SOVIET MOTIVATIONS FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05173289
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01432
• Publication Date: January 3, 1983

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Soviet otiva ions
for the Use of Chemical Weapons
in Afghanistan
and Southeast Asia
An Intelligence Assessment
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SOY 83-10003X
January 1983
Copy 295
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Soviet Motivations for the Use of Chemical Weapons in
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia
Information available as of 3 January 1983
was used in this report.
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Soviet Motivations for the Use of Chemical Weapons in
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia
Chemical Warfare in Soviet Military Doctrine
The use by the USSR and its allies of lethal and
nonlethal chemical warfare (CW) in areas such as Afghanistan
and Southeast Asia has a foundation in Soviet military
doctrine.(1) The Soviets have written extensively about
chemical warfare in a NATO-Warsaw Pact context and devote a
substantial amount of training to operating in contaminated-
-nuclear, biological, or chemical--environments. We have
long estimated, however, that the presence of nuclear cr
chemical weapons in the enemy arsenal could give the Soviets
pause in initiating chemical attacks. No such deterrent
exists with the irregular fcrces in Southeast Asia or
Afghanistan.
/has provided for the employment of chemical
munitions in a number of tactical situations--such as in
mountainous and heavily forested areas.
Soviet doctrine reportedly also has envisioned
the use of chemical agents in localized conflicts, such as
border wars. This local-war doctrine envisages the use,
initially, of harassing (irritant) agents, incapacitants
such as psychochemicals, and herbicides. During the decisive-
stage of a local war--and apparently even earlier under
certain circumstances--lethal agents also could be employed,
even if the enemy had not used them first. In addition to
supporting offensive military operations, CW in such a
conflict could be used to frustrate or spoil enemy efforts
to initiate an offensive.
In countries where chemical weapons have been employed
by the Soviets or their allies--Afghanistan, Laos,
Kampuchea, and, years ago, Yemen--they were used to
eliminate the resistance of stubborn, highly resilient
Irregular forces located in inaccessible mountainous or
jungle terrain. (b)(3);
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In addition to its direct military utility, the
Soviets--and more particularly their allies--appear to view
CW as a terror weapon, relying upon its psychological as
well as its physiological impact. Soviet allies have
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employed CW in an apparent effort to eliminate popular
support for insurgents�as well as to eradicate them. In
Southeast Asia, for instance, chemical agents frequently are
used to contaminate entire villages, including their food
and water supply. In addition, the medical symptoms produced
by the use of mycotoxins--"yellow rain"--are particularly
horrifying and guaranteed to instill fear in villagers who
observe them.
Tactical Advantages
The use of a variety of CW agents in a local war also
affords a number of tactical advantages. Irritants and �
incapacitants have been used to render an enemy, well hidden
in caves or dense forests, more accessible to conventional
weapons or to capture. For instance, according to
Soviet helicopter units in Afghanistan have used
chemical agents to dislodge insurgents from caves and then
have attacked them with conventional weapons. In addition,
claim lethal chemical agents have been used
to kill resistance fighters in hiding places which, due to
natural terrain and vegetation, are impervious to
conventional ordnance.
Chemical attacks frequently have been conducted in lieu
of costly ground sweeps in extremely difficult terrain. Such
attacks also can deny the insurgents entry into contaminated
areas and prevent their return home by poisoning food and
water supplies.
Testing and Evaluation
Operational testing and evaluation under various field
conditions is another important military rationale for the
use of chemical weapons. In our judgment, the Soviets may
have thought the United States gained valuable experience in
the use of chemicals during the Vietnam war. This, in part,
may have stimulated their own interest in conducting
overseas operational testing cf chemical agents. The wide
variety of medical symptoms reported in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan suggests that these countries now have become
test sites for a broad spectrum of Soviet irritant,
Incapacitating, and lethal chemical agents--both old and
new--as well as delivery vehicles.
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According to Afghan and H'mong refugees, Soviet and Lao
medical survey teams have entered contaminated areas after
attacks and conducted field examinations of living and dead
victims. In at least one case, an claims the
Soviets removed bodies for further study. Some field
examinations may have been conducted to assess levels of
toxic contamination before the entry of ground troops.
