomiting
and diarrhea. Many deaths. H'Mong car-
ried the sample out of Laos 8 December
1981. received
it 9 December 1981 and provided sample
to Embassy. Received by USACSL on 5
January 1982. One-fourth of sample giv-
en to UK for analysis. One-fourth sample
to USAMIIA for trichothecene analysis.
Sample 1: No evidence of known CW
agents. Analysis incomplete.
Sample 2: No evidence of known CW
agents. Identified 2 methylfuran, cyclo-
octatetraene which could be indicative of
a trichothecene. Analysis incomplete.
Residue
Sample collected by a H'Mong resistance
leader immediately after a 12 December
1981 CW attack. Villagers suffered
bloody diarrhea, some deaths. Sample
given to Embassy official on 8 January
1982 and transferred to UK officials on
that date. Sent to London on 19 January
for analysis.
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Table B-2
Kampuchea: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
1
Sample Description
Clothing (two pair of trousers,
two shirts) from dead Demo-
cratic Kampuchea (DK) soldier
History of Sample
On 27 February 1980 a US Embassy
officer obtained clothing sealed in heavy
plastic bags from Thai official. Clothing
reportedly taken from DK soldiers killed
in chemical attack in the Pailin area.
Clothing sample was obtained two weeks
before being given to US officer. Analysis
done by an independent laboratory.
Analytical Results
No evidence of standard CW agents was
detected. Not analyzed for mycotoxins.
Cytotoxicity tests were negative.
2
Water sample
(25 milliliters)
Sample taken in mid-January 1980 from
a stream in the Thaphaya area of the
Thai-Kampuchean border by Royal Thai
Army (RTA) troops. It was passed to
station officer by Thai who claimed that
RTA troops and villagers became ill with
swelling limbs and a red rash. Analyzed
by independent laboratory.
No evidence of standard CW agents was
detected. Not analyzed for mycotoxins.
Cytotoxicity tests were negative.
3
Red corn (500 grams). Corn con-
tained cob particles, broken ker-
nels, and insects.
Sample obtained from Kampuchean ref-
ugee who entered Thailand in early
1980. The corn was provided by the
Vietnamese and reportedly originated in
Russia. Eating it caused people to vomit
and cough up blood. Analyzed by inde-
pendent US laboratory.
No evidence of known CW agents. Was
not toxic to cell tissue culture. No toxic
effect noted in rat receiving portion of
sample orally. Not analyzed for tricho-
thecene toxins.
4
Empty artillery shell
Sample collected by DK refugee in early
1980. Received 5 May 1980. Sent to
independent laboratory for analysis.
No evidence of presence of CW agents or
their degradation products. Major con-
stituent was TNT.
5
Shirt taken from DK victim of
CW attack.
Attack occurred on 29 February 1980
about 15 to 20 kilometers southeast of
Nong Pru. Victim reported symptoms of
nausea, vomiting, weakness, and head-
ache. Some victims reportedly died from
internal bleeding. On 5 March 1980,
RTA officer in Aranyaprathet delivered
the garment sealed in a foil bag to a US
Embassy officer. Sample was pouched to
USACSL on 7 March 1980.
No evidence of any standard CW agent
or agent breakdown product was detect-
ed on the sample. Two siloxanes (hexa-
methylcyclotrisiloxane and octamethylte-
trasiloxane) were identified. These are of
interest because of the intensive studies
of siloxanes by Soviet scientists.
The presence of a component with a
mass of 100 was detected but not identi-
fied. No unusual effects were noted in
mice confined with the clothing for six
hours. Biocultures proved negative.
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Table B-2 (Continued)
Kampuchea: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
6
Sample Description
History of Sample
Yellow corn packaged in plastic Obtained from Kampuchean refugee.
bag. Received by USACSL on 19 November
1979.
Analytical Results
Arsenic was detected at a level of 43
ppm. Arsenic appears to be organically
bound, but is not in a known CW agent
structure.
7 a Water sample from area of CW
attack.
8 a Leaves and stem samples.
9
Water samples
Sample given to US Embassy officer by
Thai chemical officer who acquired it on
the Thai-Kampuchean border area near
Phnom Mak Hoeum about 15 March
1981. Sample received by USACSL on 25
March 1981. Sample given to USAMIIA
on 26 August 1981 for trichothecene
analysis by independent laboratory.
Sample obtained by Thai chemical offi-
cer about 15 March 1981 on Thai-Kam-
puchean border just south of Phnom Mak
Hoeum. Given to US Embassy officer,
who sent it to USACSL. Received on 24
March 1981. Transferred to USAMIIA on
29 April 1981 for trichothecene analysis
by independent laboratory.
Six water samples reportedly from area
of chemical attack were given to Embas-
sy personnel by Thai officer who re-
ceived them from DK sources. Collected
15 March 1981. Received by USACSL on
24 March 1981.
Cyanide at 460 ppm. (Note: control wa-
ter samples also contained high cyanide
levels.) No evidence of standrd CW
agents was detected. Analysis for toxins
revealed presence of deoxynivalenol at
level of 66 ppm. Trace of another tri-
chothecene toxin, diacetoxyscirpenol
(DAS), also found.
Sample was positive for cyanide (8.7
mg/leaf) and a trace of fluoride. No
evidence of standard CW agents. Sample
contained three trichothecene toxins: T-2
at 3.15 ppm, nivalenol at 109 ppm, and
deoxynivalenol at 59.1 ppm.
No evidence of standard CW agents. Not
yet analyzed for toxins. Cyanide was
found at levels between 210 and 590
ppm. (Note: Cyanide also found in con-
trol water samples.)
10 Negative control samples of wa- Received from field on 20 September Analyzed for toxins. Negative results on
ter, soil, vegetation, corn, and 1981. all samples.
rice.
11
12 Blood samples and blood
smears. Total blood samples: 13
(B-1 through B-13)
Blood samples (A14, A15, A16, Four samples were drawn from DK person-
and A17.) nel exposed to CW agent on 19 September
1981. Samples drawn on 7 October 1981.
Samples were left unrefrigerated for 48
hours after collection and had begun to
putrify, which interferes with many assays.
Sent to USAMIIA for analysis for trichothe-
cenes at an independent laboratory.
Nine blood samples from DK personnel
who had been subjected to a CW attack
in fall 1981. Approximately 50 people
were killed in the attack. Four samples
from unexposed DK personnel. Samples
drawn on 21 October 1981 by trained
medical personnel. Sent to USAMIIA for
analysis on 22 October 1981. Samples
properly refrigerated and in good condi-
tion for analysis.
Negative results on all samples. Samples
were in poor condition for analysis.
White blood cell count (WBC) was low in
all victims but not significantly lower
than in nonexposed individuals. A meta-
bolite of T-2 toxin (HT-2) was tentatively
identified in the blood of two victims
having the lowest WBCs.
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Table B-2 (Continued)
Kampuchea: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No.
Sample Description
History of Sample
Analytical Results
13 Two samples:
� Bottle with leaves report-
edly contaminated with
powder CW agent.
� Bottle with small piece of
bamboo reportedly con-
taminated with toxic
agent.
Powder spread by airplane over upper
Koh Kong Province. Exposed individuals
vomited blood. Also some deaths. Attack
took place on 10 November 1981. Sam-
ples were given to Embassy contacts by
DK escape representative in Bangkok on
12 November 1981. Sent 16 November
1981 in diplomatic pouch. Received by
USACSL on 19 November. Portion of
sample transferred to USAMIIA for tri-
chothecene analysis.
Analysis in progress.
14 Glass bottle containing a pow-
der, tinted pink.
Powder was obtained on 20 November
1981 by KPNLF (Khmer People's Na-
tional Liberation Front) forces in Kam-
puchea. Received by USACSL on 8 De-
cember 1981. Portion of sample
transferred to USAMIIA on 16 December
1981 for trichothecene analysis.
a Control samples collected outside range of chemical attack did not contain any trichothecene toxins or known CW agents.
Table B-3
Sample is 98-percent talc. Other chemi-
cals not identified. Analysis for trichothe-
cenes incomplete.
Afghanistan: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No. Sample Description
1 Rocket and bomb fragments
with Soviet markings.
History of Sample
Fragments were obtained in Konarha
Province. Sent to USACSL on 18 April
1980.
Analytical Results
No evidence of standard CW agents.
2
Soviet gas mask and canister.
Purchased in Kabul. Sent to USACSL 18
September 1980.
No evidence of standard CW agents.
Dioctylphthalate, which probably was
used to test gas mask filter, was
identified.
3
Knit polyester cap, a polyester
knit jacket, badly worn shirt,
which appeared to be recently
washed.
Obtained in Islamabad, Pakistan, from
an Afghan refugee, who claimed he was
subjected to a gas attack. Collected on 2
November 1980; shipped from field on
19 November 1980; received by CSL 8
December 1980.
No evidence of any known CW agent.
Detected a high molecular weight ester
and adipic acid esters which could be
indicative of a trichothecene. Also de-
tected malathion.
4
Human tissue
(2 bottles)
Same as 3.
Not analyzed because of sample deterio-
ration en route.
5
7.62-mm cartridges.
The cartridges, which reputedly were
coated with a poison, were carried by
special Afghan police and some Soviet
advisers. Samples were collected in No-
vember 1980 and received for analysis at
USACSL on 4 February 1981.
No evidence of standard CW agents was
found on bullet coating or scrapings from
slug. Not analyzed for toxins.
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Table B-3 (Continued)
Afghanistan: Sample Collection and Analysis for Presence of Chemical Warfare Agents
Sample No. Sample Description
History of Sample Analytical Results
6 Cotton garment and socks. Clothing appeared to be very dirty. No evidence of known CW agents. Re-
Clothing obtained from Afghan refugee suits on trichothecene pending comple-
in Islamabad, Pakistan. Refugee report- tion of analysis.
edly subjected to CW attack. Received
by USACSL 12 February 1981. Trans-
ferred to USAMIIA for toxin analysis.
7 Soviet Shlem gas masks. Five masks were procured in Kabul, No evidence of any known CW agents to
Afghanistan, at various times and were date.
sent as received to USACSL for analysis
between 24 August 1981 and 21 Decem-
ber 1981. No background information is
available with these masks.
8
9
Soviet 5.45-mm cartridge case, Obtained by Mujahedin about 1980. The No evidence of any generally recognized
expended, bullets had been captured from the Sovi- agent or toxic compound was found. Was
ets and used by Afghan Islamic insur- not analyzed for toxins.
gents. During a firefight, insurgents using
the bullets became ill, with severe vomit-
ing and nausea for several hours. They
suspected that Soviets had contaminated
the powder charge. Sent to USACSL on
25 August 1981.
Soviet gas mask with canister. Item was reportedly taken from a Soviet Analysis incomplete.
who was killed during a Soviet gas attack
in early 1981. Item was collected by an
Afghan, who is associated with the Muja-
hedin and who loaned the item to US
personnel for analysis. USACSL received
the mask on 18 December 1981.
10 Grain Sample was collected by a reliable Analysis incomplete.
source, who reported that it may have
been poisoned. USACSL received sample
on 24 February 1982. Portion of sample
to be analyzed for toxins.
-TeS-3.1969-44,1-LL
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ANNEX C '
US ARMY SURGEON GENERAL'S INVESTIGATIVE TEAM REPORT
Authors
Charles W. Lewis, M.D., COL, MC
Chief, Dermatology Service
Brooke Army Medical Center
Fort Sam Houston, Texas
Frederick R. Side11, M.D.
Chief, Clinical Resources Group
US Army Biomedical Laboratory
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010
William D. Tigertt, M.D.
(Brigadier General, Ret., USA)
Professor of Pathology
University of Maryland
Baltimore, Maryland
Charles D. Lane, LTC
Southeast Asia Desk Officer, OACSI
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.
Burton L. Kelley, SP5, USA
Dermatology Technician
Brooke Army Medical Center
Fort Sam Houston, Texas
Use of Chemical Agents
Against the H'Mong in Laos
From 28 September to 12 October 1979 a team
from the office of the US Surgeon General was in
Thailand to investigate allegations of the use of chemi-
cal agents against H'Mong tribesmen in Laos.
The team visited the following H'Mong refugee
camps in northern Thailand: the detention center at
Nhong Khai; the large H'Mong camp at Ban Vanai;
and two smaller camps at Nam Yao and Mae Char-
min. As the great majority of refugees as well as the
rrifirATITre,
H'Mong leadership are at Ban Vanai, most of the
interviews were obtained there.
Entrance and exit briefings concerning the team's
mission were held at the US Army Biomedical Labora-
tory, Aberdeen Proving Ground; the State Depart-
ment, Washington; and the US Embassy, Bangkok;
and with the Thai Army Surgeon General; refugee
camp officials; and the US Army Surgeon General and
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
The team was prepared to obtain blood and skin
samples (for cholinesterase activity and study of patho-
logical changes, respectively) from those exposed to
chemical agents. For such samples to yield meaningful
results they must be taken within six to eight weeks of
exposure. Since the last reported exposure was in May
1979, no samples were collected.
Interviews were conducted through interpreters;
one interpreter was an employee of the US Consulate
at Udorn, and the remainder were hired from among
the refugees. The interpreters screened those refugees
who volunteered to talk to the team and selected only
those who had been eyewitnesses to or had themselves
been exposed to an agent attack. Team members
interviewed 40 men, two women, and a 12-year-old
girl. Each interview took one to two hours. To achieve
conformity a prepared questionnaire was used as a
guide.
The chemical attacks reportedly occurred between
June 1976 and May 1979 (table C-1). The absence of
reports of attacks after May 1979 may be because very
few refugees crossed the Mekong River after that time
because of heavy rains and flooding from June to
September 1979. Most of the early reports were of the
use of rockets releasing the agent, but beginning in the
fall of 1978 the majority of the attacks were carried out
by aircraft spraying a yellowish substance which -fell
like rain." The sites of the attacks, which were concen-
trated around the H'Mong stronghold in the mountain-
ous Phou Bia area, are also listed in table C-1.
C-1
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Table C-1
Reports of Probable Chemical Agent Attacks
Date
Location
Method of Attack
Material Used (Smoke or Gas)
Jun 76
Pou Mat Sao
Plane, rockets
Red and green
Jan 77-Oct 78
Pha Khao
Plane, rockets
Yellow, red, green
Mar 77
Nam Theuna
Plane, rockets
Red and yellow
Apr 77
Houi Kam Lang
Plane, rockets
Yellow
May 77
Pha Khae
Plane, rockets
Red
May 77
Nam Mob
Plane, rockets
Yellow
May 77
Pha Ngune
Biplane, spray
Yellow gas
Plane, rockets
Yellow
1977-78x3
Phu Seu
Plane, rockets
Red, green, yellow
Jan 78
Houi Xang
Plane, rockets
Red and green
Feb 78
Sane Mak Ku
Plane, rockets
Yellow
Feb 78
Tham Se Sam
Plane, rockets
Yellow and black
Lein
Feb 78
Kio Ma Nang
Plane, rockets
Yellow
Mar 78
Mouong Ao
Plane, rockets
White
Mar 78
Khieu Manang
Plane, rockets
Green
Apr 78
Tha Se
Plane, rockets
Yellow
Jun 78
Pha Phay
Plane, rockets
Yellow
Jun 78
Phou Seng
Plane, rockets
Red, white, black
Jul 78
Phou Bia
Plane, rockets
Red
Jul 78
Ban Nam Mo
Plane, spray
Yellow
Jul 78
Phou Lap
Plane, rockets
Yellow
Aug 78
Pha Houai
Plane, rockets
Red and green
Aug 78
Ban Thin On
Plane, rockets
Green and red
Aug 78
Bouam Long
Plane, rockets
Red, green, yellow
Sep 78
Pha Koug
Plane, rockets
Yellow
Sep 78
Ban Nam Tia
Plane, spray/rockets
Yellow, green, red
Sep 78
Pha Na Khum
Plane, rockets
Red
Oct 78
Phou Bia
Plane, rockets
Oct 78
Ban Done
Plane, spray
Yellow
Oct 78
Phou Bia
Plane, rockets
White, green, red
Nov 78
Phou Chia
Plane, rockets
White, red
Feb 79
Pha Mat
Plane, spray
Yellow
Feb 79
Tong Moei
Plane, rockets
Yellow and red
Mar 79
Pha Mai
Plane, spray
Yellow
Apr-May79x4
Pha Mai
Plane, spray
Gray-white
Mar-May79x6
Pha Mai
Plane, spray
Yellow
May 79
Phou Chia
Plane, spray
Yellow
May 79
Moung Phong
Plane, rockets
Red
Department of State Interviews
Oct 77
Phu Hay,
S of Phu Bia
Plane (L-19),
rockets
Yellow-gray gas
Unk 78
Pa Sieng,
S of Phu Bia
Plane, unknown bomb
Yellow cloud
Feb 78
Ban Nam Luk,
S of Phu Bia
Planes (L-19),
spray (?)
Yellow/white gas
Feb 78
20 km SE of
Plane, unknown spray
Yellow, provided sample
Phu Bia
(?)
Feb 78
Ban Ko Mai
Plane, unknown bomb
Yellow
Mar 78
Pha Houei
Plane (MIG?), sacks
burst in air
Brown gas
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Table C-1 (Continued)
Reports of Probable Chemical Agent Attacks
Date
Location
Method of Attack
Material Used (Smoke or Gas)
Mar 78
Ban Na Pong
Plane (jet?), not described
Yellow
Apr 78
Ban Phamsi
Plane, not described
Green and white cloud
May-Apr 78
Ban Nong Po
Plane (MIG?), cloud
Yellow-brown like rain
Jun 78
Ban Nam Teng
Plane, unknown rocket (?)
Yellow gas
Jun 78-May 79
Ban Don area
Plane (jet?), spray
Yellow rain
Mid-78
1-3 km NE of
Phu Bia
Plane, unknown rocket,
burst in air
Red gas
Oct 78
Nam Kham
Plane (L-19), rockets, airburst
Yellow cloud
Oct 78
6 km N of
Plane (L-19?), rockets, airburst
Red cloud
Phou Khao
Oct 78
3-4 km N of
Plane (L-19?), rockets, airburst
Yellow-gray fog
Phu Bia
Nov 78
Phou Xang Noi
Plane (MIG?), spray
Yellow and blue cloud
Nov 78
nr Phu Bia
Plane, unknown bomb, airburst
Yellow substance
Nov 78
NE of Pha Khao
Plane (L-19), rocket, airburst
Yellow gas
Apr 79
Ban Nouia Pong
Plane (MIG?), spray
Yellow clouds
May 79
Nam Po
Plane (jet?), spray
Yellow substance
May 79
Pha Mai
Plane (MIG?), spray, airburst
Yellow substance
The team was given a plastic vial containing pieces
of bark stained by a yellow substance which several
H'Mong refugees claimed was residue from an aircraft
spray attack in April 1979. Preliminary chemical
analysis of the sample indicates that no standard
chemical agent is present, i.e., an agent listed in TH 8-
285 (US Army, May 1974). A complete report of this
analysis will be submitted upon completion of further
studies.
A similar series of interviews was conducted by
State Department officials in June 1979. From the
signs/symptoms described and observed the following
is suggested:
1. At least two, and possibly three, different
chemical agents may have been used, such as:
(a) A nerve agent (five or six individuals
reported symptoms that could be attributed to
a nerve agent).
(b) An irritant or riot control agent (a third
of the interviews).
(c) Over half of the interviews indicated
such a variety of signs and symptoms that it is
difficult to attribute them to a single known
agent.
2. It is possible that, in some cases, two or more
agents were combined.
(a) Reported signs and symptoms suggesting a
nerve agent include sweating, tearing, excessive
salivation, difficulty in breathing, shortness of
breath, nausea and vomiting, dizziness, weakness,
convulsions, and death occurring shortly after
exposure.
(b) Reported signs and symptoms suggesting a
riot control or irritant agent include marked
irritation or burning of the eyes with tearing and
pain; irritation and burning of the nose and
throat; coughing, burning, and tightness in the
chest; headache; and nausea and vomiting in a
few cases.
(c) Reported signs and symptoms not related to
any known single agent include a mixture of the
above plus the features of profuse bleeding from
mucous membranes of the nose, lungs, and gastro-
intestinal tract with rapid death of the affected
individuals in some instances. Many of these
effects were similar to those described in attacks
during the war in Yemen.'
' SIPRI The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol-
ume 5, The Prevention of CBW, page 255, Humanities Press, Inc.,
300 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10010.
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Estimates from the H'Mong interviewed indicate
that approximately 700 to 1,000 persons may have
died as a result of the use of chemical agents, and that
many times this number were made ill. It was report-
ed that on numerous occasions entire villages were
devastated by these agents, leaving no survivors.
In the episodes described, most of the animals
exposed to the chemical agents were killed. Generally,
all chickens, dogs, and pigs died and, to a lesser extent,
the cattle and buffalo.
On several occasions it was reported that where
these agents settled on tree and plant leaves, many
small holes appeared in the leaves within two or three
days. Rarely did agent exposure result in the defolia-
tion or death of the plants.
Conclusions
The conclusions of the team based upon interviews
obtained from H'Mong refugees are as follows:
1. Chemical agents have been used against the
H'Mong.
2. The reported effects of these agents suggest the
use of a nerve agent, a riot control agent, and an
unidentified compound or combination of com-
pounds.
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ANNEX D '
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF TRICHOTHECENE TOXINS
I. SAMPLE ANALYSES FOR
TRICHOTHECENES
The Trichothecene Hypothesis
Since 1976, remarkably consistent reports detailing
chemical attacks in Southeast Asia have been received
by the Intelligence Community. Some of these reports
were of particular interest in that they described the
use of lethal agents producing symptoms that could
not be correlated with those produced by traditionally
recognized chemical warfare agents or combinations
of them. Table D-1 is a compilation relating the signs
and symptoms reported in Laos, Kampuchea, and
Afghanistan with symptoms associated with certain
chemical agents. The frequency with which a particu-
lar symptom was reported is expressed as a percentage
of the total number of attacks.
It is readily apparent that the symptoms most
frequently described in Laos and Kampuchea corre-
spond most closely with those produced by a group of
mycotoxins, the trichothecenes. A review of the scien-
tific literature revealed not only that these compounds
had physical and chemical properties indicating po-
tential as chemical agents, but also that they were the
subjects of intensive investigation by Soviet scientists at
institutes previously linked with chemical and biologi-
cal warfare research. In the fall of 1980 the trichothe-
cenes were added to the list of agents suspected to
have been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.
Other candidates under consideration included phos-
gene oxime, arsines, cyanogen, nerve agents, riot con-
trol agents, and combinations of these agents.
Numerous samples from chemical attacks in Laos
and Kampuchea were examined at the Chemical
Systems Laboratory (CSL) for the presenLe of tradi-
tional chemical warfare agents and were reported to
711rallyrex-is-uada,
be negative. In March 1981 CSL reported the presence
of an unusual compound (C151-124) in the vapor analyses
from several clothing and tissue samples taken from
the victim of a chemical attack. The compound was
very closely related in structure to the simple
trichothecenes, and this finding sparked the request
for analysis of all future samples for the presence of
trichothecene mycotoxins.
The Kampuchean Leaf and Stem Sample�The
First Analysis for Trichothecenes
On 24 March 1981 a number of samples from the
US Embassy in Bangkok were received. Two of the
samples were reported to have been collected from the
site of a chemical attack that occurred in the vicinity
of TV 3391, an area just south of Phnom Mak Hoeum.
A vegetation sample and a water sample were collect-
ed within 24 hours of the attack. Examination of
bodies of victims of this attack by medical personnel
revealed highly unusual degeneration of the mucosal
lining of the gastrointestinal tract. The effects de-
scribed paralleled those known to be produced by the
trichothecenes.
The samples were submitted to Chemical Systems
Laboratory for analysis for the presence of chemical
warfare agents. No evidence of known chemical war-
fare agents was found. An initial test for the trichothe-
cenes by thin layer chromatography (TLC) was incon-
clusive because of severe problems with interfering
substances and the lack of appropriate standards. The
trichothecenes are difficult to detect even under ideal
circumstances, and the presence of interfering sub-
stances in the sample may make identification and
quantitation by TLC inconclusive. A review of the
limitations and potentials of analytic methods for
trichothecenes led to the conclusion that the comput-
erized gas chromatography/mass spectroscopy method
in the selected ion monitoring mode would enable
precise identification and quantitation of these corn-
D-1
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Table D-1
Symptoms of Chemical Attacks Reported in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan
Symptom
Percentage
of Reports
Mentioning
Symptom
Tricho-
thecenes
Nerve
Agents
Arsines
Phosgene
Oxime
Cyano-
gens
Incapitant
Riot
Control
Agents
Laos
Multiple deaths
84.6
X
X
X
X
Vomiting
71.4
X
X
X
-
-
Diarrhea
53.1
X
X
X
-
-
Hemorrhage
52.0
X
X.
Breathing difficulty
47.95
X
X
X
X
X
X
Itching and skin irritation
43.9
X
X
X
X
Nausea
42.8
X
X
X
-
-
X
Animal death
41.8
X
X
X
-
X
Blurred vision
39.7
X
X
X
X
X
X
Headache
36.7
X
X
X
-
X
Fatigue
35.7
X
X
-
Nasal excretion
34.7
X
X
X
X
X
Rash or blisters
32.6
X
-
X
X
X
Tearing
30.6
X
X
X
X
X
X
Coughing
28.6
X
X
X
X
X
X
Effect on Vegetation
26.5
X
X
-
Dizziness and vertigo
25.5
X
X
X
X
Facial edema
20.4
X
-
X
X
X
Thirst and dry mouth
20.4
X
-
-
X
Skin color change
16.3
X
X
Tachycardia
12.3
X
X
X
X
X
X
Temporary blindness
9.18
X
X
X
-
X
X
Rapid loss of consciousness
9.18
Xb
X
X
Salivation
6.12
Xc
X
-
-
Hearing loss
5.1
X
-
-
Tremors or convulsions
4
X
X
X
X
Sweating
3
X
-
Paralysis
3
X
X
-
-
X
Loss of appetite
3
X
X
X
-
Frequent urination
2
X
X
-
Kampuchea
Multiple deaths
72.4
X
X
X
X
Hemorrhage
62.06
X
-
Xd
-
Dizziness and vertigo
51.7
X
X
-
-
X
Vomiting
41.3
X
X
X
-
Nausea
34.5
X
X
X
-
X
X
Skin irritation
27.6
X
X
X
-
X
Rapid loss of consciousness
24.1
Xb
X
X
X
Fever
20.68
X
-
-
-
Headache
17.2
X
X
-
X
-
X
X
Tearing
13.8
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Breathing difficulty
13.8
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Fatigue
13.8
X
X
-
-
X
Paralysis
10.3
X
X
-
-
X
Numbness
6.9
X
X
-
X
X
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Table D-1 (Continued)
Symptoms of Chemical Attacks Reported in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan
Symptom
Percentage
of Reports
Mentioning
Symptom
Tricho-
thecenes
Nerve
Agents
Arsines
Phosgene
Oxime
Cyano-
gens
Incapitant
Riot
Control
Agents
Blurred vision
6.9
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Dry throat and thirst
6.9
X
�
�
�
�
X
�
Edema
6.9
X
�
X
X
�
�
�
Salivation
3.4
X.
X
�
�
�
�
�
Vegetation affected
3.4
X
�
�
�
�
�
�
Diarrhea
3.4
X
X
X
�
�
�
�
Cough
3.4
X
�
X .
X
X
X
X
Nasal discharge
3.4
X
X
X
X
�
�
X
Rash or blister
3.4
X
�
X
X
�
�
X
Chills
3.4
X
�
�
�
�
�
�
Hearing loss
3.4
X
�
�
�
�
�
�
Afghanistan
Rapid loss of consciousness
47.9
Xb
X
�
�
X
X
�
Skin irritation and itching
31.5
X
�
X
X
�
�
X
Multiple deaths
30.1
X
X
X
�
X
�
�
Nausea
20.5
X
X
X
�
�
X
X
Vomiting
19.1
X
X
X
�
�
�
X
Tearing
17.8
X
X
X
X
X
�
X
Dizziness and vertigo
16.4
X
X
�
�
X
X
X
Blisters or rash
15
X
�
X
X
�
�
X
Difficulty breathing
13.7
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Paralysis
13.7
X
X
�
�
X
�
�
Headache
12.3
X
X
�
X
�
X
X
Temporary blindness
8.2
X
�
X
X
�
X
X
Salivation
6.8
X.