Military Effectiveness
Tie military results of the use of chemical weapons in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan have varied considerably. In
Laos, where aircraft spray poisonous substances on
unprotected villagers--routinely including women and
children--such use apparently has been quite effective.
Thousands of H'mong have been killed, injured, or forced to
seek refuge in Thailand. In Kampuchea, where the attacks in
large pact have been conducted by artillery in support of
ground troop operations against better protected guerrilla
fighters, the effectiveness has been substantially less.
In Afghanistan, where Soviet forces have at their
disposal a broad range Of mcdern weaponry, the use of lethal
and nonlethal chemical weapers seems to be much more limited
and selective than in Southeast Asia. In addition, the
effectiveness of such use has been even lower than in
Kampuclea. This may be because the mujanedin normally are
well hidden and have begun employing crude methods of
protecting themselves from inhaling gas vapors, and because
weather and geographic conditions are extremely difficult.
Political Calculations
In providing their Vietnamese and Laotian allies with a
chemical weapons capability and in undertaking some lethal
chemical operations in Afghanistan themselves, the Soviets
must have considered the possibility that they would be
accused of violating the relevant international accords,
even tnough the legal aspects of OW use are ambiguous (see
appendix). We doubt, however, that the Soviets believed
there would be significant risk of international discovery.
They probably anticipated that .documenting the use of
chemical weapons in the Third World would be difficult--the.
areas where they have been used are remote and the
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substances generally dissipate rapidly. In addition, Moscow
and its allies could try to thwart detection efforts--as
they have by making it difficult for UN observers to gain
access to Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos. Furthermore, the
Soviets probably initially dcubted that anyone would take an
interest in such obscure people as the H'mong or the
remnants of the stigmatized Fol Pot regime.
The continuing use of chemical weapons in Southeast
Asia and Afghanistan indicates that, So far, MOSCOW has
judged the international reaction to their use to be more an
irritant than a reason to change policy. The Soviets
probably thought that initial US charges of employment of
such weapons could be brushed away as part of US efforts to
discredit the USSR. They probably judged that propaganda on
such U3 actions as the use of chemical weapons in Vietnam
and the decision to undertake a binary OW program could be
used to counter the US charges. The failure of all but a few
close US allies to publicly endorse the US charges and the
initial UN investigation's equivocation on the issue
probably reinforced these judgments. The recent UN report
attesting to the existence of circumst3ntial evidence of CW
use may give Moscow more concern, however, because it is the
first good 1ndtcation that the US case is obtaining broader
acceptance.
Appendix
Legal Issues Associated With the Use of Chemical Agents and
Mycotokins
The 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use in war of
chemical (and bacteriological) weapons.(2) Although the USSR
ratified the treaty in 1928 and Vietnam did so in 1980,
Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea have not signed it. By its
own language, the Protocol only applies between signatory
parties. Many countries--including the USSR and Vietnam--
have made reservations reiterating that they are not bound
with respect to countries that did not sign the Protocol.
Therefore, the Protocol itself would not apply to Soviet or
Vietnamese use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan,
Kampuchea, or Laos. Neither the possession nor transfer of
chemical weapons, nor assistance to otner countries in their
acquisition, are violations of the Protocol in the absence
of involvement in the use of such weapons. The Protocol,
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however, has become international custom among civilized
nations. That custom, at least, would be "violated" by the
use of lethal chemical weapons or assistance in such use.
The US position is that the use of mycotoxins in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan clearly violates the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This agreement, to
which the USSR, Vietnam, Lacs, and Afghanistan are parties,
prohibits the development, production, stockpiling,
acquisition, and retention of biological agents or toxins.
It also bans weapons and equipment to deliver such
substances. Additionally, the convention prohibits the
transfer of such items "to any recipient whatsoever,
directly or indirectly," ard prohibits assistance to any
state in manufacturing or acquiring them.
The Soviets deny using mycotoxins but assert that these
substances--whether produced synthetically or by biological
organisms--are not living and hence are chemicals. They say
they snould be classified as chemical warfare agents. The US
position, however, is that all toxins, whether natural or
synthetic, are prohibited by the agreement.
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(1) As used in this paper, the term "chemical warfare"
includes the use of mycotoxins.
(2) The United States holds that the treaty covers only the
use of lethal weapons, not such substances as irritants and
herbicides.
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