X
�
�
�
�
�
Loss of appetite
6.8
X
X
X
�
�
�
�
Effects on vegetation
5.5
X
�
�
�
�
�
�
Fatigue
5
X
X
�
�
�
X
�
Confusion
4.1
X
X
�
X
�
Hemorrhage
4.1
X
�
�
X.
�
�
�
Change in skin color
2.8
X
�
�
X
�
�
�
Diarrhea
2.8
X
X
X
�
�
�
�
Coughing
1.3
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
a Bloody frothing.
b Only at very high doses.
. Depending on which trichothecenes.
d Blood-flecked frothing.
c Depending on compound.
D-3
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pounds in complex mixtures. An additional recent
publication includes a summary of the currently avail-
able methods suitable for trichothecene analysis and
an assessment of their utility and limitations.
A portion of the leaf and stem sample was furnished
to the US Army for further analysis. This sample (see
table D-2, group I/A), a positive control sample to
which T-2 toxin was added (group I/B), and a negative
control sample of similar vegetation (group I/C) were
forwarded to Dr. Chester J. Mirocha, Department of
Plant Pathology, University of Minnesota. Dr. Mirocha
was given no information concerning the history or
content of the samples, and was requested to analyze
the three unknowns for the presence of trichothecene
toxins using the best methods at his disposal. Briefly,
the analysis involves a series of extractions followed by
ferric gel separation, selected ion monitoring on a
computerized gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer,
and a full mass spectral scan for comparison with
known standards.
The methods used are among the most sensitive and
specific for detection of these compounds; also, false
positives are rare. Toxins can be identified by their
mass spectra and Quantified with a high degree of
accuracy. Group I/A�the vegetation sample allegedly
exposed to a CW agent�was found to contain 109
Table D-2
Trichothecene Sample Analyses
Reference Number/
Case Number Code Date Received
Description
Current Status
Sample Group I/ 29 Apr 81
M-22-81
A
Sample Group II/ 26 Aug 81
M-23-81
E
Sample Group III/ 20 Sep 81
M-26-81
A
Leaf and stem + nega-
tive control
Sample from attack area
Positive control (spiked)
External negative control
Environmental samples
Water
Yellow powder
Speck (unknown substance)
Environmental samples
(Negative controls)
Water sample
Soil sample
Soil sample
Dried corn
Rice
Leaves and stem
Leaves and stem
Leaves and stem
Leaves and stem
D-4
Analysis complete.
Code A sample:
T-2 - 3.15 ppm
Nivalenol - 109 ppm
Deoxynivalenol - 59.1 ppm
Code B sample:
T-2 - 35.7 ppm
Nivalenol - 21.7 ppm
Code C sample:
Negative results
Analysis complete.
Code D sample:
Deoxynivalenol - 66 ppm
Diacetoxyscirpenol - Trace
Code E sample:
T-2 - 150 ppm
Diacetoxyscirpenol - about
25 ppm
Code F sample:
Diacetoxyscirpenol - 10 ng
Analysis complete.
Negative results on all
samples tested to date.
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Table D-2 (Continued)
Trichothecene Sample Analyses
Reference Number/
Case Number
Code
Date Received Description
Current Status
Sample Group IV/ 5 Oct 81 Environmental samples Retained at laboratory pending
M-1-82 (Negative controls) results of higher priority
analyses.
Sample Group V/ 11 Oct 81 Blood samples Analysis complete.
M-2-82
A14 Negative results on all
A15 samples tested to date.
A16
A17
Sample Group VI/ 22 Oct 81 Blood samples Analysis complete.
M-3-82 Analytical findings to date
have tentatively identified
HT-2, a deacetylated
metabolite of T-2 toxin, in
the blood of patients 3 and
4 (see table D-3).
Al Medical laboratory evalua-
tion of blood samples con-
ducted by US Army Medical
Research Institute of Infec-
A13 tious Diseases (USAMRIID).
B1 No significant statistical
differences between control
samples from alleged victims
of -yellow rain,- but a trend
toward low blood cell counts
B13 in victims was noted. See
table D-3.
Sample Group VII/ 17 Nov 81 Blood samples Retained at laboratory pending
completion of higher priority
analyses.
Sample Group VIII/ 17 Nov 81 Environmental samples Analysis in progress.
M-8-82
Sample Group IX/ 6 Nov 81 Environmental samples Analysis in progress.
M-9-82 (Sock, pants,
mask, water)
Sample Group X/ 19 Nov 81 Environmental sample Analysis complete.
M-11-82 143 ppm T-2
E2 Yellow powder 27 ppm DAS
0 nivalenol
0 deoxynivalenol
a Additional 25 mg of this sample was provided to laboratory for analysis for nivalenol and deoxynivalenol (see Sample Group X/M-11-82).
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parts per million (ppm) of nivalenol, 59.1 ppm of
deoxynivalenol, and 3.15 ppm f T-2 toxin; each is a
potent toxin of the trichothecene group. No trichothe-
cenes were detected in the negative control sample
(group I/C), and 35 ppm of T-2 toxin were detected in
group I/B�the sample to which T-2 toxin had been
added. It was Dr. Mirocha's assessment that a mixture
of these particular toxins in the high levels detected
could not have occurred as a result of natural
contamination.
The possibility that the identified toxins were pro-
duced by natural fungal contamination is addressed in
section III. In summary, the possibility was discounted
on the basis of the climatic conditions required for
production of T-2 toxin, the high levels of toxins
detected, the unusual mixture of toxins found, and the
results of surveys of Southeast Asia for the presence of
these toxins. This conclusion was supported by the
analysis of normal flora samples from Kampuchea
described below.
Analyses of Control Samples From Kampuchea
for the Presence of Trichothecenes
On 20 September 1981, nine control samples were
received from US Army personnel in Bangkok, Thai-
land, for the purpose of conducting laboratory analy-
ses for background levels of trichothecene toxins. The
samples were collected from an area near TV 3391
that had not been subjected to any reported chemical
attacks. The samples were collected by US personnel
under instructions to reproduce the sampling condi-
tions, handling, packaging, and transfer conditions of
the original sample as closely as possible. The same
species of plant was sampled, and three other vegeta-
tion samples were also collected. A water sample as
well as two soil samples were recovered. Samples of
corn and rice from the area were also taken. These
grains provide an ideal substrate for growth of toxin-
producing fungi and would therefore be a sensitive
indicator of any natural occurrence.
The nine samples were forwarded under code to Dr.
Mirocha for trichothecene analysis. A portion of each
sample was also submitted to CSL for background
determinations of CN-, Cl-, and Fl- levels. No tri-
chothecenes were detected in any of these samples
(group III/A-I), indicating that nivalenol, deoxyniva-
lenol, T-2, and diacetoxyscirpenol are not prevalent in
-TeS-44161.142.al
the geographical area from which the alleged CW-
exposed sample was collected. The appearance of
these trichothecenes in high levels and unique combi-
nations in a sample associated with a chemical attack
producing symptoms typical of trichothecene exposure
indicates that these toxins may have been used as
chemical weapons. This conclusion is further support-
ed by the confirmatory evidence provided by the
analysis of additional alleged CW samples from Laos
and Kampuchea, which are described below.
Analysis of Additional CW Samples From Laos
and Kampuchea for the Presence of
Trichothecenes
Chemical Systems Laboratory provided three addi-
tional suspected chemical warfare samples for analysis
for trichothecenes. The first sample (group II/D)
consisted of 10 milliliters of water taken from the same
chemical attack site in Kampuchea as the leaf and
stem sample previously examined (group I/A). The
second sample (group II/E) came from the site of a
-yellow rain- attack occurring on 13 March 1981 in
the village of Muong Cha in the Phou Bia region of
Laos. The agent was sprayed from a twin-engine
propeller aircraft. The falling substance was described
as -like insect spray- and sounded like drizzling rain.
It was quite sticky at first, but soon dried to a powder.
Symptoms described by victims included nausea, vom-
iting, and diarrhea. A sample of the agent scraped
from the surface of a rock by a victim and carried into
Thailand was turned over to US Embassy personnel.
The third sample (group II/F) was taken from the
site of a -yellow rain- attack that occurred on 2 April
1981 at Ban Thong Hak in Laos. Twenty-four people
reportedly died in this attack and there were 47
survivors. Symptoms included severe skin irritation
and rash, nausea, vomiting, and bloody diarrhea. This
sample was scraped from the surface of a rock with a
bamboo knife by a survivor of the attack. Although the
individual took precautions (that is, cloth mask) a
severe skin rash and blisters developed.
These three samples were submitted to Dr. Mirocha
for analysis. Group II/D (the water sample from
Kampuchea) contained 66 ppm of deoxynivalenol and
a trace amount of diacetoxyscirpenol (DAS). A trace
quantity of group II/E was screened as strong positive
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for trichothecenes. Further analysis of that sample
confirmed the presence of high levels of T-2 toxin (150
ppm) and diacetoxyscirpenol (25 ppm). Interference
from phtalate compounds (leached from the plastic
packaging) made detection of nivalenol and deoxyni-
valenol difficult. In a second analysis, the extraction
process was modified so that nivalenol and deoxyniva-
lenol could be measured accurately. The analysis
showed the presence of 143 ppm T-2 and 27 ppm
DAS. No nivalenol or deoxynivalenol was detected.
Interestingly, examination of the petroleum ether frac-
tion from sample group II/E revealed the presence of
a yellow pigment almost identical to that previously
identified by Dr. Mirocha in cultures of Fusarium
roseum, indicating that the yellow powder probably
consisted of the crude extract of a Fusarium culture.
There was very little of group II/F contained in the
vial received for testing. The quantity was too small to
be accurately weighed, and inspection of the vial
revealed only a very small speck estimated to weigh
much less than 0.1 milligram. That speck contained 10
nanograms of diacteoxyscirpenol, a level equivalent to
100 ppm at the very least and probably much higher.
The sample size was too small to allow adequate
analysis for the other three trichothecenes of interest.
These results, in general, support the hypothesis that
trichothecenes have been used as chemical warfare
agents in Laos and Kampuchea. The presence of these
high levels of trichothecene toxins in water and in
yellow powder scraped from rocks argue against natu-
ral occurrence, since neither water nor rock is a
suitable environment for growth of the fungi required
to produce the toxins.
Differences between the analyses of the Kampu-
chean leaf and stem sample and the water sample
collected from the same attack site raise additional
questions. The failure to find T-2 toxin in the water
sample is probably due to the relative insolubility of
T-2 toxin in water. The presence of DAS in the water
might be the result of biotransformation or breakdown
of 1-2, as they are so structurally similar, differing
only in the substitution on carbon 8. While this
hypothesis cannot be entirely ruled out, it is unlikely
on the basis of known biotransformation of T-2 in the
laboratory. The initial vegetation sample was not
screened for DAS, though the mass spectra from the
initial analysis will be reexamined for trace amounts of
DAS.
The absence of nivalenol in the water sample is
more difficult to explain because nivalenol is water
soluble. The effect of environmental conditions and
microorganisms on the stability of these compounds
may vary widely for each of the specific compounds
and may explain the analytical results. Further scienti-
fic investigation of these factors is needed.
II. ANALYSIS OF BLOOD SAMPLES FROM
CHEMICAL ATTACK VICTIMS
Blood samples drawn from victims of recent chemi-
cal attacks have been received for analysis for indica-
tions of trichothecene exposure. Little is known con-
cerning the rate of metabolism of trichothecenes in
humans; it is difficult, therefore, to estimate the
probability of detection of trichothecenes or their
metabolites in blood samples. 1-2 is rapidly cleared
from the blood in animals, and 25 percent of the total
dose is excreted within 24 hours after exposure; there-
fore, it is unlikely that trichothecenes could be detect-
ed unless samples were obtained within 24 to 48 hours
after an attack. Other blood parameters are affected
by the trichothecenes, however, and may prove to be
useful markers. The trichothecenes induce a severe
leukopenia (decrease in white cell count) which can
persist for several weeks following exposure. In addi-
tion, the trichothecenes affect some liver and kidney
function marker enzymes which can be monitored in
the blood. �
On 11 October 1981, four whole blood samples and
four blood smears were received from the US Embas-
sy, Bangkok. The blood was drawn from four DK
soldiers on 7 October inside Kampuchea. Detailed
medical histories as well as descriptions of the attack
were recorded on each individual from whom a blood
sample was taken. All four men were victims of a gas
attack occurring in the fall of 1981 near Takong.
Symptoms experienced included vomiting, blurred
vision, bloody diarrhea, difficulty breathing, dry
throat, loss of consciousness, frontal headache, tachy-
cardia, and facial edema. Unfortunately, the samples
could not be refrigerated until 48 hours after collec-
tion. It was therefore not possible to obtain data
concerning white cell counts and blood chemistry. The
four whole blood samples were submitted to Dr.
Mirocha for analysis for trichothecene metabolites
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because of the possibility (admittedly remote) that
some of the metabolites may bind to blood proteins
and may still be detectable even three weeks after an
attack. These analyses are reported as group V A14-
A17 in table D-2.
On 22 October 1981 additional blood samples were
received. These had been drawn from nine victims
from a 19 September attack and from four control
individuals of similar age and background who had
not been exposed to a chemical attack. The samples
had been properly refrigerated and were accompanied
by very complete and detailed medical histories taken
by trained medical personnel who examined the indi-
viduals. Included in the package were blood smears
and heparinized and nonheparinized samples from
each individual. The samples were submitted to US
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Dis-
eases (USAMRIID) for blood assays. These results are
reported in table D-3.
The results show no statistically significant differ-
ences between exposed and control groups (students T-
test). A trend toward depressed white cell counts in
eight individuals exposed to chemical agent was ob-
served. Such an observation would be compatible with
the clinical picture of toxin exposure; however, it is
also compatible with a number of other medical
problems and a larger control sample would be re-
quired before such results could be adequately inter-
preted. Abnormal liver and kidney functions were not
indicated by the data.
Portions of these blood samples were analyzed by
Dr. Mirocha for presence of trichothecenes and/or
trichothecene metabolites. The results of those analy-
ses are consistent with trichothecene exposure in at
least two of the gassing victims and tend to support the
hypothesis that a trichothecene-based agent was used
in this attack.
Using the selected ion-monitoring gas chromatog-
raphy/mass spectroscopy analysis technique, Dr.
Mirocha was able to identify tentatively a metabolite
of T-2 toxin (that is, HT-2) in the blood of two alleged
victims. The compound was identified on the basis of
its selected ion masses and gas chromatographic reten-
tion times.
The tentative identification of HT-2 in the blood
of two victims, and the trend toward depressed white
cell counts in these same victims, cannot be taken as
conclusive scientific proof of toxin exposure because
the trace amount of the compound present precluded
unequivocal identification and quantitation, and also
because many other medical problems in addition to
toxin exposure can cause a decrease in white cell
counts. It is interesting to note that the individual who
showed the greatest amount of the compound tenta-
tively identified as HT-2 in his blood, was reported to
have received the greatest exposure to the agent and
also had the lowest white blood cell count. He was
exposed to contaminated water for more than 30
minutes and was the only victim who fell down in the
water and actually swallowed some of it. However, the
description by victims of symptoms correlating exactly
with those associated with trichothecene poisoning
provide strong circumstantial evidence that trichothe-
cenes were used as chemical agents in yet another
chemical attack in Southeast Asia.
Trichothecenes have been identified previously in
environmental samples taken from several other
chemical attacks in Laos and Kampuchea. Analysis of
control vegetation, water, soil, corn, and rice samples
from these areas, as well as reviews of published
scientific literature, indicate that the particular toxins
that have previously been identified are not known to
occur naturally in the combinations found and at the
levels detected in Southeast Asia. The latest analysis
results contribute another piece of evidence to the
growing body of data supporting the charge that
trichothecenes have been used as chemical/biological
agents in Southeast Asia.
III. OVERVIEW OF NATURAL OCCURRENCE
AND SIGNIFICANT PROPERTIES OF
TRICHOTHECENES
Historical Trichothecene Mycotoxicoses
The trichothecenes are members of a large group of
naturally occurring toxins known as mycotoxins. The
word -mycotoxin" is derived from the Greek "mykes-
meaning fungus and the Latin "toxicum- meaning
poison. It refers to a metabolite produced by a mold
that is toxic to man or animals. Mycotoxicoses have
been described as the -neglected diseases- and, before
1960, little English-language literature concerning the
diseases caused by mycotoxins was available. Interest-
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Table D-3
Peripheral Blood Hemograms of
Kampuchean Victims of Chemical Attack
Patient
No.
RBC a
Hgb b
Hct e
WBC d
Retic e
MCV f
MCH g
MCHC h
1
specimen clotted
2
4.46
12.6
37
4,700
1.0
84
28.5
34
3
4.90
11.8
40
5,700
0.4
81
26
32
4
4.90
10.3
34
1,700
2.1
70
21
30
5
4.92
15.0
46
5,300
1.2
93
32
34
6
4.04
12.6
37
4,300
0.8
93
31
34
7
4.88
15.6
46
3,000
0.5
94
32
34
8
5.56
17.0
50
8,700
1.5
91
31
34
9
4.88
11.2
35
5,000
1.0
73
23
32
Controls:
10
6.23
12.5
41
7,200
0.8
66
20
30
11
4.47
11.9
38
8,000
0.9
85
26.5
31
12
4.88
12.9
41
5,100
2.0
85
26.5
32
13
5.16
15.6
46
6,500
1.0
90
30.5
34
Normal range:
Male 4.5-6.0 14-18 40-54 7,400 80-94 27-32 33-38
Female 3.5-5.0 12-16 37-47 �2,000
BUN'
Creatinine
SGPT i
Alkaline
Phosphatase
1
9.0
3.5
48
132
2
8.5
0.8
36
47
3
8.0
1.4
12
75
4A
11
1.3
6
94
4B
10.5
1.2
6
68
5
6.0
1.6
12
84
6
7
1.2
18
115
7
8.5
1.7
6
69
8
10
1.5
36
79
9
12.5
1.4
12
70
10
10.5
1.8
12
86
11
12
0.8
24
74
12
12
1.4
6
76
13
9.0
1.2
30
102
Normal Range
Male
7-20
0.4-1.7
6-37
24-69
Female
23-71
a Red blood cells x10-6 (#/cc)
b Hemoglobin (gm/100cc)
Hematocrit (%)
a white blood cells (#/cc)
e Reticulocytes (#/cc)
-7"CS-6616
f Mean corpuscular volume (� 6)
s Mean corpuscular hemoglobin (wig)
h Mean corpuscular hemoglobin concentration (%)
Blood urea nitrogen (mg%)
I Serum glutamic pyrovic transaminase
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ingly, the first comprehensive studies of mycotoxin
diseases were conducted in the Soviet Union in the late
1930s. Thus, Soviet scientists have been involved in
research with some of these compounds for almost 30
years longer than their Western counterparts (see
section V of this annex). The Soviet Union has had
serious problems with mycotoxin contamination of
food and has suffered several severe outbreaks of
disease in humans.
The group of mycotoxins that has figured most
prominently in Soviet scientific literature since the
1940s are the trichothecenes. They are a group of
chemically related, biologically active fungal metabo-
lites produced primarily by various species of Fusari-
urn. Table D-4 lists some of the toxins in this group
and producing fungi. The fungi are well-known plant
pathogens that frequently invade numerous agricul-
tural products.
Trichothecene toxins, perhaps more than any other
mycotoxins, have been associated with acute disease in
humans. Most of the human intoxications occurred in
the Soviet Union (table D-5). The earliest recognized
outbreak occurred in 1891 in the Ussuri district of
eastern Siberia. Humans who consumed contaminated
grain exhibited headache, chills, nausea, vomiting,
vertigo, and visual disturbances. Dogs, horses, pigs,
and domestic fowls were reported to be affected.
The most extensive mycotoxicosis outbreak, report-
ed to have caused multiple fatalities in man, also
occurred in the Soviet Union. In 1944, 30 percent of
the population of Orenburg was affected by alimen-
tary toxic aleukia or ATA, a disease later shown to be
due to ingestion of trichothecene toxins. Over 10
percent of the entire population of the Orenburg
district died of the disease. Numerous other outbreaks
of ATA occurred in the Soviet Union, primarily
between the years 1942 and 1947. The contamination
was traced to overwintered millet, wheat, and barley
infected with Fusarium. Symptoms of the disease
included vomiting, skin inflammation, multiple hem-
orrhaging (especially of the lung and gastrointestinal
tissue), diarrhea, leukopenia, and suppression of bone
marrow activity.
In 1939, Nikita Khrushchev was dispatched to the
Ukraine region of Russia by Premier Joseph Stalin to
organize and improve agricultural operations and to
identify the disease that was causing the deaths of
many horses and cattle. The problem was traced to
hay and straw contaminated with Stachybotrys atra.
The disease, later referred to as stachybotryotoxicosis,
occurred after ingestion or contact with the contami-
nated grain. Symptoms included ulcerative dermatitis,
perioral dermatitis, blood dyscrasias, hemorrhagic syn-
dromes, abortion, and death. The greatest economic
impact was due to loss of horses, but cattle, sheep,
poultry, and humans were also affected.
Other disease outbreaks in which similar symptoms
were exhibited occurred in 1958 and 1959 among
Table D-4
Trichothecene-Producing Fungi
Type (A) T-2 Type
(13'; Nivalenol-Type
(C) Macrocylic
Trichothecenes
Fungus
T-2 toxin
HT-2 toxin
Diacetoxyscirpenol
Neosolaniol
F. tricinctum
F. roseum
F. equiseti
F. sporotrichioides
F. lateritium
F. poae
F. solani
F. rigidiusculum
F. semitectum
Nivalenol
Monoavetylnivalenol
Diacetylnivalenol
Deoxynivalenol
F. nivale
F. opisphaeria
F. roseurn
Roridins
Verrucarins
Satratoxins
Vertisporin
Myrothecium verrucaria
M. roridum
Stachybotrys atra
Verticimonosporium diffractum
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Table D-5
Historical Trichothecene Mycotoxicosis
Toxicosis
Districts and
Affected Species
Symptoms
"Taumelgetreide- toxicosis
Alimentary toxic aleukia
Stachybotryotoxicosis
Bean-hull toxicosis Japan
Horse
Dendrodochiotoxicosis
Moldy corn toxicosis
Red mold toxicosis
USSR
Man, farm animals
USSR
Man, horse, pig
USSR, Europe
Horse
USSR, Europe
Horse
United States
Pig, cow
Japan, USSR
Man, horse, pig, cow
Headache, nausea, vomiting,
vertigo, chills, visual
disturbances
Vomiting, diarrhea, multiple
hemorrhage, skin inflammation,
leukopenia, angina
Shock, somatitis, hemorrhage,
dermal necrosis, nervous
disorders
Convulsion, cyclic movement
Skin inflammation, hemorrhage
Emesis, hemorrhage
Vomiting, diarrhea, con-
gestion, and hemorrhage
of lung and intestine
horses and cattle in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Thousands of animals were lost in these
outbreaks. Other intoxications were reported subse-
quently in Japan, Europe, the Soviet Union, and the
United States, affecting various domestic animals
and�in the case of red mold toxicosis�affecting man.
All of these diseases have now been shown to be due to
ingestion of trichothecenes rather than to an infectious
agent. In earlier disease outbreaks, the levels of toxin
present in the contaminated grain was not measured;
however, the levels of nivalenol and/or deoxynivalenol
measured in toxic grains implicated in more recent
outbreaks (that is, "moldy corn toxicosis" and "red
mold toxicosis") were typically between 2 and 8 ppm.
Natural Occurrence of Trichothecene
Mycotoxins
Publications concerning the occurrence of trichothe-
cenes have been relatively scarce because of the lack
of convenient detection methods and the complexity
res-ssic
of the trichothecene family of compounds. Only re-
cently have scientists developed methods capable of
distinguishing between close structural derivatives and
accurately quantitating the levels of toxin present (see
table D-6 for comparison of analytical methods). Ex-
treme care must be taken when reviewing the scienti-
fic literature on natural occurrence of these com-
pounds, because erroneous conclusions can be drawn
on the basis of results obtained with inadequate
analytical techniques. Misidentification of compounds
and gross overestimation of concentrations have oc-
curred using techniques such as thin layer chromatog-
raphy as the basis of analysis.
Table D-7 lists the reports of natural occurrence of
1-2 toxin, diacetoxyscirpenol, and nivalenol that were
obtained from a literature search of over 3,000 cita-
tions concerned with trichothecene toxins. Levels that
are questionable on the basis of techniques used are
indicated. It is immediately apparent that the levels of
toxins found in the various samples from Laos and
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Table D-6
Physicochemical Methods for Detection of Trichothecenes in Feedstuffs
Trichothecenes
Detection
Required
Method
Detected
Limits
Standards
Thin-layer chroma-
tography 1-dimension
All
0.1 microgram/spot
(H,S0.)
Reference Standard
Thin-layer chroma-
tography 2-dimension
All
0.1-1.0 microgram/spot
(H,SO4)
Reference Standard
Gas-liquid chroma-
Nonhydroxylated or
0.03-0.05 microgram/
Reference Standard
tography
TMS derivatives
microliter injection
Gas chromatography/mass TMS derivatives
spectrometry-normal scan-
ning mode
Gas chromatography/mass TMS derivatives
spectrometry-selection ion
monitoring
Nuclear-magnetic-reso-
nance
All
Radioimmunoassay (devel- T-2 toxin
opmental stage)
0.02-0.05 microgram/ Reference Standard or
microliter injection Spectrogram
0.007-0.02 microgram/ Reference Standard or
microliter injection Spectrogram
1-20 nanograms
Reference Standard or
Spectrogram
Rabbit anti�T-2 toxin
antibody
HT-2 toxin
Use and
Limitation
Qualitative
Interference
Not confirmatory
Qualitative
Less interference
Confirmatory
Quantitative
Monoglyceride
interference
Equivocable
interference
Semiquantitative
Less interference
Unequivocable
identification
Quantitative
Best for
complex mixtures
Unequivocable
identification
Confirmatory
Purified toxin
structure elucidation
Sensitive
Low interference
Relative structural
specificity
Kampuchea are highly unusual, even if one accepts
the questionable reports in table D-7 as valid. The
levels of these toxins (150 ppm of T-2 toxin, 109 ppm
of nivalenol, more than 100 ppm of diacetoxyscir-
penol, and 66 ppm of deoxynivalenol) are markedly
higher than those reported to occur in nature.
It should also be noted that the incidences recorded
in table D-7 concern levels of toxin produced when
Fusarium is growing on its ideal substrate, while the
Laos and Kampuchea samples were taken from sur-
faces that would be extremely unlikely to support
Fusaria growth and toxin production�that is, the
surface of rocks and water. Higher levels of toxin
production can, of course, be induced when the mold
species is grown in pure culture under ideal conditions
in the laboratory; for instance, the Soviets have suc-
ceeded in producing 4 grams of T-2 per kilogram of
substrate. In a natural environment, however, the
Fusaria species cannot compete well with other molds
such as species of Aspergillus and Penicillium, and, as
in table D-7, levels of toxin produced are orders of
magnitude lower.
The conclusion that the levels of toxins found in the
Southeast Asia samples could have occurred only by
means of an unnatural mechanism is also strengthened
by surveys of the area conducted by various research-
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Table D-7
Spontaneous Occurrence of Trichothecene Mycotoxins
Toxin Country
Source
Concentration
Reference a
(parts per million)
T-2:
USA
Mixed feed
0.08 b
15
UK
Brewer's grains
ND C
19
India
Sweet corn
4 b,d
5
Canada
Corn
ND
4
India
Sorghum
ND d
22
Canada
Barley
25 d
20
India
Safflower seed
3_5 d
6
US
Corn stalks
0.11 b
16
US
Feed supplement
ND
7
US
Corn
2
8
US
Mixed feed
0.3
14
France
Corn
0.02 b
10
US
Corn
ND
2
Diacetoxyscirpenol:
US
Mixed feed
0.5
15
US
Mixed feed
0.38
15
India
Safflower seed
3_5 d
6
India
Sweet corn
14 d
5
Germany
Corn
31.5 d
23
US
Corn
0.88
21
Deoxynivalenol:
US
Corn stalks
1.5 b
16
US
Corn
1.8b
15
US
Corn
1.0 b
15
US
Corn
0.1 b
15
US
Mixed feed
0.04 b
15
US
Mixed feed
1.0 b
15
US
Mixed feed
1.0 b
15
US
Corn
7.4
9
US
Corn
0.125 d
21
US
Corn
trace-25 d
2, 21
US
Corn
1.1-10.7
26
US
Corn
41
25
US
Corn
1.0 b
17
US
Oats
5
17
Japan
Barley
ND
18
US
Corn
1.0 b
13
US
Corn
0.06 b
13
US
Mixed feed
0.07 b
13
France
Corn
0.6b
10
South Africa
Corn
2.5
11
Zambia
Corn
7.4
11
US
Corn
ND
2
Japan
Barley
7.3
18
Austria
Corn
1.3
24
Austria
Corn
7.9
24
Canada
Corn
7.9
24
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Table D-7 (Continued)
Spontaneous Occurrence of Triehothecene Myeotoxins
Toxin Country
Source
Concentration Reference a
(parts per million)
Nivalenol:
Japan
Barley
ND
18
France
Corn
4.3 b
10
Partially characterized trichothecenes:
US
Corn
ND
25
India
Safflower seed
ND d
6
Skin irritant factors�not analyzed chemically:
US
Corn
93 positive b of 173
3
US
Corn
Multiple positive sam-
pies
21
Yugoslavia
Corn
16 positive of 191
1
a References:
1. Balzer et al. (1977)
2. Ciegler (1978)
3. Eppley et al. (1974)
4. Funnel (1979)
5. Ghosal et al. (1978)
6. Ghosal et al. (1977)
7. Hibbs et al. (1974)
8. Hsu et al. (1972)
9. Isshi et al. (1975)
10. Jemmail et al. (1978)
11. Marasas etal. (1977)
12. Miller (1976)
13. Mirocha (1979a)
14. Mirocha (1979a)
15. Mirocha et al. (1976b)
16. Mirocha et al. (1979a)
17. Mirocha et al. (1979b)
18. Morooka et al. (1972)
Zearalenone (F-2 toxin) also detected in the sample.
ND = toxin concentration was not determined.
d Levels that are questionable on the basis of techniques used.
ers. Surveys of the toxigenic fungi and mycotoxins of
Southeast Asia conducted by the Mahidol University in
Bangkok and the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, have not revealed the presence of T-2, nivalenol,
deoxynivalenol, or diacetoxyscirpenol, although other
mycotoxins such as aflatoxin, were identified. These
results were confirmed by our analysis using our own
methodology of normal flora samples of vegetation,
soil, water, corn, and rice from Kampuchea that
revealed the presence of no trichothecenes.
Skeptics have formulated theoretical explanations
for the analytical results to support a hypothesis of
natural occurrence of these toxins. It was postulated
that the trichothecenes found were absorbed through
the roots of a plant, translocated to the leaves, and
exuded and washed onto the surface of a rock and into
water where they were found. A 1981 publication by
7-"TS-311019-424.1.1._
19. Petrie et al. (1977)
20. Puls and Greenway (1976)
21. Romer, T., Ralston Purina, St.
Louis, MO (personal
communications
22. Rukmini and Bhat (1978)
23. Siegfried (1979)
24. Vesonder and Ciegler (1979)
25. Vesonder et al. (1976)
26. Vesonder et al. (1978)
Jarvis et at. reported a Brazilian shrub that appeared
to absorb, translocate, and chemically alter a macrocy-
clic trichothecene produced by a soil fungi. While this
citation is used to support a hypothetical mode for
natural deposition in Southeast Asia it should be noted
that the plant reported by Jarvis et al. did not exude
the toxin, that the toxin was extremely phytotoxic to
all other plants assessed, and that the plant was not
capable of de novo trichothecene synthesis. No other
trichothecenes have been found to be absorbed and
translocated in any other plant in this manner. Control
samples of soil and vegetation from Southeast Asia do
not support endemic presence of these toxins. The
appearance of these particular trichothecene toxins in
these high levels in environments generally inhospita-
ble to their formation cannot reasonably be attributed
to a natural contamination.
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Chemical and Physical Properties of the
Trichothecenes
When considering the suitability of trichothecenes
as agents, factors such as stability, solubility, and ease
of production must be considered. The general struc-
ture for the trichothecene group is shown in figure
D-1. There are over 40 currently known, naturally
occurring, 12, 13 epoxytrichothecenes. The R groups
may be hydroxyls, acylated hydroxyl groups, or esters.
The R group for the toxins detected in Sample Group
I/A are shown below the general structure. All of the
compounds have in common an olefinic double bond
at carbon atoms 9 and 10 and an epoxy group at
carbon atoms 12 and 13. These compounds are stable,
especially in the solid form. They may be stored for
years at room temperature with no loss of activity.
They are heat stable with no loss of activity noted after
heating for 1 hour at 100 degrees centigrade. The
solubility depends on the R groups; highly hydroxy-
lated derivatives are more water soluble. The com-
pounds are also quite stable in solution. Detoxification
can be accomplished by treatment with strong mineral
acid, which will open the 12 to 13 epoxide bond and
abolish all biological activity. Most of the toxins are
well absorbed through mucous membranes and some
through skin; this property is also a function of the R
group.
Some of these compounds have been synthesized
chemically; however, biosynthesis employing Fusari-
urn species is the most effective way to produce large
quantities. In a preliminary search of recent Soviet
open source literature, 50 articles dealing with the
trichothecenes were reviewed. Of these, 22 dealt with
defining optimum conditions for biosynthesis of the
compounds. N. A. Kostyunina has reported production
of T-2 toxin at levels of 4 grams per kilogram of
Figure D-1
General Structure of Trichothecenes
T-2 Toxin
10
0
CH3
R1= 0� C�CH2�CH(c�
R2= H
R3=0Ac
R4=0Ac
R5=0H
Unclassified
3
Nivalenol
R1 =O
R2=0H
R3=0H
R4=0H
R5=H
Deoxynivalenol
R1 =0
R2=0H
R3=0H
R4=H
R6=-H
R5
Diacetoxyscirpenol (DAS)
Ri
R2=-H
R3=0Ac
R4=0Ac
R5=0H
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To-p-sefigat
substrate (normally wheat grain, or rice). Numerous
industrial microbiology plants have been identified in
the Soviet Union. Some of these are involved in
production of single-cell protein for fodder additives,
others produce antibiotics, and the function of still
others is unknown. As published in the open literature,
Fusaria are produced in the Soviet Union at the
Berdsk Chemical Works, which is under the Main
Administration of the Microbiological Industry and is
located near the -Science City- of Novosibirsk in
Siberia. Such a facility also has been a suspect biologi-
cal warfare (BW) agent production and storage facili-
ty. The only difference between an antibiotic and
mycotoxin is their target specificity. Both are pro-
duced by fungi, but the mycotoxins are relatively
more toxic to man than to microorganisms. Mycotoxins
can be produced in good yield employing the same
techniques that are used to produce some antibiotics.
Thus, it may be concluded that the Soviets could
produce trichothecenes in large amounts. They pro-
duce an antibiotic that is a trichothecene derivative,
which would provide an ideal cover for agent produc-
tion facilities.
Medical Effects of the Trichothecenes
in Humans
The most prominent symptoms associated with tri-
chothecene poisoning are listed in table D-5. Striking
among these is the rapid onset of vomiting with severe
itching and tingling of the skin. Hemorrhage of the
mucous membranes and bloody diarrhea follow. That
table also presents symptoms reported to have been
caused by the trichothecenes in gas attack victims in
Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. The correlation is
striking.
LD� values (dose required to produce death in 50
percent of a test population) of the trichothecenes in
laboratory animals range from 0.1 mg/kg to greater
than 1,000 mg/kg depending on the particular toxin,
species, and route of exposure. The LD� of T-2 toxin
in cat is 0.5 mg/kg. However, the ED� (dose required
to produce a desired physiological effect in 50 percent
of a test population) is much lower. The ED� to
produce a vomiting reaction is 0.1 mg/kg, and for skin
irritation it is in the tenths of microgram range.
Most of the data concerning the toxicological effects
of the trichothecenes are derived from animal data in
-"TCS-814414,2,[ll
which pure compounds were administered by oral,
subcutaneous, intraperitoneal or intravenous routes.
Unfortunately, there are no reports concerning the
effects of inhalation of mixtures of the compounds.
Therefore, it is difficult to speculate concerning the
effects that would be expected in humans who were
exposed to an aerosol of mixtures of these very potent
toxins. The most useful data concerning exposure in
humans was obtained in a Phase I clinical evaluation
of anguidine (diacetoxyscirpenol) as an anticancer
drug. Diacetoxyscirpenol was administered by intrave-
nous infusion. Doses of 3 mg/1112/day caused immedi-
ate onset of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, somnolence
(and/or mental confusion), fever, chills, a generalized
erythema with a burning sensation, hypotension, dysp-
rlea, stomatitis, hives, and ataxia. Because of the side
effects the treatment was discontinued. The properties
which make the use of diacetoxyscirpenol potentially
useful as an anticancer drug are the same as those
responsible (in part) for its extreme toxicity. It and the
other trichothecenes cause extensive damage to rapid-
ly dividing cells such as tumor cells. Unfortunately, the
cells of the lining of the gastrointestinal tract and bone
marrow are also rapidly dividing and the effects of the
trichothecenes on these cells result in severe rapid
degeneration of these tissues. The compounds also
have direct effects on the clotting factors in the blood
(that is, a primary effect on Factor VII activity and a
secondary effect on prothrombin) which result in
excessive hemorrhage following trauma.
The other useful body of clinical data concerning
the effects of trichothecenes in humans is drawn from
descriptions of the course of the disease in the natural
outbreaks that occurred in the Soviet Union. The
clinical picture may be divided into four stages. The
effects produced are very similar to radiation poison-
ing and there is a latent phase in which the overt
symptoms disappear, as occurs in radiation poisoning.
The first stage occurs within minutes to hours after
ingestion of toxic grains. The symptomatology de-
scribed was produced by oral exposure to low doses. In
exposure by inhalation, the symptoms may be more
pronounced or the time course accelerated. The char-
acteristics of the first stage include primary changes,
with local symptoms, in the buccal cavity and gastro-
intestinal tract. Shortly after ingestion of toxic grain,
the patient experiences a burning sensation in the
D- 1 6
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mouth, tongue, throat, palate, esophagus, and stomach
as a result of the toxin's effect on the mucous mem-
branes. The tongue may feel swollen and stiff and the
mucosa of the oral cavity may be hyperemic. Inflam-
mation of the gastric and intestinal mucosa occurs,
along with vomiting, diarrhea, and abdominal pain. In
most cases excessive salivation, headache, dizziness,
weakness, fatigue, and tachycardia accompany the
initial stage. There may be fever and sweating, but the
body temperature normally does not rise. The leuko-
cyte count may begin to decrease in this stage and
there may be an increased erythrocyte sedimentation
rate. This first stage may last from three to nine days.
The second stage is often called the latent stage or
incubation period because the patient does not feel ill
and is capable of normal activity. It is also called the
leukopenic stage because its main features are disturb-
ances in the bone marrow and the hematopoietic
system, characterized by a progressive leukopenia, a
granulopenia, and a relative lymphocytosis. In addi-
tion, anemia and decreases in erythrocytes, in the
platelet count, and hemoglobin occur. Disturbances in
the CNS and autonomic nervous systems may occur.
Weakness, vertigo, fatigue, headache, palpitations, and
mild asthmatic conditions may occur. Visable hemor-
rhagic spots (petechiae) begin to appear on the skin
and this marks the transition to the third phase. The
second stage may last three to four weeks. The
transition to the third stage is sudden and symptoms
progress rapidly.
In the third stage petechial hemorrhages occur on
the skin of the trunk, arms, thighs, and face and head.
They can vary from a millimeter to a few centimeters
in size. Capillaries are very fragile and any slight
trauma results in hemorrhage. Hemorrhages of the
mucous membranes of the mouth, tongue, soft palate,
and tonsils occur. Nasal, gastric, and intestinal hemor-
rhages can be very severe. Areas of necrosis begin to
appear on the lips, fingers, nose, jaws, eyes, and in the
mouth. Lymph nodes are frequently enlarged and the
adjoining connective tissue can become so edematous
that the patient has difficulty opening his mouth.
Blood abnormalities previously described are intensi-
fied. Death may occur from hemorrhage, strangula-
tion (due to swelling) or secondary infection.
The fourth stage is convalescence. Three to four
weeks of treatment are required for disappearance of
necrotic lesions and hemorrhagic effects. Two months
or more may elapse before the blood-forming capabili-
ty of the bone marrow returns to normal.
IV. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF NON-SOVIET LITERATURE
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Bamburg, J. R., and Strong, F. M., "Mycotoxins of the trichothecene family produced
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Ciegler, A., "Trichothecenes: Occurrence and Toxicoses," Journal of Food Protection,
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Eppley, R. M., Stoloff, L., Trucksess, M. W., and Chung, C. W., "Survey of Corn for
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1974, pp. 632-635.
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Funnel, H. S., -Mycotoxins in Animal Feedstuffs in Ontario 1972 to 1977," Canadian
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Ghosal, S., Chakrabarti, D. K., and Choudhary, K. C. B., "The Occurrence of 12, 13-
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Ghosal, S., Biswas, K., Srivastava, R. S., Chakrabarti, D. K., and Choudhary, K. C. B.,
"Toxic Substances Produced by Fusarium V: Occurrence of Zearalenone, Diacetoxy-
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Hibbs, C. M., Osweiler, G. D., Buck, W. B., and Macfee, G. P., "Bovine Hemorrhagic
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Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, Vol. 17, 1974, pp. 305-310.
Hsu, I. C., Smalley, E. B., Strong, F. M., and Ribelin, W. E., "Identification of T-2
Toxin in Moldy Corn Associated with a Lethal Toxicosis in Dairy Cattle," Applied Mi-
crobiology, Vol. 24, 1972, pp. 684-690.
Ishii, K., Ando, Y., and Ueno, Y., -Toxicological Approaches to the Metabolites of
Fusaria. Isolation of the Vomiting Factor from Moldy Corn Infected with Fusarium
Species," Chemical Pharmacology Bulletin, Vol. 23, 1975, pp. 2162-2164.
Jarvis, B. B., Midiwo, T. 0., and Tuthill, D., "Interaction Between the Antibiotic
Trichothecenes and the Higher Plant Baccharis megapotamica,- Science, Vol. 214,
1981, pp. 460-461.
Jemmali, M., Ueno, Y., Ishii, K., Frayssinet, C., and Etienne, M., "Natural Occurrence
of Trichothecenes (Nivalenol, Deoxynivalenol, T-2) and Zearalenone in Corn,"
Experientia, Vol. 34, 1978, pp. 1333-1334.
Joffe, A. Z., -Alimentary Toxic Aleukia," Microbial Toxins, Vol. 7, 1971, pp. 139-189.
Edited by S. Kadis, A. Ciegler, S. J. Ajl, Academic Press, N. Y.
Marasas, W. F. 0., Kreik, W. P. J., Van Rensburg, S. T., Steyn, M., and Van
Schalkwyk, G. C., -Occurrence of Zearalenone and Deoxynivalenol, Mycotoxins
Produced by Fusarium graminearum Schwabe in South Africa," South African
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Miller, J. K., "Suspected Mycotoxic Diseases of Pigs in Scotland. Second Meeting on
Mycotoxins in Animal Disease," Eds. Patterson, 1). S. P., Pepin, G. A., and Shreeve, B.
J., 1976, pp. 14-16. Pinner: Middlesex.
Mirocha, C. J., -Fusarium Species and their Effects on Farm Animals," Proceedings of
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Guelph.
Mirocha, C. J., "Trichothecenes Produced by Fusarium,- Conference on Mycotoxins
in Animal Feeds and Grains Related to Animal Health, Ed. Himoda, W., 1979b, pp.
289-260. Report FDA/BVM-79/139. National Technical Information Service:
Springfield.
Mirocha, C. J., Pathre, S. V., Schauerhamer, B., and Christensen, C. M., "Natural
Occurrence of Fusarium Toxins in Feedstuff," Applied and Environmental Microbi-
ology, Vol. 32, 1976b, pp. 553-556.
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Morooka, N., Uratsuii, N., Yoshizawa, T., and Yamamoto, H., "Studies on the Toxic
Substances in Barley Infected with Fusarium," Japanese Journal of Food Hygiene,
Vol. 13, 1972, pp. 368-375.
Murphy, W. K., Burgess, M. A., Valdivieso, M., Livingston, R. B., Bodey, G. P., and
Freireich, E., "Phase I Clinical Evaluation of Anguidine," Cancer Treatment Reports,
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Petrie, L., Robb, J., and Stewart, A. F., "The Identification of T-2 Toxin and its
Association with a Hemorrhagic Syndrome in Cattle," Veterinary Record, Vol. 101,
1977, p. 326.
Puls, R., Greenway, J. A., "Fusariotoxicosis from Barley in British Columbia II.
Analysis and Toxicity in Suspected Barley," Canadian Journal of Comparative
Medicine, Vol. 40 1976, pp. 16-19.
Rukmini, C., and Bhat, R. V., "Occurrence of T-2 Toxin in Fusarium-infested
Sorghum from India," Journal of Agriculture and Food Chemistry, Vol. 26, 1978, pp.
647-649.
Shank, R. C., Wogan, G. W., and Gibson, J. B., "Toxigenic Molds in Foods and
Foodstuffs in Tropical Southeast Asia," Fd. Cosmet. Toxicol., Vol. 10, 1972, pp. 51-60.
Siegfried, R., "Fusarium-toxine," Naturwissenschaften, Vol. 64, 1977, p. 274.
Vesonder, R. F., and Ciegler, A., "Natural Occurrence of Vomitoxin in Australian and
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8, 1979, pp. 237-240.
Vesonder, R. F., Ciegler, A., Jensen, A. H., Rohwedder, W. K., and Wiesleder, D.,
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sen, A. H., "Survey of 1977 Crop Year Preharvest Corn for Vomitoxin," Applied and
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V. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET LITERATURE
Maksimova, R. A., Palmova, N. P., and Khuratova, B. G., "The Effect of Polyploido-
genous Factors on the Mycelium of Trichothecin and Fibrinolytic Enzymes,"
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Fusarium sporotrichioides With Different Sources of Nitrogen Nutrition," Vestnik
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Paletskaya, L. N., Kiseleva, N. T., Zhuravleva, V. P., Gonna, E. I., and Saryeva, A. N.,
-Effects of Nitrogenous Fertilizers on Fusarium oxysporum f. vasinfectum and Its
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Kalinina, R. T., -The Determination of Pathogenicity of and the Presence of
Phytotoxins in Fusariurn Fungi-The Pathogens of Root Rot of Wheat," Mikologiya i
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Kostyunina, N. A., and Ermakov, V. V., -Isolation and Identification of Zearalenone,"
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Lapja, Vol. 32, No. 9, 1977, pp. 572-573.
Seelyey, G., Vanyi�k., and Petri, A., -Effect of Irradiation on the Viability and Toxin
Production of Different Fungus Species," Magyar Allatorvosok Lapja, Vol. 34, No. 6,
1979, pp. 412-416.
Polovinki, G. P., -Accumulation of Fusaric Acid by Different Fusarium Species and
Their Phytotoxic Properties," Mikrobiologicheskii Zhurnal, Vol. 41, No. 5, 1979, pp.
504-508.
Bilai, V. I., and Ellanskaya, I. A., -Morphological Features of the Fusarium Species
Under Submerged Cultivation," Mikrobiol. Zh., Vol. 42, No. 2, 1980, pp. 172-179.
Maksimova, R. A., and Rapoport, I. A., -Investigation of the Mutagenic Effects of
Nitrosomethylurea on Trichotheciurn roseum, A Producer of the Antibiotic
Trichothecin," Genctika. Publ. 67, Issue 3, pp. 107-113.
Zaichenko, A. M., Proskuryakova, N. S., and Dakhnovsky, V. I., -Physiological and
Biochemical Characteristics of Dendrodochium to:uicurn in Connection with Biosyn-
thesis of Dendrodochins in the Process of Dendrodochium toxicum 5800 Cultivation.
II. Dynamics of Dendrodochins Component Composition," Mikrobiol. Zh., Vol. 42,
No. 3, 1980, pp. 315-318.
Bilai, V. I., Nikaskaya, E. A., Bogomolova, L. A., Zakordonets, L. A., Strizhevskaya,
A. Ya., Silvers, V. S., Zaichenko, A. M., and Proskuryakova, N. S., -Regulation of
Growth and Biosynthetic Activity of Microscopic Fungi,- Mikrobiol. Zh., Vol. 33, No.
2, 1971, pp. 134-140.
Bilai, V. I., Shcherbina, S. N., Bogomolova, L. A., and Proskuryakova, N. S., -Effect of
Different Ratios of Carbon and Nitrogen on Biosynthesis of Fusaric and Nicotinic
Acids and on Respiration in Fusarium (Ukrainian)," Mikrobiol. Zh., Vol. 36, No. 3,
1974, pp. 293-299.
Bilai, V. I., and Koval, E. Z., -Features of Growth of Fusaria With Assimilation of Hy-
drocarbons (Ukrainian)," Mikrobiol. Zh., Vol. 36, No. 5, 1974, pp. 587-594.
Bilai, V. I., Losjakova, L. S., Serebrennikov, V. M., and Shkolnyj, A. T., -Growth of
Micromycetes From Different Taxonomic Groups on the Medium With Lignin of
Pinus sylvestris.- Microbiol. Zh., Vol. 40, No. 3, 1978, pp. 327-332.
-P�A-4414(1-.82al_
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-rap-secred
Bilai, V. I., and Strizhevskaja, A. IA., "Growth of Mycelium and Rate of Xylan, Xylose
and Glucose Uptake by Strains of Different Fungi Species," Mikrobiol. Zh., Vol. 39,
No. 3, 1977, pp. 307-310.
Panozishvili, K., Zornikova, N. V., and Borovkov, A. V., "Verrucarin A From
Dendrodochium toxicum," Khim. Prir. Soedin., No. 2, 1972, p. 245.
Kurbatskaya, Z. A., and Ibragimov, R. G., "Growth and Toxin Formation in Some Spe-
cies of Aspergillus Genus Under Different Temperature Conditions of Cultivation,"
Mikrobiol. Zh., Vol. 41, No. 4, 1979, pp. 358-362.
Bilai, V. I., Shcherbina, S. M., and Ellanska, I. A., "Formation of Group B Vitamins by
Different Species of Fusarium LK," Mikrobiol. Zhur., Vol. 33, No. 3, May/June 1971,
pp. 310-314. ;
Bilai, V. I., "Determination of Growth and Biosynthetic Activity of Fungi," Metody
Eksp. Mikol., 1973, pp. 5-16.
Bilai V. I., and Misyurenko, I. P., "Formation of Toxins During the Submerged
Cultivation of Fusarium sporotrichiella," Dopov. Akad. Nauk Ukr. RSR, Vol. 36, No.
9, 1974, pp. 846-849.
Bilai, V. I., Nikol'skaya, E. A., and Bilai, T. I., "Regulation of Enzymic Activity of
Fungi by the Relation and Level of Nutrient Components," Fiziol. Puti Povysh.
Ferment. Akt. Mikroorg., 1973, pp. 134-148.
Erofeev, N. S., Bezborodov, A. M. Bilai, V. I., Bogomolova, L. A., Zolotareva, E. A.,
Medvedeva, T. N., Surovtseva, V. M., and Chermenskii, D. N., Fusaric Acid Patent,
Institute of Biochemistry and Physiology of Microorganisms, Academy of Sciences,
USSR, Patent SU 516739, 5 June 1976.
Zaichenko, A. M., and Dakhnovskii, V. I., "Growth Regulation and Toxin Formation
of Dendrochium toxicum and Stachybotrys alternans by the Carbon/Nitrogen
Nutrient Ratio," Tr. S'ezda Mikrobiol. Ukr., 1975, pp. 57-58.
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moniliforme 51070 in the Process of Growth," Mikrobiol. Zhur., Vol. 33, No. 3,
May/June 1971, pp. 306-309.
Bilai, V. I., Zakordonets, L. A., and Shcherbina, S. M., "Effect of Autolysis on Yield of
Amino Acids and Group B Vitamins in Fusarium moniliforme," Mikrobiol. Zhur.,
Vol. 34, No. 3, May/June 1972, pp. 292-296.
Proskuriakova, N. S., and Dakhnovs'kyi, V. I., "On Some Morphological and
Cytological Changes in Microscopic Fungi When Using Dendrodochine as a Sub-
strate," Mikrobiol. Zhur., Vol. 34, No. 3, May/June 1972, pp. 297-300.
Bilai, V. I., and Shematiuk, E. G., "Cellulose-Digesting Mycomycetes of Some Soil
Types in the Ukrainian SSR," Mikrobiol Zh., Vol. 36, No. 3, May/June 1974, pp. 300-
303.
Bilai, V. I., Zakordonets, L. A., Bogomolova, L. A., and Meteiko, T., "Effects of
Different Ratios of Carbon and Nitrogen in a Nutrient Medium on the Growth and
Metabolism of Fusarium moniliforme Sheld. (Strain 2804" Mikol Fitopatol, Vol. 8,
No. 3, 1974, pp. 177-184.
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Ponozishvili, K. P., and Borovkov, A. V., -Roridin A From Dendrodochium toxicum
Fungi," Khimiia Prirodnykh Soedinenii, Vol. 3, May/June 1974, pp. 404-405.
Fafurova, V. L., and Kurbatskaia, Z. A., -Study of Toxin-forming Capacity of Some
Species of Entomopathogenic Fungi (in View of Biologic Control)," Izvestiia. Akade-
miia Nauk Tadzhikskoi SSR., Vol. 2, April/June 1978, pp. 28-34.
Bilai, V. I., and Shcherbina, S. M., -Effect of Concentration and Correlations of
Sources of Carbon and Nitrogen on the Formation of Vitamins of Group B in
Fusarium mondiforme She'd v. Lactis," Mikrobiologicheskii Zhurnal, Vol. 42, No. 5,
September/October 1980, pp. 576-581.
Bilai, V. I., and Ellanskaya, I. A., -Microculture Method for Obtaining Typical
Conidial Production in Fusarium spp.," Mikologiya i Fitopatologiya, Vol. 9, No. 1,
1975, pp. 74-76.
Bilai, V. I., and Shcherbina, S. M., -Dynamics of the Vitamin Content of Different
Strains of Fusaria," Mikrobiologichnii Zhurnal, Vol. 39, No. 5, 1977, pp. 597-600.
Ermakov, V. V., Kostyunina, N. A., and Kurmanov, I. A., -Isolation and Identification
of T-2 Mycotoxin Produced by Fusarium sporotrichiella,- Doklady Vsesoyuznoi
Akademii Serskokhozyoistvennykh Natilk, No. 3, 1978, pp. 36-38.
Kotik, A. N., Chernobai, V. T., Komissarenko, N. G., and Trufanova, V. A., -Isolation
of the Mycotoxin of Fusarium sporotrichiella and a Study of Its Physicochemical and
Toxic Properties," Mikrobiologicheskii Zhurnal, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1979, pp. 636-639.
Bilai, V. I., Zaichenko, A. M., Kirillova, L. M., and Dokhnovskii, V. I., -Physiological
and Biochemical Features of Dendrodochium toxicum in Connection With the
Biosynthesis of Dendrodochines. I. Some Features of Dendrodochium toxicum 5800
Growth," Mikrobiologicheskii Zhurnal, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1980, pp. 180-184.
SiLev, A. B., Bekker, Z. E., Maksimova, R. A., Gus'kova, T. M., Karnaukhova, M. V.,
Zeleneva, R. N., and Paramonov, N. Ya., -Trichothecin, Conditions of Its Biosynthesis
and Isolation," S-Kh. Biol., Publ. 66, Series 1, Issue 4, pp. 627-631.
Maksimova, R. A., Palmova, N. P., and Alekseeva, A. A., -Effect of Vitamins on the
Growth and Development of Various Strains of Trichothecium roseum Producing
Trichothecin," Antibiotiki, Publ. 70, Series 15, Issue 3, pp. 229-232.
Maksimova, R. A., Khuratova, B., and Silaev, A. B., -Synthetic Medium for the
Tricothecin in Biosynthesis," Biol. Nauki, Publ. 71, Series 14, Issue 4, pp. 138-141.
Akhmedova, A. N., Velikanov, L. L., and Sidorova, I. I., -Effect of Absorbents on the
Biosynthesis of Trichothecin by Trichothecium roseum Strains," Vstn. Mosk. Univ.,
Biol., Pochvoved, Publ. 71, Series 26, Issue 4, pp. 49-51.
Bilai, V. I., and Shkurenko, V. A., -Effect of Temperature and pH on the Proteolytic
Activity of Fungi," Fermenty Med., Pishch. Prom. Sel. Khoz., 1968, pp. 190-192.
Bilai, V. I., Kharchenko, S. M., and Lemeshchenko, G. P., -Toxicity of Dendrodochin
in Relation to Nutritional Source of Dendrodochiurn toxicum,- Mikrobiol. Nar.
Gospod. Med., Mater. Z'izdu Ukr. Mikrobiol. Toy., 1966, pp. 142-145.
Bilai, V. I., and Kharchenko, S. M., -Effect of Nutritional Source on the Growth of
Dendrodochium toxicum and the Antibiotic Properties of Dendrodochin," Mikrobiol.
Nar. Gospod. Med., Mater. Z'izdu Ukr. Mikrobiol. Toy., 1966, pp. 138-141.
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Bilai, V. I., and Kharchenko, S. N., "Physiology of the Growth of Dendrodochium tox-
icum and Formation of Dendrochin," Eksp. Mikol., 1968, pp. 97-105.
Paper submitted at symposium on mycotoxins held 28 to 30 September 1977 in
Orenburg, "Questions Related to the Biosynthesis of Steroid Mycotoxins," Reference
MIFIB 78, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 269.
Paper submitted at symposium on mycotoxins held 28 to 30 September 1977 in
Orenburg, "The Physiologic Bases of Regulation of the Processes of Fungal Toxin
Formation," Reference MIFIB 78, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 269.
"The Effect of Inhibitors of Protein Synthesis on the Growth and Biosynthetic Activity
of Trichothecium roseum," Reference MIKBA 79, Vol. 48, No. 5, pp. 858-862.
"Growth of Fungi of Different Genera on Mineral Medium With Lignin of Pinus
sylvestris,- Reference MZUKA 77, Vol. 39, No. 6, p. 740.
"Effect of an Addition of Enzymic Inhibitors and Stimulants to the Nutrient Medium
on the Fibrinolytic and Antibiotic Activity of the Fungus Trichothecium roseum,"
Reference PBMIA 77, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 515-520.
"Activator Properties of Protease Synthesized by the Saprophyte Fungus Trichothe-
cium roseum LK EX FR," Reference PBMIA 77, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 398-404.
"Kinetics of Hydrolysis of N-Toluene-Sulphonyl-L-Arginine-Methylester and N-
Benzoyl-L-Arginine Ethylester Catalyzed by Tricholysine From Trichothecium ro-
seum," Reference PBMIA 77, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 241-247.
"Fungi From the Genus Trichothecium Link and the Antibiotic Substances Formed
by Them," References MIKBA 77, Vol. 46, No. 1, p. 112.
"Procedure for Obtaining Trichothecin," Reference OIPOB 528918, 76, No. 35, p. 8.
"Natural Variability of Trichothecium roseum," Reference MIKBA 77, Vol. 46, No. 1,
pp. 109-112.
"Effect of Colchicine and Other Polyploidogenous Factors During Contact With
Submerged Vegetative Mycelium of Trichothecium roseum, A Fungus Producing
Antibiotic Trichothecin and Proteolytic Enzymes," Reference MIKBA 77, Vol. 46, No.
1, pp. 80-85.
"Morphogenetic Action of Trichothecin on Trichothecium roseum," Reference
MIKBA 76, Vol. 45, No. 6, pp. 1023-1027.
"A Procedure for Obtaining Fusaric Acid," Reference OIPOB 516739, Vol. 76, No. 21,
pp. 78-99.
Ermakov, V. V., Kostyunina, N. A., and Kurmanov, I. A., "Isolation and Identification
of Mycotoxin T-2 Produced by Fusarium sporotrichiella," Soviet Agricultural Sci-
ences, 1978, No. 3, pp. 47-49.
Bilai, V. I., "Principles of Taxonomy and Structure of Phytopathogenic Species of the
Genus Fusarium Lk. Ex Fr," Mikrobiol. Zh., Vol. 40, No. 2, 1978, pp. 148-156.
Bilai, V. I., Cherkes, A. I., Bogomolova, L. A., and Frantsuzova, S. B., "Toxicobiologic
Properties of Fusaric Acid, A Metabolite of Fusarium oxysporum (Ukrainian),"
Mikrobiol. Zh., Vol. 37, No. 3, 1975, pp. 325-328.
-Tr"3-8+9414,20Q.
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Palmova, N. P., and Maximova, R. A., -Effect of Inhibitors of Protein Synthesis on the
Growth and Biosynthetic Activity of Trichothecium roseum,- Mikrobiologiya, Vol.
48, No. 5, 1979, pp. 858-862.
Maximov, V. N., Maximova, R. A., and Minayeva, T. A., -Characteristics of the
Directed Biosynthesis of Trichothecin and Fibrinolytic Enzymes in Trichothecium
roseum,- Mikrobiologiya, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1980, pp. 258-264.
Bilai, V. I., and Olifson, L. E., -Mycotoxins (Producers, Chemistry, Biosynthesis,
Determination, Effect on the Body)," Izv Akad Nauk SSSR Biol., Vol. January/
February 1979, pp. 150-155.
Olifson, L. E., Kenina, S. H. M., and Kartashova, V. L. "Fractional Composition of the
Lipid Complex of Grain Infected by the Microscopic Fungus Fusarium sporotrichiella
Bilai," Prikl. Biokhim. Mikrobiol., Vol. 14, No. 4, July/August 1978, pp. 630-634.
Bilai, V. I., -Principles of the Systematics and the Structure of Phytopathogenic
Species of the Genus Fusarium Lk. Ex Fr,- Mikrobiol. Zh., Vol. 40, No. 2,
March/April 1978, pp. 148-156.
Olifson, L. E., -On the Question of Biosynthesis of Toxic Steroles by the Microscopic
Fungi Fusarium sporotrichiella, Paper Presented,- Mikrobiologichnyy Zhurnal, Vol.
35, No. 2, 1973, p. 266.
Dunin, M. S., and Prasad, Y., -Effect of Zinc Upon Growth of Fusarium oxysporum
F. Inli (Bolley) Synder Et Hansen and the Formation of Toxins,- Izvestiya Timirya-
zevskoy Selskokhozyaystvennoy Akademii, No, 3, 1972, pp. 143-147.
Alisova, Z. I., -Immunization of Rabbits by the Toxic and Atoxic Condensation of
Liquid Cultures of the Fungus Fusarium,- Voprosy Meditsiny, No. 1, 1964, p. 190.
Kvashnina, Ye. S., -Water Soluble Toxic Substances From Fusarium Genus Molds (4th
All Union Conference on Aerosols, 1958)- Letopis Zhurnalnykh Statey, No. 38, 1959,
p. 127.
Titova, L. M., -Amino Acids as a Single Source of Nitrogen for Toxin Forming Fungi,-
Mikrobiologichnyy Zhurnal, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1971, pp. 159-164.
Bekker, Z. E., and Poletayeva, V. F., -The Role of Zinc in the Pathogensis of Fusarium
Wilt and the Biosynthetic Activity of Strains of Its Etiologic Agent," Izvestiya
Akademii Nauk Turkmenskoy SSR, No. 2, 1968, pp. 3-9.
Gubin, I. Ye., -Morphological and Culture Properties of Some Toxic Fungi of the
Genus Fusarium,- SB Nauchn. Rab. Ryazan. S-Sk. Inst., Vol. 24, No. 2, 1970, pp. 51-
55.
Gubin, I. E., -The Development of Toxic Strains of Fusarium sporotrichiella Bilai var
sporotrichioides, sherb, Bilai Under Different Conditions of Cultivation,- SB Nauch.
TR Ryazan. Serskokhoz. Inst., Vol. 17, 1967, pp. 172-175.
Kurbatskaya, Z. A., -The Effect of Certain Factors on Toxin Formation in Fish of the
Species Fusariurn," Letopis Zhurnalnykh Statey, No. 32, 1969, p. 140.
TCS 3000 82/11
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Bekker, E. E., Doviet, M., Ovletmuradov, K. D., Pushkareva, I. D., Poletayeva, V. F.,
Shilina, S. G., and Yaskova, E. I., "Nature and Biosynthesis of the Causative Agent
Toxin of Fusariosis Wilt, the Mechanism and Its Action and Possible Transformation
Within the Organism of the Cotton Plant," Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR, No. 5,
1971, pp. 749-754.
Bilai, V. I., and Pidoplichko, N. M., "Toxin Producing Micromycetes," Izvestiya
Akademii SSSR, No. 4, 1970, pp. 600-608.
Guntaishvili, R. K., "Material About the Study of the Stimulant of Red Mold of Corn
in Georgia," Soobshcheniya Akademii Nauk Gruzinskoy SSR, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1963.
Hoshayev, M. H., Hubin, I. E., Leonov, A. N., Shylina, S. H., and Soboleva, N.A.,
"Toxin Forming Characteristics of Certain Types of Fungi of the Fusarium Family,"
Mikrobiologichnyy Zhurnal, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1973, p. 266.
Pidoplichko, V. M., "Toxicity of Fungi From the Genus Fusarium Agents of Root Rot
in Winter," Mikrobiologichnyy Zhurnal, Vol. 32, No. 6, 1970, pp. 700-704.
Akhmeteli, M. A., Linnik, A. R., Chernov, K. S., Voronin, V. M., Khesina, A. Ya., Gu-
seva, N. A., and Shabad, L. M., "Toxins Isolated From Grain Infected With Fusarium
sporotrichioides,- Pure and Applied Chemistry (London), No. 35(3), 1973, pp. 209-215.
Prasad, Yogendra, "Zinc in the Toxin Metabolism of Fusarium oxysporum," Indian
Journal of Agricultural Science (New Delhi), No. 42(10), 1972, pp. 950-952.
Some Soviet Scientists Involved in Mycotoxin Research
A. Kb. Sarkisov All Union Scientific Research
Institute of Experimental
Veterinary Science, Moscow
V. I. Bilay Ukrainian SSR Institute of
(also spelled Bilai) Microbiology and Virology, Kiev
V. A. Tuteryan USSR Academy of Medical Sciences
Nutrition Institute, Moscow
M. A. Akhmeteli USSR Academy of Medical Sciences
Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology
L. Ye. Olifson
M. F. Nesterin
K. Z. Salomatina
Ye. P. Kozhevnikova
N. D. Osadchaya
L. F. Mikhaylova
Sh. M. Kenina
V. L. Kartashova
L. R. Filonova
T. Ye. Tolcheyeva
Kn. A. Dzhilavyan
I. S. Yelistratov
1---7C-S""319644.42.1.11
N. S. Tishkova
V. I. Kaplun
Ye. P. Kozhevalkova
S. M. Gubkin
L. I. Irina
P. A. Il'in
A. M. Kogan
D. T. Martynenko
N. A. Kostyunina
V. V. Yerinakov
I. A. Kurmanov
V. V. Semenov
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Z. K. Bystryakova
Z. Z. Orlova
L. S. L'vova
L. I. Lozbina
T. A. Shevtsova
I. Yu. Makedon
N. S. Proskuryakova
A. V. Borovkov
M. N. Nazypov
L. I. Lozbin
M. S. Marova
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UP
ANNEX E '
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
Southeast Asia
Since 1976, multiple sources�refugees, relief medi-
cal and civilian workers, and many specially qualified
physicians�consistently have detailed unusual signs
and symptoms of victims of -yellow rain." Specifical-
ly, victims in Southeast Asia subjected to a direct
attack of the yellow powder, mist, smoke, or dust
would be seen to begin retching and vomiting in a
matter of minutes. This and the effects described
below were not pronounced in individuals even 100
meters from the attack zone, indicating a relatively
dense chemical/carrier combination that was effective
in low wind conditions.
Unlike that caused by a traditional riot-control
nausea agent, the initial induced vomiting following
exposure to -yellow rain" was protracted over hours to
days and was often accompanied by dizziness, with
rapid heartbeat and apparently low blood pressure,
chest pain, loss of far-field vision, and a feeling of
intense heat and burning on the skin, but not described
as being most acute in the groin and axillae. Thus, the
acute signs and symptoms match some ol the effects of
traditional vomiting and urticant agents, but clearly
not all.
A significant number of victims also reported in-
tense -red eyes," -bleeding gums," convulsions or
more often trembling, and vomiting of blood with or
without production of copious amounts of saliva with-
in the first hours after the attack. Again, this could last
many hours to days, apparently depending on the
exposure level. Thick mucus, pinpoint pupils, respira-
tory collapse, prolonged spasticity, and involuntary
urination or defecation were seldom reported after a
-classic- attack of "yellow rain,- and this absence
helped to rule out organophosphate nerve agents in the
minds of CW experts. Many medical and environmen-
tal samples also ruled out these and other traditional
agents such as DM, DS, and others.
27
led.
Many observers of the "yellow rain- effects report-
ed formation within several hours of small (1 centi-
meter), homogeneous, hard, fluid-filled blisters over
only exposed areas of skin, frequently including the
victim's hands, arms, entire throat, and face�when-
ever skin was uncovered. In most cases, the vomit,
after two to eight hours, contained blood, and in many
cases a good deal of it. About half of those receiving
the most concentrated doses of yellow material, who
had been directly under the spray, were observed
several hours after the attack to cease vomiting tempo-
rarily. This interval was often followed in five to 15
minutes by a period of great pain when the victim
would hold his abdomen and emit a "gush" of blood
from his mouth and nose. These individuals were
usually dead within minutes after that. Close question-
ing by physicians of those who witnessed these final
moments leave no doubt that these observed effects
were the results of severe gastrointestinal bleeding,
significant pulmonary bleeding, temporary compres-
sion of accumulated blood in the stomach, and finally
projectile vomiting of as much as several hundred
milliliters of blood. These findings were consistent
with animal and human autopsies.
Very recent, as yet unpublished data on effects of
these compounds in animals show striking and sudden
impairment of several elements of the normal blood
clotting mechanisms. Observers and victims have re-
ported signs and symptoms occurring within a few
minutes to a few hours after exposure. These signs and
symptoms, including bleeding, the other systemic ef-
fects mentioned above, and in some cases death even
from skin absorption, are consistent with these emerg-
ing laboratory data.
Many victims of the yellow material received less
than the full brunt of a spray, or entered the attack
zone several hours to two days later, or consumed food
or water contaminated by the material. These individ-
uals often within the next 24 hours developed signs
and symptoms similar to those of the more directly
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affected (but often without pronounced skin effects if
they did not contact the powder residue directly). In
addition to attacks of intense vomiting (five or six
times a day), they also had diarrhea, with bloody stools
passed up to eight times a day. Bleeding under the
fingernails and around the skin of the eyes and severe
bruising of the skin are also commonly reported.
Opiates helped the fluid loss in adults; but, in children
or young persons not able to tolerate the treatments of
raw opium and water, death occurred in about half
the cases after 10 days to two weeks. On the basis of
reported signs and symptoms, the cause of delayed
death was almost certainly dehydration.
In many cases chemical attacks are reported to
produce symptoms other than the ones described here.
There has always been, however, a direct association
of the symptoms above with reports of -yellow rain"
attacks�that is, when yellow material is used these
symptoms appear; other agents may give rise to other
symptoms. Although it is possible to have one or even
several of these symptoms associated with traditional
CW agents, no expert has been able to -fit" the
sequence, severity, and consistency with any of them.
In many cases victims and observers were examined,
histories taken, and interviews conducted by several
health professionals weeks apart. Remarkable consist-
ency has been observed.
From the beginning of the -yellow rain" episodes in
1976, autopsies have occasionally been reported anec-
dotally. Some have been done by less than expert
technique, some by nonphysicians, and some were on
animals rather than human victims. However, the
consistency of the early reported -putrefaction" or
rottenness" of the digestive tract within 12 to 48
hours after death led many forensic experts to suspect
that one effect of the poison, whatever it was, was to
cause necrosis (cell death) of rapidly dividing mucosa
(mucous membranes), especially in the stomach and
upper small intestine. Other autopsy findings included
hyperemia (engorgement with blood) of digestive mu-
cosal linings, and remarkably intense congestion and
swelling in the lungs, liver, spleen, and sometimes the
kidneys. These and other findings often led experts in
toxicology and pathology to suggest mycotoxin or even
trichothecene intoxication based on clinical and patho-
logical data alone.
Although not a common cause of death, trichothe-
cene effects have been reported in the forensic, onco-
--Tr'S-8444542,LIL.
logical, and toxicological literature for several years.
Unpublished findings of ten were discussed in sympo-
siums. In several dozens of cases, toxic effects in
humans and animals have been carefully recorded,
and they match those of the -yellow rain" story with
good precision. (See table E-1.) There are no additional
signs effects of known trichothecene intoxication not
frequently reported by victims, nor are there any
reported -yellow rain" symptoms that cannot be
explained by the effect of the four specific trichothe-
cene toxins found in the samples, and the doses
inferred from the operational situation and descrip-
tion.
From a medical viewpoint, there are no significant
differences in the reporting from Laos and Kampu-
chea. The timing and delivery systems have sometimes
varied, but the effects of the chemical agent, both
clinically and pathologically, are identical. In one case,
a series of blood samples from Kampuchean victims
also showed a trend toward leukopenia (reduction in
number of white blood cells) and the presence of a
trichothecene metabolite (HT-2) consistent with tri-
chothecene intoxication (see annex D for blood analy-
sis results). To a first order, dose-response effects are
also seen, and routes of administration are consistent
with effects.
Public Health Issues. An early hypothesis (1978-
79) was that a significant number of the deaths,
especially in Laos, could be explained by the heavy
use of riot-control agents such as CS, CN, DM, and
agents which cause itching and/or blistering. The
hypothesis was rejected quickly on two grounds. First,
trace contaminant analysis did not show the presence
of any of these compounds in samples (several samples
did, however, contain a trichothecene precursor). Sec-
ondly, contrary to commonly held views, the epi-
demiology of diseases endemic to the Central High-
lands and the public health of the H'Mong do not
support the view of malnourished, disease-ridden, and
weak persons who would succumb easily to riot-
control agents. Also, a number of studies have shown
the opposite: a relatively low incidence of pulmonary
disease (lower than what could otherwise account for
certain effects); better nutritional states than could
other wise account for death in 10 days to two weeks
from water loss (dehydration) and calorie depletion;
and a death rate of near zero from causes other than
infection, gerontological causes, and trauma.
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Table E-1
Comparison of Reported "Yellow Rain" Effects
With Known Trichothecene Effects
-Yellow Rain" Reports a
1. Nausea, vomiting-severe, immediate
2. -Falling down, world turning"
3. -Burning of skin- ... small blisters
4. -Shaking all over, flopping like fish out of water"
5. -Bleeding eyes"
6. -Pounding" chest, rapid heartbeat, weakness
7. Severe pain in center of chest
8. Sleepiness, -not able to talk"
9. Bleeding gums and profuse saliva
10. -Can't breathe"
11. -Skin and body hot with cold-
12. Diarrhea with blood
13. Loss of appetite, inability to eat
14. Bleeding into skin and fingernails
15. Drop in white blood cell count
16. -Rotten esophagus, stomach, intestines; soft spleen and liver"
17. Swelling of all organs
Effects of Trichothecenes
1. Nausea, vomiting-severe, immediate
2. Dizziness
3. Generalized erythema with a burning sensation of skin
4. Ataxia (failure of muscular coordination), occasional tremors
and convulsions
5. Congestion of the sclera (white outer coat of eyeball) and blood
in tears
6. Hypotension (abnormally low blood pressure) with secondary
rise in heart rate
7. Angina (substernal chest pain)
8. Somnolence, central nervous system symptoms
9. Stomatitis (inflammation of oral mucous membranes) and
ptyalism (excessive salivation)
10. Shortness of breath
11. Fever and chills
12. Diarrhea with blood
13. Anorexia
14. Thrombocytopenia (decrease in number of platelets-white
blood cells involved in clotting of blood) and purpura (skin discolor-
ation caused by hemorrhage into tissues)
15. Leukopenia and anemia
16. Rapid necrosis of linings of gastrointestinal tract; lymphoid
necrosis in spleen and liver
17. Congestion of all organs
a Effects are immediate at levels near to or above a rough estimate of 500 to 1,000 mg total body burden for an adult. Although
inhalation data are pending, the levels are consistent with reported lethal and sublethal doses. Trichothecenes in combination, when
directly ingested or inhaled, or in purified form, are more toxic in lower concentrations and the order of signs and symptoms and
timing varies.
Afghanistan
Some deaths with bleeding have been described in
the accounts from Afghanistan. In one series of cases a
physician examined a number of persons who had
been exposed to sublethal doses of a yellow smoke/
black smoke combination attack and one man near
death after a series of attacks. Hemoptysis (nasal
bleeding)-but not hematemesis (bleeding from the
gastrointestinal tract)-was reported in about half of
these and other cases.
Several features of at least one of the chemical
agents-an incapacitant-used in Afghanistan defy
explanation at this time. No good candidate has yet
been identified which will selectively inhibit the cen-
tral nervous system to cause unconciousness for several
hours as reported. A second finding has been the
presence of a dermal anaesthesia, affecting only ex-
posed areas of skin.
Postattack Medical Survey. There is evidence that
after some of the attacks in Laos and Afghanistan,
Soviet or Communist (Pathet Lao) forces entered the
attack zones to conduct surveys. Several reports indi-
cate that a group of survivors from a toxin attack on a
Laotian village were taken several kilometers from the
village and injected with a small volume of a clear
solution said by their captors to be a -new- medicine
to -assess the gas.- The injections were given intra-
muscularly in the upper arm and reportedly did
nothing to alleviate the weakness, nausea, vomiting, or
diarrhea suffered by the survivors. One source report-
ed the effect of the drug was to cause an immediate
sensation of warmth throughout his body. Only the use
of opium later eased the discomfort, after the survivors
had lied to their captors about how much better the
new medicine made them feel. It is probable that the
procedure was a test, either of a new antidote or of a
drug developed to reduce incapacitation from the
nausea and vomiting.
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Similarly, in a few cases in Afghanistan, Soviet
troops were reported to disembark from helicopters or
armored personnel carriers at the edge of an attack
site. Three or four, dressed in full anticontamination
gear, walked among the dead; examined the corpses;
and, opening them with a crude autopsy incision,
examined the organs in the abdominal and thoracic
cavities. In one report a solution was poured into the
incision. When the corpses were later recovered by
Mujahedin guerrillas, the body cavity contents were
destroyed beyond recognition. These bizarre stories
would be discounted were it not for the past reliability
and quality of reporting from the sources, which is
believed excellent.
TC----78-7767-1127i�
These and a small number of additional reports
support the hypothesis that the perpetrators of some of
the attacks are interested in studying aftereffects,
lethality, or some other quasi-experimental aspect of
use of a new chemical weapon. Details are not suffi-
ciently clear to explain the purpose of the above
events, and -destruction of evidence- is by itself not
an entirely credible explanation. Recent indications
from Afghanistan indicate that one purpose of these
reviews of bodies and the field surveys is to determine
levels of toxic materials still present in the attack zone
before Soviet troops occupy it.
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ANNEX F
REPORT OF THE WEAPON AND SPACE SYSTEMS
INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, APRIL 1980, ON USE OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN, LAOS, AND KAMPUCHEA
The Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Com-
mittee has reviewed all available intelligence as of 25
March 1980 to determine if chemical agents have been
used in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea
Afghanistan
1. There is an even chance that lethal chemi-
cals such as nerve agents have been used by the
Soviets in Afghanistan but we lack confirmatory
evidence
2. We are almost certain that irritant agents
have been used by the Soviets against the Afghan
insurgents.
3. The presence of Soviet chemical defense
forces in Afghanistan provides the capability to
engage in chemical warfare. We cannot predict
whether the Soviets will exercise this capability.
The earliest reported use of chemical weapons
occurred during the summer of 1979, when refugees
claimed that "toxic gas bombs" were used in Bamian
Province. In the fall of 1979
reported on the presence o "chemical" bombs at
several airfields and their use against insurgents. The
bulk of reporting since then has come from Afghan
refugees, who have described aircraft attacks with gas
bombs and canisters, causing dizziness, sickness,
breathing difficulty, and in some cases death'
confirmed the deploy-
ment of a chemical defense battalion (which is stand-
ard issue to Soviet forces) at Qonduz and Shindand,
and chemical defense equipment has been observed in
-71-Cs-3o619-69,41._
the Kabul area. The unit at Qonduz has set up two
small nonstandard personnel and clothing decontami-
nation stations.
The evidence for the Soviet possession of irritant
agents is convincing. There is no conclusive evidence
of Soviet use of lethal agents. We believe that any
chemicals used or stored in Afghanistan would be
supplied by the Soviets. We would require samples of
munitions or fragments, contaminated materiel
(b)(1
(b)(3)�)
("(b)(3)
and/or the debriefings of victims by qualified medical (b)(3)
experts to establish not only that lethal agents were
used but also the exact type of agent employed
F-1
Laos
1. We are almost certain that the Vietnamese
(PAVN) and Laotian People's Democratic Army
forces have used lethal chemical agents against
the dissident H'Mong (Meo) tribesmen over a
period of more than three years. The most recent
report is from October 1979.
2. From the reported symptoms, at least three
types of chemical agents have been used: a nerve
agent; an unidentified lethal chemical or combi-
nation of chemicals; and an irritant agent of
unknown type.
3. There is good evidence that the Soviets have
supplied chemical munitions and advice to PAVN
forces and the Laotians
4. Stores of chemical munitions probably are
located near Xiangkhoang and Vieng Sai (Military
Region II), Savannakhet (Military Region III), and
Pakxe (Military Region IV).
VP
c
(b)(a1 ))(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)((b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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-firirr-SeePei
Refugee and clandestine reporting has described
repeated chemical attacks on combatants and the
civilian population with rockets, bombs, sprays, and
artillery weapons. Eyewitnesses have been interviewed
by US medical experts. However, chemical analysis of
roofing material supposedly contaminated with a le-
thal chemical agent proved negative.
provide good evidence that the
Soviets have supplied unidentified chemical agents
and munitions to Laos and have provided assistance in
usage and storage.
Kampuchea
1. There is insufficient evidence to support
allegations that PAVN forces or those of the
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) have
used lethal chemicals against Democratic Kampu-
chean (DK) guerrillas.
2. Vietnamese and PRK forces probably are
using irritant agents against both the DK and
Khmer Serei forces, especially along the Thai-
Kampuchean border,
"firs-6,6649-42,4_
The possibility of a DK propaganda campaign is
real. Of 76 CW attacks in Kampuchea reported
between October 1978 and March 1980, 62 originated
in DK propaganda broadcasts and press releases. Be-
cause the DK forces, unlike the H'Mong or the Afghan
dissidents, remain under central control, the planting
of other stories is possible. Five reports from DK
informants were surfaced through the International
Red Cross and Thai military. The remaining reports
were provided by Thai intelligence, Khmer Serei
forces, and PAVN defectors.
The Vietnamese have the means of delivering
chemical munitions, but have no capability to produce
the agents themselves. Lethal chemical agents would
have to be supplied by the USSR; irritant agents would
be either Soviet supplied or drawn from captured US
supplies
F-2
Secrogt,
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--Tap-Seget
Approved for Release: 2015/01/05 005184100